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ABSTRACT
This study seeks to find an explanation for the two main problems associated with the 
Criminal Division of the Court of Appeal which are, its problems in identifying and 
correcting the wrongful convictions of the factually innocent, and its inconsistent, 
unpredictable and contradictory decision making. This study uses empirical data 
collected from the judgments of the Court to analyse the decision making process of the 
Court in relation to the powers given to it in the Criminal Appeal Act 1995. The data 
collected is used to analyse the Court’s powers in four main areas which are appeals 
where the appellant wishes to adduce fresh evidence, appeals where there is a ‘lurking 
doubt’, appeals where the appellant is arguing an error occurred either pre-trial or during 
the trial and the Court’s approach to the issue of ordering a retrial. The research 
conducted for this thesis is a replication study of previous research carried out for the 
Royal Commission on Criminal Justice which proposed reforms to the Court's powers 
and ultimately led to the Criminal Appeal Act 1995. The aim of the research is to analyse 
whether the Court uses an identifiable approach to its various powers, in order to find an 
explanation as to why the Court has proved so deficient at identifying and correcting the 
wrongful convictions of the factually innocent, and why its decision making is so 
inconsistent and unpredictable.
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CHAPTER ONE: INTRODUCTION
In his report, Access to Justice, Lord Woolf stated (1996, p. 153) that there are two main 
purposes of appeals. The first is the private one of doing justice in individual cases by 
correcting wrong decisions. The second is the public one of engendering public 
confidence in the administration of justice by correcting wrongs and in clarifying and 
developing the law. If this is an accurate assessment of the purposes of appeals, it 
would appear that since the Court of Criminal Appeal1 was created in 1907, the Criminal 
Division of the Court of Appeal has been criticised for being defective on both fronts. The 
two main criticisms of the Court have been its deficiencies in identifying and correcting 
miscarriages of justice and its inconsistent, unpredictable and contradictory decision 
making. Whilst these may appear to be separate issues they are in fact connected and 
this thesis will argue that these problems are an inevitable result of the Court’s decision 
making process and in particular, its function as a court of review. In short, the study has 
concluded that a court of rehearing would be much more effective at rectifying 
miscarriages of justice.
In order to define these problems in more detail, it is necessary to discuss the meaning 
of the term ‘miscarriage of justice’ to illustrate where the Court’s problems lie.
Defining ‘miscarriages of justice’
There have been a number of attempts to define a ‘miscarriage of justice.’ In a factual 
sense, a person is innocent if they did not commit the crime.2 Innocence in the legal 
sense and context is much more complex. There are a myriad of ways in which 
innocence could be defined.3 In the criminal justice system, a person may be considered 
wrongly convicted if there were procedural or legal errors upon which to found a 
successful appeal. But whilst this may qualify as wrongful conviction in the legal sense, it 
would generally not be understood as innocence outside the legal arena. There is a 
natural tension between the commonly held notions of ‘innocence’ (which is also usually 
utilised by the media) and the concept of ‘innocence’ or ‘wrongful conviction’ as it applies 
in the legal system. Whilst the public and media perception of terms such as ‘wrongful 
conviction’ and ‘miscarriage of justice’ may appear to relate more to actual innocence 
than procedural errors, the legal system has adopted much broader definitions to include 
both. This is illustrated by the speech of Lord Bingham in R (on the application of 
Mullen) v Secretary of State for the Home Department
1 The Court of Criminal Appeal became the Criminal Division of the Court of Appeal in the Criminal Appeal Act 
1966.
2 This person is considered to be ‘factually’ or 'actually' innocent.
3 For a discussion on definitions of innocence see Burnett (2002).
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The expression “wrongful conviction” is not a legal term of art and it has no 
settled meaning. Plainly the expression includes the conviction of those who 
are innocent of the crime of which they have been convicted. But in ordinary 
parlance the expression would, I think, be extended to those who, whether guilty 
or not, should clearly not have been convicted at their trials. It is impossible and 
unnecessary to identify the manifold reasons why a defendant may be convicted 
when he should not have been. It may be because the evidence against him 
was fabricated or perjured. It may be because flawed expert evidence was 
relied on to secure conviction. It may be because evidence helpful to the 
defence was concealed or withheld. It may be because the jury was the subject 
of malicious interference. It may be because of judicial unfairness or 
misdirection. In cases of this kind, it may, or more often may not, be possible to 
say that a defendant is innocent, but it is possible to say that he has been 
wrongly convicted. The common factor in such cases is that something has 
gone seriously wrong in the investigation of the offence or the conduct of the 
trial, resulting in the conviction of someone who should not have been 
convicted.’4
And similarly in relation to miscarriage of justice:
“‘Miscarriage of justice" is an expression which, although very familiar, is not a 
legal term of art and has no settled meaning. Like “wrongful conviction” it can be 
used to describe the conviction of the demonstrably innocent. But, again like 
“wrongful conviction”, it can be said and has been used to describe cases in 
which defendants, guilty or not, certainly should not have been convicted.’5
Lord Bingham's definitions are useful for understanding these terms in a broad sense, 
but there have been various arguments put forward which provide a more detailed 
analysis of what these terms may mean and the approaches to them.
Nobles and Schiff adopt a systems theory approach to defining miscarriages of justice, 
namely autopoiesis, utilising the work of Niklas Luhmann and Gunter Teubner (Nobles 
and Schiff, 1995). Within this theory, a legal definition of ‘wrongful conviction’ is the 
definition that would be legally understood by the system. Other (non-legal) systems 
may have other definitions that accord with their frames of reference. The application of 
autopoiesis to miscarriages of justice helps to explain why there may be different 
interpretations and possible tensions between the differing definitions of ‘wrongful 
conviction’ and ‘miscarriage of justice’. Nobles and Schiff consider that the media (and 
the general public) may interpret the term differently from how the legal system would 
define it, leading to understandable yet inexorable confusion of meaning (Nobles and 
Schiff, 1995, p. 299).6
Using autopoiesis systems theory, the Court of Appeal would apply the code of what is 
legal or illegal. Whilst it is a common perception amongst those outside the legal arena
4 R (on the application of Mullen) v Secretary of State for the Home Department [2005] 1 AC 1 at para. 4.
5 Ibid, at para 9.
6 See generally, Nobles and Schiff (2004) for an application of autopoiesis to the Sally Clark case.
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that it is the role of the Court of Appeal to declare people innocent, this is not allowed 
within its legally defined role.7 Instead, it is argued that the media and the Court of 
Appeal produce different communications about miscarriages of justice. The media 
would misread a quashed conviction as a declaration of innocence, and the Court of 
Appeal would reject a lay perception of factual innocence when constructing whether a 
conviction is unsafe.8 This may cause problems for defendants9 or the media10 who 
consider that the Court’s role is to free innocent people and offer an apology when 
quashing convictions. The public may also express concern and in some instances 
disgust in situations in which it views people ‘getting off on a technicality’ who may be 
guilty. The difference in frame of reference may also cause problems for the Court when 
it is considered slow to react or understand public pressure for reform when convictions 
of those the public consider to be innocent are not quashed, or not quashed quickly 
enough. A history of criminal appeals reveals that it is in these times of public pressure 
that the Court is reformed.
In defining a miscarriage of justice, Greer adopts a human rights approach. He accepts 
that the conviction of the factually innocent is one possible definition but suggests a 
number of other definitions. These are divided into two categories. The first category is 
‘the unjustified avoidance of conviction’ which includes alleged defects in the substantive 
criminal law; alleged defects in criminal procedure; decisions not to charge or prosecute 
or unjustified acquittals (deliberate external influence with the trial process or inherent 
bias on the part of tribunals). The second category is ‘unjustified convictions’ which 
includes criminal conduct which should be lawful; plea, charge and sentence bargaining; 
convictions obtained in special anti-terrorist criminal justice processes; or convictions 
stemming from impropriety or mistaken convictions (Greer, 1994, p.74).
Similarly to Greer, Walker argues that one possible definition of a ‘miscarriage of justice’ 
is one which reflects ‘an individualistic rights based approach.’ He suggests that a 
miscarriage occurs whenever suspects or defendants or convicts are treated by the 
State in breach of their rights, whether because of, first, deficient processes or, second, 
the laws which are applied to them or, third, because there is no factual justification for 
the applied treatment or punishment; fourth, whenever suspects or defendants or 
convicts are treated adversely by the state to a disproportionate extent in comparison 
with the need to protect the rights of others; fifth, whenever the rights of others are not
7 In R v A(D), Lord Bingham stated 'the Court is in no position to declare that the appellant is innocent...That 
is not the function of this court. Our function is to consider whether in the light of all the material before us this 
conviction is unsafe.’ [CA, unreported, transcript 14 March 2000].
8 The Court of Appeal's current test for quashing convictions which is discussed later in this chapter.
9 At a press conference after the Birmingham Six were freed, one of the six, William Power criticised the appeal 
system and stated: ‘It’s all about points of law. It had nothing to do with justice. The truth didn’t come out. 
Nobody was interested in the truth.’ The Times, 15 March 1991.
10 The judgment of Lord Lane, when freeing the Guildford Four, was criticised in a Sunday Times editorial in 
the following terms: ‘Not a single word of apology for their years of wrongful imprisonment were uttered. No 
declaration of innocence was made for the record.’ 17 March 1991.
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effectively or proportionately protected or vindicated by State action against wrongdoers 
or, sixth, by State law itself (Walker, 1999, p. 33). Walker states that those who are 
wrongly convicted because they are factually innocent would fall into the third category 
but there should be a qualification on this, namely that the system should be allowed 
some time to correct itself, whether through acquittal or the payment of damages. 
Consequently, the notion of ‘miscarriage’ involves a completion of a process (in failure) 
and not simply a mistake. Therefore, using this argument, the term ‘miscarriage of 
justice’ would only be used to describe those cases that have been through the appeal 
process and failed and are sent back to the Court and then overturned.
Naughton divides miscarriages of justice into the ‘exceptional,’ the ‘routine,’ and the 
‘mundane.’ He states that criminal justice reform typically focuses on exceptional cases 
which are those cases that are referred back to the Court of Appeal after the initial 
appeal has failed. He defines ‘routine’ miscarriages of justice as those which are 
quashed by the Court of Appeal on the first appeal and ‘mundane’ miscarriages as those 
which are quashed by the Crown Court after appeal from the Magistrates Court on the 
first appeal. He argues that the consequences of focusing on the ‘exceptional’ cases are 
that the true scale of miscarriages of justice may be overlooked and an extensive range 
of harmful consequences (zemiological harms) that accompany routine and mundane 
miscarriages of justice may also be overlooked (Naughton 2007). If we use Walker’s 
argument, Naughton’s ‘routine’ and ‘mundane’ appeals would not be classed as 
miscarriages of justice as this term would only apply to Naughton’s ‘exceptional’ cases. 
This potentially explains why criminal justice reform typically focuses on those 
‘exceptional’ cases. Even within academic legal discourse there is a divergence of 
opinion on an appropriate definition.
Naughton is correct in that ‘miscarriage of justice discourse’ does typically focus on the 
cases he deems ‘exceptional.’ These are cases where the appeal process has 
previously failed and the appellant has been forced to locate some new evidence or 
argument in order to be referred back to the Court of Appeal.11 These appellants are 
more likely to be accepted by the media and the public to be factually innocent of the 
crime. Their cases tend to have more resonance than someone who may have 
succeeded at the first appeal on the basis of a procedural irregularity as the media and 
public may consider this appellant to be ‘getting off on a technicality.’ The perceived 
failings of the appeal process to rectify miscarriages otf justice means that appellants are 
often forced to go back to the appeal court a number of times before they are successful 
which is what makes these cases ‘exceptional.’ In that sense they are ‘true’ miscarriages
11 This procedure was previously the Home Secretary’s reference uinder section 17 of the Criminal Appeal Act 
1968 but is now undertaken by the Criminal Cases Review Commiission. This procedure is dicussed in more 
detail in chapter three.
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of justice, using Walker’s analogy above, as every part of the criminal justice system has 
failed including the appellate process.
This thesis seeks to find an explanation for why these ‘exceptional’ appeals are 
exceptional. These appeals are illustrative of the problems of the appellate procedure 
and it is important to note that as Savage et al state:
‘ the appeals procedures have only a partial role in the ‘governance’ of
miscarriages of justice. To begin with they only operate in relation to 
miscarriages of justice based on questionable conviction and have no role in 
relation to that other sector of miscarriages of justice based on what we shall 
call ‘questionable actions’, such as inadequate police investigations, decisions 
not to prosecute and so on. The latter are as important ‘drivers’ of criminal 
justice reform as questionable convictions. Furthermore, as the case of the 
‘Birmingham Six’ made all too clear, the appeals procedures themselves can be
instrumental in allowing miscarriages of justice to take place they can be as
much a part of the ‘problem’ as a ‘solution’ to miscarriages of justice’ (Savage et 
al, 2007, p. 84).
This study examines why appeal procedures, namely appeals against conviction in the 
Court of Appeal, can be instrumental in allowing miscarriages of justice to take place 
and why they can be as much a part of the problem as a solution.
The Court’s deficiencies in identifying and correcting miscarriages of justice and its 
inconsistent and unpredictable decision making have been well documented over the 
years. In order to illustrate and explain some of these inconsistencies it is necessary to 
outline why the Court was created in the first place, which was primarily to provide a 
tribunal for reviewing the findings of the jury. The years between 1844 and 1906 had 
seen the publication of several official reports stating the need for reform which had 
highlighted the inconsistencies and deficiencies in the state of the law, often in response 
to particular cases of alleged miscarriages of justice and the publicity that had 
surrounded them. A major contradiction at this time was the discrepancy between the 
availability of appeal in civil cases but not in criminal cases12 and the first bill to reform 
the criminal appeal system had been introduced with the object of assimilating civil and 
criminal appeals.
It is now well documented13 that it took approximately 31 bills14 over sixty years before 
the Court of Criminal Appeal was created and the main protagonists against reform in
12 See for example the views of the Commissioners on Criminal Law in their Eighth Report in 1845, p.20: ‘...it 
cannot be denied that a failure of justice in a criminal case, where it may concern not only property, liberty, but 
even life itself, is of much more serious importance than in civil cases, where a mere question of property is 
concerned.’
13 See Pattenden (1996); Nobles and Schiff, (2000).
14 This is an approximate figure because different sources suggest different numbers of bills but this is the 
figure listed in the Return of Criminal Appeal Bills (1906) H.L. 201.
13
the nineteenth century proved to be the judges. Various reports from the period15 reveal 
that the judges were not opposed to a criminal appeal system as such, as the judiciary 
did not object to their decisions being reviewed in relation to sentences or questions of 
law, but were clearly very hostile to an appeal system based on errors of fact. The 
reasons given by the judges were to resonate through the history of criminal appeals 
and can be summed up as follows: they did not believe that innocent people were 
convicted;16 they felt that it would lessen the responsibility felt by jurors who would be 
less reluctant to convict on doubtful evidence if they knew the decision could be 
appealed;17 they felt a right of appeal would lessen the deterrent effect of the criminal 
law;18 and they felt that there were insufficient numbers of judges to handle the 
anticipated volume of appeals.19 Thus, the development of a court of criminal appeal 
was stifled by the judiciary on public policy grounds, at odds with the public policy 
concerns expressed in the official reports of the time.
An inevitable consequence of the lack of appeal remedies in the nineteenth century was 
reliance on the prerogative of mercy as a means of putting right injustice. The Home 
Secretary had the option of granting a free pardon which amounted to a declaration of 
innocence and it was felt by most members of Parliament that justice was being done by 
an ‘appeal’ to the Home Secretary so a court of criminal appeal was not needed. 
However, there was much criticism of the procedure adopted by the Home Secretary, 
and the inadequacies of the Home Office as a mechanism for reviewing convictions 
were highlighted by the case of Adolf Beck who had been convicted twice for defrauding 
women when he was mistaken for the real culprit. The Home Office had rejected sixteen 
attempts by Beck to have his conviction reviewed and the controversy surrounding this 
case, and a number of other convictions,20 persuaded some politicians that a criminal 
appeal on matters of fact was urgently needed. Retrial by newspaper had become so 
prevalent that public confidence in the courts was being undermined and the 
government responded to mounting pressure with the creation of the Court of Criminal 
Appeal in the Criminal Appeal Act 1907.
From the Court’s creation and up until the 1950s there was a general consensus that the 
Court was working well with one of the most immediate benefits of the Court’s 
establishment being a noticeable improvement in the standards of the trial courts
15 The views of the judges can be ascertained from the evidence given in the following reports: Commissioners 
on Criminal Law (1836), Second Report on the Criminal Law, cmnd. 343. (London:HMSO); Commissioners on 
Criminal Law (1845), Eighth Report on the Criminal Law, Pari. Pap., vol. xiv, 161; House of Lords Select 
Committee (1848), Report of the Select Committee of the House of Lords on the Administration of the Criminal 
Law, cmnd. 523 (London:HMSO); Royal Commission on the Law Relating to Indictable Offences (1879),
Report of the Royal Commission on the Law Relating to Indictable Offences, cmnd. 2345. (London:HMSO).
16 See Select Committee Report (Baron Parke, p.4; Lord Denman CJ, p.44; Lord Brougham, p.49).
17 ibid (Lord Denman CJ, p.45; Lord Brougham, p.49).
18 ibid (Baron Parke, p.8; Lord Brougham, p.49).
19 ibid (Baron Parke, p.5; Baron Alderson, p.10; Lord Brougham, p.8).
20 See Pattenden, 1996, n. 215 on p. 30 for other examples.
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(Pattenden, 1996, p. 58; JUSTICE Committee, 1964, [para. 13; Seaborne Davies, 1951, 
p. 427; Knight, 1970, p.1). As Malleson has argued (11996, p.128), a possible reason for 
the lack of criticism expressed during these first fifty years is ‘appeal fatigue’ which had 
been caused by the effort of finally establishing the Court. The very existence of the 
Court represented such an improvement on the previous situation that there was not the 
impetus to tackle the areas in which the Court was felt to be inadequate. Another 
possible factor for the lack of criticism is the absence of a perceived crisis, as during this 
period there was a distinct lack of any high profile imiscarriages of justice. However, 
once the novelty of having a Court of Criminal Appeal began to wear off, the Court’s 
practices began to be viewed more critically.
The main difficulties associated with the Court have stemmed from its function in 
deciding appeals on factual grounds where, at its moist simplistic level, the appellant is 
arguing the jury made a mistake and he or she was wirongly convicted. A major difficulty 
is identifying the source of the problem as it is not cleiar whether it is the legislation that 
has caused the problems or whether the probleims are caused by the Court’s 
interpretation of the legislation. The general consensus is that it is the latter with the 
Court adopting a restrictive approach to its role of correcting miscarriages of justice 
(Pattenden, 1996, p. 77; Nobles and Schiff, 2000„ p. 83; Malleson, 1994, p. 163; 
Thomas, 1966, p. 42; Justice, 1964, p. 22; RCCJ, 11993, ch. 10, para.3; Justice 1989, 
para. 4.21; Friedland, 1969, p. 234; Williams, 1963, p. 330; Samuels, 1984, p. 337; 
Knight, 1970, p. 1; Woffenden, 1987, p. 323; Spencer, 1982, p. 264). This, in turn, has 
led to its inconsistent and unpredictable decision making. Two main interlinked reasons 
have been suggested as to why this has occurred, which are that the Court has shown 
undue reverence to the jury verdict and shown undue reverence to the principle of 
finality. There is also a third reason which is the problem of resources
Although these two main interlinked reasons hiave been deemed responsible for the 
Court’s problematic approach to errors of fact, the Court has also been criticised for its 
approach to procedural irregularity appeals. The cases Naughton deems ‘exceptional’ 
only reach that status when they have been through the appeal process and failed and 
have to be referred back to the Court for a second try. Therefore, the ‘exceptional’ 
appellant will previously have had an appeal fail. This is important as the appellant’s 
first appeal tends to be based on a procedural irregularity. The reasons for this are 
obvious in that there is a 28 day time limit on whiich to appeal after conviction. This really 
only leaves time for the pre-trial and trial process to be reviewed for error, as locating 
new evidence is more problematic in that time frame. This study examines why these 
first appeals may be unsuccessful, necessitating] a return to the Court a number of times 
before the appeal is successful. These difficulties apply to not only the factually innocent 
appellant but may also apply to the factually guiilty appellant. Whilst the factually guilty
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appellant may not have the same resonance with the media and the public as the 
factually innocent one, both have been deserving of overturned convictions according to 
legal system discourse.
The Criminal Division of the Court of Appeal represents a very small fraction of the work 
of the criminal courts in England and Wales and as such is an often neglected area in 
terms of law reform and empirical research. Although much has been written about 
criminal appeals since the Court was created, only a very small amount has actually 
been based on empirical evidence. There have only been four major studies conducted 
using the judgments of the Court, with the first three using only the reported judgments 
(Ross 1911, Seaborne-Davies 1949, Knight 1970 and Malleson 1993). The last study 
was conducted over fifteen years ago by Kate Malleson for the Royal Commission on 
Criminal Justice (hereinafter RCCJ) prior to the enactment of the Criminal Appeal Act 
1995. Recent empirical research is required in order to determine what the current 
practice of the Court is and to determine whether the Criminal Appeal Act 1995 has had 
any effect on the working practices of the Court. The empirical research I have 
conducted on the judgments of the Court forms the basis of this study. The methodology 
used to conduct the research is outlined in chapter two. In order to illustrate why 
empirical research is required, it is necessary to outline the various powers the Court of 
Appeal has been given and the background to the Criminal Appeal Act (CAA) 1995.
Powers of the Court of Appeal
The statutory powers the Court has been given have been fairly wide. These powers will 
be analysed in detail during the course of this thesis but for the purposes of this chapter 
it is necessary to outline the powers prior to the CAA 1995 briefly in order to see how the 
powers have changed. This provides an insight into what the changes were in the CAA 
1995 and the reasons for those changes.
In the CAA 1907, section four authorised the Court to allow the appeal:
‘if they think that the verdict of the jury should be set aside on the ground that it 
is unreasonable or cannot be supported having regard to the evidence or that 
the judgment of the Court before whom the appellant was convicted should be 
set aside on the ground of a wrong decision of any question of law or that on 
any ground there was a miscarriage of justice.’
There was also a proviso to this section which allowed the Court to dismiss the appeal if 
they considered that no miscarriage of justice had actually occurred.21 Under section 
nine of the CAA 1907, the Court had wide powers to adduce fresh evidence and could
21 ‘Provided that the Court may, notwithstanding that they are of the opinion that the point raised in the appeal 
might be decided in favour of the appellant, dismiss the appeal if they consider that no substantial miscarriage 
of justice has actually occurred.'
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order the production of documents, exhibits or any other thing connected with the 
proceedings ‘if they think it necessary in the interests of justice.’
Under the CAA 1968, the Court of Appeal had the following power to quash a conviction:
S.2(1) Except as provided by this Act, the Court of Appeal shall allow an appeal 
against conviction if they think--
(a) that the [conviction] should be set aside on the ground that under all the 
circumstances of the case it is unsafe or unsatisfactory; or
(b) that the judgment of the court of trial should be set aside on the ground of a 
wrong decision of any question of law; or
(c) that there was a material irregularity in the course of the trial, 
and in any other case shall dismiss the appeal.
The proviso still applied to this section but the word ‘substantial’ had been deleted. 
Section 23 gave the Court a discretionary power to admit fresh evidence and a duty to 
admit it if likely to be credible, admissible at the trial on an issue which was the subject 
of the appeal and if there was a reasonable explanation for the failure to adduce it at the 
original trial.
The Court interpreted its new ‘unsafe and unsatisfactory’ ground in R v Cooper23 where 
Lord Widgery CJ created the ‘lurking doubt’ ground of appeal. He stated
‘....in cases of this kind the Court must ask itself a subjective question, whether 
we are content to let the matter stand as it is, or whether there is not some 
lurking doubt in our minds which makes us wonder whether an injustice has 
been done. This is a reaction which may not be based strictly on the evidence 
as such; it is a reaction which can be produced by the general feel of the case 
as the Court experiences it.’
The Court also has the power to order a retrial which was initially given in fresh evidence 
cases only24 but is now a general power25 and can be ordered only after the Court has 
quashed the conviction.26 The Court also has the power to substitute an alternative 
offence under section 3 of the CAA 1968 as amended by section 316 of the Criminal 
Justice Act (CJA) 2003. Section 3 applies where the appellant has pleaded not guilty 
and a new section 3A inserted by the CJA applies where the appellant has pleaded 
guilty. The Court also has a further power under section 6 of the CAA 1968 to substitute 
a verdict of not guilty by reason of insanity on the advice of two or more registered 
practitioners.
22 The original provision in the CAA 1968 stated that the ‘verdict of the jury should be set aside' but this was 
changed to ‘conviction’ by section 44 of the Criminal Law Act 1977 to allow the Court to quash a conviction 
where the appellant had pled guilty at trial.
23 (1969) 53 Cr. App. R. 82.
24 Section 1(1) Criminal Appeal Act 1964.
25 Section 43 Criminal Justice Act 1988.
26 Section 7(1) Criminal Appeal Act 1968.
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The current test for quashing convictions is in the CAA 1995 which amended the Court’s 
powers in the CAA 1968. The Court’s amended powers will be discussed after the 
background to the CAA 1995 has been outlined.
Background to the Criminal Appeal Act 1995
The catalysts for changing the Court’s powers in 1995 proved to be the cases of the 
Guildford Four and the Birmingham Six. The Guildford Four had been convicted in 1975 
of five murders resulting from the Guildford and Woolwich pub bombings. They had 
appealed in 1977 when convicted IRA terrorists admitted to carrying out the bombings. 
That appeal failed but as a result of intense public pressure during the 1980s, the Home 
Secretary referred their case back to the Court of Appeal in 1989 and the convictions 
were quashed when the Director of Public Prosecutions stated that the Crown no longer 
sought to maintain them. This was because new evidence had come to light which 
showed that their confessions to the crimes had been fabricated. The Birmingham Six 
were also convicted in 1975 but of the Birmingham pub bombings. They had also 
confessed to the crimes but there was also forensic evidence that they had handled 
explosives. They appealed in 1976 but the appeal was dismissed and their case was 
referred to the Court of Appeal in 1988 which also failed. As a result of pressure, which 
had intensified after the release of the Guildford Four, the case was referred again by 
David Waddington, the then Home Secretary, as new evidence had emerged that the 
police statements had been tampered with and also the forensic evidence had been 
discredited. Once again the Director of Public Prosecutions stated that the Crown no 
longer sought to maintain the convictions however the Court then decided it would 
decide the issue for itself and after a full appeal hearing, the convictions were 
quashed.27
The RCCJ was set up on the day the Birmingham Six were freed with the aim of 
proposing reforms to the appeal process which would restore public confidence in the 
ability of the criminal justice system to identify and correct miscarriages of justice. But 
although the RCCJ was set up as a direct response to the perceived crisis in the appeal 
process, the terms of reference did not just relate to the appeal and post appeal process 
but included the whole criminal justice system. Initially the terms of reference with regard 
to the appeal process were very narrow and were just ‘the role of the Court of Appeal in 
considering new evidence on appeal, including directing the investigation of allegations’ 
(RCCJ, 1993, Ch. 10). However, the Commission extended this view to consider all of 
the Court’s powers and practices, stating that it had not confined itself to the issues set 
out in the terms of reference since they could not be readily separated from the role of 
the Court of Appeal in hearing appeals against conviction in general (RCCJ, 1993, Ch. 
10).
27 For details of the cases, see Woffenden (1987).
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The RCCJ discussed the test the Court had been given in section 2(1) of the CAA 1968. 
They stated that much of the difficulty in deciding which ground the Court of Appeal was 
applying under section 2(1) seemed to be due to the confusing way the section was 
drafted and the Court seldom seemed to distinguish between ‘unsafe’ and 
‘unsatisfactory.’ The Commission doubted whether there was any real difference 
between the two. They stated that either of the grounds set out in paragraphs (b) and (c) 
-  the error of law or a material irregularity during the course of the trial, may cause the 
Court to think that the original conviction was unsafe and unsatisfactory. Thus there was 
an overlap between the three grounds of appeal (ch. 10, para. 29).
The RCCJ also stated that there was potential confusion as to the scope of the proviso. 
They stated that its use may be appropriate where there was a material irregularity 
during the course of the trial but the wording seemed difficult to reconcile with the unsafe 
and unsatisfactory ground or the wrong decision on a question of law ground. They 
stated that it seemed from the decided cases that the court did consider whether the 
unsatisfactory nature of a conviction under either of those two grounds is nevertheless 
outweighed by the consideration that no miscarriage of justice appears to have occurred 
(ch. 10, para.30).
The majority of the RCCJ recommended that the grounds should be redrafted to a single 
ground of appeal. This single ground was whether a conviction ‘is or may be unsafe.’ 
Where the court is satisfied that the conviction is unsafe it should allow the appeal, but 
were the court to feel it may be unsafe then it should quash the conviction but order a 
retrial unless a retrial was not possible. The majority saw no need for the proviso 
because if the court was not convinced the conviction ‘is or may be unsafe’ it simply 
dismisses the appeal (ch. 10, para. 32). The RCCJ, therefore, recommended the proviso 
be abolished.
In response to the RCCJ, the Government issued a consultation paper in 1994 (Home 
Office, 1994). The paper stated that in considering reforming the Court of Appeal, the 
Government had three policy objectives which were, firstly, convictions which could not 
be considered safe should be quashed leaving those which are safe to stand; secondly, 
there must be arrangements to ensure that doubts about the safety of the conviction 
could be considered and resolved at the earliest opportunity as ‘it would be a mark of 
failure in the system of criminal justice if a substantial number of cases needed to be 
considered by the courts on more than one occasion’; thirdly, to ensure consistency of 
approach in criminal proceedings so that the final decision on whether or not a 
conviction should stand is in all cases taken by the courts (para.4). The Government felt
19
that the RCCJ’s recommendations would provide a ‘sound basis for change which will 
ensure that these objectives are achieved.’
The overall response by the Government to the proposals for the Court of Appeal was:
The Government is inclined to support the Royal Commission’s general 
prescription for reform of the Court of Appeal, which it believes reflects to a large 
extent the Court’s own developing response to unsafe in recent years’ (para. 18).
The Criminal Appeal Bill was introduced into the Commons by the then Home Secretary, 
Michael Howard. On the subject of the amendments to the grounds of appeal, he stated:
The present formula involves three overlapping grounds and is widely felt to 
cause confusion. Under the Bill, the Court of Appeal will allow any appeal where 
it considers the conviction unsafe and will dismiss it in any other case. That 
simple test clarifies the terms of the existing law. In substance, it restates the 
existing practice of the Court of Appeal and I am pleased to note that the Lord 
Chief Justice has already welcomed it.’28
This declaration that the Bill was simply restating the existing practice of the Court was 
because in the early 1990s it was felt that the Court of Appeal was adopting a liberal 
approach to quashing convictions evidenced by the Guildford Four and Birmingham 
Six's successful appeals. The Court also appeared to be more willing to order retrials, 
which was taken to be part of the Court’s so-called liberal phase. So as Nobles and 
Schiff note ‘the problem facing Parliament was to devise a form of words which ensured 
that the Court would continue to do what it was (apparently) already doing’ (Nobles and 
Schiff, 2000, p. 86).
The Bill was generally well received in the Commons. There was agreement that there 
had been a change of attitude by the Court of Appeal during the early 1990s. Although 
the provisions in the 1995 Bill were the result of recommendations by the RCCJ, the 
Government had not adopted the full test for quashing convictions as set out in the 
RCCJ report. The Government had rejected the words ‘is or may be unsafe,’ preferring 
the test to be simply ‘is unsafe.’ There was some disquiet over this and during the 
Standing Committee stage of the Bill in the Commons, there was an amendment to the 
Bill to insert the words ‘is or may be unsafe’ to give legislative effect to the RCCJ’s 
recommendation.29 The reason for not implementing the full recommendation of the 
RCCJ was given by David Maclean, Minister of State for the Home Office, as ‘the Royal 
Commission’s formula goes wider than the current practice of the Court of Appeal and
28 H.C. Debs, 6 March 1995, col. 24. Similarly the Minister of State for the Home Department, David Maclean, 
had stated ‘the Lord Chief Justice and members of the senior judiciary have given the test a great deal of 
thought, and they believe that the new test restates the existing practice of the Court of Appeal.’ Ibid, col. 110.
29 HC Debs, Standing Committee B, Criminal Appeal Bill, 21 March 1995, col. 8.
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was, on examination, found to be uncertain in its effect.’ Though, he was keen to point 
out that ‘I can assure the House that it does not narrow the grounds for allowing an 
appeal.’30
During the second reading in the Lords, the Lord Chief Justice, Lord Taylor, who had 
been largely credited with bringing about a change of attitude in the Court of Appeal at 
that time, gave his support for the Bill and stated that ‘in doing so I speak not only for 
myself but with the concurrence of a group of senior judges with great experience both 
in the practice of criminal law and in the Criminal Division of the Court of Appeal whom I 
consulted on both the policy of the Bill and its detailed provisions.’31 On the subject of 
the new test for quashing convictions he stated:
The new test will, in my view, be concise, just and comprehensible to the 
ordinary citizen without narrowing the present grounds of appeal. It will assist 
the Court of Appeal and those who appear before it. And it will help appellants to 
understand more readily what is at stake and the reason for the court’s
decision there is no merit in including in the test the words ‘is or may be
unsafe’ since the implication of doubt is already inherent in the word ‘unsafe.’ A 
conviction which may be unsafe, is unsafe.’ 32
The Criminal Appeal Bill received royal assent on 19 July 1995, and the sections of the 
Act dealing with the Court of Appeal came into force on 1 January 1996. The new 
statutory test for quashing convictions was set out in section 2 of the Act which stated 
that the Court of Appeal (a) shall allow an appeal against conviction if they think that the 
conviction is unsafe; and (b) shall dismiss such an appeal in any other case. The proviso 
was now repealed as it was considered not necessary under the amended test.
Research conducted for this thesis
There have been suggestions from the academic literature that the test introduced by 
the CAA 1995 may have resulted in the Court adopting a more restrictive approach than 
the RCCJ envisaged.33 Therefore, empirical research may shed light on whether 
amending the Court’s power to quash convictions had any effect on the decision making 
process of the Court. The paradox in conducting research on this issue is that, as 
indicated above, during the debates on the Criminal Appeal Bill there was a recurrent 
theme that the new test was simply to restate the existing practice of the Court of 
Appeal. But there was obviously potential for the new test to bring about some change 
as the object of the RCCJ’s recommendations had been to restore public confidence in 
the criminal justice system. Whilst it is very difficult to prove whether public confidence
30 Ibid, cols. 109-10.
31 Ibid, col. 311.
32 Id.
33 See, for example, Wadham and Missen (1995); Nobles and Schiff (1996); Smith (1995a) and (1995b).
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was restored, it is possible to conduct research in order to gain an indication of whether 
the new test encapsulated or changed the Court’s approach to its task.
As well as conducting research on the ‘unsafe’ test, empirical research is also required 
in order to examine the Court’s approach to fresh evidence appeals as the powers of the 
Court were also amended in the CAA 1995 in this area. Under section 23(1) of the CAA 
1968, the Court had a general discretion to admit fresh evidence ‘if they think it 
necessary or expedient in the interests of justice.’ In addition section 23(2) set out a duty 
to admit evidence if certain criteria of credibility, relevance, and an adequate explanation 
for not adducing it at the original trial were fulfilled. Little research has been undertaken 
to consider fresh evidence appeals, their use and operation. However, the Court has 
often been criticised for taking a restrictive approach to fresh evidence appeals and this 
was discussed by the RCCJ.34 It had been suggested to the RCCJ that the test in 
section 23(2) that the evidence had to be ‘likely to be credible’ was too high a test and 
they recommended that the test should be changed to ‘capable of belief as they 
suggested this would ‘be a slightly wider formula giving the court greater scope for doing 
justice’ (ch. 10, para. 60).
This intention behind the amendment to section 23 CAA 1968 by the RCCJ to widen the 
basis upon which fresh evidence would be admitted by the Court of Appeal seemed to 
be accepted by the Government. In introducing this part of the Criminal Appeal Bill into 
Parliament, the then Home Secretary stated that ‘the Bill also lowers the threshold for 
the admission of fresh evidence along the lines recommended by the Royal 
Commission.’35 However, when amendments to section 23 were introduced in the House 
of Lords, Baroness Blatch, stated that:
‘We intend that these amendments should not in any way narrow the scope 
of the receipt of fresh evidence by the Court of Appeal. We have consulted 
the Lord Chief Justice about this and we are satisfied that the amendments 
would not alter the current practice of the court.’36
Therefore, the confusing picture that emerged during the debates on the Criminal 
Appeal Bill 1995 was that the RCCJ made recommendations with the hope of liberalising 
the Court’s approach to fresh evidence appeals. The Home Secretary seemed to accept 
that the Court’s approach should be liberalised and adopted the RCCJ’s 
recommendations accordingly. But Baroness Blatch seems to be saying that the 
amendments in the Bill were not intended to alter the then current practice of the Court. 
This presents a confusing picture as to what the intentions were in the Government
34 The reasons for the Court’s restrictive approach to fresh evidence appeals are discussed in more detail in 
chapters three and five.
35Hansard, H.C. Vol 256, Col 25, 6 March 1995.
36 Hansard, H.L. Vol. 565, Col 567, 26 June 1995.
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making the changes to the law regarding fresh evidence in the CAA 1995.
The amendments to the fresh evidence provisions were in section four of the CAA 1995 
which amended the provisions in section 23 of the CAA 1968. The amendments to 
section 23 were that the duty to admit new evidence was abolished, but the power to 
admit new evidence is made subject to a duty to consider the same factors as limited the 
former duty: credibility, relevance to the safety of the conviction, admissibility at trial and 
the reasonableness of the explanation for the failure to adduce the evidence at trial. 
Following the recommendation of the RCCJ, the requirement that new evidence be 
‘likely to be credible’ has now become ‘capable of belief.’ As under the previous 
legislation, the Court’s power to receive evidence is unfettered, provided it considers it 
necessary or expedient in the interests of justice to do so regardless of the above 
factors. The Court’s rarely used power to rehear the evidence presented at the trial was 
also abolished.37 This was criticised by Pattenden who stated ‘this can only increase the 
difficulty for the Criminal Division of the Court of Appeal of deciding whether a conviction 
is unsafe because of jury error’ (Pattenden, 1996, p. 415).
There had been arguments that the ‘capable of belief amendment was merely a 
cosmetic change. For example, Darbishire points out (1996, p. 487) that under the old 
legislation ‘credible’ was held to mean ‘well capable of belief’38 and therefore the former 
test was ‘likely to be well capable of belief.’ This is replaced by the words ‘capable of 
belief and Smith argues (1995a) ‘how can likely to be capable of belief be a higher test 
than is capable of belief? It seems to be the other way round.’ He stated (1995a, p. 928) 
that to lower the threshold, the section should have provided ‘may possibly be capable 
of belief (or credible).’ Smith went on to say (1995c, p. 573) that section 23 is concerned 
with the consideration of evidence which has not yet been heard. Therefore, it makes 
sense to ask the court to consider whether the unheard evidence is ‘likely to be credible;’ 
but ‘how can the court determine whether the evidence ‘is credible’ (or capable of belief) 
before they have heard it?’ In his opinion ‘the recommendation, and section four seem to 
be misconceived.’
Empirical research is needed in this area to determine whether the amendments to the 
fresh evidence provisions have brought about any changes to the Court’s approach to 
these appeals. This study will use the judgments of the Court to determine whether there 
have been any changes and if so, whether those changes can be attributed to the CAA 
1995.
37 Section 4(1 )(a) CAA 1995.
38 In the case of R v Beresford [1972] 56 Cr. App. R. 143.
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Summary
Although the Court of Criminal Appeal was originally created after a series of 
miscarriages of justice, the main criticism of the Court has been that it has never fulfilled 
the function intended for it as it has proved to be deficient at identifying and correcting 
miscarriages of justice. It has also proved to be inconsistent, unpredictable and 
contradictory. This thesis seeks to find an explanation for these problems and uses 
empirical research to analyse the Court’s decision making process in relation to its 
powers. The empirical research is used to evaluate the amendments to the Court’s 
powers in the CAA 1995 in relation to ‘unsafe’ and fresh evidence and to analyse 
whether those amendments brought about any changes to the Court’s practices or 
whether it did merely ‘restate the existing practices of the Court of Appeal.’ It will also 
analyse the Court’s retrial power. This thesis will argue that the Court’s failures are an 
inevitable result of the decision making process of the Court, and in particular, its 
creation and function as a court of review.
In chapter two, the methodology used to conduct the thesis will be outlined.
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CHAPTER TWO: METHODOLOGY
This study seeks to use empirical methods to examine the working practices of the 
criminal division of the Court of Appeal. This study has many of the features that some 
term a replication study, in that it employs an identical method to that undertaken by 
Kate Malleson for the research she conducted for the RCCJ (Malleson, 1993).39 
Replication studies are used predominantly in the natural sciences, although use is 
made of them in the social science arena including in psychological and criminological 
studies.40 I have replicated this study with the aim of comparing and contrasting the 
findings of the two studies to provide an insight into whether there have been any 
changes to the Court’s practices. This may provide an indication of whether the CAA 
1995 has made any difference to the Court’s approach.
Replication, Verification, Change over Time and Originality
It is legitimate to ask: why replicate a previous study’s method? Does this not lead to 
concerns about originality? Replication studies have some clear benefits over new 
method studies. Firstly, replication studies permit comparison between the findings of a 
previous study, and findings with the current study to assist with an examination of 
change over time. There is always a suspicion that if a new researcher seeks to answer 
an identical research question, using a different method from the original, then the 
combination of new researcher and new method may influence the findings to such an 
extent that any apparent similarities and differences in the findings from the two studies 
may be dismissed as a function of researcher and method rather than true research 
findings of change. Triangulation of research findings through the use of different 
research methods, is an important tool in seeking to confirm previous findings. But, in a 
situation where a researcher is seeking to look at change over time, it is important to 
control for as many intervening influences as possible. Consequently, in this study which 
seeks to compare the situation in 1990 with the situation as at 2002 replication was 
considered essential.
Secondly, there are concerns that social scientists have tended to see studies in 
isolation rather than to build on previous studies to consider change, although there is 
evidence to suggest that replication studies are gaining ground.41 Interestingly, 
replication is a working method that most legal professionals, and particularly judges, 
would consider to be their modus operandi. Judges and other legal professionals 
regularly compare previous cases with current cases and employing a similar method to
39 Professor Kate Malleson has acted as my supervisor for this thesis.
40 For a discussion of the use of replication studies in criminology, see for example Hochstelter, A., DeLisis, M. 
& Puhrmann, A. (2007).
41 For a consideration of authenticity and replication see Davies, G., Lloyd-Bostock, S., McCurran, M. & Wilson, 
C. (1996).
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seek to develop legal knowledge and promote consistency of findings, as well as do 
justice.
There has been some dispute about the method used in these studies in terms of what 
needs to be replicated in order for it to be a replication study. This debate centres on 
whether there is a requirement for the use of the exact same data or the exact same 
method of analysis. There has also been some dispute as to the terminology used, 
particularly focusing on the differences, if any, between what may be a replication study 
and what may be a verification study. For the purposes of this thesis it is necessary to 
outline these debates in order to have a better understanding about the method chosen 
and the authenticity of the data collected.
King (1995) has argued that
‘the most common and scientifically productive method of building on existing 
research is to replicate an existing finding -  to follow the precise path taken by a 
previous researcher, and then improve on the data or methodology in one way
or another Reproducing and then extending high-quality existing research is
also an extremely useful pedagogical tool’ (King, 1995, p. 445).
King claims that replication involves the identical method but not the identical data. He 
argues that there should be a ‘replication standard’ whereby ‘sufficient information exists 
with which to understand, evaluate and build upon a prior work if a third party could 
replicate the results without any additional information from the author’ (p. 444). In other 
words, he argues that the same method be used, rather than the same dataset.
King’s definition is contested. Some argue that King is describing ‘replication’, whereas 
others argue that King is describing ‘verification’ rather than replication. Both Herrnson 
(1995) and Aberbach and Rockman (1995) consider that if you use the same method 
but generate new data then that is verification rather than replication. Herrnson argues 
that King ‘misstates the meaning of replication’ and that ‘replication is not the same 
meaning as reanalysis, verification or secondary analysis’ (1995, p. 452). He argues that 
the four terms have very different meanings:
‘A reanalysis studies the same problem as that investigated by the initial 
investigator; the same data base as that used by the initial investigator may or 
may not be used. If different, independently collected data are used to study the 
same problem, the reanalysis is called a replication. If the same data are used, 
the reanalysis is called a verification. In a secondary analysis, data collected to 
study one set of problems are used to study a different problem’ (1995, p. 452).
Further, Herrnson argues that:
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‘replication repeats an empirical study in its entirety, including independent data 
collection. It enables a researcher to comment on whether data used in an 
original study were collected properly or whether generalizations supported 
under one set of conditions are also supported under others. Replications 
increase the amount of information for an empirical research question and 
increase the level of confidence for a set of empirical generalizations’ (1995, p. 
452).
In short, were Herrnson’s definition to be applied to this study, the study would be 
described as a verification study, albeit one with a number of new elements to negotiate.
Sniderman (1995) has suggested that rather than debate the terms ‘replication’ and 
‘verification’ it should be recognised that the term ‘replication’ can be used in different 
ways such as:
‘Replication in sense 1 involves the use of the same data set, procedures of 
measurement, and methods of estimation to verify the accuracy of reported 
results. Replication in sense 2 involves the same data, but not the same 
methods of measurement or estimation, to confirm the adequacy of the 
interpretation and reported results. Replication in sense 3 involves the use of a 
different data set and comparable measurement and estimation procedures, to 
validate the robustness of both the results initially observed and the 
interpretation originally given to them’ (1995, p. 464).
For the purposes of this study, Sniderman’s approach to the definition of replication has 
been taken. In sum, this study employs an identical method to that adopted by Malleson 
in her study in order to compare and contrast the findings, with some additional features 
(discussed later in the chapter). It does not seek to replicate her findings by re-analysing 
the data she generated, and it does not seek to verify her findings by undertaking a fresh 
data collection exercise -  this would not be possible even if it were desirable, due to the 
time that has elapsed between her study and this study, and the nature of the changes 
in the criminal justice system in the intervening period. Instead, it seeks to use a tried 
and tested research method to examine a fresh situation. The study’s claim to originality 
stems from the examination of the Court of Appeal's new powers, and the related 
analysis of the Court of Appeal’s current role, rather than from the method used in their 
examination.
Data Collection and Data Analysis
The data used as the principal basis for this study is that derived from published and 
unpublished Court of Appeal judgments. Malleson reviewed the first 300 appeals of 
1990, analysing each judgment separately to gather information on the grounds of 
appeal, the approach of the Court to the case, and the result of the appeal. Where the 
Court commented on relevant issues such as fresh evidence or the ‘lurking doubt’ 
principle, these were recorded in order to obtain both qualitative and quantitative 
information on the Court’s powers and practices. Malleson consequently used a form of
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relational content analysis to identify and code key pieces of information from the 
judgments. The codes were generated from legally defined and legally understood 
concepts relevant to criminal appeals. It could be said that this is a form of ‘legal’ 
content analysis.
Content analysis is a research tool used to determine the presence of certain words or 
concepts within texts or sets of texts. Researchers quantify and analyse the presence, 
meanings and relationships of such words and concepts, then make inferences about 
the messages within the texts.42 Relational analysis, like conceptual analysis, begins 
with the act of identifying concepts present in a given text or set of texts. However, 
relational analysis seeks to go beyond presence by exploring the relationships between 
the concepts identified. The focus of relational analysis is to look for semantic, or 
meaningful, relationships. Individual concepts are viewed as having no inherent 
meaning. Rather, meaning is a product of the relationships among concepts in a text43
In methodological terms, Malleson employed relational content analysis using the 
judgments of the Court. This was done by identifying certain words within the text of the 
judgment such as ‘lurking doubt’, ‘fresh evidence’ and ‘retrial.’ These concepts were 
then explored quantitatively (descriptively rather than statistically) and qualitatively, in 
the form of relational content analysis, in order to provide an in depth analysis of the 
Court’s powers and practices. This relational content analysis has been replicated in this 
study.
This study followed a pilot phase that is not discussed in this thesis. However, it may 
assist to provide a brief explanation of this pre-study phase, by way of background to 
this study. The pilot study was undertaken on the first 300 appeals of 2000 using 
Malleson’s methodology. The pilot study assisted me in honing my method but it was 
conducted prior to the Human Rights Act coming into force. The decision was taken to 
conduct the full study in 2002, post the entry into force of the Human Rights Act which 
has potentially had a significant impact on the working practices of the Court. As the 
Human Rights Act was not in force at the time of my pilot study, in the interests of data 
integrity, I considered that it would not have been appropriate to merge the two data sets 
-  the pilot and the full study sets. However, this thesis has the benefit of being founded 
on a previous study by Malleson, of 300 cases, and a pilot study of 300 cases.
This study reports on findings from a relational content analysis of the first 300 available 
appeals against conviction which the Court considered in 2002. The transcripts of the
42 For a detailed discussion of content analysis, see Carney (1972), Neuendorf (2002), Krippendorf (1980) and 
Weber (1990).
43 See http://writing.colostate.edu/guides/research/content/com2b2.cfm.
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appeals were taken from Casetrack.44 I accessed the appeals against conviction on a 
daily basis using the search engine until I had obtained 300 judgments. Some of the 
transcripts on the database were not available as they were subject to reporting 
restrictions so where this occurred I accessed the next transcript. The appeals reviewed 
covered the period from January to May 2002. I adopted the same methodology as 
Malleson and each judgment was analysed separately and information was gathered on 
the grounds of appeal, the approach of the Court to the case and the result of the 
appeal.45 The information was coded in such a way so as to permit a descriptive 
quantitative analysis and a qualitative analysis. It would have been possible to limit the 
analysis to a descriptive statistical analysis of the first 300 judgments, however, it 
became apparent in the pilot that there was a rich vein of data that could be mined and 
analysed in instances where the Court commented on relevant issues and these were 
recorded in order to obtain information on the Court’s powers and practices. I decided to 
use a mixed method of analysis in the hope that it would capture the richness of the 
data.
After Malleson’s study was replicated, I then used the judgments of the Court of Appeal 
to discern what the different approaches were that the Court used to determine the 
appeal. These different approaches were compiled and then the judgments of the Court 
were divided into these different approaches. This was necessary to determine what 
those different approaches were in order to analyse the decision making processes of 
the Court. It was apparent from reading the judgments that the Court used a small 
number of decision making processes when determining the appeal. I initially compiled 
two approaches which were apparently being used from reading the literature on the 
Court (notably Pattenden, 1996). These were what the Court thinks about the ground of 
appeal and whether it applies the jury impact test which requires the Court to decide the 
appeal on the basis of what the original jury, or a reasonable jury, would make of the 
ground of appeal. But it became apparent from reading the judgments, that there were a 
number of approaches within these two broad overarching processes and these were 
collated. The judgments of the Court were allocated to one of these approaches which 
allowed a diagram to be drawn illustrating how the Court decides the appeal. This is 
discussed in detail in chapter four. The aim in collating the different approaches was to 
see how the Court approaches its task to try to ascertain why the Court’s decision 
making can be problematic. This allows a relational content analysis to be conducted, 
which assists in understanding what the problems are and suggesting proposals for 
reform. This type of research has not been undertaken previously on the judgments of 
the Court and adds an additional element to the replication of Malleson’s study.
44See http://www.casetrack.com/index.html. Casetrack is a database and holds the majority of judgments of 
the Criminal Division of the Court of Appeal from 1996 onwards. There are some judgments which are not 
available because they are subject to reporting restrictions.
45 See the Data Collection Form in Appendix 1
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This study has not sought to determine in any reliable statistical terms, whether the CAA 
1995 has changed the way in which the Court makes its decision as compared with 
Malleson’s findings in 1990. In order to make such claims, the research would have had 
to have been constructed in a way that would permit a more sophisticated analysis 
including the use of multiple regression tests. This form of analysis would have assisted 
in determining whether other intervening factors between the two studies, such as the 
introduction of the Human Rights Act, a change in political climate, or a change in senior 
judges, may have had a greater effect of any perceptible change in Court of Appeal 
decision making, than the introduction of the CAA 1995 and the change in the test used 
to determine the lack of safety of the conviction. But, were the study to have focused on 
an inferential quantitative method, it would not have benefited from the insights provided 
by the qualitative method that was used in conjunction with a purely descriptive 
quantitative analysis. This study does provide an indication of the ways in which the 
Court’s decision making has changed since the introduction of the 1995 Act and may 
serve as a basis for future quantitative analysis that attempts to verify or reject these 
tentative hypotheses.
Summary
This thesis has used a replication study to conduct research on the Court’s judgments to 
determine what the current practice of the Court is and to analyse the decision making 
process of the Court. The aims of the research have been twofold, firstly to analyse the 
judgments quantitatively in order to determine what grounds of appeal are currently 
being argued and what the most common grounds of appeal are. These findings have 
been compared to Malleson’s findings to provide a broad picture of the current practice 
of the Court by comparison with her earlier findings. Secondly, research undertaken in 
addition to the replication study has provided an analysis of the Court's decision making 
process to determine the approaches the Court uses to decide the appeal. The Court’s 
approaches have been quantified and then analysed qualitatively in order to show how 
the Court determines the appeal and why the Court’s approach can be problematic. 
These findings indicate that the Court’s failures are an inevitable result of the Court’s 
decision making process, and in particular, its function as a court of review.
The next chapter, chapter three, provides a review of the literature to give an in depth 
picture of the problems associated with the Court. This serves as the foundation for the 
study, its focus and approach.
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CHAPTER THREE: LITERATURE REVIEW
The Court of Criminal Appeal was founded at the start of the twentieth century against a 
background of public outcry, heated press opinion, high profile individual cases of 
miscarriages of justice, a Royal Commission, and a public inquiry (Nobles and Schiff, 
2000, p.50). This series of events, which culminated in the CAA 1907, bears a striking 
similarity to the series of events which culminated in the CAA 1995. This Act was 
enacted at the end of the twentieth century against a background of public outcry, 
heated press opinion, high profile miscarriages of justice and a Royal Commission. This 
is not a coincidence; a reading of the history of criminal appeals reveals a recurring 
theme of crisis and reform. This chapter reviews the literature in order to place the most 
recent reforms in their historical context. This is necessary in order to assess whether 
the CAA 1995 has had any impact on the working practices of the Court of Appeal or 
whether the Act has merely fallen foul of the problems which bedevilled its predecessors 
in 1907 and 1968.
A review of the literature reveals that the Court’s approach to its powers has been driven 
by two main areas. These are firstly, a reverence to the jury verdict, and secondly, a 
reverence to the principle of finality. These will now be explored.
Deference to the jury verdict
Historically, the grounds of appeal that have appeared to be the most problematic for the 
Court are those which involve it in assessing factual issues such as whether the verdict 
was unreasonable or could not be supported by the evidence, or whether it was unsafe 
and unsatisfactory, and those where the appellant wishes to adduce fresh evidence or 
argue there was a ‘lurking doubt.’ These grounds necessarily involve the Court to some 
extent trespassing on the role of the jury and the difficulty comes from determining how 
far the Court is allowed, or should be allowed, to do this. The evidence indicating that 
the Court has been affected in its approach to these grounds by its deference to the jury 
verdict is overwhelming.
Ross (Ross 1911) found in his study of the reported cases of the Court’s first three years 
that ‘in practice so great has been the regard paid by the Court to trial by jury that cases 
are extremely rare in which the conviction has been quashed solely on the ground that 
upon the evidence properly given at the trial the verdict was unreasonable and 
unsupportable’ (p. 88). He stated that it was constantly enunciated by the Court that:
‘the jury are pre-eminently judges of the facts to be deduced from the evidence
properly presented to them, and it was not intended by the Criminal Appeal Act,
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nor is it within the functions of a Court composed as the Court of Appeal that 
such cases should be practically retried before the Court’ (p. 89).
Similarly, Seaborne Davies, who conducted a study of the reported cases of the first 
forty years of the Court, stated that ‘it is worth mentioning the constant insistence by the 
Court that trial by jury is trial by jury and not trial by the judge. Its decisions on what are 
the respective provinces of judge and jury are numerous’ (Seaborne Davies, 1949, p. 
430). Knight’s study (Knight, 1970, p. 124) of the reported cases from 1907 to 1966 
indicates that even in the earliest cases, the Court reiterated that the jury were the 
arbiters of questions of fact, and that the appellate Court would only interfere where the 
verdict of guilty was blatantly wrong. Malleson concluded in her study of the first 300 
appeals of 1990 that:
'the court is very concerned that as far as possible the jury’s decision should be 
final and the trial should not come to be seen as an initial skirmish. The Court’s 
anxiety not to undermine the principle of the sovereignty of the jury was referred 
to directly or indirectly in many of the cases reviewed’ (Malleson, 1993, p. 16).
Consequently, there is strong empirical evidence to support the conclusion that the 
Court was, and at least until the 1990s remains, deferential to the jury's fact finding role. 
Evidence of deference to the jury verdict has not only come from these empirical 
studies, but has also come from the various committees and inquiries that have been set 
up to evaluate the work of the Court in times of crisis. The Tucker Committee was set up 
in 1954 to consider whether the Court should be given the power to order a retrial and its 
conclusions were that ‘the Court of Appeal have never considered it to be any part of 
their duty to substitute their verdict for that of the jury or to make use of their 
supplementary powers to bring about drastic change in a matter fundamental to criminal 
practice in indictable cases in this country’ (Tucker Committee, 1954, paras. 6-7).
In the 1960s, when the Court’s perceived restrictive approach to its role was being 
widely criticised, two committees were set up to evaluate the working practices of the 
Court. The JUSTICE Committee was set up in 1964 and the Donovan Committee was 
set up by the Government in 1965; the Donovan Committee’s recommendations formed 
the basis of the reforms of the Court in the CAA 1968. Both committees concluded that 
the Court only interfered with jury verdicts in the most limited of circumstances. The 
JUSTICE Committee stated that the restrictive approach of the Court was an ‘expression 
of an attitude of undue reverence for the verdict of the jury’ (para. 60).
It would appear that this attitude did not change. In their 1989 report on miscarriages of 
justice, JUSTICE concluded that (JUSTICE, 1989, para. 4.17):
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‘ the common attitude of the Court of Appeal is that where all the
discrepancies and weaknesses of the prosecution evidence have been 
canvassed before the jury, and the judge has summed up fairly and correctly, 
then it must not interfere with the jury’s verdict, as this would amount to a retrial 
of the merits of the case, which is not its function. Time and again Justice has 
read counsel’s advice on appeal to the effect that, where the summing up has 
been impeccable and there are no mistakes of law, the Court of Appeal will not 
substitute its own opinion for that of the jury, however much it may disagree with 
it, and therefore there are no arguable grounds of appeal’ (para. 4.17).
Similarly, it was the conclusion of the RCCJ that ‘in its approach to the consideration of 
appeals against conviction, the Court of Appeal seems to us to have been too heavily 
influenced by the role of the jury in Crown Court trials’ (RCCJ, ch. 10, para. 3). Thus, the 
weight of evidence points to the Court’s deference to the jury’s decision making function.
Although the Court’s deference to the jury verdict was cited as having a negative affect 
on its powers to quash convictions on factual issues, conversely, it appeared to have a 
positive affect on the Court’s willingness to quash convictions because there was a 
wrong decision on a question of law or a material irregularity in the course of the 
proceedings. Its reluctance to substitute itself for the jury meant that it rarely applied the 
proviso which allowed the judges to uphold the appeal if they felt there had not been a 
miscarriage of justice.46 The purpose of the proviso was described in an early case as 
follows: ‘[it] enables the court to go behind technical slips and do substantial justice’ 47 
The main problem associated with the proviso was the lack of a retrial power in the CAA 
1907. The power to order a retrial had been included in twenty-six of the thirty-one Bills 
introduced before the Court was created, but it was not in the CAA 1907, even though it 
was the subject of an amendment. It has been argued that it was not included because 
the Court had been given wide powers under section 9 to receive further evidence, and 
coupled with the proviso, this would enable the Court, in suitable cases, to virtually re-try 
the case. Therefore, the power to order a retrial would not be needed. However, the 
problem the Tucker Committee identified, was that:
‘ being the way the Criminal Appeal Act has worked in practice it was soon
found that there were a number of cases in which there had been some 
irregularity or misdirection at the trial which could not be dismissed as trivial, and 
it being impossible to apply the proviso, the Court had no alternative but to 
quash the conviction and enter a verdict of acquittal, although they might feel 
little doubt of the appellant’s guilt’ (paras. 6-7).
So the broad picture that began to emerge in the 1960s from the literature was a Court 
concerned with the judge’s direction, evidence and procedure and the occasional point 
of substantive law rather than the 'merits’ of the case. An appellant who could point to a 
clear misdirection, the wrongful admission or exclusion of evidence or some procedural
46 See for example, R v Dyson [1908] 2 K.B. 454.
47 R v Meyer (1908) 1 Cr. App. R. 10.
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irregularity, had better prospects of success than the appellant claiming simply that he 
was innocent and that the jury had come to the wrong decision (Dean, 1966, p. 539).
This attitude did not appear to change. In 1993, a panel of eminent QCs, Peter 
Thornton, Ann Mallalieu and Anthony Scrivener under the auspices of an ‘Independent 
Civil Liberty Panel on Criminal Justice’ looked at the Court of Appeal and heard a wide 
range of evidence from, amongst others, the Lord Chief Justice, Justice, the Criminal 
Bar Association, the Bar Council and the Law Society. Their conclusions, in view of the 
recent miscarriages of justice, were that the Court as currently constituted was adequate 
at correcting errors of law but inadequate at righting miscarriage of justice wrongs (The 
Civil Liberties Trust, 1993 para. 1.1).
It has been suggested that there are three main reasons why the Court has shown such 
deference to the jury verdict. The first is the constitutional reason that defendants should 
be convicted or acquitted not on the basis of what judges believe but through the 
judgement of their peers. By finding that the appellant’s guilt has not been proved 
beyond reasonable doubt or is thrown into doubt by fresh evidence the appellate court 
usurps the jury’s function which is to decide issues of fact (Nobles and Schiff, 2000, p. 
89; Pattenden, 1996, p. 76; Williams, 1963, p. 330; Thomas, 1966, p. 42; Devlin, 1971, 
p. 112; Buxton, 1993, p. 71; Justice, 1964, p. 19). This is illustrated by the speech of 
Lloyd LJ in R v Mcllkenny and Others48 where he defined the role of the Court:
‘Rightly or wrongly (we think rightly) trial by jury is the foundation of our criminal 
justice system. Under jury trial juries not only find the facts; they also apply the 
law. Since they are not experts in the law, they are directed on the relevant law 
by the judge. But the task of applying the law to the facts, and so reaching a 
verdict, belongs to the jury, and the jury alone. Nothing in section two of the Act, 
or anywhere else obliges or entitles us to say whether we think that the 
appellant is innocent. This is a point of great constitutional importance. The task 
of deciding whether a man is guilty falls on the jury. We are concerned solely 
with the question whether the verdict of the jury can stand.’
Although Lloyd LJ states that the Court is not entitled to say whether it thinks the 
appellant is innocent, the Court has in various judgments expressed the view that the 
appellant may be innocent and that a miscarriage of justice had occurred which is 
illustrative of the Court’s inconsistency.49
The second main reason for jury deference is the belief that the system of jury trial, if 
properly followed, would not result in the conviction of innocent persons (Cohen, 1927, 
p. 154; Thomas, 1966, p. 42; Bar Council, 1992, p.52; Justice, 1989, p. 50). This stems
48 (1991) 93 Cr. App. R. 287.
49 See for example R v Fell [2001] EWCA Crim 696; R v Ward [1993] 2 All ER 577; R v Kelly [2003] EW CA  
Crim 2957; R  v Martin C [2003] EWCA Crim 1246; R v Mattan The Times, March 5, 1998; R v Roberts [1998] 
EWCA Crim 998; R v Fergus (1994) 98 Cr App R 313.
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from judicial attitudes prior to the Court’s creation as this was generally one of the 
reasons given by the judges as to why a criminal appeal system based on fact was not 
needed as discussed in chapter one. The Bar Council has argued that this reason is 
combined with the belief, widespread amongst the judiciary that the rules of the trial 
operate in favour of the accused (Bar Council, 1992, p. 54).
The third main reason cited for jury deference is that an appeal is not a rehearing of the 
witnesses. The jury, who have heard the witnesses, is accordingly supposed to be in a 
better position to draw inferences than would be the Court who generally just read a 
transcript of the judge’s summing up (Williams, 1963, p. 330; Nobles and Schiff, 2000, p. 
89; Pattenden, 1996, p. 76; O’Halloran, 1949, p. 167).
The Court’s deference to the jury verdict is not the only perceived problem in relation to 
the Court of Appeal. It has been argued that it also has an undue reverence for the 
principle of finality which will now be discussed.
Undue reverence to the principle of finality
One of the reasons given by the judges prior to the Court’s creation in order to illustrate 
why they were against a criminal appeal system based on errors of fact was the need to 
uphold the principle of finality . Malleson has argued (1994, p. 158) that the principle of 
finality has been a critical factor in the Court’s approach to the review process and helps 
to explain why judges have so consistently adopted such a restrained and cautious 
approach. She states that the process of review, more than any other aspect of the 
judicial process, undermines the key principle of finality as it reminds us that the 
contested events are capable of review and reinterpretation. It delays the execution of a 
sentence and undermines the certainty of the original decision by destroying the finality 
of the original verdict (p. 159).
There was criticism of this by Pattenden (1996, p. 74) who agreed that the willingness of 
the Court to correct the errors of judges certainly intended to promote consistency and to 
reduce the likelihood of future appeals but:
‘it does not follow from this that the finality principle underlies the [Court’s] 
reluctance to correct errors of fact. A reason which explains (or partly explains) 
intervention in one situation (procedural or legal irregularity) does not 
necessarily explain non-intervention in a quite different one (potential error of 
fact)’ (p. 75).
But there is evidence that appears to suggest that the finality doctrine has been a factor 
that underlies the Court’s perceived reluctance to correct errors of fact. This is illustrated 
by looking at two areas: the reluctance of the Court to admit fresh evidence and the
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perceived reluctance of the Home Secretary to refer cases back to the Court after the 
normal appeal process had been exhausted. These will be considered next.
The reluctance of the Court to admit fresh evidence
Although the Court was given wide powers under section 9 CAA 1907 to adduce fresh 
evidence, it imposed its own restrictions on the receipt of fresh evidence partly because 
of its deference to the jury verdict50 and partly because it did not want the criminal justice 
process to be indefinitely prolonged as this would contravene the principle of finality. 
Pattenden argues that:
‘the Court of Criminal Appeal was afraid that liberal treatment of fresh evidence 
would encourage counsel to hold evidence back from the trial. The conviction 
would then be invested with something of a provisional quality. This rationale 
gives the desire for finality in litigation precedence over the desire to do justice 
through the courts’ (1996, p. 75).
The restrictions the Court imposed were hurdles transposed from civil cases such as the 
evidence had to be credible and relevant to the issue of guilt,51 the evidence had to be 
admissible,52 and the evidence could not have been put before the jury.53
The Court was given the power to order a retrial in fresh evidence cases in the 1964 
Criminal Appeal Act. It was the hope of some of those who debated this point in the 
Commons’ debates on the Bill that it would have the effect of liberalising the Court’s 
attitude to fresh evidence appeals. Soon after the 1964 Act was enacted, the Donovan 
Committee heard evidence that the conditions the Court had imposed on the reception 
of fresh evidence were too narrow. The condition that had caused the most disquiet was 
the one which stated that additional evidence should not have been available at the 
original trial. The Committee recommended that additional evidence should be received 
if it was relevant and credible and there was a reasonable explanation for the failure to 
place it before the jury (para. 136). These proposals initially became section 5 of the 
CAA 1966 which was consolidated into section 23 of the CAA 1968.
The judgment of Edmund Davies LJ in R v Stafford and R v Luvaglio54 in 1968 illustrates 
how the principle of finality affected the Court’s approach:
‘It is clear that a more liberal attitude than hitherto prevailed was introduced by 
the provision in section 5 [1966 Act] that the fresh evidence sought to be
50 Lord Parker CJ stated in R v Parks: ‘It is only rarely that this court allows further evidence to be called, and it
is quite clear that the principles upon which this court acts must be kept within narrow confines, otherwise in
every case this court would in effect be asked to effect a new trial.’ (1962) 46 Cr. App. R. 29, 32.
51R v Dunton (1908) 1 Cr. App. R. 165.
52 R v Tellett (1921) 15 Cr. App. R. 159.
53 R v Jones (1908) 2 Cr. App. R. 27.
54 (1968) 53 Cr. App. R. 1.
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introduced shall be received unless the court is satisfied upon the grounds 
specified in the section that it ought to be. Nevertheless, public mischief would 
ensue and the legal process could become indefinitely prolonged were it the 
case that evidence produced at any time will generally be admitted by this Court 
when verdicts are being reviewed. There must be some curbs, the section 
specifies them, and we proceed to consider the present applications with due 
regard to them.’
Writing in 1975, Samuels thought (1975, p. 30) that fresh evidence law and practice had 
been liberalised over the previous decade. However, he felt that the provisions in section 
23 of 'likely to be credible’ and ‘reasonable explanation for failure to adduce’ were too 
vaguely drafted and were too susceptible to narrow or restrictive interpretation. Writing 
nine years later his conclusions on fresh evidence appeals were that ‘the practice of the 
Court is uncertain, inconsistent and unpredictable’ (1984, p. 340).55
The condition of section 23(2), which has remained the most problematic is the fourth 
condition of what constitutes a reasonable explanation for failure to adduce evidence at 
the trial. It is also the condition which directly relates to the principle of finality. The 
RCCJ stated that it had been suggested in evidence to them that the Court took an 
excessively restrictive approach to whether the fresh evidence was available at the trial 
and whether there was a reasonable explanation for the failure to adduce it (RCCJ,
1993, ch. 10, para. 55). The Commission felt that the Court’s powers under section 23 
were adequate but the question was whether the Court had construed them too 
narrowly. The Commission considered that it was understandable that the Court would 
view fresh evidence with some suspicion and the Court was right not to wish to 
encourage defendants to think of the Crown Court trial as a practice run. But on the 
other hand, the Court must be alive to the possibility that the fresh evidence may 
exonerate the appellant or at least throw some serious doubt on the conviction (ch. 10, 
para. 55). The Commission stated that ‘we would urge that in general the court should 
take a broad, rather than a narrow, approach to them’ (ch. 10, para. 56). It had been 
suggested to the Commission that the test in section 23(2) that the evidence had to be 
‘likely to be credible’ was too high a test and they recommended that the test should be 
changed to ‘capable of belief’ as this would ‘be a slightly wider formula giving the court 
greater scope for doing justice’ (ch. 10, para. 60).
The Government accepted the view that if there was a reasonable explanation for the 
evidence not being adduced at the original trial then the Court should consider the 
evidence. But ‘considers that the Court should continue to have power to exclude 
evidence where it considers that there is no reasonable explanation’ (Home Office,
1994, para. 13). As discussed in chapter one, the Government agreed with the
55 This had also been the conclusion of Glanville Williams twenty-one years earlier when he stated ‘there are 
shortcomings in our system of criminal appeal, and one of the greatest is the erratic way in which the court 
sometimes allows fresh evidence to be given on the appeal and sometimes does not' (Williams, 1963, p. 133).
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recommendation of changing ‘likely to be credible’ to ‘capable of belief.’ This was given 
legislative effect in section 4 of the CAA 1995 and these changes will be analysed in 
chapter five.
The perceived reluctance of the Home Secretary to refer cases back to the Court will 
now be discussed.
The reluctance of the Home Secretary to refer cases back to the Court
As section 9 of the CAA 1907 gave the Court such wide powers to adduce fresh 
evidence it was felt at the time of the Court’s inception that it would take over the role the 
Home Secretary had played in reviewing wrongful convictions. The Home Secretary’s 
role in relation to the prerogative of mercy remained untouched by the Act, but the Home 
Secretary was given an additional power by section 19 which allowed him, on an 
application for the prerogative of mercy, to refer a case back to the Court for its 
determination. Section 19 became section 17 of the CAA 1968 which allowed the Home 
Secretary to refer a case back to the Court ‘if he thinks fit.’ As far as the principle of 
finality is concerned, this was problematic because these were cases that had already 
exhausted the normal appeal process. This, thus, re-opened a case that had been 
finalised, and thereby prolonged the criminal justice process.
The role of the Home Secretary was essentially reactive so he generally had to be 
persuaded to refer a case back to the Court of Appeal by a petition from the applicant. 
The Home Office received approximately 800 petitions per year so as Taylor and 
Mansfield have stated ‘it was vital that an individual petition was clearly written and well 
drafted to catch the eye of the relevant officials’ (Taylor and Mansfield, 1999, p. 231). 
When the petition arrived at the Home Office, civil servants in its C3 department, who 
were not legally trained, would look for any new and relevant arguments which had not 
previously been dealt with by the Court of Appeal. If this evidence was not available then 
the application would usually be rejected, but if the petition provided grounds for re­
examining the case then further investigations could be carried out. Following any re­
investigation, if C3 was of the opinion that a miscarriage of justice might have occurred, 
the matter would then be passed on to the Home Secretary who would then decide 
whether to refer the case to the Court of Appeal.
It has been argued by Pattenden that the overriding concern of the Home Office since 
the inception of the reference power had been to uphold the separation of powers. 
Anything which could be interpreted as interference with the independence of the 
judiciary or supervision of the judicial system by the Executive had been studiously 
avoided (Pattenden, 1996, p. 364). As a result of this, the Home Office imposed its own 
restrictions on the power. These were that the applicant had to have exhausted the
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normal appeals process and there had to be new evidence or a new consideration that 
had not been before the Court of Appeal previously. These criteria were criticised by Sir 
John May in his inquiry into the Guildford and Woolwich pub bombings and he stated 
‘...the self imposed limits have led the Home Office only to respond to the 
representations which have been made to it in relation to particular convictions rather 
than to carry out its own investigations into the circumstances of a particular case’ 
(RCCJ, 1993, ch 11, para. 7). A common explanation for this approach raised in 
evidence submitted to the RCCJ in 1993 was that the Home Office had neither the 
necessary commitment nor the resources to undertake a broader role (Malleson, 1995, 
p. 929). However, this was troubling, given the fact that the Court of Appeal was 
expected, by some, to take over the Home Secretary's power in this regard, and yet the 
Home Secretary was acting as a restrictive gate-keeper in relation to referrals back to 
the Court.
The RCCJ found that between 1981 and 1992 only 64 cases were referred out of around 
750 petitions each year. More revealing still was that very few of the cases that the 
Home Secretary permitted to go to the Court were then unsuccessful. In 1989, every 
one of the six convictions was quashed and in 1990 every one of the twenty convictions 
was quashed or sent for retrial (Malet, 1995, p. 716). This was not necessarily viewed in 
a positive light. Nobles and Schiff have stated that the Home Secretary did not seek to 
challenge the authority of the Court but, quite the contrary, was dominated by the Court, 
seeking to anticipate the Court's likely approach and only to refer cases which had a 
good chance of success (Nobles and Schiff, 1996, p. 579).
Malleson has argued that in quantitative terms the Home Office played a marginal role in 
the review process. For the majority of those who claimed to be the victim of a 
miscarriage of justice, the chances of a case being reviewed and referred back were so 
small as to be almost an irrelevance. This is obscured by the fact that qualitatively, Its 
work was disproportionately serious because of the high-profile nature of the cases it 
investigated. Almost all the cases it referred back involved serious offences such as 
murder, and most had received extensive media coverage (Malleson, 1994, p. 155). 
This is explained by the fact that whether the power of referral was used depended on 
how effective and successful interested parties and pressure groups were in initially 
awakening public awareness to a possible miscarriage of justice and then maintaining 
public concern over a protracted period (Tregilgas-Davey, 1991, p. 715). The Home 
Affairs Committee reported in 1981 that ‘...the chances of a petition ultimately being 
successful might sometimes depend less on its intrinsic merits than on the amount of 
external support and publicity that it was able to attract’ (Sixth Report, 1981-2, para.10).
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It has been argued by Pattenden that there had been ill-concealed judicial distaste at the 
involvement of a politician in this process, and further at the role played by publicity and 
campaigns in the bringing of cases to the attention of the Home Secretary (Pattenden, 
1996, p. 368-369). The need for publicity and campaigns to secure a reference was very 
unfair to those wrongly convicted persons who were unable to attract the attention of 
journalists or people of influence.
As a result of these criticisms, calls began as early as the 1970s to set up an 
independent tribunal and continued throughout the 1980s (Devlin Report, 1976; Sixth 
Report of the Home Affairs Committee, 1981-82; Justice, 1989, para. 5.19; Civil Liberties 
Trust, 1993, para. 1.1; Bar Council, 1992, p. 54). The catalysts for change proved to be 
the cases of the Guildford Four and the Birmingham Six as discussed in chapter one. 
The RCCJ reviewed the post-appeal process in relation to ‘the arrangements for 
considering and investigating allegations of miscarriages of justice.’ The Commission 
acknowledged that only a small percentage of cases ended in a reference by the Home 
Secretary and a rigorous sifting process was applied.
The Commission stated that almost all of those who gave evidence to them argued that 
arrangements should be changed with the responsibility for reopening cases being 
removed from the Home Secretary and transferred to a body independent of 
Government. The Commission agreed there was a ‘strong case for change’ and 
recommended that the Home Secretary’s power to refer cases back to the Court of 
Appeal under section 17 be removed and that a new body should be set up to consider 
alleged miscarriages of justice, to supervise their investigation if further inquiries were 
needed, and to refer appropriate cases to the Court of Appeal. This recommendation 
was accepted by the Government and after a report issued by JUSTICE on how it could 
be set up (JUSTICE, 1994a), the Criminal Cases Review Commission (CCRC) was 
created by the Criminal Appeal Act 1995 and began work on 1 April 1997. The work of 
the CCRC specifically is outside the scope of this thesis which focuses on the powers of 
the Court of Appeal. Under section 9(2) of the Criminal Appeal Act 1995, a reference by 
the CCRC is to be treated in the same way as any other appeal so the Court uses the 
same powers to determine all appeals. Therefore, this thesis focuses on the Court’s 
decision making process generally rather than looking at CCRC referrals specifically.56 
However, the fact that the CCRC is a new addition to the criminal justice system marks 
out this study as distinct from Malleson’s and those that preceded hers.
56 For recent studies on the relationship between the CCRC and the Court of Appeal, see McCartney, C and 
Walker, C (2008); Nobles, R and Schiff, D (2005) with Graham Zellick’s response (Chairman of the CCRC) 
Zellick, G (2005); Nobles, R and Schiff, D (2008); Elks, L (2008). Elks was a former Commissioner of the 
CCRC.
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Even the most ardent miscarriages of justice campaigners have recognised the need for 
finality in the criminal justice process. For example, the campaigning journalist Bob 
Woffenden recognises the need for finality to avoid criminal justice deteriorating into a 
process in which repeated tribunals reassess the same issues which he admits would be 
‘self-defeating, impractical, and also absurdly expensive’ (Woffinden, 1987, p. 322). He 
accepts the fear that an appellate body that failed to place restrictions on the cases it 
was willing to reassess would be overwhelmed. He also sees the danger that defence 
lawyers would treat a trial as a mere rehearsal of their ‘full’ case. But he then goes on to 
say that it is ‘nevertheless unpardonable that appeal judges have allowed such 
considerations an overriding importance, with the result that the channels of judicial 
review have effectively been sealed' (p. 340-1).
A second campaigning journalist, Peter Hill (Hill, 1996, p. 1553) has also recognised that 
‘the reputation of any legal system depends on its ability to produce finality.’ However, 
he also states that the Court has relied largely on its authority to produce finality, rather 
than the wisdom of its judgments. Hill states that to achieve finality there must be a more 
serious and thorough re-investigation than cases are thoroughly subjected to, coupled 
with a change of attitude towards the trial process; he says that finality in some cases 
may have to be the result of a longer process than a simple trial and ‘inevitably such a 
process will need to be more inquisitorial than adversarial.’
The large numbers applying to the CCRC would seem to suggest that the Court is not 
particularly effective at promoting finality as these are cases that have largely been 
through the appeal process and failed. Therefore, whilst the Court may assume that its 
approach is conducive to promoting finality, the difficulties of its decision making process 
may actually prolong the process for many appellants who have to keep returning to the 
Court before they are successful. This is discussed in more detail below.
Statute or attitude?
As discussed above, the academic consensus appears to suggest that the Court's 
approach to the jury and finality has resulted in it taking a restrictive approach to its role 
of correcting miscarriages of justice. This critcism centres round whether the Court is too 
reluctant to quash convictions and the academic consensus appears to suggest that it is. 
The fact that the Court appeared initially to be given wide powers under statute to quash 
convictions and hear new evidence and applied its own narrow perameters is potentially 
evidence that the Court has been too restrictive in its role.
But whilst the academic consensus appears to suggest that the Court is too reluctant to 
quash convictions, it is difficult to measure in any meaningful way whether the Court 
should be quashing more convictions. It is not every appeal that should be overturned
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and the Court needs to find some way of differentiating between those appeals which 
are without merit from those that require the quashing of the conviction. In doing so, the 
Court has to take account of the role of the jury and the principle of finalty and weigh that 
against the merits of quashing the conviction. Whilst the academic consensus may 
suggest that the Court's approach to finality and deference leads it to be restrictive, the 
literature does not provide a gauge by which this should be measured. This problem is 
summed up by Pattenden:
What is more important: upholding convictions, or minimizing miscarriages of 
justice? In a democratic state this important policy question is a matter for 
Parliament. The CACD [Court of Appeal Criminal Division] is like a broken 
compass which swings erratically between North and South. Until the CACD’s 
orientation is settled there will be no proper yardstick against which to measure 
its performance’ (Pattenden, 1996, p. 210).
The difficulty Pattenden alludes to is inevitable given the complexity of the role of the 
Court of Appeal. The balancing exercises the Court has to perform can be illustrated by 
looking at the criteria for a good criminal appellate system as identified by Sir Robin Auld 
in his Review of the Criminal Courts (Auld, 2001, ch 12, para 2). They are:
‘It should do justice to individual defendants and to the public as represented 
principally by the prosecution; it should bring finality to the criminal process, 
subject to the need to safeguard either side from clear and serious injustice and 
such as would damage the integrity of the criminal justice system; it should be 
readily accessible, consistently with a proper balance of the interest of individual 
defendants and that of the public; it should be clear and simple in its structures 
and procedures; it should be efficient and effective in its use of judges and other 
resources in righting injustice and in declaring and applying the law, and it 
should be speedy.’
Whilst its structures and procedures can be assessed for clarity and simplicity, and the 
speed by which it hears appeals can be measured, defining bench marks by which the 
other criteria can be measured is very difficult.
There is one method though by which its performance can be measured and that is in 
the number of appeals that are quashed after an appeal has previously failed. As 
discussed in chapter one, the Court is often criticised for perpetuating miscarriages of 
justice by not rectifying wrongful convictions at the first opportunity; for example, the 
Guildford Four convictions were quashed on the second appeal and the Birmingham Six 
convictions were quashed on the third appeal. The most extreme example of this is the 
case of R v Cooper and McMahon57 which took six appeals before the conviction was 
finally quashed but by then both had died. The fact that these appeals need to return to 
the Court potentially shows the Court’s failings in not recognising the merits of the initial
57 [2003] EWCA Crim 225
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appeal. Therefore, the number of convictions quashed after a CCRC referral could be 
used as quantitative evidence of the Court’s restrictive approach. The CCRC’s figures 
show that as of 31 July 2009, there have been 437 referrals with 397 appeals heard by 
the Court of Appeal and 280 quashed, 116 upheld and 1 reserved.58 Whilst not all of the 
280 convictions quashed would have previously failed, a large number of them would 
have; it states on the CCRC website that ‘we will almost certainly turn you down if you 
have not already appealed.’59
If we are using the number of failed appeals that are consequently overturned to 
measure the Court’s performance then we do potentially have evidence that the Court 
has been restrictive in those appeals. The fact that the appeal was overturned after a 
previous appeal failed is potentially evidence of the failings of the appellate process to 
rectify the miscarriage of justice at the first opportunity. This potentially shows the appeal 
court being a part of the problem of miscarriages of justice as well as being the solution 
as outlined by Savage et al in chapter one.60 These appeals are the exceptional appeals 
Naughton identifies in chapter one as being those that miscarriage of justice discourse 
tends to focus on. This is because these appeals are considered to be ‘true’ 
miscarriages of justice in the sense that every part of the criminal justice system has 
failed, including the appellate process. These appellants also tend to have more 
resonance as factually innocent appellants who may have spent many years in prison 
for crimes they have not committed. Therefore, these appeals tend to be used to argue 
for changes to the Court’s powers as they can be cited as evidence of a restrictive 
approach. However, as Naughon identifies, they are rare appeals and the counter 
argument to citing these appeals as evidence of a restrictive approach is that arguments 
made at the first appeal may have been without merit and it was only the finding of new 
argument or evidence which persuaded the Court to quash the conviction subsequently. 
This could be due to a number of reasons such as changes in the law, new witnesses 
being found or developments in scientific evidence. These would all potentially 
strengthen the subsequent appeal and lead to the conviction being overturned where it 
had previously failed. But despite the problems of defining a bench mark by which to 
measure the Court’s performance, and the difficulties associated with the ‘exceptional’ 
appeals, this thesis will adopt the view that the consensus is largely correct in citing the 
Court being too restrictive in its role of correcting miscarriages of justice.
The approach the Court has taken to appeals can be traced back to the Court’s origins, 
which potentially explains where the difficulties and contradictions associated with the 
Court may have come from. The creation of the Court was not only innovative in terms 
of creating a criminal appeal system for errors of fact, it was also innovative in creating a
58 Figures taken from the CCRC website, http://www.ccrc.gov.uk/cases/case_44.htm.
59 See http://www.ccrc.gov.uk/applying/applying_37.htm.
60 See page 13.
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court of review as a mechanism for determining appeals. When the Court was created, 
appeals to the Court of Appeal in civil cases and appeals from magistrates’ courts in 
criminal cases both involved a form of rehearing. However, the terms ‘review* and 
‘rehearing’ have not been used consistently in law and consequently it has been 
necessary for the purposes of this study to define what these terms mean.
Since the Summary Act 1879, appeals from the magistrates’ court have been by way of 
‘rehearing.’61 This means the appeal is heard de novo in the Crown Court and the 
procedure is the same as that for a summary trial. The parties are not limited to, or 
bound to call all the evidence called before the magistrates' court and additional 
evidence may be freely admitted on appeal. The Crown Court may reverse, affirm or 
amend the magistrates' decision, or may remit the matter back to them giving its opinion 
for its disposal.62 It may also consider points of law as well as decide matters of fact and 
may impose its own sentence, though not one greater than the magistrates could have 
passed.
From the Judicature Acts 1873-75 and up until the Civil Procedure Rules 1998, appeals 
to the Court of Appeal in civil cases were also a ‘rehearing’ (Jacob, 1987, p. 232; D. di 
Mambro, 1999, p. 493; Jolowicz, 2000, p. 276; Spencer, 1989, p. 91 ).63 However, this 
term was deceptive in that the Court would not rehear all the evidence and the 
witnesses, as in appeals from magistrates’ courts, but would rather perform a review of 
all the evidence including the transcripts of the witnesses. Further evidence on questions 
of fact that had occurred after the date of the trial could be adduced but restrictions were 
imposed on further evidence relating to matters that had occurred before the judgment.64 
Andrews has stated that ‘the reason for this restriction is obvious. In the interests of 
finality, directness and economy, the hearing at first instance should be the only 
opportunity to delve into matters of primary fact’ (2003, p. 908) This is reinforced by the 
distinction the Court of Appeal (Civil Division) draws between the primary facts found by 
the judge in the lower court and the inferences that can be drawn from them.
The Court of Appeal (Civil Division) rarely rejects a finding by a trial judge of specific or 
primary facts, especially when the finding is based on the credibility or bearing of a 
witness. However, as a result of the Civil Division’s powers to draw inferences from 
facts,65 it is willing to form an independent opinion of the proper inferences to be drawn
61 Section 19, and reaffirmed by section 79(3) of the Supreme Court Act 1981.
62 Supreme Court Act 1981, section 48.
63 R.S.C. Ord. 59, r. 3.
64 R.S.C. Ord. 59 r10 stated that no such further evidence shall be admitted ‘except on special grounds.’ The 
common law has also provided restrictions which are that it must be shown that the evidence could not have 
been obtained with reasonable diligence for use at the trial; the evidence must be such that it would probably 
have an important influence on the result of the case and it must be credible offence. See Ladd v Marshall 
[1954] 1 W LR 1489; Skone v Skone [1971] 1 WLR 812; Sutcliffe v Pressdram Ltd [1991] 1 QB 153.
65 R.S.C. Ord 59 r 10.
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from the specific or primary facts found by the trial judge (Jacob 1987, p. 234). In 
Saunders vAdderley, the Privy Council stated:
‘It is well established that an appellate court should not disturb the findings of 
fact of the trial judge when his findings depend upon his assessment of the 
credibility of the witnesses which he has had the advantage of seeing and 
hearing -  an advantage denied to the appellate court. However, when the 
question is what inferences are to be drawn from specific facts an appellate 
court is in as good a position to evaluate the evidence as the trial judge.'
The burden of showing that a trial judge was wrong in a finding of fact lies on the 
appellant and if the Court of Appeal is not satisfied that he was wrong, the appeal will be 
dismissed.67 This will be more difficult where the finding of fact depends on the 
assessment of the credibility of witnesses, although the Civil Division of the Court of 
Appeal has been empowered to reach its own conclusions based on the evidence. In 
Coghlan v Cumberland,68 Sir Nathaniel Lindley M.R. stated:
‘Even where....the appeal turns on a question of fact, the Court has to bear in 
mind that its duty is to rehear the case, and the Court must reconsider the 
materials before the judge, with such materials as it may have decided to admit. 
The Court must then make up its own mind, not disregarding the judgment 
appealed from but carefully weighing and considering it, and not shrinking from 
overruling it if on full consideration it comes to the conclusion that it is wrong.'
In 1996, the Bowman Committee, (Bowman Committee, 1997) was set up to carry out a 
full review of the Civil Division of the Court of Appeal because of an increasing number 
of applications and appeals which had resulted in long delays in the hearing of appeals. 
The recommendations they made were ‘to ensure that the Civil Division deals with cases 
of an appropriate weight for a Court consisting of senior and very experienced judges’ 
and ‘to improve the way the Civil Division works so that it can deal with its caseload 
more quickly.’ As a result of these recommendations and Lord Woolf’s Access to Justice 
report, amendments were made to the role and powers of the Civil Division of the Court 
(see Nobles and Schiff, 2002, p. 676, 684-689).
Under the Civil Procedure Rules, every civil appeal will now be limited to a ‘review’ of the 
decision of the lower court unless a practice direction makes different provision for a 
particular category of appeal, or unless the Court considers that in the circumstances of 
an individual appeal it would be in the interests of justice to hold a rehearing.69 The 
appeal court still has the power to draw any inference of fact it considers justified on the
66 Sir John Balcombe, Saunders v Adderley [1999] 1 WLR 884, 889, citing Dominion Trust Co v New York 
Insurance Co [1919] AC 254; Benmax v Austin Motor Co Ltd [1955] 1 AC 370; Whitehouse v Jordan [1981] 1 
WLR 246. See Andrews, 2003, p. 907.
67 Norman v King [1946] 1 All ER 339.
68 [1898] 1 Ch. 704.
69 CPR, r 52.11(1).
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evidence70 but unless it orders otherwise, the appeal court will not receive oral evidence 
or evidence which was not before the lower court.71 The appeal court will only allow an 
appeal where the decision of the lower court was wrong or unjust because of a serious 
procedural or other irregularity in the proceedings in the lower court.72 In assessing 
these changes, Brook LJ in Tanfern Ltd v Cameron-MacDonald stated ‘under the new 
practice, the decision of the lower court will attract much greater significance. The 
appeal court’s duty is now limited to a review of that decision, and it may only interfere in 
the quite limited circumstances set out in CPR, r 52.11(3).’73 Although the changes that 
the Civil Procedure Rules have brought about are more restrictive than previously, in 
terms of limiting the majority of appeals to a review of the trial judge’s decision and only 
allowing oral evidence and new evidence in very limited circumstances, the general 
powers of the Civil Division remain wide and extensive. It has all the powers of the 
lower court74 and it has the power to affirm, set aside or vary any order or judgment 
made or given by the lower court75 including the power to order a new trial or hearing.76
In contrast to appeals from magistrates’ courts and appeals to the Civil Division of the 
Court of Appeal, the role and powers of the Criminal Division of the Court of Appeal are 
much more limited. This is illustrated by the speech of Lord Tucker in the Privy Council 
judgment of Aladesuru v The Queen77 in 1955, where he compared the civil and criminal 
systems of appeal:
‘It has long been established that the appeal is not by way of rehearing as in civil 
appeals from a judge sitting alone, but it is a limited appeal that precludes the 
court from reviewing the evidence and making its own evaluation thereof.’
And Lloyd LJ in R v Mcllkenny and others78 in 1991 further explained:
‘Like the criminal division, the civil division is also a creature of statute. But its 
powers are much wider. A civil appeal is by way of rehearing of the whole case. 
So the court is concerned with fact as well as law. It is true the court does not 
rehear the witnesses. But it reads their evidence. It follows that in a civil case 
the Court of Appeal may take a different view of the facts from the court below. 
In a criminal case this is not possible. Since justice is as much concerned with 
the conviction of the guilty as the acquittal of the innocent, and the task of 
convicting the guilty belongs constitutionally to the jury, not to us, the role of the 
criminal division of the Court of Appeal is necessarily limited. Hence it is true to 
say that whereas the civil division of the Court of Appeal has appellate
70 CPR, r 52.11(4).
71 CPR, r 52.11(2).
72 CPR, r 52.11(3).
73 [2000] 1 WLR 1311, 1317. See the House of Lords decision of Barber v Somerset County Council [2004] 
UKHL 13 for a conflicting decision on the role of the appeal court in terms of the circumstances in which it may 
interfere with the ruling of a trial judge.
74 CPR, r 52.10(1).
75 CPR, r 52.10(2)(a).
76 CPR, r52.10(2)(c).
77 39 Cr App R 184, 185.
78 (1991)93 Cr App R 287, 311.
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jurisdiction in the full sense, the criminal division is perhaps more accurately 
described as a court of review.’
The Justice Committee in 1964 acknowledged that ‘the court was not set up to re-try 
cases, but to ensure that the due forms of trial were properly observed’ (Justice, 1964, 
22). Leigh has stated that ‘the function of the Court is not to substitute itself for the jury 
but to decide whether the verdict is one which a properly instructed jury, acting judicially, 
could reasonably have rendered’ (Leigh, 1977, p.526). Similarly, Blom-Cooper has 
stated that ‘the Court of Appeal cannot substitute itself for the jury and re-try the case. 
That is not its function. It must oversee the fairness of the trial and satisfy itself that there 
was evidence on which the jury could properly convict’ (Blom-Cooper, 1997, p.8). 
Nobles and Schiff have argued that the process of review requires the Court of Appeal 
to identify how a conviction might have been constructed by the jury, rather than simply 
administering justice (or identifying miscarriages of justice) (Nobles and Schiff, 1997, 
301).
If the Criminal Division’s legally defined role as a court of review is to merely assess the 
fairness of the trial and whether there was evidence on which the jury could convict 
beyond all reasonable doubt, this makes it very difficult for injustice to be rectified as it 
precludes the Criminal Division from delving too deeply into factual issues and the 
merits of a case. This potentially explains why the Court is reluctant to assess factual 
issues and to hear fresh evidence on appeal as this would amount to a rehearing which 
is not its function. Therefore, it is not just the attitude of the judges to the jury, finality 
and resources that may have caused the problems associated with the Court as the way 
it was created in the first place lies at the heart of the issue. This can be illustrated 
further by looking at the process of review.
The process of review
The difficulties associated with the process of review can be broken down into three 
interlinked problems which are the preparation of appeals, the hearing of appeals and 
the burden and standard of proof on appeal. The decision making process of the Court 
was outlined by Sir Robin Auld in his review of the criminal courts (Auld, 2001). As Auld 
is a Court of Appeal judge, his review provided an insight into the working practices of 
the Court, which illustrates how problematic the decision making process can be.79
The preparation of appeals
Prior to the appeal each judge is provided with a bundle of papers which are prepared 
by the Criminal Appeal Office. This bundle consists of counsel’s advice on appeal, initial 
or draft grounds of appeal, ‘perfected’ grounds of appeal, a skeletal argument and a 
case summary prepared by the Criminal Appeal Office with a transcript of the evidence
79 For an analysis of Sir Robin’s proposals for the appellate process see Malleson and Roberts (2002).
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or summing up which is referred to (Auld, 2001, ch. 12, para. 77). The case summary 
consists of a summary of the essential facts of the case, its procedural history, the 
matters of which complaint is made, the grounds of appeal and brief references to any 
relevant law (Auld, 2000, ch. 12, para. 82). They are prepared by caseworkers who are 
lawyers in the Criminal Appeal Office and there has been criticism of some of these 
case summaries as illustrated by Michael Beckman QC:
‘As every practitioner is aware, these summaries can vary enormously in their 
quality, understanding and coverage. No doubt their intended purpose is to 
assist the court in the reading and comprehension of the papers concerned so 
that the maximum number of appeals can be dealt with efficiently in the 
minimum period of time’ (Beckman, 1997, p. 948).
The Court is currently sitting six courts at a time with a constitution of three in an attempt 
to clear the current backlog and the judges have four reading days in every three week 
period (Criminal Division annual report, 2007-8, para. 1.3). As Auld has stated ‘for each 
judge to prepare for each day involves much preparatory work, five or six hours 
preparation a day in addition to normal sitting hours, sometimes longer, and much of the 
weekend is not unusual’ (Auld, 2001, ch. 12, para. 79).The judges of each constitution 
usually receive their hearing papers from the Criminal Appeal Office about a week 
before the appeals are listed for hearing and are expected to read and digest them 
thoroughly before sitting in the appeal. The judge allotted the task of giving the judgment 
in each case will often need to prepare in advance some provisional notes of the 
relevant facts, issues and law as a reference for his judgment (Auld, 2001, ch. 12, para. 
82).
Auld himself has criticised this method of working. He stated:
Working at such speed gives the judges of the court little time to focus on 
anything but the application of the law to the particular facts before them. They 
usually meet for the first time to discuss each day’s list for about a quarter of an 
hour before going into court to hear and deal with it. It is thus difficult for them to 
apply and develop the law in a principled and consistent manner. Despite the 
Registrar’s introduction of machinery to alert one constitution of the Court to 
similar points that have arisen or are about to arise in another constitution, 
inconsistencies arise or anomalies develop because of the piecemeal and 
focused way in which the judges have to work. The system is capable, because 
of these inconsistencies and anomalies, of engendering wrong decisions at first 
instance and otherwise unnecessary appeals. This is a serious shortcoming in 
the main judicial institution in this country responsible for declaring and 
developing the criminal law as well as for applying it’ (Auld, 2001, ch. 12, para. 
84.).
And:
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‘the Court as it is presently constituted and in the volume of its work, is plainly 
overloaded. Even though its judges can cope -  just -  I do not see why they or 
those appearing in front of them or their respective clients should have to put up 
with it’ (para. 86).
As a consequence of this, Auld stated that the Court should be reorganised and 
reconstituted to enable it, first to concentrate on cases of general significance 'in which it 
can declare and develop the criminal law in a principled and more reflective way, so as 
to provide useful guidance to the courts below1 and second, ‘to apply well established 
principles or rules of law in a more consistent manner to correct errors and to ensure 
justice in individual cases’ (Auld, 2001, ch. 12, para. 87). He recommended that in cases 
where there was a point of law of general public importance or of particular complexity 
or of public interest the Court should consist of the Lord Chief Justice, or the Vice 
President or a Lord Justice and two High Court judges. But in straightforward appeals 
against conviction the Court should consist of two High Court judges or one High Court 
and one Circuit judge. He also stated that the Court should ‘slow down’ and more 
preparation and judgement writing time should be allowed to the judges as part of their 
sitting plan’ (para. 95). This appears to have been implemented as the Court have now 
been allocated four working days in every three week period which went up from three 
days recently (Criminal Division annual report, 2003, para. 2.2).
The hearing of the appeal may also cause potential problems for the appellant.
The hearing of appeals
Appeal hearings are generally very short and focused since the facts of the case and 
the main issues being raised have been set out in advance in the grounds of appeal and 
the case summary. Where the grounds of appeal are based on legal error, counsel will 
produce cases to support their arguments. The judges will often have read these in 
advance and they are usually dealt with relatively quickly (Malleson, 1997, p. 177). The 
normal procedure for a contested appeal is for the defence to present the arguments in 
support of the appeal and for the Crown to respond. The Court is quite willing to receive 
evidence informally during the hearing and to take short cuts to save time. The Crown 
will not be asked to reply to points which the Court finds unarguable and where, from 
their reading of the case papers in advance. And where the judges consider a defence 
argument overwhelming argument by the defence may be dispensed with. During the 
hearing the judges frequently interrupt counsel, test their arguments, focus their 
attention on doubtful points, and in the process reveal the trend of their own thinking 
(Pattenden, 1996, p. 120).
Malleson has argued (1997, p. 180) that the judges in the Court of Appeal see their role 
as being to direct counsel to the issues which they want to address. On appeal, counsel 
therefore has much less scope for presenting and developing arguments and so
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affecting the outcome of the decision than when presenting a case to the jury. The 
judges come to the appeal hearing having read the papers and having formed a 
preliminary view, and they see the role of counsel as being primarily to assist them in 
the process of clarifying, testing and challenging the issues which they have already 
identified. The judgment of the Court is given at the end of the appeal hearing which 
illustrates how much preparation the judges have done beforehand. As Malleson has 
stated:
‘in order to construct the judgment spontaneously at the close of the hearing the 
judges must be familiar with the issues and possible outcomes before the 
hearing begins. Although the exact decision or the detailed arguments put in 
court may not have been predictable beforehand, the judges are clearly in a 
position to have prepared, at least mentally, a significant proportion of the 
judgment before the hearing on the basis of the information provided in the 
papers, their readings and the discussions themselves.’ (1997, p. 181)
The Court will occasionally reserve judgment in order to write it up before it is delivered 
but this usually happens in the more complicated appeals against conviction such as 
references from the CCRC.
Auld acknowledged that there were disadvantages to this process. He stated:
The performance of the judges of the Court of Appeal, in their obvious 
familiarity with the facts and issues of law in the cases before them, and in the 
speed with which they dispatch them, often suggests to those in the court that 
they have made up their minds before hearing argument in the matter. I believe 
that, despite the rush, the judges are anxious to allow advocates to make their 
points and, if the points are good, are prepared to reconsider whatever 
provisional views they may have formed. But it does not always sound or feel 
like that to an unsuccessful advocate who has not been given an opportunity to 
develop his argument or to his client who may feel that his case has not 
received a full hearing’ (Auld, 2001, ch. 12, para. 85).
This was certainly the experience of Michael Beckman QC who wrote an article on one 
particular experience he had at the Court of Appeal. He stated that the oral hearing of 
the appeal had taken place in the usual way with two of the judges taking a reasonably 
active part in the questioning and the third judge taking very little part. The hearing was 
reasonably courteous throughout but when the argument ended the judges did not 
depart to chambers but had a brief discussion amongst themselves in court and the 
third judge then gave the judgment. Beckman states:
‘It was manifestly clear that the judgment had been prepared before argument. 
None of the specific points raised were addressed. There was a clear factual 
error which never could have been made had the argument been listened to 
and digested. Both appeal against conviction and sentence were dismissed in a 
host of generalities.’ (Beckman, 1997, p. 948)
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Auld has recommended that ‘more time should be allowed to advocates to deploy their 
arguments and to the judges to consider the issues together in an unhurried way before 
and after argument’ (Auld, 2001, para. 95) but as the workload of the Court is currently 
so heavy it is doubtful that this would be implemented.
Auld’s review of the appellate process clearly shows that there are problems with the 
decision making process of the appeal. There are further potential problems for the 
appellant that relate to the burden and standard of proof.
The burden and standard of proof
One of the most confusing aspects of the appeal process can be determining where the 
burden of proof lies and how the standard of proof operates. This issue is not stipulated 
in legislation and the case law has remained largely silent on the matter. It would appear 
that the burden of proof is reversed on appeal. Malleson has argued that ‘in most 
appeals the initial burden lies with the appellant who brings the case and so must prove 
it by persuading the judges that the conviction is unsafe' (1997, p. 184).80 This is 
supported by case law; Stuart-Smith LJ in R v Maguire and others81 stated that there 
was a ‘persuasive onus’ on the appellant ‘to argue his grounds in order to persuade us 
to think that a verdict is unsafe and unsatisfactory.’ Similarly, Lord Hobhouse in R v 
Pendleton,82 in relation to the current test for quashing convictions, stated ‘the appellant 
has to discharge a burden of persuasion and persuade the Court of Appeal that the 
conviction is unsafe.’
This reversal of the burden of proof appeared to be criticised by Lord Scarman during 
the passage of the Criminal Appeal Bill in 1995:
The Court of Appeal -  and this is perhaps not always understood -  inevitably 
reverses the burden of proof. ...In an appeal against a conviction, the appellant 
goes first and put his case. The Crown, the prosecutor, responds. When new 
facts are considered by the Court and a ruling is made upon them by the court, 
the defendant appellant has to prove his case on the new facts. He now has to 
go first. The Crown answers. He no doubt has a reply, but he has to make the 
going. Where has the presumption of innocence gone? Where indeed, do we 
find the accused? He is attempting to establish a defence whereas if he was in 
the court of first instance, the evidence would be led by the Crown and he would 
have a presumption of innocence, with the burden of proof resting steadily on 
the Crown.'83
Whilst this, and the case law, would appear to be authority that the burden of proof is 
indeed reversed on appeal, the operation of the standard of proof can also cause 
difficulties for appellants. If the normal criminal standard of proof applies then it would
80 See also James , 1983, p. 156; Nobles and Schiff, 2000, p. 70; Pattenden, 1996, pp. 176-178.
81 [1992] 2 All ER 433, 442.
82 [2002] 1 WLR 72, 90.
83 H.L. Debs, 8 June 1995, col. 1497-1498.
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appear that the appellant has to prove either by new evidence or argument that there is 
a doubt as to the safety of the conviction. This presumably operates on the minds of the 
judges to quash the conviction if there is a reasonable doubt about the guilt of the 
appellant. However, what is not clear is how the judges decide this. For example, do the 
judges have to have a reasonable doubt or do they decide that the original jury would 
have had a reasonable doubt. This can create problems for fresh evidence appeals 
particularly when the judges have to view the fresh evidence in the light of the evidence 
given at trial. In lurking doubt appeals, it is presumably the judges themselves who have 
to have a reasonable doubt as the appellant is asking the judges to subjectively assess 
the evidence.
If the judges are deciding the appeal on the basis that there is a reasonable doubt about 
the guilt of the appellant, it is not clear how the judges are deciding the conviction is 
unsafe as a result of a procedural irregularity where they may be satisfied of the guilt of 
the appellant. This may be explained by Pattenden who has argued that where an 
appeal indirectly impugns the jury’s finding of guilt, as in appeals where there has been 
a procedural irregularity, the defence must satisfiy the Court that an error occurred 
which was of such dimensions that the ground for allowing the appeal is made out (the 
conviction is unsafe under the current test) (Pattenden 1996, p. 178). She states that 
this is not normally discussed in terms of the burden of proof which may explain why the 
standard of proof is not clear in those appeals.
The language used by the judges to describe the burden and standard of proof is also 
confusing. The persuasive burden is normally known as the legal burden and in the 
course of a trial if the legal burden of proof is on the defence then the standard of proof 
is on the balance of probabilities. If the judges are using the term ‘persuasive’ to mean 
legal burden then it is not clear from this whether the appellant has to prove the 
conviction is unsafe in terms of a reasonable doubt or on the balance of probabilities. 
But whatever the standard of proof used, the fact that the burden is on the defendant to 
persuade the judges that the conviction is unsafe can be a daunting task, especially 
considering that it appears some of the judges may have made up their minds before 
the appeal has even begun as discussed above.
The operation of the burden and standard of proof will be analysed in subsequent 
chapters relating to individual grounds of appeal.
Summary
The literature reviewed in this chapter shows that the Court’s deference to the jury 
verdict and its reverence for the principle of finality has had a major impact on its role of 
overturning convictions. The evidence for this has come not only from empirical studies,
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but also from the various committees that have been set up over the years to review the 
Court’s powers. Whilst the impact jury deference and the principle of finality have had is 
fairly clear in the sense of the Court using them to uphold convictions, what is more 
debateable is whether the impact on the Court has been an overly restrictive one. The 
consensus from the academic literature and from the various committees is that the 
Court has adopted a restrictive approach and it has proven too reluctant to quash 
convictions. But as discussed, in the absence of a tried and tested method of measuring 
whether more convictions should be quashed, the evidence of a restrictive approach 
remains speculative even if it appears to be overwhelming by the sheer number of 
different sources that have made the same allegations. As Pattenden has argued, the 
difficulties in assessing the Court’s approach are largely down to the inconsistencies of 
its decision making in defining its role and the balancing exercise it has to perform. The 
Court has to balance the competing values of justice on the one hand and the 
constraints of resources and the need for finality on the other on a day to day basis and 
assigning bench marks as to how this can be evaluated is very difficult. However, 
despite the problems of defining a bench mark by which to measure the Court’s 
performance, and the difficulties associated with the ‘exceptional’ appeals, this thesis will 
adopt the view that the consensus is largely correct in citing the Court being too 
restrictive in its role of correcting miscarriages of justice.
With that in mind, this thesis argues that the problems associated with the Court are 
caused by three interlinked problems. Firstly, the statute that created the Court initially 
created a court of review which was unique and in contrast to both civil appeals and 
appeals from magistrates’ courts. This has prevented the Court from delving too deeply 
into jury decision making since as its function is not to retry the case, the Court feels that 
decisions of fact are for the jury alone.
The second problem is the decision making process itself. The fact that the Court reads 
all the papers beforehand and generally only reads a transcript of the judge’s summing 
up does not give it a full picture of what has gone on before. The result is because its 
review function is limited, it is not even an effective court of review. The judges are not 
given much time to read all the papers and get to grips with all the issues.
The third problem is the burden of proof on appeal. As the Court reads all the 
documents beforehand it is suggested that it comes to its prima facie decision before the 
appeal has even begun. As the burden of proof is on the appellant to persuade the Court 
that the conviction is unsafe, this makes it very difficult for the appellant and counsel to 
change the minds of the judges. The fact that the judgment is given shortly after the 
appeal ends, indicates that the Court rarely does change its mind.
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The case law in the subsequent chapters will be analysed in order to determine what 
approach the Court takes to its powers and whether there is evidence of a restrictive 
approach to determining the appeal. In chapter four, the general findings from the 2002 
sample of cases will be evaluated and compared to Malleson’s sample from 1990. There 
will also be an analysis of the workload and success rate of the Court in order to provide 
a general picture of the Court’s practices. A more detailed analysis of the Court’s 
decision-making process will be provided in later chapters.
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CHAPTER FOUR: GENERAL APPROACHES OF 
THE COURT OF APPEAL
As stated in previous chapters, there have only been four major studies conducted using 
the judgments of the Court of Appeal since its creation in 1907 (Ross 1911, Seaborne- 
Davies 1949, Knight 1970 and Malleson 1993). The last study was conducted over 
fifteen years ago by Kate Malleson for the RCCJ prior to the enactment of the Criminal 
Appeal Act 1995. Since then much has changed in the criminal appeal landscape. 
Empirical research is therefore required in order to determine what the current practice 
of the Court is. This study did not set out to prove whether the RCCJ’s recommendations 
and subsequent Criminal Appeal Act have made a difference (as discussed in chapter 
two). Instead, it sought to provide an indication of similarities and differences in court 
practice when compared with Malleson’s 1993 study and to provide some possible 
explanations for any differences. This chapter outlines the general findings of the 
research I have conducted and compares those findings with the general findings from 
Malleson’s study. It also outlines the general approaches the Court of Appeal uses to 
determine appeals against conviction. The subsequent chapters will analyse the Court’s 
powers individually.
As discussed in chapter two a research study was undertaken on the RCCJ’s behalf by 
Kate Malleson which was designed to ‘examine the practices of the Court of Appeal in 
order to determine how it interprets and applies its powers’ (Malleson, 1993, p.1). In 
order to carry out this research, Malleson reviewed the first 300 appeals of 1990 and her 
methodology was to analyse each judgment separately and gather information on the 
grounds of appeal, the approach of the Court to the case, and the result of the appeal.84 
Where the Court commented on relevant issues such as fresh evidence or the ‘lurking 
doubt’ principle, these were recorded in order to obtain both qualitative and quantitative 
information on the Court’s powers. As outlined in chapter two, I replicated the study 
using the same methodology and reviewed the first 300 available appeals of 2002.
As well as replicating the Malleson study, I added an additional element to the research 
which was not undertaken by Malleson in her study. I gathered information on the 
different approaches the Court uses to determine the appeal. The different approaches 
used were quantified in order to analyse the decision making processes of the Court and 
these will be outlined in this chapter.85 This provides new data and new insights into the 
decision making of the Court. It also contributes to the originality of the PhD.
84 See Appendix One for the data collection form.
85 See Appendix Two for the form used to gather this information.
55
Before the general findings of both studies are compared it is necessary to analyse the 
figures in relation to the workload and success rate of appeals against conviction in 
order to provide a general picture of the Court’s working practices.
The workload and success rate of the Court of Appeal
The figures relating to the workload and success rate of the Court of Appeal are collated 
annually by the Ministry of Justice (formerly the Department for Constitutional Affairs). 
The statistics for 1990, 2002 and 2006 are reviewed below. These years were selected 
for examination to coincide with the sample from Malleson’s study, the sample from the 
replicated study, and the latest figures currently available, in order to compare and 
contrast the Court’s workload and success rate. This may help to understand any impact 
the Criminal Appeal Act 1995 may have had on the Court of Appeal.
In 1990, there were 1,705 applications received by the Court of Appeal and of those 
1,452 (85%)86 had their applications for leave to appeal considered by the single judge. 
Of those 1,452 considered, 443 (31%) were granted leave to appeal with 1,009 (69%) 
rejected. Of the 1,009 rejected, 429 (43%) of appellants renewed their applications for 
leave to appeal. And of these (429), 101 (24%) were granted leave to appeal to the full 
court. Finally, of those 593 appeals against conviction heard by the full court, 256 (43%) 
were successful with 337 (57%) dismissed (Judicial Statistics, 1999).
These figures can be compared with those from 2002. In 2002, there were 1,914 
applications received by the Court of Appeal which was a rise of 175 compared to 1990. 
Of those 1,914, 1,739 (91%) had their applications for leave considered by the single 
judge. Of those 1,739 considered, 405 (23%) were granted leave to appeal with 1,334 
(77%) rejected. Of those 1,334 rejected, 457 (34%) renewed their applications for leave 
to appeal. Of those 457 who renewed their applications, 140 (31%) were granted leave 
to the full court. There were 485 appeals against conviction heard by the full court and 
166 (34%) were successful with 319 (6 6 %) dismissed (Judicial Statistics, 2005). These 
figures are in the table below.
86 The 15% not considered by the single judge can be explained by a number of factors such as the application 
may have been abandoned, and the Registrar of the Criminal Division has the power to refer cases directly to 
the full court where the circumstances of the appeal require it or the trial judge issues a certificate that the case 
is fit for appeal under section 1 (2)(b) Criminal Appeal Act 1968. The Registrar may refer cases directly to the 
Court, for example, when urgent guidance may be needed on a particular point of law. This occurred in the 
following cases regarding bad character provisions in the Criminal Justice Act 2003: R v Hanson and others 
[2005] EWCA Crim 824; R v Bovell and Dowds [2005] EWCA Crim 1091; R v Edwards and others [2005] 
EWCA Crim 1813; R v Highton and others [2005] EWCA Crim 1985 .
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Table 4.1: Workload and success rate of the Court of Appeal in 1990 and 2002
YEAR N 1990 %of
applic’ns
1990
N 2002 %of
applic’ns
2002
Applications received 1705 1 0 0 % 1914 (1 0 0 %)
Applications considered by a single 1452 1 0 0 % 1739 1 0 0 %
judge (85% of (91% of
total) total)
Leave granted 443 31% 405 23%
Leave rejected 1009 69% 1334 77%
Renewed applications to appeal 429 1 0 0 % 457 1 0 0 %
(43% of (34% of
total) total)
Leave granted after renewed 1 0 1 24% 140 31%
application
Appeals* 593 1 0 0 % 485 1 0 0 %
Appeal successful 256 43% 166 34%
Appeal unsuccessful 337 57% 319 6 6 %
*Not all of these appeals are ones resulting from applications made in the year stated. Some will 
be applications made in a previous year but heard the next.
The conclusions that can be drawn from these figures are that although there were 209 
more applications received in 2002 than in 1990, fewer applicants (in percentage terms) 
were granted leave to appeal in 2002. Fewer applicants renewed their applications for 
leave in 2002 but more applicants were granted leave to the full Court in 2002 after 
renewing the application to appeal than in 1990. These figures are contradictory but 
what is clear is that there were fewer successful appeals in 2002 than in 1990 with a 
drop of 9% (appeal outcomes are discussed in more detail below).
The latest figures available for 2006 show there were 1,596 applications which is a drop 
of 318 applications from 2002. Of those 1,596, 1,134 (71%) had their applications for 
leave considered by the single judge. Of those 1,134 considered, 291 (26%) were 
granted leave to appeal with 843 (74%) rejected. Of those 843 rejected, 481 (57%) 
renewed their applications for leave to appeal. Of those 481 who renewed their 
applications, 137 (28%) were granted leave to the full court. There were 572 appeals 
against conviction heard by the full court and 181 (32%) were successful with 391 (6 8 %) 
dismissed (Judicial Statistics, 2006). This is outlined in the table below:
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Table 4.2: Workload and success rate of the Court of Appeal in 1990, 2002 and
2006
YEAR N 1990 % of N 2002 % of N 2006 % of
&% applic’ns & % of applic’ns &% applic’ns
total 1990 total 2002 total 2006
Applications 1705 1 0 0 % 1914 1 0 0 % 1596 1 0 0 %
received
Applications 1452 1 0 0 % 1739 1 0 0 % 1134 1 0 0 %
considered (85%) (91%) (71%)
Leave granted 443 31% 405 23% 291 26%
Leave rejected 1009 69% 1334 77% 843 74%
Renewed
applications to 429 1 0 0 % 457 1 0 0 % 481 1 0 0 %
appeal (43%) (34%) (57%)
Leave granted
(renewed 1 0 1 24% 140 31% 137 28%
application)
Appeals* 593 1 0 0 % 485 1 0 0 % 572 1 0 0 %
Appeal 256 43% 166 34% 181 32%
successful
Appeal 337 57% 319 6 6 % 391 6 8 %
unsuccessful
*Not all of these appeals are ones resulting from applications made in the year stated. Some will 
be applications made in a previous year but heard the next.
These figures show there was a 20% drop between 2002 and 2006 in applications to the 
Court being considered by the single judge. An interpretation of this figure is that more 
appeals are being abandoned and/or there are more appeals where leave is not 
required. These could either be referrals by the Registrar to the full court or referrals 
from the Criminal Cases Review Commission which do not require leave. The figures for 
leave granted are similar between 2002 and 2006 with 23% and 26% respectively but 
there appears to be a big increase in those renewing their applications for leave with 
34% in 2002 and 57% in 2006.
The big increase in the numbers renewing their applications for leave is having a real 
impact on the workload of the Court. This has had a number of consequences. The 
Court of Appeal (Criminal Division) annual report for April 2001 to March 20028 7  
indicated that the average waiting time during that period was 1 2 . 2  months for appeals 
against conviction. The annual report for 2002 to 2003 showed that things had got 
worse. The average waiting time over the year was 14.5 months and in relation to the 
increase in the number of renewed applications for leave to appeal, Lord Woolf stated 
‘this additional work represents considerable additional pressure upon already stretched 
judicial and administrative resources’ (para. 2.14). The annual report for 2003 to 2004 
showed that the waiting times peaked at 15.2 months in September 2003 but had
87 Available from the Court Service website.
See http://www.hmcourts-service.gov.uk/cms/1497.htm.
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reduced slightly to 14.7 months by September 2004. The 2004 to 200588 report showed 
there had been a slight decrease in waiting times for appeals against conviction from 
14.7 months to 14.1 months (para. 1.8) and the report for 2005 to 200689 indicated the 
waiting time had further been reduced to 12 months (para 1.7). The downward trend 
continued in 2006 to 200790 with a further reduction down to 10.9 months (para 1.3) but 
the latest annual report for 2007-891 shows there has been an increase of waiting times 
to 11.1 months. This suggests that the workload of the Court has got heavier over the 
last year.
The number renewing their applications to appeal is only one factor which affects the 
Court’s workload. There are a number of other factors such as the complexity of cases, 
the efficiency of the parties involved and the extent of judicial and administrative 
resources to cope with the demand. In the annual report 2005-6, Lord Phillips stated that 
there was evidence that cases were becoming more complex and that references from 
the Criminal Cases Review Commission tended to be the most complex (Annual Report, 
2005-6, para. 1.3-1.4). Therefore, the number of references from the CCRC has a major 
impact on the workload of the Court. The workload of the judiciary also has an impact. 
Lord Justices of Appeal have a number of administrative duties, such as sitting on the 
Judicial Appointments Committee, which impacts on their availability to hear appeals. 
They may also be needed in other courts. The Court of Appeal usually sits in six 
constitutions which had to be reduced to five during 2008 because a constitution had to 
be released to sit in the Administrative Court which was overburdened during that time 
(Annual Report, 2007-8, para. 1.13). Again, this illustrates the competing demands 
facing Court of Appeal judges, and also goes to the matter of judicial and administrative 
resources available to address potential wrongful convictions.
There has also been an increase in recent years in the duties of the Court. For example, 
the Court has to deal with a number of interlocutory appeals under section 9 of the 
Criminal Justice Act 1987, section 35 of the Criminal Procedure and Investigations Act 
1996 and Part 9 of the Criminal Justice Act 2003. These appeals can be very disruptive 
to the Court’s schedule as they may have to be listed at short notice. The Court also has 
to deal with applications under the Proceeds of Crime Act, Part 10 of the Criminal 
Justice Act, references by the Attorney General in relation to acquittals and sentences 
(section 36 of the Criminal Justice Act 1988), and appeals under the sentencing 
provisions under the Criminal Justice Act 2003. This list is not exhaustive but provides
88 The Court of Appeal Criminal Division Annual Review October 2004 to September 2005. Available from 
http://www.hmcourtsservice.gov.uk/cms/files/crim_div_review_2004_05.pdf.
89 The Court of Appeal Criminal Division Annual Review October 2005 to September 2006. Available from 
http://www.judiciary.gov.uk/docs/judgments_guidance/coareview2005-6.pdf.
90 The Court of Appeal Criminal Division Annual Review October 2006 to September 2007. Available from 
http://www.judiciary.gov.uk/docs/coareview2006-7.pdf.
91 The Court of Appeal Criminal Division Annual Review October 2007 to September 2008. Available from 
https://www.hmcourtsservice.gov.uk/cms/files/Criminal_Division_Review_2007-08_web.pdf.
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an indication of the workload of the Court in addition to deciding appeals against 
conviction. It also decides on appeals against sentence which often have to be 
prioritised so the appellant does not serve his/her sentence before the appeal is heard.
A further indication of the performance of the Court is the success rates for appeals. As 
table 4.2 shows, the success rate for appeals in 1990 was 43% (based on the total of 
appeals finally decided by the Court). This can be compared to 2002 when the success 
rate had dropped to 34%. The success rate in 2006 was very similar to 2002 and had 
dropped to 32%. The graph below shows the success rate of appeals from 1990 to 
2006.92
Graph 4.1: Appeals allowed 1990 to 2006 (percentages of appeals decided by the
Court)
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This possibly confirms the views of those during the debates on the CAA 1995 that the 
Court of Appeal was going through a liberal phase in the early 1990s93 as evidenced by 
the higher percentage of convictions quashed. They argued that the Court was more 
inclined to quash convictions during this period. It also possibly shows that the Criminal 
Appeal Act 1995 had an immediate impact on the number of convictions quashed as 
1996, 1997 and 1998 all show an increase in convictions quashed after a dip in 1995. 
But the Court has arguably adopted a more restrictive approach since then resulting in 
fewer appeals being quashed.
The potentially restrictive approach could also be illustrated by an examination of the 
number of applications to the Court. It could be argued that the so-called liberal phase 
encouraged more applicants to appeal, a restrictive phase would likewise do the
92 Figures taken from Judicial Statistics 2000  and Judicial and Court Statistics 2006.
93 See chapter one.
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reverse. The graph below shows the number of applications to the Court over the period 
1990 to 2006.
Graph 4.2: Applications for leave to appeal 1990 to 2006
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This graph shows that there was a steady increase in applications to the Court from 
1990 when there were 1,705, to a high of 2,393 in 1995. Since 1995 there has been a 
steady decrease in the number of applications to appeal to the current figure of 1,596 
applications in 2006. The volume of defendants appealing to the Court is guided by a 
number of factors. For example, in the 1960s there had been an almost five-fold 
increase in the workload of the Court since it was created which was ‘as a result of the 
volume of crime and prosecutions.’94 And in the late 1960s a recommendation by the 
Widgery Committee (1966) on Legal Aid, that each prison should provide information to 
prisoners on appeal, resulted in 12,000 applications being received in 1970. This was a 
sharp rise when compared with the average figure of 2,500 in the 1960s. But the Court’s 
attitude itself is undoubtedly a factor as the rise in 1970 could also have been a 
response to the Court’s new powers in the 1968 Act and a supposedly more liberal 
approach as illustrated by the Court’s decision in Cooper. The steady rise in applications 
to the Court from 1,705 applications received in 1990 to a peak of 2,393 in 1995 could 
arguably have been a response to the high profile convictions of the Guildford Four and 
the Birmingham Six being quashed.95 Since then, under the stewardship of Lord 
Bingham CJ and Lord Woolf CJ respectively there has been a steady decline in 
applications with 1,596 received in 2006 96
94 Attorney General, H.L. Debs, 11 July 1966, col. 1108.
95 Judicial and Court Statistics 2006, table 1.6. In an interview in The Guardian, Lord Taylor stated that the 
publicity accompanying the successful appeals produced a 26%  increase in the number of appeals received in 
the first five months of 1992, compared with the same period in 1991 (20 July 1992).
96 Judicial and Court Statistics 2006, table 1.6.
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One possible conclusion from these figures is that rather than encapsulating the Court’s 
apparent liberal approach in the early 1990s, the changes in the Criminal Appeal Act 
1995 have resulted in it taking a more restrictive approach. This would explain the 
steady decline in both applications and appeals allowed since the early 1990s. It could 
be argued that there may be a correlation between these figures in that fewer 
applications may lead to a lower success rate, but in 1990, there were 1,705 
applications with a success rate of 43% against 1,914 applications with a 34% success 
rate in 2002. This shows that the success rate of appeals is not necessarily affected by 
the number of applications to the Court. However, there may be a relationship between 
the number of applications to the Court and the success rate of appeals as a lower 
success rate may deter defendants from appealing.
There is no obvious reason as to why the CAA 1995 would have resulted in fewer 
applications and a lower success rate. The changes in the law did not make it more 
procedurally or legally difficult to appeal. But there may have been a change in judicial 
attitudes. This can be examined further by evaluating the general findings from the 
research conducted on the judgments of the Court. The research conducted by Kate 
Malleson for the RCCJ will now be analysed and compared to the replicated study from 
2002.
The 1990 and 2002 sample findings
In Malleson’s study of the first 300 appeals of 1990, 216 (72%) were full appeals and 
eighty-four (28%) were renewed applications for leave to appeal, forty-seven (16%) of 
which were own grounds. 9 7  Just over one third of the appeal grounds reviewed were 
allowed (102 (34%)). This is set out in the table below:
97 These are appeals where the applicant/appellant has drafted their own grounds of appeal.
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Table 4.3: Grounds of appeal of cases before the Court of Appeal (Criminal
Division) January to July 1990
Total no. of cases: 300 Total no. of grounds: 32998
Grounds Allowed Dismissed/
Refused
Adj’d %
of total
Misdirection on the law or evidence 42 67 4 35%
Poor/unbalanced summing up 16 22 4 13%
Evidence wrongly included/excluded 8 26 3 11%
Inconsistent verdicts 8 9 0 5%
No case to answer 7 16 0 7%
Weak ID evidence 2 4 1 2%
Jury irregularity 2 9 0 3%
Fresh evidence 5 15 3 7%
Generally unsafe and unsatisfactory 2 4 1 2%
No Jurisdiction 2 0 0 1%
Co-D should have been tried separately 1 1 0 1%
Equivocal plea 0 4 0 1%
Counsel’s errors 0 9 0 3%
Prejudiced trial 0 2 1 1%
Other 4 10 0 4%
Not specified 2 10 2 4%
TOTAL o c c 208 19 100%
In the replicated study of the first 300 available appeals of 2002, 179 (60%) were full 
appeals and 121 (40%) were renewed applications for leave to appeal, fifty-one (17%) of 
which were own grounds. There were seventy-six appeal grounds allowed (25%). See 
table below:
98 There are more grounds than appeals because some appeals raised more than one ground.
99 These cases are adjourned for a full hearing being renewed applications for leave to appeal.
100 There is an error in the table. The total says 102 but the figures add up to 101.
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Table 4.4: Grounds of appeal of available101 cases before the Court of Appeal
(Criminal Division) January to May 2002
Total no. of cases: 300 Total no. of grounds: 641
Grounds Allowed Dismissed)
Refused
' Adj’d %
of total
Misdirection on the law or evidence 28 113 5 23%
Defective/unbalanced summing up 1 0 78 4 14%
Evidence wrongly included/excluded 5 65 5 1 2 %
Fresh evidence 9 26 1 6 %
No case to answer 0 34 0 5%
Non-disclosure of evidence 
Trial should have been withdrawn or 
adjourned or stayed as an abuse
0 23 1 4%
of process 0 23 0 4%
Unfair trial/breach of Article 6 0 2 2 0 3%
Inconsistent/perverse verdicts 2 1 2 1 2 %
Judge unfairly intervened 5 7 2 2 %
Prosecution errors 1 9 0 2 %
Police malpractice 3 8 0 2 %
Lawyer error 0 1 0 0 2 %
Jury should have been discharged 0 9 0 1 %
Weak/insufficient evidence 2 6 0 1 %
Generally unsafe (including lurking doubt)1 
Counts should have been severed/
6 0 1 %
Withdrawn 1 7 0 1 %
Biased tribunal 0 7 0 1 %
Previous convictions incorrectly admitted 1 3 1 1 %
Jury irregularity 0 5 0 1 %
Breaches of Human Rights Act1 0 2  
Judge did not adequately answer
0 5 0 1 %
jury question 0 4 0 1 %
Pressure to plead guilty 
Indictment should not have been
0 3 0 0 %
amended 0 3 0 0 %
Other1 0 3 8 54 3 1 0 %
TOTAL 76 542 23 1 0 0 %
There are a number of obvious differences between the two samples. The first 
difference is that the number of full appeals is larger in the 1990 sample than the 2002 
sample. These are appeals where leave has been granted by the single judge and the 
full court of three judges has adjudicated on the appeal. In 1990, there were 216 with 
179 in 2002. These figures tally with the general picture discussed above for the years 
1990 and 2002. In 1990, 443 (from 1,705 applications) appeals were granted leave to 
appeal with 405 (from 1,914 applications) in 2002. This therefore, shows that more
101 Cases obtained from Casetrack as discussed in chapter two. Some of the cases were not available as they 
were subject to reporting restrictions.
102 These are breaches other than Article 6.
103 This category was largely own grounds appeals where the applicant/appellant had drafted his own grounds 
which did not fit into any of the other areas. They tended to be issues of fact that were within the remit of the 
jury and the Court largely dismissed them.
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appeals were granted leave in 1990 (despite fewer applications), in keeping with the 
higher figure of full appeals in Malleson’s sample and the lower figure in this study.
The second difference in the two samples is that there is a lower figure of renewed 
applications in the 1990 sample than in 2002. In 1990, there were eighty-four renewed 
applications with 121 in 2002. Again, these figures seem to tally with the general picture 
for 1990 and 2002. In 1990, 429 renewed their applications for leave to appeal with 457 
in 2002. This therefore shows that more defendants renewed their applications to appeal 
in 2 0 0 2  which explains the higher figure of renewed applications in the 2 0 0 2  sample.
The third difference is the number of grounds of appeal argued, as indicated in tables 
4.3 and 4.4. Although both samples had 300 judgments, there is a big difference in the 
number of grounds of appeal between the samples. Malleson had 329 grounds from 300 
judgments and the 2002 sample had 641 from the same number of judgments. It could 
be argued that applicants/appellants as of 2 0 0 2  were arguing more grounds per appeal 
under the new safety test than they necessarily would have done under the old test.
In addition, as can be seen from the 2002 sample, a larger number of different types of 
grounds are argued than in the 1990 sample. This may indicate that the new test 
encompasses a wider variety of grounds than were argued under the old test. It would 
appear that the RCCJ’s aim in recommending the new test ‘[to] give the Court the 
flexibility to consider all categories of appeal’ has been achieved and that, as table 4.4 
demonstrates, the Court is considering a wider variety of grounds than previously in 
table 4.3.
However, the rise in the number of grounds may also be explained by the large number 
of changes in the law between 1990 and 2002. For example, the enactment of the 
Human Rights Act 1998 makes it much more likely that there would be an increase in 
human rights arguments. This explains why these appeals appear in the 2002 sample 
but not as a separate category in the 1990 sample. There are other pieces of legislation 
which may also have had an impact include the right to silence provisions in the Criminal 
Justice and Public Order Act 1994 and the disclosure provisions in the Criminal 
Procedure and Investigations Act 1996. There has also been a huge rise in the number 
of criminal offences created under the Labour Government with more than 3,600 alleged 
to have been created overall (this figure is disputed because some of these crimes will 
be amendments to existing crimes) . 1 0 4  These new offences would not all have been tried
104 See Morris, N ‘More Than 3,600 New Offences Under Labour, The Independent, 4 September 2008. 
Available from http://www.independent.co.uk/news/uk/home-news/more-than-3600-new-offences-under- 
labour-918053.html. For a discussion on the Labour Government’s policies on the criminal justice system see 
Solomon, E et al (2007).
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in the Crown Court, and therefore not all would be eligible to appeal to the Court of 
Appeal, but they may have had an impact on the number of grounds to appeal.
The increase in the number of grounds may also be explained by the creation of the 
Criminal Cases Review Commission, which has the power to refer cases back to the 
Court of Appeal. The CCRC was created by the Criminal Appeal Act 1995 and began 
work on the 1 April 1997. The referrals, therefore, will be a factor in the 2002 sample but 
not in the 1990 sample. These are cases that have usually been through the appeal 
process and failed but the CCRC does have the power to refer cases under ‘exceptional 
circumstances’ when this has not occurred. When cases are referred to the Court by the 
CCRC, they are treated as normal appeals. 1 0 5  But the difference is that these appeals 
do not have to go through the leave process so cannot be filtered out at that stage. Until 
2003, the appellant also had the opportunity of adding grounds to the appeal which had 
not been the subject of the referral. So if the CCRC decided to refer the appeal on 
certain grounds, the appellant could then add more grounds to be considered by the 
Court. This may have had an impact on the increase in grounds in the 2002 sample. The 
law was changed by section 315 of the Criminal Justice Act 2003 and so now if the 
appellant wants to add additional grounds to those upon which the CCRC has referred 
the case, leave has to be granted for those additional grounds. Therefore, the CCRC 
may have had a major impact on the 2 0 0 2  sample which could partly explain the 
difference in the number of grounds.
Whatever the reasons for the increase in the number of grounds, the 1990 sample 
shows that the percentage of grounds allowed was higher in the 1990 sample (31%) 
than the 2002 sample (12%). This is potentially explained by fewer grounds being 
argued in the 1990 sample as only one ground need be successful for an appeal to be 
allowed. Therefore, although more grounds may result in a higher chance of a 
successful appeal, there is also the opportunity for more grounds to be unsuccessful. 
But a higher percentage being allowed in the 1990 sample does tally with the number of 
successful appeals as discussed above, with fewer appeals being allowed generally in 
2 0 0 2  even though more grounds were argued.
Whilst there may be differences as outlined above, the most common grounds argued in 
both samples were the same, being errors of the trial judge. In Malleson’s sample these 
constituted 59% of the total grounds and 49% in the 2002 sample. When comparing the 
three most common grounds in the samples -  misdirection on the law or evidence, 
defective or unbalanced summing up and evidence wrongly excluded or included, they 
all demonstrate that more appeals were allowed in the 1990 sample than the 2002 
sample. In the 1990 sample, seventy-seven (40%) of these grounds were allowed with
105 Criminal Appeal Act 1995, section 9.
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115 (60%) dismissed or refused. In the 2002 sample, fifty-seven (18%) of these grounds 
were allowed with 256 (82%) dismissed. This shows that fewer appeals with these 
grounds were allowed in 2 0 0 2  and appears to confirm the statistics discussed above 
(indicating that there has been a downward trend in allowed appeals since 1990). These 
figures are not representative of each appeal as one appeal may have raised a number 
of grounds on which the appeal was successful. Rather, they represent the success and 
failure rate of the specific ground as the grounds were collated separately from each 
appeal.
Both samples show that the majority of grounds are procedural irregularities with very 
few based on factual error. In the 1990 sample, fresh evidence grounds were 7% of the 
total grounds with 6 % in the 2 0 0 2  sample, and ‘lurking doubt' type grounds were 2 % in 
1990 and 1% in 2002. Therefore, the 2002 sample appears to confirm Malleson’s 
findings that most of the Court’s time is spent reviewing the decisions of the trial judge 
and that it is rare for the Court to hear fresh evidence or consider the existence of a 
‘lurking doubt’ (Malleson, 1993, p. 15). This will be discussed in much more detail in 
chapters five and six.
The samples also show a difference in the workload of the Court. Malleson’s sample of 
300 appeals covered the period January to July. The sample from 2002 covered the 
period January to May. This is indicative of the increasing workload of the Court 
because it shows the Court dealing with the same number of cases but in a much 
shorter time in 2002. The Court dealt with a much larger number of cases per year in 
2002 than in 1990. This corresponds with the figures above which show a larger number 
of applications in 2002 than there were in 1990.
As well as replicating Malleson’s study, I also added an additional element to the 
research which Malleson did not undertake. I collected data from the judgments on the 
general approaches the Court of Appeal uses to determine the appeal. The decision 
making process of the Court was collated and quantified in relation to the different 
grounds of appeal. This was done in order to ascertain what the decision making 
process of the Court is in order to determine why its decision making is can be 
problematic. The decision making processes were identified from the judgments1 0 6  and 
will be analysed in detail in chapters five, six and seven. For the purposes of this chapter 
it is necessary to outline the categories of approaches that the Court uses in order to 
provide a general picture of the Court’s approach.
106 See Appendix 2 for the form used to compile the approaches.
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The general approaches of the Court of Appeal to determining appeals against 
conviction
As the Court has been given fairly wide statutory powers under the various Criminal 
Appeal Acts, it has adopted its own processes to determine the appeal. Although the 
Court and the House of Lords have set out general tests to be followed, both have 
refrained from outlining a specific approach to be adopted when applying the tests, 
preferring to leave it to the Court to decide that for itself. 1 0 7  Whilst this does allow for 
flexibility, the downside is that a number of contradictory approaches have developed 
which have created inconsistency and unpredictability. These approaches may also 
have contributed to the criticisms that the Court has taken a restrictive approach to 
identifying and correcting miscarriages of justice.
Since the Court of Criminal Appeal was created in 1907, the common law tests that have 
been adopted for the Court to follow in relation to its statutory powers can broadly be 
divided into two. The first test is what the Court itself thinks of the merits of the ground of 
appeal. The second test is the ‘jury impact test’ whereby the Court assesses what the 
original jury, or a reasonable jury, may have concluded in relation to the ground of 
appeal. The diagram below outlines the various approaches the judges in the Court of 
Appeal use to determine appeals against conviction. The term ‘FE’ stands for fresh 
evidence.
107 For example, Lord Bingham in R v Pendleton stated that 'it is undesirable that adherence to a particular
thought process should be required by judicial decision.' See above, n. 82, p. 83.
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Diagram 4.1: The Decision Making Process
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As the diagram shows, there is an initial assessment by the Court as to whether the 
province of grounds is for the Court of Appeal to determine. If the Court believes that the 
grounds raised were merely factual issues for the jury to assess, then the conviction will 
be upheld. If it is felt that the grounds raised are the province of the Court then the Court 
will make an assessment of the grounds in order to determine the appeal. The grounds 
of appeal broadly fall into three categories, firstly, whether there was fresh evidence, 
secondly, whether there was a procedural irregularity and thirdly, the lurking doubt 
ground of appeal.
As stated above, the decision making process of the Court can be divided into two 
categories. The first is what the Court thinks of the ground of appeal and the second is 
what the Court thinks either the original jury or a reasonable jury may have made of the 
ground of appeal (known as the jury impact test). Either of these approaches may result 
in the conviction being upheld or quashed.
With regard to the ‘lurking doubt’ ground of appeal, the diagram shows that the Court 
only uses one decision making process which is what the Court thinks of the ground. 
The Court either decides that there is no lurking doubt which results in the conviction 
being upheld or the Court decides there is a lurking doubt which has made the 
conviction unsafe and therefore, it should be quashed. This complies with the subjective 
test set out in Cooper to determine these appeals. The diagram shows that in relation to 
fresh evidence or procedural irregularity (error) grounds the Court uses either process to 
determine the appeal. With regard to fresh evidence appeals the diagram shows a 
number of differing approaches that the Court may use. If the Court decides not to admit 
the fresh evidence then the appeal is upheld. If the Court decides to admit the fresh 
evidence it then has a number of options to determine the appeal. The Court itself may 
decide that the fresh evidence did not make the conviction unsafe and uphold the appeal 
or it may decide that the fresh evidence did make the conviction unsafe and quash the 
conviction. Alternatively, the Court may apply the jury impact test and decide that the 
fresh evidence may have had an impact on the jury and quash the conviction or it may 
decide that the jury would not have inevitably convicted if the fresh evidence was not 
admitted and quash the conviction. If the Court decides that the jury would have 
inevitably convicted if the fresh evidence was not admitted then the conviction will be 
upheld.
With regard to procedural irregularities, the Court has a number of options. Both tables 
(4.3 and 4.4 above) indicate that the majority of the Court’s work is determining appeals 
where there has been some kind of procedural irregularity. There are numerous 
potential procedural irregularities such as, the judge may misdirect the jury on the 
evidence or law, there may be non-disclosure of evidence or there may be lawyer or
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prosecution errors. The procedural irregularities in the tables are basically, all the 
grounds of appeal that are not fresh evidence or lurking doubt grounds. These are 
referred to as ‘errors’ in the diagram. The Court may decide that the error did not occur, 
or if it did occur, that there was strong prosecution evidence or the error was too minor. 
These will result in the conviction being upheld. The Court may decide that the error did 
occur and quash the conviction. Alternatively, the Court may apply the jury impact test 
and if it decides that the error may have had an impact on the jury, it will quash the 
conviction. If it decides that the jury would have inevitably convicted if the error did not 
occur, then the conviction will be upheld, but if it decides that the jury would not have 
inevitably convicted if the error had not occurred, it will quash the conviction. If the 
Court decides to quash the conviction it will then decide whether to order a retrial but it 
cannot decide to order a retrial until it has made the decision to quash the conviction.
As the above shows, the Court has developed a number of different approaches to 
determine the appeal. This does allow the judges to be flexible, however, it also goes 
some way to explaining why the decision making process of the Court is so inconsistent, 
contradictory and unpredictable. This will be explored in the following chapters.
Summary
The statistical evidence is contradictory as to whether there were any major changes 
between the 1990 and 2002 samples. What is clear from the figures is that in the mid to 
late 1990s there was an increase in the number of applications to appeal and there was 
a rise in the number of convictions being quashed. This is potentially evidence that the 
Criminal Appeal Act 1995 did have an impact on both of these areas after its enactment. 
Both of these figures dropped in the late 1990s with a decrease in applications and the 
number of successful appeals which has continued up to 2006. This is possible 
evidence that the 1995 Act resulted in a more restrictive approach being taken rather 
than encapsulating a liberal approach prior to it. Admittedly, other factors may also have 
played a role.
The big difference between the two samples is the number of differing grounds being 
argued. Although the grounds of appeal are generally categorised into three areas -  
fresh evidence, procedural irregularities and lurking doubt -  there are a wide variety of 
grounds within those broad categories. The much wider number in the 2002 sample is 
possible evidence that the ‘safety’ test in the 1995 Act encompasses a much wider 
variety than its predecessor in the 1968 Act. But the most noticeable figures in the two 
samples are the similarities between the most common grounds and the small number 
of appeals based on factual error. This is arguably evidence that the 1995 Act has not 
made an impact on either of these areas. This will be explored in more detail in chapters 
five and six.
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The large number of differing approaches the Court uses to determine the appeal 
explains to some extent, the Court’s inconsistent decision making. These approaches 
are based on the common law tests the Court has been given, to be outlined in the 
subsequent chapters. There are conflicting arguments as to whether the Court’s choice 
of test (the test of what it thinks or the jury impact test) makes a difference. In the 
following chapters, the differing approaches will be analysed in detail in relation to the 
grounds of appeal to ascertain whether these differing approaches do make any 
difference to the Court’s approach.
In chapter five, the fresh evidence grounds from the two samples will be analysed in 
detail. The common law tests used to determine the appeal will be outlined. The Court’s 
decision making process will also be assessed to examine if there are any differences 
between the Court’s differing approaches to determining these appeals.
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CHAPTER FIVE: APPEALS BASED ON THE 
CORRECTNESS OF THE JURY VERDICT: FRESH 
EVIDENCE
As stated in previous chapters, the main criticism of the Court of Appeal has been that it 
is deficient at rectifying the wrongful convictions of the factually innocent. This stems 
from the Court’s perceived difficulties in relation to appeals based on factual error. 
These appeals are generally made up of two grounds of appeal which are fresh 
evidence and ‘lurking doubt.’ For these appeals, the argument essentially is that the jury 
made a mistake and the appellant was wrongly convicted in the sense that he/she did 
not commit the crime. As discussed in chapter three, these appeals have tended to 
cause the most difficulty because of the Court’s perceived reluctance to admit that the 
jury made an error and convicted the wrong person. These appeals also cause the most 
difficulty because the decision making process of the Court is not necessarily conducive 
to determining these appeals. This chapter will analyse the fresh evidence grounds from 
the 1990 and 2002 samples and will also outline the common law tests that the Court 
has developed to determine these appeals. There will then be an analysis of the 
decision making process from the judgments in order to ascertain how the Court 
determines the appeal. This will be necessary in order to assess whether a restrictive 
approach is taken to these appeals and if so, where the problem lies. There will also be 
an analysis of the law after 2 0 0 2  to see whether there have been any more recent 
developments.
The historical approach to fresh evidence appeals will now be discussed in order to put 
the 2 0 0 2  cases in context.
The historical approach to fresh evidence appeals
As discussed in chapter three, the Court was originally given wide powers under section 
9 of the CAA 1907 to adduce evidence on appeal but it chose to interpret those powers 
narrowly and imposed hurdles such as: that evidence had to be credible and relevant to 
the issue of guilt, 1 0 8 that the evidence had to be admissible, 1 0 9 and that the evidence 
could not have been put before the jury. 1 1 0 These principles were summarised by Lord 
Parker, LCJ in R v Parks in 1962:111
‘First, the evidence that it is sought to call must be evidence which was not 
available at the trial. Secondly, and this goes without saying, it must be evidence 
relevant to the issues. Thirdly, it must be evidence that is credible evidence in
R v Dunton [1908] 1 Cr. App. R. 165.
109 R v 7e//eff [1921] 15 Cr. App. R. 159.
110 R v Jones [1908] 2 Cr. App. R. 27.
111 [1962] 46 Cr. App. R. 29.
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the sense that it is well capable of belief. Fourthly, the court will, after 
considering that evidence, go on to consider whether there might have been a 
reasonable doubt in the minds of the jury as to the guilt of the appellant if that 
evidence had been given together with the other evidence at the trial.’
This case showed that the Court was initially applying an objective test in deciding fresh 
evidence appeals by analysing the influence that fresh evidence may have had on the 
original jury, or a reasonable jury. Lord Parker also alluded to why the Court would take 
a restrictive approach to fresh evidence appeals. He stated:
‘it is only rarely that this court allows further evidence to be called, and it is quite 
clear that the principles upon which this court acts must be kept within narrow 
confines, otherwise in every case this court would be in effect asked to effect a 
new trial.’
As the Court is a review Court it does not have the power to rehear the case. Therefore, 
it cannot perform a retrial with the new evidence. This issue was discussed by the 
Donovan Committee which was set up in 1965 to review the working practices of the 
Court. It agreed with the various pronouncements in the judgments of the Court that the 
Court of Criminal Appeal was not a court of re-trial and an appeal to it ‘is not an appeal 
by way of a re-hearing of the case.’ The Committee acknowledged that if fresh evidence 
was admitted as a matter of course there would clearly be a risk that the Court would on 
occasions find itself re-trying a case - ‘a function which Parliament did not intend it to 
discharge, and for which it is in any event inadequately equipped’ (para. 132). However, 
the Committee did hear evidence that the conditions the Court had imposed on the 
reception of fresh evidence were too narrow and the condition that had caused the most 
disquiet was the one which stated that additional evidence should not have been 
available at the original trial. The Committee recommended that additional evidence 
should be received, if it was relevant and credible and there was a reasonable 
explanation for the failure to place it before the jury (para. 136). These proposals were 
incorporated into the 1966 Criminal Appeal Act.
The Court of Appeal was given the power to order a retrial in fresh evidence appeals in 
section 1(1) of the Criminal Appeal Act 1964. It was hoped that this, and the 
amendments to the Court’s powers, would succeed in liberalising the Court’s approach 
to these appeals. The provisions of the 1964 Act and the 1966 Act were consolidated in 
the Criminal Appeal Act 1968 and section 5 became section 23 of the 1968 Act. Section 
23(1) consisted of a general discretion for the Court to admit evidence ‘if they think it 
necessary or expedient in the interests of justice.’ In addition section 23(2) set out a duty 
to admit evidence if certain criteria of credibility, relevance, and an adequate explanation 
for not adducing it at the original trial were fulfilled. It would seem that initially there was
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a more liberal approach to fresh evidence appeals. In R v Hams, 1 1 2  for example, the 
fresh evidence was admitted as ‘the justice of the case required that it should be heard.’
However, Edmund Davies LJ in R v Stafford and R v Luvaglio 1 1 3  took a more cautious 
approach to the Court’s new powers when deciding whether the evidence was credible:
‘It is clear that a more liberal attitude than hitherto prevailed was introduced by 
the provision in section 5 [of the 1966 Act] that the fresh evidence sought to be 
introduced shall be received unless the court is satisfied upon the grounds 
specified in the section that it ought to be. Nevertheless, public mischief would 
ensue and the legal process could become indefinitely prolonged were it the 
case that evidence produced at any time will generally be admitted by this Court 
when verdicts are being reviewed. There must be some curbs, the section 
specifies them, and we proceed to consider the present applications with due 
regard to them.’
This case made it clear that the Court reviewed verdicts, it did not rehear cases which 
illustrates why fresh evidence cases are treated with such caution. If the evidence was 
freely admitted then the Court may find itself rehearing the case which it was not allowed 
to do. In his supplement review of the reported cases of the Court from 1969 to 1973, 
Knight (1975, p. 43) concluded that ‘the promising approach of 1964 -  1969 has not 
been kept to strictly in the period 1969 -  1973. There are some healthy signs -  but also 
some worrying developments.’ He stated that the worrying developments mainly 
stemmed from Edmund Davies LJ’s judgment above.
After a failed attempt to quash the conviction at the Court of Appeal, the case of R v 
Stafford and R v Luvaglio eventually went to the House of Lords on a point of law which 
clarified the Court’s approach to its new fresh evidence powers. 1 1 4  Previously, as 
discussed, the objective test the Court applied was whether the original jury might have 
been influenced by the fresh evidence1 1 5 but in Stafford the Court adopted a new 
subjective approach. Lord Cross stated:
‘It was argued strenuously by the counsel for the appellants that the Court of 
Appeal ought to have asked itself expressly whether if the fresh evidence had 
been given at the trial together with the original evidence the jury might have 
had a reasonable doubt as to the guilt of the accused and that its failure to ask 
itself the question vitiated its judgment. I do not agree. Section 2(1 )(a) of the 
Criminal Appeal Act 1968 simply directs the court to allow an appeal against 
conviction if it thinks that under all the circumstances of the case the verdict is 
unsafe and unsatisfactory. In a fresh evidence case it is natural for the court to 
put itself in the position of the jury which convicted on the original evidence and 
to ask itself whether the addition of the fresh evidence might have induced a 
reasonable doubt in its mind. But that is only another way of asking whether it
112 [1966] Crim. L.R. 102.
113 [1968] 53 Cr. App. R. 1.
114 Stafford v DPP  (1974) A.C. 878.
115 See above, n. 111.
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might have induced a reasonable doubt in the minds of the members of the 
Court if they had constituted the jury. ’ 1 1 6
The test to be applied was set out by Viscount Dilhorne:
The court has to decide whether the verdict was unsafe or unsatisfactory and 
no different question has to be decided when the court allows fresh evidence to
be called Parliament has, in terms, said that the court should only quash a
conviction if, there being no error of law or material irregularity at the trial, ‘they 
think’ the verdict was unsafe or unsatisfactory. They have to decide and 
Parliament has not required them power to quash a verdict if they think that a 
jury might conceivably reach a different conclusion from that to which they have 
come. If the court has no reasonable doubt about the verdict, it follows that the 
court does not think that the jury could have one. ’ 1 1 7
This test moved away from an objective one to a subjective one. The Court had to 
decide whether it thought the new evidence made the conviction unsafe and 
unsatisfactory with no reference to what a jury would have thought of it.
The Stafford judgment has been the subject of much criticism, 1 1 8  most notably from the 
former Law Lord, Lord Devlin. In his book, The Judge (1979, pp. 158-9), Devlin criticised 
the approach of the judges on the grounds that the accused now had a mixed trial by 
judges and jury. He stated:
They [the judges] did not hear the old witnesses and there are no specific 
findings about them to be found in the general verdict. So the judges have to 
decide upon their reliability on the record, fortified by conjectures from the 
verdict; to reach their verdict, the judges would say, the jury must have believed 
this or that. In assessing the reliability of the new witnesses.. .the judges are on 
their own.’
Devlin went on to say:
‘It seems to me that even those judges who are in favour of extending the 
domain of the judges over the facts must accept that the position which has now 
been reached is not a satisfactory one. Instead of the re-trial by jury for which 
Parliament provided in 1964, there is an imperfect re-trial by judges, in which the
normal appellate review has been swallowed up I do not think that in 1964
Parliament would have taken kindly to a trial by judges alone in fresh evidence 
cases’ (pp. 171-172).
Devlin felt that most cases involving fresh evidence should be sent for retrial before a 
fresh jury as anything less was a denial of the appellant’s constitutional right to trial by 
jury. Pattenden’s view is that Lord Devlin’s criticism is based on a crucial assumption
116 See above, n. 114, 907.
117 Ibid, 892.
118 See O’Connor (1990, p. 620) and Buxton (1993, p. 74).
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that the right to trial by jury persists after a trial has already taken place; the counter view 
is that a defendant’s right to trial by jury is fully satisfied by the original trial (1996, p. 
196).
The approach taken by the Lords in Stafford was confirmed in 1989 by the Court of 
Appeal in one of the failed Birmingham Six appeals, R v Callaghan. 1 1 9  The appellants 
had submitted that the judges should look at the case through the eyes of the jury and if 
they were to think that the jury might have come to a different conclusion had the jury 
themselves heard the new evidence then the appeal should be allowed regardless of 
what the judges themselves thought. The judgment of the Lord Chief Justice indicated:
‘Although the Court may test its views by asking itself what the original jury 
might have concluded, the question which in the end we have to decide is 
whether in our judgment, in all the circumstances of the case including both the 
verdict of the jury at trial upon the evidence they heard, the convictions were 
safe and satisfactory.’
This thus followed Stafford and rejected the jury impact test as the method for 
determining fresh evidence appeals.
Malleson has stated (1996, p. 150) that the Stafford decision [House of Lords] appeared 
to indicate that the Court was extending the application of its powers and taking a more 
proactive role in reviewing appeals against conviction. But the difficulty this causes is 
that if the Court is deciding on the basis of what it thinks of the evidence this is 
essentially usurping the role of the jury. This moves the Court away from its review 
function towards a rehearing one; it has to decide what the jury thought of the evidence 
it heard and marry that up with the new evidence the Court has heard and decide 
whether the conviction is unsafe. This results in, as Lord Devlin states, an imperfect 
retrial by judges. When this is combined with its deference to the jury and its reverence 
for finality, it can be difficult to overturn convictions on the basis of new evidence.
The difficulties associated with fresh evidence appeals were discussed by the RCCJ.
The Royal Commission on Criminal Justice
The Royal Commission concluded that the Court’s powers under section 23 were 
adequate but may be being construed too narrowly. The Commission stated it thought it 
understandable that the Court would view fresh evidence with some suspicion and the 
Court was right not to wish to encourage defendants to think of the Crown Court trial as 
a practice run. But on the other hand, the Court must be alive to the possibility that the
119 [1989] 88 Cr. App. R. 40. An then confirmed again in R v Byme [1989] 88 Cr. App. R. 33.
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fresh evidence may exonerate the appellant or at least throw some serious doubt on the 
conviction (ch. 10, para. 55).
The Commission stated that it had been suggested in evidence to them that the Court 
took an excessively restrictive approach to whether the fresh evidence was available at 
the trial and whether there was a reasonable explanation for the failure to adduce it. 
They stated that ‘we would urge that in general the court should take a broad, rather 
than a narrow, approach to them’ (ch. 10, para. 56). It had been suggested to the 
Commission that the test in section 23(2) that the evidence had to be ‘likely to be 
credible’ was too high a test and they recommended that the test should be changed to 
‘capable of belief’ as this would ‘be a slightly wider formula giving the court greater 
scope for doing justice’ (ch. 1 0 , para. 60).
The Commission discussed the case of Stafford, and the criticisms of the decision by 
Lord Devlin. It agreed that there was some force in Devlin’s criticisms and suggested 
that wherever possible the Court should order a retrial of the case rather than decide the 
issue for itself as ‘the Court of Appeal, which has not seen the other witnesses in the 
case nor heard their evidence, is not in our view the appropriate tribunal to assess the 
ultimate credibility and effect on a jury of the new evidence’ (ch. 10, para. 62). But the 
Commission also stated that where a retrial was impracticable or otherwise undesirable, 
the Court of Appeal should follow the Stafford test and decide the matter for itself rather 
than just simply allowing the appeal (ch. 10, para. 63).
In response to the RCCJ, the Government issued a consultation paper in 1994 (Home 
Office, 1994). With regard to fresh evidence, the Government accepted the view that if 
there was a reasonable explanation for the evidence not being adduced at the original 
trial then the Court should consider the evidence. But ‘considers that the Court should 
continue to have power to exclude evidence where it considers that there is no 
reasonable explanation’ (para. 13). The Government agreed with the recommendation of 
changing ‘likely to be credible’ to ‘capable of belief.’ The Government also agreed that 
the Court should decide the issue for itself in fresh evidence cases where a retrial was 
not possible (para. 17).
As discussed in chapter one, the amendment to the Court’s fresh evidence powers was 
confusing as to its aims. The intention behind the amendment to section 23 CAA 1968 
by the RCCJ was clearly to widen the basis upon which fresh evidence would be 
admitted by the Court of Appeal. This seemed to be accepted by the Government when 
introducing this part of the Criminal Appeal Bill into Parliament. The then Home 
Secretary stated that "The Bill also lowers the threshold for the admission of fresh
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evidence along the lines recommended by the Royal Commission. . . " 1 2 0 However, when 
amendments to section 23 were introduced in the House of Lords, Baroness Blatch 
stated that her understanding from the Lord Chief Justice was that the amendments 
would not restrict fresh evidence being admitted nor change Court practice.1 2 1Therefore, 
there was confusion as to whether these amendments were to liberalise the Court’s 
approach to fresh evidence appeals or to allow the Court to continue what it had been 
doing prior to the changes in the law. This was a reference to the supposed liberal 
approach the Court was taking prior to the CAA 1995 as previously discussed.
The amendments to the fresh evidence provisions were in section four of the Criminal 
Appeal Act 1995 which amended the provisions in section 23 of the 1968 Act. The 
amendments to section 23 were that the duty to admit new evidence was abolished, but 
the power to admit new evidence is made subject to a duty to consider the same factors 
as limited the former duty: credibility, relevance to the safety of the conviction, 
admissibility at trial and the reasonableness of the explanation for the failure to adduce 
the evidence at trial. Following the recommendation of the RCCJ, the requirement that 
new evidence be ‘likely to be credible’ has now become ‘capable of belief.’ As under the 
previous legislation, the Court’s power to receive evidence is unfettered, provided it 
considers it necessary or expedient in the interests of justice to do so regardless of the 
above factors. The Court’s rarely used power to rehear the evidence presented at the 
trial was abolished. 1 2 2  As Pattenden has stated ‘this can only increase the difficulty for 
the criminal division of the Court of Appeal of deciding whether a conviction is unsafe 
because of jury error’ (Pattenden, 1996, p. 415). The removal of the Court’s power to 
rehear trial evidence reinforces the review function which arguably is what has caused 
some of the problems in the first place.
The key to the liberalisation of the Court’s approach would be whether the overriding 
consideration is if it is in the interests of justice to admit the evidence regardless of 
whether the four factors have been satisfied. The restrictive approach of the Court can 
be demonstrated by undue weight being given to any of the four factors in the face of 
evidence which may lead to the conviction being unsafe. This was expressed by 
JUSTICE in their response to the RCCJ report:
There is clearly a consensus that what is considered as fresh evidence should 
no longer be subject to the restrictive approach adopted by the Court of Appeal 
in the past. Our view is that although the Court is entitled to seek and take 
account of any explanation why evidence which was available was not adduced 
at the trial, this should not be the determining factor; the test must be a broad 
one of whether the evidence goes to the safety of the conviction’ (JUSTICE, 
1994b, p. 6 ).
120 Hansard, H.C. Vol 256, Col 25, 6 March 1995.
121 Hansard, H.L. Vol. 565, Col 567, 26 June 1995.
122 Criminal Appeal Act 1995, section 4(1 )(a).
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Therefore, empirical research was needed in this area to determine whether the 
amendments to the fresh evidence provisions have brought about any changes to the 
Court’s approach to these appeals. As the above shows, the Court's approach to these 
appeals has largely been described as restrictive, though it has occasionally been 
acknowledged as taking a liberal approach. But as discussed in chapter three, without a 
normative baseline in which to measure the Court's approach it can be difficult to 
determine whether the Court is taking a restrictive or a liberal approach. With that in 
mind, the judgments in this chapter will be analysed in terms of whether it is possible to 
say whether the Court is being restrictive or liberal and if so, whether that approach can 
be attributed to the changes in the 1995 Act.
The sample of judgments from 1990 and 2002 will now be analysed.
The 1990 and 2002 samples of judgments
Malleson had a total of twenty-three cases in her sample in which fresh evidence was 
raised (7% of the total grounds). Four out of the twenty-three cases involved expert or 
forensic evidence and sixteen involved witnesses of fact. See table below.
Table 5.1: Type of fresh evidence cases before the Court of Appeal (Criminal
Division) January to July 1990
Type of Fresh Evidence Allowed Dismissed/ Adj’d/ 
Refused
%
Retrial of
New witness of fact 2 7 1 43%
Trial witness of fact 1 4 1 26%
New expert witness 0 1 2 13%
Trial expert witness 0 1 0 4%
Other 1 2 0 13%
TOTAL (N= 23) 4 15 4 1 2 3 1 0 0 %
In fourteen of the twenty-three cases the evidence was admitted by the Court (61%). Of 
these, Malleson states four were allowed and two were adjourned for a full hearing 
(being renewed applications) . 1 2 4  In two cases retrials were ordered. Therefore, Malleson 
states that ‘the number of appeals which succeeded on the basis of fresh evidence was 
small, being less than 17% of the total fresh evidence cases and just over 1 % of all the
123 There is possibly a discrepancy here. Malleson states in the text that there were 2 cases adjourned for a full 
hearing and two retrials ordered. It is possible that the 4 cases in this column are those cases. But if so, it is 
not clear which ones are the cases adjourned and which are the retrials so any comparative figures are taken 
from the allowed column.
124 There is a discrepancy in relation to the figures. Malleson's grounds of appeal table (reproduced at table 
4.2 in this thesis) shows fresh evidence figures of 5 appeals allowed, 15 dismissed and 3 adjourned for a full 
hearing. Table 5.1 reproduced from Malleson’s study shows that there were 4 appeals allowed, 15 dismissed 
and 2 were adjourned for a full hearing. The comparisons carried out between the 1990 and 2002 samples 
have been done using the fresh evidence table.
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cases reviewed’ (Malleson, 1993, p. 9). Malleson’s findings will now be compared with 
the 2 0 0 2  sample of judgments.
The 2002 sample had a total of thirty-six cases in which fresh evidence was raised (6 % 
of the total grounds). Thirteen out of the thirty-six cases involved expert or forensic 
evidence and twenty-one involved witnesses of fact. See table below.
Table 5.2: Type of fresh evidence cases before the Court of Appeal (Criminal
Division) January to May 2002
Type of Fresh Evidence Allowed Dismissed/
Refused
Adj’d/ %
Retrial c
New witness of fact 0 4 0 1 1 %
Trial witness of fact 4 1 2 1 47%
New expert witness 3 7 0 28%
Trial expert witness 2 1 0 8 %
Other 0 2 0 6 %
TOTAL (N = 36) 9 26 4 1 0 0 %
In eighteen of the thirty-six cases the evidence was admitted by the Court (50%). Of 
these, nine were allowed and one adjourned for a full hearing. In three cases, retrials 
were ordered. Therefore the number of appeals which succeeded on the basis of fresh 
evidence was 25% which was 3% of all the cases reviewed.
The initial comparisons between the two samples shows that there were more fresh 
evidence grounds in the 2002 sample (thirty-six) than there were in the 1990 sample 
(twenty-three). Therefore, the rise in the number of fresh evidence grounds in 2002 
could be interpreted as the Court adopting a more liberal approach as arguably more 
fresh evidence appeals are getting through the leave filter. However, ten of the cases in 
the 2002 sample were references from the Criminal Cases Review Commission and 
those cases do not need to go through the leave filter. Therefore, if those cases are 
deducted from the total, the truer comparison is twenty-six cases in 2 0 0 2  as opposed to 
twenty-three cases in 1990. Although three more cases got through the leave filter in 
2002 than in 1990 this is not really conclusive proof that the Court is adopting a more 
liberal approach in 2 0 0 2 .
The rise in fresh evidence grounds could also be explained by a rise in the number of 
grounds generally with 329 in the 1990 sample and 641 in the 2002 sample. Overall, the 
percentage of fresh evidence grounds in relation to all the grounds was lower - being 6 % 
in the 2002 sample and 7% in Malleson’s. This shows that whilst the 2002 sample had 
almost double the number of grounds of the 1990 sample, fresh evidence grounds had
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not increased substantially as a proportion of the total grounds.
The 1990 sample indicates that the fresh evidence was accepted by the Court in 61% of 
cases whereas the 2002 sample shows that the fresh evidence was accepted in 50% of 
cases. This arguably shows that while more fresh evidence appeals may have got 
though the leave filter in 2002, the evidence was rejected by the Court in a higher 
percentage of cases. This is therefore potential evidence that either the single judge is 
being too generous in granting leave or the full Court is still being restrictive in deciding 
whether to accept the evidence. It may also be evidence that the Court is not particularly 
receptive to CCRC referrals. Either way, these figures show that a high proportion of 
fresh evidence is rejected by the Court, even if it manages to get through the leave filter.
In Malleson’s sample of twenty-three fresh evidence grounds, four were allowed, fifteen 
were dismissed or refused and two were adjourned for a full hearing being renewed 
applications to appeal. Therefore of the total grounds, 17% were successful (based on 
four allowed) with 83% unsuccessful. In the 2002 sample, of the thirty-six fresh evidence 
grounds, nine were allowed, twenty-six were dismissed or refused and one was 
adjourned for a full hearing. Therefore of the total grounds, 25% were successful (based 
on nine allowed) with 75% unsuccessful. Thus, although there were a lower percentage 
of cases where the fresh evidence was accepted by the Court in 2002, the fresh 
evidence that was accepted led to a higher success rate with more appeals allowed in 
2002. This is potentially evidence of a more liberal approach to deciding whether the 
appeal will be allowed, even if there is a more restrictive approach being taken to the 
admitting of the evidence in the first place. Having said that, the sample size is small and 
differences can be distorted or hidden in such a situation. The figures should, thus, be 
treated with caution more as possible indicators to be considered in the qualitative 
analysis rather than as findings per se.
There are differences in the type of grounds that were successful. Malleson states that 
in the 1990 sample, the most common cases were witnesses of fact with sixteen cases 
and they were the most successful with three allowed. In contrast, the 2002 sample 
shows that cases involving witnesses of fact were the most common (twenty-one) but 
cases involving forensic or expert witnesses were the most successful (with five allowed 
out of thirteen cases). This is potential evidence for the proposition that there are now 
more forensic or expert evidence appeals. The 1990 sample does appear to be 
particularly low on forensic and expert evidence cases (four out of twenty-three) on 
appeal and it may be that by 2 0 0 2 , this type of evidence was being argued more readily 
either as a result of advances in psychological testing, psychiatric testing or forensic
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science. 1 2 5  This could also indicate that the Court is now more likely to grant leave for 
this type of evidence than previously.
As well as this quantitative analysis, Malleson also conducted a qualitative analysis of 
the judgments and this will now be explored and compared with the 2002 sample. The 
qualitative analysis provides a rich data set that allows an assessment of the merits of 
the tentative indicators suggested from the descriptive quantitative analysis.
Malleson stated in her study that identifying how the Court deals with the requirements 
in section 23 was not easy because ‘the reasoning behind its decision making process 
as to relevance, credibility or the explanation for the failure to adduce it at trial was not 
stated in the judgments’ (Malleson, 1993, p. 9-10). She stated that the only clear 
statement of practice concerned the Court’s reluctance to hear new evidence from a 
witness at the trial citing the case of Turner (30/3) (Malleson, 1993, p.10):
‘....the mere fact that a prosecution witness chooses to come forward after the 
trial to assert that his evidence at trial was perjured will rarely provide a basis 
for permitting him to give evidence or for interfering with the conviction.’
Malleson stated that the explanation for this policy seemed to be concern that if the 
Court relaxed its approach to the admission of such evidence it would lead to an 
inundation of fresh evidence cases citing Haycroft (15/5) (Malleson, 1993, p. 10):
To permit additional evidence to be given by a witness who has given evidence 
at the trial below on such a tenuous foundation would open the floodgates to 
applications of a similar kind in many appeals.’
Malleson argued that this illustrated that the most commonly produced category of fresh 
evidence, the retracted statement of a trial witness, was treated with great caution by the 
Court (Malleson, 1993, p. 10).
Malleson stated that the judgments were less explicit on the issue of how the Court 
should approach the question of whether there was a reasonable explanation for the 
failure to adduce evidence at the trial. She said that this question tended to be 
mentioned in passing or not at all and the Court’s reasoning in reaching its decision was 
never explicitly set out. She explained that where it was mentioned, the distinction 
between what was reasonable and what was not appeared to be a very fine one 
(Malleson, 1993, p. 10).
125 That was acknowledged in one of the appeals in the sample that involved expert evidence where Auld LJ 
stated ‘we acknowledge the considerable advances over the last two or three decades in psychiatric and 
psychological research and knowledge and in the use of those disciplines.' R v Kavanagh [2002] EWCA Crim 
904, para. 56.
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Malleson also argued that there was evidence within her sample that the Court clearly 
adopted the Stafford subjective approach in assessing the evidence once it had been 
admitted by the Court (Malleson, 1993, p. 10). This shows that the use of the jury impact 
test of the early years of the Court (as evidenced by R v Parks) had fallen out of favour. 
However, there was another major development between the 1990 and 2002 samples 
which may have had an impact on the way the Court decides the appeal. This was the 
House of Lords judgment of R v Pendleton1 2 6  which was decided in December 2001. 
The cases in the 2002 sample were the first to apply it and that case will be analysed 
below to see if it has made any difference to the Court’s decision making process.
In the 2002 sample, of the thirty-six cases, twenty-four discussed the provisions in 
section 23 of the CAA 1968 (as amended by section 4 of the CAA 1995) and twelve did 
not mention it at all. In two cases some of the wording of section 23 was mentioned but 
there was no reference to section 23. As discussed above, the fresh evidence was 
admitted in eighteen of the thirty-six (50%) cases.
Similarly to Malleson, a reading of the judgments from the 2002 sample where section 
23 was considered reveals very little guidance from the Court in terms of how it applies 
the provisions of that section. There was guidance in one judgment as to the provision of 
there having to be a reasonable explanation for the failure to adduce evidence at the 
trial. In R v Tully, Kay LJ stated:
‘Generally speaking, a defendant will be required to call all the evidence upon 
which reliance is to be placed at his trial. No system could operate effectively 
if a defendant could run his trial in one way and then come to the Court of 
Appeal and suggest he might have done better if he had run it a different way. 
For example, a defendant could not be permitted to choose not to give 
evidence at trial and then, if convicted, go to the Court of Appeal and argue 
that if he had given evidence the jury might have come to a different 
conclusion. It is for a defendant and his legal advisors to decide what 
evidence to deploy at trial and the Court of Appeal will not in normal 
circumstances allow a second bite of the cherry if an unfavourable outcome 
follows. ’ 1 2 7
Although the judgments from both the 1990 and 2002 samples show that the judges do 
not want the appeal to be a second trial, which is why they are accused of adopting a 
restrictive approach to this factor, there is no guidance given as to what is a ‘reasonable’ 
explanation. One of the judgments did give an indication of the differences between 
expert evidence and evidence of fact in relation to section 23. In R v Thomas, 1 2 8  Auld LJ 
stated:
126 [2002] 1 W LR 72.
127 R v Tully [2002] EWCA Crim 18, para. 118. This was also emphasised in a different judgment in the 
sample, R v Biggs [2002] EWCA Crim 418, para. 20.
128 [2002] EW CA Crim 941.
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‘In the ordinary way the existence of a reasonable explanation for not calling 
evidence at the trial, to which the Court should have regard when considering 
whether to receive fresh evidence, has more ready application to factual 
evidence than to scientific evidence since expert witnesses, though varying in 
standing and experience, are interchangeable in a way in which factual experts 
are not. ’ 1 2 9
This may partly explain the changes in the 2002 sample in that although the most 
common ground was witnesses of fact, the most successful ground was expert 
evidence. This trend should continue with the advances in expert evidence and the 
Court appearing to take a more liberal approach to this evidence under section 23.
In order to provide a more detailed picture of the operation of section 23, the 2002 
sample of cases can be divided into those where the evidence was rejected and those 
where it was admitted. This may provide some indications of what the decision making 
process of the Court is when deciding whether to admit the evidence. Those cases 
where the Court refused to admit the evidence will be considered first.
Fresh evidence rejected
As Lord Bingham stated in R v Pendleton, the decision to receive the evidence is initially 
taken by reading a witness statement on paper and applying the provisions of section 
23.130 The case of R v Biggs131 illustrates a potentially restrictive approach to section 23. 
The new evidence was a statement from a co-accused. The Court refused to hear the 
evidence because it was not convinced there was a reasonable explanation for the 
failure to adduce the evidence at an earlier stage. Kennedy LJ stated in the judgment 
that it appeared that the statement from the co-accused was not capable of belief but ‘of 
course were we to hear the evidence, we might be persuaded to the contrary effect.’ 
This shows that section 23(2)(d) was the overriding consideration in that case and 
because of that the Court were not prepared to even hear the evidence which may have 
resulted in the conviction being overturned. This is the situation JUSTICE hoped would 
be liberalised after the CAA 1995 so could be evidence that the Court is continuing to 
take a restrictive approach.
There was further evidence of the Court potentially taking a restrictive approach. In R v 
C/ee/and, 1 3 2 which was a very detailed case with 20 grounds of appeal, the evidence of 
a firearms expert was not admitted because it would not have impacted on the safety of 
the conviction. In R v Armstrong,'33 the evidence was not admitted because in the
129 Ibid, para. 98.
130 See above, n. 126, para. 10.
131 See above, n. 127.
132 [2002] EWCA Crim 293.
133 [2002] EWCA Crim 1057.
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Court’s view most of the evidence had been in the possession of the lawyers at the trial 
and had already been put to the complainant. In R v Garner,134 the witness evidence 
was not admitted because the Court took the view that the witnesses were not capable 
of giving credible evidence likely to undermine the safety of the conviction. In R v 
Allan,™5 a statement by a co-accused was not admitted with the Court stating that ‘one 
must be extremely cynical about statements being provided by co-accused post trial 
seeking to assist another co-accused when they are no longer in a position of being 
affected by what they might say. ’ 1 3 6  In R v McGee,137 evidence from a Doctor whose 
evidence was read at trial was rejected on the basis that his evidence on appeal would 
not be considered ‘fresh.’ In R v Willington,138 the defendant had pled guilty at trial and 
wanted to call on appeal the witnesses he would have called had he pled not guilty and 
had a trial. The Court refused to allow the witnesses to be called. In R v McKee,™9 
expert evidence was not admitted as the Court took the view it was not in the interests of 
justice to receive it. In R v Smith, the Court rejected the evidence from two witnesses on 
the basis that ‘we took the view that even if we were to accept every single word of what 
they say as true, we did not consider that that evidence would afford a ground for 
allowing the appeal. ’ 1 4 0  In R v Tully, the evidence was rejected on the basis that ‘if all 
the material now available had been available at trial, we are satisfied that the case 
would have taken exactly the same form that it took then and that as a result the 
outcome would have been no different. ’ 141 In R v Sanghera,1 4 2  the Court refused to 
accept the evidence ‘having regard to section 23(2)(d).’ In R v Burton,1 4 3  the evidence of 
an expert was not admitted because it would afford no ground for allowing the appeal. In 
R v Kavanagh,u 4 the expert evidence was rejected because the Court was satisfied that 
the jury’s verdict would not have been affected by the fresh evidence. In R v Korsa- 
Rossi, the evidence of a witness was rejected because ‘it seems to us that no 
explanation, reasonable or otherwise, has been proffered as to why he was not called at 
the trial. ’ 1 4 5  In R v Rodger,1 4 6  the evidence of witnesses was rejected as it would cast no 
doubt on the safety of the conviction. In R v Thomas,1 4 7  the evidence of witnesses was 
rejected as the Court did not consider it to be ‘new.’ Finally in R v Byrne,1 4 8  the evidence 
of a co-accused was rejected as it was not capable of belief and it did not afford any 
ground for allowing the appeal. There was an interesting and extreme twist in reasoning
34 [2002] EWCA Crim 1155.
35 [2002] EWCA Crim 1055.
36 Ibid, para. 27.
37 [2002] EWCA Crim 1338.
38 [2002] EWCA Crim 40.
39 [2002] EWCA Crim 1498.
40 [2002] EWCA Crim 759, para. 25.
41 [2002] EWCA Crim 18, para. 137.
42 [2002] EWCA Crim 1088.
43 [2002] EWCA Crim 614.
44 [2002] EWCA Crim 904.
45 [2002] EWCA Crim 1757, para. 31.
46 [2002] EWCA Crim 660.
47 [2002] EWCA Crim 941.
48 [2002] EWCA Crim 1284.
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in a case in the 2002 sample. In R v Hooper, the Court had not been provided with a
witness statement as to what the fresh evidence was going to be:
‘However, leaving that aside, assuming that there might have been, though as
we know in the event there was not going to be, some evidence from Mr
Carpenter; and assuming also that its content would be entirely speculative; in 
the light of the judge's findings we feel that we would have found it difficult to 
hold under section 23(2)(a) of the statute that such evidence would be capable 
of belief. ’ 1 4 9
Here, the Court seems to be rejecting evidence it has not even seen.
A review of these cases reveals that section 23 was discussed when rejecting the 
evidence in thirteen cases and not discussed in a further five where the evidence was 
rejected. These cases could show the Court taking a restrictive approach because at 
this stage the Court is refusing to hear the evidence rather than hearing it and making a 
decision on it. As these cases show, the Court uses a variety of reasons not to admit it 
such as it not being capable of belief, it not affording a ground for allowing the appeal, it 
not being considered new, it being available at trial, no reasonable explanation for it not 
being at the trial etc. As the cases demonstrate, generally a reading of the witness 
statement is combined with a discussion of whether to admit the evidence under section 
23. The Court often makes a decision that the evidence does not comply with section 23 
without hearing or seeing the evidence in person. It may be true that a large amount of 
evidence on paper may seem not capable of belief or would not afford a ground for 
allowing the appeal, but perhaps a better approach would be to hear the evidence in 
person before making the decision as to whether it complies with section 23. This way 
the Court may be persuaded about the cogency of evidence which may not appear, on 
paper, to be that persuasive. There is very little evidence here that the Court is looking 
for the merits in the case in terms of whether this person may have been wrongly 
convicted. As discussed above, the Court’s review function prevents it from delving too 
deeply into the merits of the case and combined with its reverence for finality and its 
deference to the jury verdict only a small amount of fresh evidence is actually being 
heard by the Court. But in the absence of a tried and tested method of determining 
whether these appeals should have been overturned, we can only speculate on whether 
the Court is taking a restrictive approach in these appeals. The Court appears to be 
applying a mixture of the jury impact test and Stafford to determining whether the 
evidence should be admitted so either results in the evidence being excluded.
There is evidence that could be construed as a more liberal approach in some 
instances. There were five judgments in the 2002 sample where the evidence was
149 [2002] EWCA Crim 621, para. 51.
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heard ‘de bene esse. ' 1 5 0 This is where the Court hears the evidence without 
considering section 23 first. This is potentially more liberal because the cases above 
show the Court rejecting the evidence using section 23 in the majority of cases. If the 
evidence is heard ‘de bene esse’ then it is not subject to the initial section 23 
assessment prior to being admitted by the Court. Of those cases, three were allowed, 
one was dismissed and one was refused leave to appeal. In R v Ba/g, 1 5 1 the appeal 
was refused because the Court found that the new evidence could afford no ground 
for allowing the appeal. In R v Cartledge, 1 5 2  the appeal was dismissed as the 
evidence was deemed incapable of belief and was not deemed to have assisted the 
appellant’s case. But in R v Roberts, 1 5 3  R v RF1 5 4  and R v Daniel, 1 5 5  the appeals were 
allowed, suggesting that the appellant has more chance of success if the evidence is 
heard prior to section 23 being considered rather than the evidence being read on 
paper and section 23 considered prior to the hearing of it in Court. It is not clear why 
the Court chose to do this in these cases and not others but if this was general 
practice then perhaps more appellants would have convictions overturned.
The cases where the evidence was admitted by the Court will now be reviewed.
Fresh evidence admitted
As discussed above, the fresh evidence was admitted in eighteen of the thirty-six cases 
which equates to 50% of the total fresh evidence cases. Once the evidence is admitted 
the Court then goes on to decide whether the fresh evidence has made the conviction 
unsafe. As chapter four showed, the Court has a number of different approaches to 
determining the appeal. The House of Lords was given the opportunity to clarify the test 
to be used by the Court when deciding fresh evidence appeals in the case of R v 
Pendleton, 1 5 6  The certified question for the House of Lords was:
"Where, on an appeal against conviction, the Court of Appeal receives fresh 
evidence under section 23 of the Criminal Appeal Act 1968, in determining the 
safety of the conviction, is the court confined to answering the question, might a 
reasonable jury have acquitted the appellant had they heard the fresh 
evidence?"
The case of Pendleton was decided in December 2001 and the cases in the sample 
were the first opportunity for the Court of Appeal to consider the judgment. Therefore, it
150 This translates into ‘for what it is worth.’
151 [2002] EWCA Crim 823.
152 [2002] EWCA Crim 1306.
153 [2002] EW CA Crim 1069.
154 [2002] EWCA Crim 633.
155 [2002] EWCA Crim 37.
156 See above, n.126.
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is necessary to outline the judgment before proceeding with an analysis of those cases 
where the evidence was admitted.
Pendleton and the decision making process
As discussed above, initially the Court applied the objective jury impact test in 
determining the appeal but the House of Lords in Stafford decided the test should be 
more subjective. The case of Pendleton gave the House of Lords the opportunity to 
overrule the Stafford judgment. The Crown relied on the decision in Stafford while the 
appellants relied on the judgment of R v McNamee1 5 7  where Swinton Thomas LJ had 
applied the jury impact test:
‘We have concluded that the conviction is unsafe because we cannot be sure
that the jury would have reached the same conclusion that they were sure of 
guilt if they had the fresh evidence we have heard. Furthermore the case as 
presented to us by both sides is very different to that presented at trial.’
The leading speech in Pendleton was given by Lord Bingham who discussed the 
difficulties of the Court’s task in relation to fresh evidence appeals as:
‘...it will ordinarily be safe for the Court of Appeal to infer that the factual 
ingredients essential to prove guilt have been established against the 
satisfaction of the jury. But the Court of Appeal can rarely ever know, save 
perhaps from questions asked by the jury after retirement, at what points the 
jury have felt difficulty. The jury’s process of reasoning will not be revealed and, 
if a number of witnesses give evidence bearing on a single question, the Court 
of Appeal will never know which of those witnesses the jury accepted and which, 
if any, they doubted or rejected. ’ 1 5 8
Lord Bingham accepted the appellant’s submission that the starting point had to be 
recognition of the jury as the tribunal of fact but he was not persuaded that the House of 
Lords had laid down any incorrect principle in Stafford, ‘so long as the Court of Appeal 
bears very clearly in mind that the question for its consideration is whether the conviction 
is safe and not whether the accused is guilty. ’ 1 5 9  Therefore:
The Court of Appeal can make its assessment of the fresh evidence it has 
heard, but save in a clear case it is at a disadvantage in seeking to relate that 
evidence to the rest of the evidence which the jury heard. For these reasons it 
will usually be wise for the Court of Appeal, in a case of any difficulty, to test 
their own provisional view by asking whether the evidence, if given at the trial, 
might reasonably have affected the decision of the trial jury to convict. If it might, 
the conviction must be thought to be unsafe. ’ 1 6 0
157 [1998] EW CA Crim 3524.
158 See above, n.126, at para. 16.
159 Ibid, at para. 19.
160 f  j
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Donald Pendleton’s appeal was allowed on the basis that the Court of Appeal had failed 
to appreciate that the importance of the fresh evidence was that it would have led to the 
trial being conducted completely differently:
‘Had the jury been trying a different case on substantially different evidence the 
outcome must be in doubt. In holding otherwise the Court of Appeal strayed 
beyond its true function of review and made findings that were not open to it in 
all the circumstances. Indeed it came perilously close to considering whether 
the appellant, in its judgment, was guilty. ’ 161
Lords Steyn and Hope agreed with Lord Bingham’s reasoning but Lord Hobhouse took a 
differing view, though agreeing that the conviction should be quashed. He felt that 
changing the test to ‘unsafe’ had reinforced the reasoning in Stafford that ‘appeals are 
not to be allowed unless the Court of Appeal has itself made the requisite 
assessment’ 1 6 2 as:
‘in my judgment it is not right to attempt to look into the minds of the members of 
the jury. Their deliberations are secret and their precise and detailed reasoning 
is not known. For an appellate court to speculate, whether hypothetically or 
actually, is not appropriate. It is for the Court of Appeal to answer the direct and 
simply stated question: Do we think that the conviction was unsafe? ’ 1 6 3
The question after Pendleton was what approach the Court of Appeal would follow in 
fresh evidence appeals; would it be Lord Bingham’s supposedly more liberal approach in 
highlighting the jury impact test or Lord Hobhouse’s reinforcement of the supposedly 
more restrictive Stafford approach? The answer is, unsurprisingly, not clear.
Reference to Pendleton was made in eight of the 2002 sample cases1 6 4  although the 
reasoning of Lords Bingham and Hobhouse could be traced through the other cases as 
the decision making process of the Court tended to be one or the other. The supposed 
more liberal approach of Lord Bingham is illustrated by cases such as R v Daniel,165 R v 
McMillan,166 R v Murphy and Brannan,167 and R vF  (RJ)168 where the Court quashed the 
convictions after applying the jury impact test to conclude that if the fresh evidence had 
been given at trial it might reasonably have affected the decision of the jury to convict 
the defendant. In the latter case the Court emphasised that the ‘determination of where 
the truth lies, in a matter of this kind, is not one for this Court. It is a matter, invariably,
161 Ibid, at para. 28.
162 Ibid, at para. 35.
163 Ibid, at para. 38.
164 R v Murphy and Brannan[2002] EWCA Crim 120; R v Izzigail [2002] EWCA Crim 925; R v Hanratty [2002] 
EWCA Crim 1141; R v Daniel [2002] EWCA Crim 37; R v Hakala [2002] EWCA Crim 730; R v McMillan [2002] 
EWCA Crim 114; R v Downing [2002] EWCA Crim 263; R v Cleeland [2002] EWCA Crim 293.
165 Id.
166 Id.
167 Id.
168 [2002] EW CA Crim 633.
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for a jury. ’ 1 6 9  This emphasizes what is known as the Pendleton principle of the Court of 
Appeal intruding on the jury’s role in assessing the credibility and reliability of witnesses; 
the question for the Court is whether the conviction is safe and not whether the accused 
is guilty. Therefore, the Court is not allowed to substitute its view for the jury’s view of 
the evidence. 1 7 0
The reinforcement of the Stafford approach of Lord Hobhouse is illustrated by cases 
such as R v Hanratty,171 R v Akiner,172 R v Izzigil,173 R v JB,174 R v Hakala,175 and R v 
Cleeland176 where the Court appears to make its own evaluation of the fresh evidence 
and upholds the appeal. This is despite the Court taking a seemingly liberal approach to 
the admittance of the fresh evidence in R v Izzigail when the Court accepted it despite 
the fact it was available at the trial and there was no reasonable explanation as to why it 
was not. In R v Hakala, one of the reasons given for the reinforcement of the Stafford 
approach was that:
The judgment in “fresh evidence” cases will inevitably therefore continue to 
focus on the facts before the trial jury, in order to ensure that the right question -  
the safety, or otherwise, of the conviction - is answered. It is integral to the 
process that if the fresh evidence is disputed, this court must decide whether 
and to what extent it should be accepted or rejected, and if it is to be accepted, 
to evaluate its importance, or otherwise, relative to the remaining material which 
was before the trial jury: hence the jury impact test. Indeed, although the 
question did not arise in Pendleton, the fresh evidence adduced by the 
appellant, or indeed the Crown, may serve to confirm rather than undermine the 
safety of the conviction. Unless this evaluation is carried out, it is difficult to see 
how this court can perform out its statutory responsibility in a fresh evidence 
case, and exercise its “power of review to guard against the possibility of 
injustice”. However the safety of the appellant's convictions is examined, the 
essential question, and ultimately the only question for this court, is whether, in 
the light of the fresh evidence, the convictions are unsafe. ’ 1 7 7
This was cited with approval in R v Hanratty178 where the prosecution sought to adduce 
DNA evidence on appeal to prove Hanratty’s guilt. By using the authorities of R v 
Pendleton and R v Hakala, Lord Woolf stated that ‘it is clear that the overriding 
consideration for this Court in deciding whether fresh evidence should be admitted on 
the hearing of an appeal is whether the evidence will assist the Court to achieve justice’ 
and ‘justice can equally be achieved by upholding a conviction if it is safe or setting it 
aside if it is unsafe. ’ 1 7 9  Counsel for the appellant, Michael Mansfield, had contended that
169 Ibid, at para 44.
170 For a detailed analysis of the Pendleton judgment see R v Mills and Poole [2003] EWCA Crim 1753.
171 [2002] EW CA Crim 1141.
172 [2002] EWCA Crim 957.
173 [2002] EWCA Crim 925.
174 [2002] EWCA Crim 543.
175 [2002] EWCA Crim 162.
176 [2002] EWCA Crim 293.
177 See above, n. 175, at para. 11.
178 See above, n. 171.
179 Ibid, at para 94.
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if the Court was not to exceed its role as a Court of review, it could only receive fresh 
evidence on behalf of the prosecution if that evidence was being relied upon to rebut 
fresh evidence introduced on the appeal by an appellant. This argument was not 
accepted by the Court, partly on the basis that it was not consistent with the decision of 
R v Craven (not in the sample) . 1 8 0 In Craven, a large amount of material had not been 
disclosed to the defence and Latham LJ had stated that ‘we are entitled, as it seems to 
us, to consider whether the material which was withheld could have affected the jury's 
verdict in the light of all the facts now known to this Court’ and ‘we acknowledge that in 
carrying out this exercise we are trespassing upon what at trial would be the function of 
the jury. But that is the inevitable consequence in any case involving fresh evidence. ’ 1 81  
In this case the Court appeared to be convinced of the appellant’s guilt as there was a 
DNA match with the appellant’s blood taken from the shirt of someone close to the victim 
at the time of an attack.
In Hanratty, Mansfield argued that Latham LJ’s approach was inconsistent with R v 
Pendleton but this was rejected by Lord Woolf who stated that Latham LJ’s general 
approach could be satisfactorily reconciled with that of Lord Bingham in Pendleton. 
However, it would appear that the Court of Appeal in Hanratty and Craven did what the 
House of Lords in Pendleton had criticised the Court of Appeal in Pendleton of doing 
which was to stray beyond its true function of review and make findings which were not 
open to it in all the circumstances. Indeed it came perilously close to considering 
whether the appellant, in its judgment, was guilty. This can be implied by Lord Woolf’s 
conclusion that ‘....for reasons we have explained the DNA evidence establishes beyond 
doubt that James Hanratty was the murderer. ’ 1 8 2 And Latham LJ’s conclusion that the 
only reasonable inference from [the blood stain] is that he was the person who thrust the 
glass at Penny Laing thereby killing her. ’ 1 8 3 In Pendleton, this approach resulted in the 
conviction being quashed but in Hanratty and Craven it resulted in the appeal being 
upheld which implies that the Court is permitted to do this when adducing prosecution 
evidence to uphold the appeal but should not when deciding whether fresh evidence 
adduced by the appellant has made the conviction unsafe. This is illustrative of the 
Court’s inconsistency and contradictions. These decisions are also difficult to reconcile 
with the Court’s review function as it would appear that these should be decisions for a 
jury. In Hanratty’s case it would be impossible to have a retrial because of the age of the 
case and the fact that he is dead would arguably make it not in the interests of justice to 
do so. But this case shows that when the Court is deciding the issue for itself it does 
appear to usurp the function of the jury. But it does so from an inferior position of not 
seeing or hearing the witnesses.
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The case of R v Hanratty can be contrasted with that of R v Downing, 1 8 4 Stephen 
Downing was convicted of murder. The new evidence on appeal was from experts 
relating to blood staining. Downing reported that he knew a woman had been attacked 
and he was found at the scene as he worked in the cemetery where she was found. He 
had blood on him at the time. During police questioning he admitted he had killed her 
(he also admitted this to various Doctors) but during the trial he said that was not true 
but he then admitted finding her after the attack and touching her breasts and between 
her legs. The new evidence on appeal consisted of expert evidence that the blood 
staining may have happened when he found her after the attack. This had not been fully 
discussed at the trial in 1974. The other evidence on appeal was that the confession 
should have been excluded from the trial because of the oppression with which it was 
obtained. The Court quashed the conviction on the basis of the expert evidence on 
blood staining and the fact that the confession evidence was not challenged at the trial. 
During the judgment, Pill LJ stated:
This court is aware of the unlikelihood, on the face of it, of someone sexually 
assaulting a badly injured woman, as the appellant admits he did, unless it was 
he who had previously disabled her with sexual assault in mind. This court is 
also aware of the confessions he made to several doctors in circumstances very 
different from those in the police station. The presence of the appellant near the 
scene and the nature of the weapon must also be borne in mind. It is not, 
however, for this court to speculate as to what might have happened had the 
fundamental defect, which we find to have existed in the conduct of the trial, not 
been present. As Lord Bingham had recently underlined in R v Pendleton “the 
question for its [the Court of Appeal’s] consideration is whether the conviction is 
safe and not whether the accused is guilty.” In the somewhat bizarre 
circumstances of this case we expressly do not address ourselves to the latter 
question. ’ 1 8 5
It would appear by mentioning this that the Court considered this to be potentially 
evidence that Downing had, in fact, committed the crime. But clearly the admission of 
the confession was the overriding factor when deciding the conviction was unsafe. In 
other cases in the sample, 1 8 6  the new evidence was rejected on the basis of other strong 
prosecution evidence which appears to give the view that the evidence was rejected 
because the Court’s view was the appellant committed the crime so the conviction was 
not unsafe. In Hanratty, the Court clearly takes the view that he was guilty and upholds 
the conviction. It would appear that Downing was fortunate to have his conviction 
quashed.
The case of Pendleton does reinforce the view that the Court should be deciding on 
safety and not guilt but how this works in practice is very difficult to ascertain. If the 
Court is deciding on the validity of new evidence and deciding whether this made the
184 [2002] EWCA Crim 263.
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conviction unsafe, it is difficult to know what the thought process is if it is not one of 
whether the appellant committed the crime. For those cases in the sample where the 
jury impact test was applied, the decision making process is more transparent in terms 
of considering whether, if the jury had that evidence, would they have found the 
defendant guilty? That is not to say the conclusions on that matter are transparent as the 
Court is making assumptions about jury decision making that cannot be tested. But at 
least it is easier to determine what thought process is being used. When the Court is 
deciding the issue for itself, it is difficult to work out what else it is deciding on other than 
the guilt of the appellant or whether it believes the person should have been convicted. If 
the Court is deciding that the new evidence would not have made any difference to the 
jury verdict it is presumably agreeing that the verdict would still have been one of guilty. 
This is particularly difficult for fresh evidence appeals because the appellant is 
essentially arguing that he/she did not commit the crime so by implication the Court is 
being asked to either agree with the adjudication of guilt by the jury and if not, quash the 
conviction. Either way, the usurpation of the role of the jury in deciding the issue is 
inevitable as illustrated above by Latham LJ in R v Craven. This can be illustrated by 
looking at those cases in the sample where the Court decides the issue for itself and 
allows the appeal.
The Court appeared to take a liberal approach in R v Roberts.™7 The appellant was 
convicted of murder and at trial ran a defence of diminished responsibility and 
provocation. The new evidence heard de bene esse was that of psychiatrists giving 
evidence as to the appellant’s personality traits. The argument on appeal was that the 
defence of provocation had not been properly put to the jury and the psychiatric 
evidence was evidence of the defendant’s characteristics which the jury had not 
considered in relation to provocation. The Court’s conclusion was that provocation was 
not adequately canvassed before the jury. The Court accepted that this evidence was 
not new as there was evidence before the jury of the defendant’s characteristics for the 
purposes of diminished responsibility. Therefore, the jury had been aware of the 
defendant’s abnormality of mind but had dismissed the defence and convicted him of 
murder. The Court stated that if the evidence at the trial, and the new psychiatric 
evidence on appeal which had reinforced the psychiatric evidence before the jury, had 
been appreciated there would have been a realistic prospect that the trial jury would not 
have excluded provocation. The Court substituted a manslaughter conviction for one of 
murder. This seems a particularly generous decision when there was psychiatric 
evidence before the jury and the defence of provocation had been left to them. Whilst 
the Court had heard ‘new1 psychiatric evidence on appeal this merely reinforced what 
the jury had previously considered when rejecting the defence. It seems here the Court 
was disagreeing with that jury decision and proceeding on the basis that provocation
187 [2002] EWCA Crim 1069.
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should have been successful. This shows the Court can intervene when it wants to but 
does not do this too often. 1 8 8
There are other cases which potentially show a more liberal approach. In R v GB, 1 8 9  the 
Court heard evidence from a witness who claimed that the complainant in a rape case 
had told her that she had made the whole thing up. The Court took the view that this was 
‘highly material evidence’ and concluded that that made the conviction unsafe; in R v 
Higgins, 1 9 0 the new evidence was witness statements that had not been handed over to 
the defence under the disclosure provisions. The Court quashed the conviction on the 
basis that ‘the evidence that it was sought to call before us is certainly suggestive of the 
possibility of a real miscarriage of justice; ’ 1 91 in R v Dem/r, 1 9 2  the Court accepted the 
evidence of a person who had done some work on a video recording to enhance it for 
the purposes of being able to identify whether the appellant was the person who 
committed a stabbing. It was accepted that his opinion on the parties identified on the 
film was a non-expert opinion. The conviction was quashed and a retrial ordered. There 
was no discussion in the judgment as to why this evidence was not available at the trial.
These cases potentially show that the Court is capable of adopting a liberal approach 
when deciding the issue for itself in line with Stafford and it is not just applying the jury 
impact test that results in quashed convictions. The jury impact test resulted in four 
convictions being quashed, but the Court deciding the issue for itself resulted in five 
convictions quashed out of nine with one leave to appeal granted. Therefore, the jury 
impact test does not necessarily provide a more liberal approach to deciding to allow the 
appeal which may be unfortunate for those appellants whose counsel argue for it as a 
more acceptable way of disposing with the appeal because of the Court’s review 
function.
The position in relation to fresh evidence after the 2002 sample will now be discussed in 
order to ascertain whether there have been any developments.
Fresh evidence after 2002
A review of the reported judgments after the 2002 sample shows the situation with 
regard to Pendleton is, unsurprisingly, contradictory. Just as in the 2002 sample, there 
are judgments where the jury impact test has been used and there are judgments where 
the Stafford approach has been used. What is clear is that the jury impact test has been 
used far more often with Lord Bingham’s test cited as the one to apply generally in those
188 This case can be contrasted with R v Bedford [2002] EWCA Crim 893. In this case the Court was asked to 
substitute a conviction of murder for manslaughter on the basis of provocation but the Court declined stating 
that provocation was a matter for the jury and not the Court and a retrial was ordered.
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cases. This does not necessarily mean that the conviction will be quashed when that 
test is used over Stafford as, as the 2002 sample shows, both approaches result in 
quashed convictions.
The Stafford approach
The Stafford approach was reinforced in the judgement of R v Ahmed.™3 In that case, 
Mantell LJ referred to the case of R v Hakala and also R v Hanratty which had both 
approved Stafford and cited with approval the speech from Judge LJ in R v Hakala 
above. 1 9 4 He stated 'as is shown in Pendleton and Hakala it is for this Court to decide 
whether or not the evidence should be accepted. If it is accepted, the question is then as 
to its impact on the safety of the conviction. ’ 1 9 5  This case illustrates the problematic 
nature of fresh evidence appeals. The new evidence was recordings of telephone 
conversations between the appellant’s sister and a witness at trial. The telephone 
conversations apparently revealed the witness saying she had given false evidence at 
trial and she gave the name of the person who committed the murder. On the appeal, 
the Court heard the tape recordings and the trial witness appeared in the Court via video 
link and was examined in chief by the Crown and cross-examined on behalf of the 
appellant. The witness told the Court she had spoken the truth at the trial. The Court 
weighed up the evidence given at trial and concluded the witness was telling the truth at 
the appeal and was lying in the telephone conversations. The Court was satisfied that 
she lied during the telephone conversations because she was being threatened and 
decided to dismiss the appeal. It appears in this case that the Court of Appeal is 
intruding on the jury’s role in assessing the credibility and reliability of witnesses which 
directly contradicts the Pendleton principle. In Pendleton, the House of Lords quashed 
the conviction because it had held that the Court of Appeal had erroneously assessed 
the credibility and reliability of witnesses. But it appears that this was acceptable for the 
Court to do this in Ahmed. This should arguably have gone to retrial so the jury could 
make the determination of whether she was truthful rather than the Court.
The Privy Council had the opportunity to review Pendleton in Dial and Dottin v The 
State.™6 This was a death row case from Trinidad and Tobago. There was undisputed 
information that an identification witness had lied at trial. The majority (three-two) 
dismissed the appeal and Lord Bingham was in the majority. Lord Brown gave the 
leading judgment and stated:
Wherever fresh evidence establishes that a material prosecution witness has 
told a lie, the question arising for the appeal court's determination is whether 
that realistically places the appellant's guilt in reasonable doubt; whether, in 
other words, the verdict is now to be regarded as unsafe. That necessarily must
193 [2002] All ER (D) 80.
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depend upon all the evidence in the case. However barefaced the lie and 
however central to the prosecution case the witness who told it, the Court of 
Appeal is bound in law to address that question. Even in a case of capital 
murder it cannot be right to allow an appeal, without more, simply on the basis 
that the State's main witness has later been shown to have told an outright lie.
The court is not in such circumstances exonerated from undertaking its 
analytical task. And if it remains sure of the appellant's guilt and upholds his 
conviction, the court is not thereby to be regarded as having deprived the 
appellant of due process. ’ 1 9 7
Brown outlined the approach to use when determining fresh evidence appeals. He 
stated:
‘In the Board's view the law is now clearly established and can be simply stated 
as follows. Where fresh evidence is adduced on a criminal appeal it is for the 
Court of Appeal, assuming always that it accepts it, to evaluate its importance in 
the context of the remainder of the evidence in the case. If the court concludes 
that the fresh evidence raises no reasonable doubt as to the guilt of the accused 
it will dismiss the appeal. The primary question is for the court itself, and is not 
what effect the fresh evidence would have had on the mind of the jury. That 
said, if the court regards the case as a difficult one, it may find it helpful to test 
its view 'by asking whether the evidence, if given at the trial, might reasonably 
have affected the decision of the trial jury to convict' (Pendleton at p 83, para 
[19]). The guiding principle nevertheless remains that stated by Viscount 
Dilhorne in Stafford (at p 906) and affirmed by the House in Pendleton:
While ... the Court of Appeal and this House may find it a convenient approach 
to consider what a jury might have done if they had heard the fresh evidence, 
the ultimate responsibility rests with them and them alone for deciding the 
question [whether or not the verdict is unsafe] . 1 9 8
It is not clear from this whether Lord Bingham was now retreating from his views in 
Pendleton and following Lord Hobhouse’s line of reasoning in Pendleton which 
reinforced Stafford. There were two dissenting judgments from Lords Steyn and Hutton 
which appeared to emphasise the jury impact test of Pendleton.
There have also been further cases that have followed Lord Hobhouse’s reinforcement 
of Stafford. In R v L, 1 9 9  part of the fresh evidence was a file belonging to the National 
Society for the Prevention of Cruelty to Children to whom one of the complainants had 
complained about her Uncle who was convicted of raping her. Moses LJ stated:
‘It must be emphasised that the task of this court is not primarily focussed on the 
question whether the disclosure of the file would have had an effect on the jury's 
consideration. As to that there can be little doubt. But, as R v Pendleton 
emphasises, the task of this court is to consider whether, in the light of the fresh 
evidence, the conviction is unsafe. ’ 2 0 0
197 Ibid, paras. 42 and 43.
198 Ibid, paras 31 and 32. The cases cited were R v Hakala', R v Hanratty and R v Ahmed as authority.
199 [2005] All ER (D) 128.
200 Ibid, para. 22.
97
The Court decided in that case that it did not think the conviction was unsafe. In R v 
Steele and others,201 the fresh evidence involved a witness who had made contact with 
the media about his involvement with the murder case. The Court reviewed Pendleton 
and decided that the convictions were safe without any reference to the jury impact test. 
In R v Malkinson,202 the Court followed Dial and Dottin. Gage LJ stated:
We remind ourselves that when receiving fresh evidence, the essential question 
for this court, and ultimately the only question for this court, is whether, in the 
light of the fresh evidence, the convictions are safe. ’ 2 0 3
In R v £3, 2 0 4  Moses LJ followed his judgment in R vL  and reiterated his reinforcement of 
Stafford. The appeal was allowed and he stated:
The correct test to be applied by the Court of Appeal when considering whether 
or not to allow an appeal against conviction where fresh evidence had been 
received on the appeal was the effect of the fresh evidence on the minds of the 
members of the court, and not the effect that it would have had on the minds of 
the jury. The test was whether the conviction was safe and not whether the 
accused was guilty.’
This seems to be saying that if the Court is applying the jury impact test, it is assessing 
the new evidence in relation to whether the appellant is guilty or not but if the Court is 
assessing the new evidence itself it is then deciding if the conviction is unsafe. This 
would clearly separate the role of the jury and the role of the Court. But it is difficult to 
establish what the Court is considering when deciding if the conviction is unsafe other 
than whether the appellant is guilty. As Lord Brown stated in Dial and Dottin above, the 
decision in relation to fresh evidence is ‘whether that realistically places the appellant's 
guilt in reasonable doubt; whether, in other words, the verdict is now to be regarded as 
unsafe.’ This seems to imply that the test of safety is whether the new evidence raises a 
reasonable doubt about guilt; if it does the conviction should be quashed and if it does 
not the conviction should be upheld. This should be the same whether the Court applies 
the jury impact test or the Stafford approach. It is difficult to see how the Court decides 
the conviction is unsafe without making its own assessment of the guilt of the defendant. 
If this is the decision making process then it is hard to see how the Court is one of 
review only in fresh evidence appeals.
Although the cases above show that the Stafford test was still being applied after 
Pendleton, and applied authoritatively in the Privy Council case, there are numerous 
cases to show that the jury impact test was also being applied to cases both allowed and 
dismissed.
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The jury impact test
A review of the reported fresh evidence cases that applied the jury impact test after the 
2 0 0 2  sample do not reveal any major differences from those discussed in the 2 0 0 2  
sample. Also, there do not appear to be any obvious reasons as to when this test will 
result in the conviction quashed and when it will result in the conviction being upheld. 
Those cases where the conviction was quashed will be considered first.
There were a number of cases where the Court used the jury impact test to quash the 
conviction. For example, in R v Dennis and others,205 R v Aspery,206 R v Jenkins,207 R v 
Nawaz and others,206 R v P,209 R v Vernett-Showers and others,2'0 R v Holdsworth211 R 
v Cadman,2'2 R v A,213 R v Cullen,214 R v Devaney,2'5 and R v Wickens,216 the Court 
decided the evidence may have had an impact on the jury and quashed the convictions. 
Some guidance on the Court’s decision making was given in R v Maynard and others,2'7 
In this case, evidence was given by a forensic document examiner who examined the 
original police interviews and discovered that some of the records were fabricated. 
There was also evidence from a trial witness saying he had lied at the trial. The 
prosecution barrister, Victor Temple QC, argued that if the jury had accepted the police 
evidence as truthful, then it must have accepted the discrepancies as errors. The Court 
reviewed the speeches of both Lords Bingham and Hobhouse in Pendleton and Mantell 
LJ stated:
‘In our view the argument of Mr Temple that the jury must have concluded that 
the police had made a mistake with the recording times, requires us to “look into 
the minds” of the jury and speculate as to their reasoning in a way that is clearly 
forbidden by Pendleton. We ask ourselves instead whether the evidence of Dr 
Hardcastle, if given at trial, might reasonably have affected the decision of the 
trial jury to convict. ’ 2 1 8
But later on he stated:
‘if the jury had cause to think that the record in the hard backed books on any 
one occasion had been fabricated, it is at least likely that they would come to 
doubt the integrity of all the interviews regardless of whether they had been
205 [2004] All ER (D) 05.
206 [2004] All ER (D) 183.
207 [2004] All ER (D) 295.
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conducted by the same officers who had been involved in the first Dudley 
interview. ’ 2 1 9
This appears to be speculating about jury decision making and it is not clear from fresh 
evidence appeals when it is or not acceptable to do this.
There was further evidence of a more liberal approach in R v Dallagher,220 where new 
evidence as to the reliability of ear print evidence was accepted by the Court as it was 
‘necessary and expedient in the interests of justice’ to receive it and in R v Fagan, 2 2 1 the 
new evidence was heard de bene esse. The Court reviewed Pendleton and Thomas LJ, 
in response to the question of whether the new evidence might reasonably have affected 
the decision of the jury to convict, stated:
‘Answering that question it seems to us that once it is accepted that we cannot 
say that her evidence is incapable of belief, it must follow that a jury might take 
the view that in the light of her evidence it might have made a difference to their 
decision to convict. ’ 2 2
And in response to the evidence from another witness, Thomas LJ stated ‘we would be 
usurping the function of a jury if we were to conclude that her evidence was not capable 
of belief. ’ 2 2 3  But under section 23, the Court has to decide whether the evidence is or not 
capable of belief. This seems to be saying that it is for the jury to determine whether the 
evidence is or not capable of belief and whilst the jury do that at trial, the Court is asked 
to do that on appeal which is yet more evidence of the Court’s confusing role in fresh 
evidence appeals. The appeal in that case was allowed.
These cases all show that the Court is able to be liberal on occasion. The cases where 
the evidence is admitted de bene esse or in the interests of justice without considering 
section 23 are all evidence of a liberal approach as some of these were. However, there 
are not that many of those. These cases are all examples of evidence leading to the 
appeal being allowed because the evidence may have had an impact on the jury, 
however there are no clear guidelines as to why this may be. The Court’s consistent 
claim that it decides whether the conviction is unsafe and not whether the appellant is 
guilty gives rise to a number of judgments where the Court says it cannot speculate on 
the decision making process of the jury at trial. But it then appears to do just that when 
deciding that the new evidence may have had an impact on their decision at trial. It is 
not entirely clear how the Court is able to decide whether the fresh evidence may have 
had an impact on them without trying to ascertain why they made the decisions they did
220 [2002] All ER (D) 383.
221 [2008] EWCA Crim 2014.
222 Ibid, para. 37.
223 Ibid, para. 36.
100
with the evidence they heard and how this new evidence would have influenced that 
decision. The cases since the 2002 sample that have applied the jury impact test to 
dismiss the appeal will now be examined.
These appeals all potentially show the Court to be taking a restrictive approach. In R v 
Maloney,224 the appellant was convicted of murdering his wife who was found crushed 
under the wheels of his car. The CCRC had referred the case with new evidence of an 
expert on traffic accidents. The Court considered whether it should receive the evidence 
and warned the CCRC against referring cases on the basis of the jury impact test. Auld 
LJ stated:
The material test for the Court both in considering whether to “receive” the 
evidence of Dr. Lambourn under section 23(1) and the appeal itself is whether, 
under section 23(2)(b), “it may afford any ground for allowing the appeal", that 
is, for holding the conviction to be unsafe. The issue of unsafety, which by the 
very meaning of the word, makes it difficult to distinguish from the notion implicit 
in section 23(2)(b) of possible unsafety, is one for the Court in the light of the 
evidence before the jury and the proposed fresh evidence; see R v. Trevor 
[1998] Crim L.R. 652. The issue is not whether the Court considers, in the light 
of the proposed fresh evidence, that a jury might conceivably have reached a 
different decision if it had heard it. So, the Commission and the Court should 
beware against adopting, consciously or unconsciously, a train of thought that 
unless they can be certain the jury would have convicted had they heard the 
proffered fresh evidence, the conviction must be unsafe. However, the Court, in 
a case of any difficulty should usually “test their own provisional view by asking 
whether the evidence, if given at the trial, might reasonably have affected the 
decision of the jury to convict” - “the jury impact test”; see R v. Pendleton, per 
Lord Bingham of Cornhill at paras. 18-19, and R v. Hanratty, at para. 93, citing 
the judgment of Judge LJ in R v. Hakala [2002] EWCA Crim 730 at para. 11, 2 2 5
This seems to be sending a warning to the CCRC that the general approach of the Court 
is the Stafford one so they should guard against just referring a case on the basis of the 
jury impact test. These two approaches may cause difficulty for the CCRC if they think 
that the Court may not be persuaded by the evidence but think the jury might be and 
refer on that basis. It makes their job of applying the ‘real possibility’ test much more 
difficult.
There were further cases where the appeal was upheld because the Court felt the 
evidence would not have had an impact on the jury. For example, in R v Ambler226 R v 
Bartrip,227 R v Harper,228 R v Barnes,229 and R v Rogers230 In R v Probyn,231 the facts 
were very similar to R v Maloney above. The appellant was convicted of murdering his
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wife whose body was found in a car in a river. The prosecution case was that he had 
propelled the car into the river after having made his wife unconscious. The evidence 
was heard de bene esse and consisted of a witness who specialised in traffic accident 
reconstruction to show that she had ended up in the river by accident. The appeal was 
dismissed and Scott Baker LJ stated:
‘We bear in mind the warning of Lord Bingham that the test is not whether we 
think the appellant is guilty but whether the conviction is safe. Whilst we cannot 
look into the minds of the jury we cannot disregard the very considerable 
circumstantial evidence which remains untouched by the fresh expert evidence. 
The fresh evidence is based on assumptions, which in our judgment provide an 
insufficiently firm foundation for that evidence to have affected the jury’s 
decision to convict. ’ 2 3 2
Scott Baker LJ seems to be saying here that the appeal is dismissed because there is 
other circumstantial evidence in the case and also because the fresh evidence is not 
strong enough to have made a difference to the jury’s decision. As he acknowledges, if 
the Court is not to look into the minds of the jury, this does appear to be making 
assumptions about what the jury would have decided. If the Court feels the 
circumstantial evidence is strong then it is saying that the jury would have too and the 
new evidence would not have had a difference. But how the Court makes this decision 
without looking into the minds of the jury is not clear.
There were cases that were rejected as it appeared the Court did not believe the 
evidence. In R v H,233 the appellant argued on appeal that the complainant, his adopted 
daughter, had made an earlier allegation of rape against him which she had admitted 
was untrue. He had been convicted of raping her. Counsel for the appellant had a sworn 
statement that neither he nor his solicitors had known about the retraction of an earlier 
allegation. The Court rejected this evidence on the basis that it was not ‘fresh’ or ‘new’ 
as whilst it was willing to accept the appellant’s lawyers did not know about the retraction 
it clearly did not believe that the appellant did not know. Also, in R v Speake, 2 3 4  a 
witness’ evidence was dismissed for not being capable of being credible or of affecting 
the jury’s decision. These cases seem to directly contradict Thomas LJ in R v Fagan 
above when he said ‘we would be usurping the function of a jury if we were to conclude 
that her evidence was not capable of belief.’ It appears in these cases the Court is 
deciding whether the evidence is credible which according to Thomas LJ is usurping the 
role of the jury but section 23 requires the Court to decide whether the evidence is 
capable of belief. This all adds to the confusion around how the Court decides fresh 
evidence appeals and is evidence of its inconsistency.
232 Ibid, para. 80.
233 [2002] All ER (D) 296.
234 [2003] All ER (D) 49.
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These cases show that the jury impact test is as capable of resulting in convictions being 
upheld as it is in them being quashed. Although the general view is that the jury impact 
test is preferable because the Court deciding the issue for itself is more likely to lead to a 
usurping of the role of the jury, these cases appear to be weighing up what the jury 
would or would not make of the evidence so it is not overly clear what the differences 
are between the approaches. It is fairly clear that the jury impact test is now being used 
far more often than the Stafford approach. It is also fairly clear that the jury impact test 
does not result in a necessarily more liberal approach because the number of 
convictions quashed and upheld was fairly even. If there were differences between the 
approaches in terms of the numbers they were negligible.
Summary
The evidence as to whether the Court is adopting a more liberal approach in the 2002 
sample is contradictory. In the 1990 sample, there were twenty-three fresh evidence 
cases and in the 2002 sample there were thirty-six. This appears to mean either that 
more fresh evidence appeals are being brought to the Court or that more of the existing 
number are getting through the leave filter. But the introduction of the CCRC has clearly 
had an impact on this ground of appeal as ten of the cases in the 2 0 0 2  sample were 
CCRC referrals. As these cases do not need to go through the leave filter, it is difficult to 
argue that the greater number of appeals in the 2 0 0 2  sample is an indication of a more 
liberal approach to the leave procedure.
During the leave process, the fresh evidence is considered on paper and it is also 
considered on paper in the appeal before the Court decides to admit the evidence. In 
1990 the evidence was admitted in 61% of appeals and in 2002 it was admitted in 50% 
of appeals. Therefore, whilst there are a larger number of fresh evidence appeals in the 
2002 sample, the evidence was admitted in fewer appeals. This is potentially illustrative 
of a more restrictive approach in 2002. There is clearly the potential for problems with 
the Court assessing the new evidence on paper. The Court generally uses the factors in 
section 23 to dismiss evidence which can result in evidence being rejected which may 
have been accepted if the judges had heard it in person. There are cases where the 
Court hears the evidence in the interests of justice without considering the factors in 
section 23 such as cases where the evidence is heard de bene esse. This potentially 
shows a more liberal approach because the appellant does not have to cross the hurdle 
of section 23 prior to the evidence being admitted. But these cases are rare with this 
power not being consistently used. It is also not clear why it is used in some appeals and 
not others. The factor in section 23 which appears to remain the most problematic for 
appellants is the failure to adduce the evidence during the trial. If the Court takes the 
view there was no reasonable excuse as to why it was not in the original trial it will 
uphold the appeal even without hearing the evidence. The difficulty for appellants is that
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there is no clear guidance on what is considered to be a 'reasonable' excuse and strong 
evidence of innocence may be excluded on the basis that it was available at trial.
In 1990, there were four appeals allowed, fifteen dismissed or refused and two 
adjourned for a full hearing. This equates to a success rate of 17%. In 2002, there were 
nine appeals allowed, twenty-six dismissed or refused and one adjourned for a full 
hearing. This equates to a success rate of 35%. This shows that despite evidence being 
admitted in fewer appeals in 2 0 0 2 , there was a much higher chance of success in 2 0 0 2 . 
This is potentially evidence that the Court was taking a more liberal approach to deciding 
the appeal in 2 0 0 2  even if it was taking a more restrictive approach to admitting the 
evidence initially.
Both samples had the same most common ground being witnesses of fact. However, in 
the 1990 sample these were the most successful but in the 2002 sample, expert 
evidence was the most successful. This could be proof that there are now more appeals 
brought on this basis and therefore more are likely to get through the leave filter. It could 
also be proof that this type of evidence is more likely to be admitted by the Court. It is 
also potentially evidence that the CCRC may be having an impact on this type of 
evidence. If the Court is taking a more liberal approach to these appeals then this is 
partly explained by the approach the Court takes to expert evidence and section 23 with 
section 23 not being adhered to as strictly as it is with witnesses of fact.
The decision making process is divided into the Stafford subjective approach or the 
objective jury impact test. As Malleson’s sample showed, the Stafford approach had 
taken over from the earlier jury impact test approach. But as the 2002 sample showed, 
the case of Pendleton had an impact on the Court in reaffirming the jury impact test. 
However, Pendleton was not mentioned in every case and some of the judges were 
clearly still applying the Stafford approach. Although leaving the judges to determine the 
appeal as they wish does give flexibility, it shows the inconsistency of the decision 
making process. As the comments of Lord Devlin above show, the jury impact test is 
generally accepted as the preferred approach as the Court is supposedly not usurping 
the role of the jury when applying it. But the judgments are not clear as to whether the 
Court is or is not usurping the role of the jury. The judgments often make reference to 
the Court’s role of deciding if the conviction is unsafe and not deciding if the appellant is 
guilty, but when deciding if the conviction is unsafe, the Court must be deciding if the 
new evidence raises a reasonable doubt about guilt. If this is the decision making 
process, then the Court is usurping the jury’s role when deciding whether the conviction 
is unsafe based on new evidence. But this is to some extent inevitable in these appeals 
as the Court is deciding on evidence that was never before the jury. This will be
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discussed in more detail in chapter nine when proposals to reform the Court are also 
discussed.
The cases in the 2002 sample show that the Stafford approach was more likely to result 
in the conviction being quashed so the jury impact test was not necessarily a more 
liberal approach though the differences in number were small. The cases after 2002 
show that the Stafford test is still being used and was, indeed, reaffirmed by the Privy 
Council in Dial and Dottin. The majority included Lord Bingham who had earlier 
emphasised the jury impact test in Pendleton. This may be evidence that Lord Bingham 
was now rejecting his earlier pronouncements of the jury impact test in Pendleton as the 
dissenting judges, Lords Steyn and Hutton, both argued should be the approach to fresh 
evidence appeals. But the speech of Lord Bingham in Pendleton was essentially saying 
that the Stafford approach was the correct one and the Court may use the jury impact 
test in cases of difficulty to confirm what the judges had decided themselves. This is not 
changing the fresh evidence test from Stafford to the jury impact test completely so it is 
not surprising that Stafford continues to be used after Pendleton. It is not clear from the 
judgments what is meant by ‘in cases of difficulty’ but the jury impact test is certainly 
being used more often after the 2002 sample. This appears to show that the Court may 
find it an easier decision making process because where the Court is deciding the issue 
for itself it is making its own subjective decision on what it thinks of the evidence which is 
straying into jury territory. But the difference between what the jury decides at trial and 
what the Court decides on appeal is not clear. The Court appears to be speculating 
about decisions the jury made at trial and coming to its own conclusions about what it 
thinks of the trial evidence and the new evidence. On this basis, what is the difference 
between the jury deciding on guilt and the Court deciding on safety as it would appear 
they are the same thing? Again, this will be discussed further in chapter nine with 
proposed reforms.
The cases in the 2002 sample and after the 2002 appear to confirm Malleson’s findings 
that:
Taken together, the quantitative and qualitative data show that fresh evidence 
cases are rare and treated with great caution by the Court. Only in very limited 
circumstances will such evidence be admitted and if admitted, form the basis of 
a successful appeal. Moreover, the Court rarely sets out the reasoning behind 
its decisions about fresh evidence so that it is hard to discern in any detail what 
the Court’s approach is to this category of appeal’ (Malleson, 1993, p. 11).
It would appear therefore that there does not appear to have been a major change as a 
result of the change of law in the CAA 1995. But there do appear to have been some 
changes, both positive and negative, which are possibly attributed to the CAA 1995. The 
Court’s approach still appears to be driven by its deference to the jury verdict and its
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reverence for the principle of finality but the Court’s review function and decision making 
process can also contribute to a restrictive approach.
If the reviewing of the conviction merely requires the Court to decide if there was 
evidence the jury could have convicted on then fresh evidence appeals are at odds with 
this function. If new evidence was freely admitted on appeal then this would be straying 
into retrial territory which, as the Donovan Committee stated, was ‘a function which 
Parliament did not intend it to discharge, and for which it is in any event inadequately 
equipped.’ This prevents the Court looking into the merits of the case as it focuses on 
whether the jury could have convicted and not whether the jury should have convicted. 
This is most apparent in fresh evidence cases because the appellant is arguing he/she 
did not commit the crime so an unsafe fresh evidence conviction is one more likely to be 
assumed to be factual innocence if overturned. And these are the cases deemed 
‘exceptional’ by Naughton as discussed in chapter one that ‘miscarriage of justice 
discourse’ is focused on and more likely to bring reforms. A more interventionist 
approach may be required with more use of the power of the Court to hear the evidence 
de bene esse. This would mean the appellant not having the restriction of section 23 
when deciding whether to admit the evidence and the Court perhaps being more 
persuaded by oral evidence than evidence given on paper. But arguably what is required 
is a more fundamental reform and this will be discussed in chapter nine.
In chapter six, the appeals where there is no fresh evidence and no procedural 
irregularity will be analysed. These are generally known as the ‘lurking doubt’ ground of 
appeal.
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CHAPTER SIX: APPEALS BASED ON THE 
CORRECTNESS OF THE JURY VERDICT: ‘LURKING 
DOUBT’
Similarly to fresh evidence appeals, ‘lurking doubt’ appeals are also based on errors of 
fact. For these appeals, the argument essentially is that the jury made a mistake and the 
appellant was wrongly convicted as he/she did not commit the crime. These appeals are 
particularly difficult for the Court because there is no new evidence and no procedural 
irregularity so the Court is essentially reviewing the evidence given at trial and deciding 
whether the conviction is unsafe. As discussed in chapter three, these appeals have 
tended to cause difficulty because of the Court’s deference to the jury verdict and its 
reluctance to admit that the jury made an error and convicted the wrong person. These 
appeals also cause difficulty because the decision making process of the Court is not 
necessarily conducive to determining these appeals. This chapter will analyse the 
lurking doubt grounds from the 1990 and 2002 samples, and will also outline the 
common law tests that the Court has developed to determine these appeals. There will 
then be an analysis of the decision making process set out in the judgments to ascertain 
the approach the Court takes. This will be necessary to determine whether a restrictive 
approach is taken to these appeals and if so, where the problem lies. There will also be 
an analysis of the law after 2 0 0 2  to see whether there have been any more recent 
developments which shed light on the Court’s approach.
The historical approach to lurking doubt appeals will now be discussed in order to put 
the 2 0 0 2  cases in context.
The historical approach to lurking doubt appeals
Before the CAA 1966, the Court could quash the conviction where the verdict of the jury 
was unreasonable or could not be supported by the evidence. 2 3 5  In deciding this, the 
Court formulated the objective test of whether there was evidence before the Court on 
which a reasonably-minded jury could have convicted. 2 3 6  The fact that the judges 
themselves were doubtful about the verdict was not of itself thought sufficient to justify 
quashing it. Lord Goddard, the then Lord Chief Justice, summed up the pre-1966 
position in R v Hopkins-HussonP7
‘ It has been held from an equally early period in the history of this court
that the fact that some members or all the members of this court think that they 
themselves would have returned a different verdict is again no ground for 
refusing to accept the verdict of the jury, which is the constitutional method of 
trial in this country. If there is evidence to go to the jury, and there has been no
235 Section 4(1) CAA 1907.
236 R v Pattinson and Laws 58 Cr. App. R. 425.
237 34 Cr. App. R. 47.
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misdirection, and it cannot be said that the verdict is one which a reasonable 
jury could not have arrived at, this court will not set aside the verdict of guilty 
which has been found by the jury. ’ 2 3 8
The Court’s reluctance to substitute its own subjective opinion for the jury’s verdict was 
criticised by JUSTICE in their 1964 report on criminal appeals (JUSTICE, 1964, p. 22). 
The JUSTICE Committee identified the Court’s approach as the problem but the 
Donovan Committee, which was set up by the Government in 1965 to evaluate the 
working practices of the Court, believed that the problem lay more with the wording of 
the statute. The Committee stated (Donovan Committee, 1965, para. 141): ’If there be 
some defect in the situation which requires to be remedied, the defect lies in the 
statutory language rather than in its judicial interpretation.’ In order to rectify the 
problem, the Committee proposed that the Court should be given the express power to 
allow an appeal where ‘upon consideration of the whole of the evidence, it comes to the 
conclusion that the verdict is “unsafe and unsatisfactory” ‘(para. 149) which was enacted 
in the CAA 1966. This test had been proposed during the debates on the CAA 1907 but 
had been defeated as the words proposed were ‘too loose and obscure.’ The Committee 
felt that in spite of the rejection of the words ‘unsafe and unsatisfactory’ the Court 
sometimes acted as though this was the proper test to apply to a jury’s verdict and had 
quashed a verdict, which it considered to be unsafe and unsatisfactory, in spite of there 
being some evidence to support it (para. 147).239
This view was confirmed by the Lord Chief Justice, Lord Parker during the debates on 
the 1966 Criminal Appeal Bill. He stated that on many occasions he had used the words 
‘in all the circumstances of the case, the Court has come to the conclusion that it is 
unsafe for the verdict to stand.’ He went on to say that:
This is something which we have done and which we continue to do, although it 
may be we have no lawful authority to do it. To say that we have not done it, and 
we ought to have power to do it is quite wrong. It is done every day and this is 
giving legislative sanction to our action. ’ 2 4 0
So the confusing and contradictory picture that emerged was that the majority of judges 
seemed to be applying the objective test of whether there was evidence before the Court 
on which a reasonably-minded jury could have convicted. But according to the debates 
on the 1966 Bill, a number of judges were also applying the subjective test of whether 
they themselves thought the conviction was unsafe and unsatisfactory.
238 See also R v Chalk which followed R v Hopkins-Husson where the trial judge granted a certificate that the 
verdict of the jury was unreasonable. The Court dismissed the appeal holding that the Court would never 
substitute its own opinion for that of the jury. [1961] Crim L.R. 326.
239 Citing R v Wallace 23 Cr. App. R. 32.
240 H.LDebs, 12 May 1966, col. 837. Concurring opinions were given by Lord Mom's (col. 843), Lord Pearson 
(col. 824) and Lord Stowhill (H.L. Debs, 21 June 1966, col. 247).
108
As stated by JUSTICE (1989, p. 50), in enacting the ‘unsafe and unsatisfactory’ ground 
it would appear that Parliament intended in 1966 to impose on the whole Court a duty to 
form its own subjective opinion about the correctness of a conviction, notwithstanding 
the fact that no criticism could be made of the conduct of the trial. It would appear that 
this had the desired effect as Knight reviewed every judgment of the Court from 1st 
October 1966 to 31st January 1968 and concluded that there were cases where the 
language of the Court displayed a wider and more sensitive preparedness to interfere 
with the jury’s verdict, where probably pre-1966 they would not have interfered (1970, p. 
135).
The leading case is R v Cooper2 4 1  where the Court considered the scope of the new 
‘unsafe and unsatisfactory’ power. Lord Widgery stated:
‘ it is, therefore, a case in which every issue was before the jury and in which
the jury was properly instructed, and, accordingly, a case in which this Court will 
be very reluctant indeed to intervene. It has been said over and over again 
throughout the years that this Court must recognise the advantage which a jury 
has in seeing and hearing the witnesses, and if all the material was before the 
jury and the summing up was impeccable, this Court should not lightly interfere. 
Indeed, until the passing of the Criminal Appeal Act 1966 it was almost unheard 
of for this Court to interfere in such a case.
However, now our powers are somewhat different, and we are indeed charged 
to allow an appeal against conviction if we think that the verdict of the jury 
should be set aside on the ground that under all the circumstances of the case it 
is unsafe and unsatisfactory. That means that in cases of this kind the Court 
must ask itself a subjective question, whether we are content to let the matter 
stand as it is, or whether there is not some lurking doubt in our minds which 
makes us wonder whether an injustice has been done. This is a reaction which 
may not be based strictly on the evidence as such; it is a reaction which can be 
produced by the general feel of the case as the Court experiences it. ’ 2 4 2
The effect of this judgment was that the test the Court applied was no longer an 
objective one as the Court now had to apply the subjective test of ‘did the Court itself 
feel a doubt’ and if it did, the jury’s verdict should be set aside.
The House of Lords discussed the Cooper case in Stafford v DPP.2*3 Viscount Dilhorne 
referred to Lord Widgery’s speech as ‘the effect of section 2(1 )(a)’ though he declined to 
say what the correct approach should be, as he felt the Court should be given a free
241 (1969) 53 Cr. App. R. 82.
242 See also R v Lake (1977) 64 Cr. App. R. 172 where Lord Widgery espoused his ‘lurking doubt’ test again: 
‘Once you have decided that the rules of procedure were followed and there remains the only residual 
question of whether there is a lurking doubt in the mind of the Court, such doubts are resolved not, as I say by 
rules of thumb, and not arithmetic, but they are largely by the experience of the judge concerned and the feel 
which the case has for them.’
243 Stafford v DPP  [1974] AC 878.
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hand in determining what was ‘unsafe and unsatisfactory as the Act gave the Court a 
choice about the appropriate test. ’ 2 4 4
Lord Devlin commented on the dangers of the Court adopting a wide interpretation of the 
formula ‘unsafe and unsatisfactory.’ He argued that although the words could be put to 
good use, they were also ‘insidious’ and must be ‘kept under control.’ To do this, he 
argued, judges had to remind themselves that the words were not intended to transfer to 
the judge the power and function of the jury. The satisfaction of the judge was not a 
substitute for the satisfaction of the jury but a requirement added to it (Devlin, 1979, p. 
200). Devlin feared that the CAA 1966 had increased the power and significance of the 
judges and undermined the role of the jury to the point where ‘people may begin to ask 
themselves whether there is any longer a need for a criminal jury’ (p. 115).
Lord Devlin need not have worried. As discussed in chapter three, the general 
consensus has been that the reluctance of the judges to usurp the role of the jury has 
inhibited their use of the ‘lurking doubt* ground of appeal. In their 1989 report on 
miscarriages of justice, JUSTICE stated that in its experience of assisting with appeals 
against conviction, the lurking doubt power had made very little difference to the way in 
which the Court decided appeals. In giving evidence to the Committee, the then 
Registrar of the Criminal Division of the Court of Appeal, Master Thompson, said that the 
‘lurking doubt’ principle was not implicit in the term ‘unsafe and unsatisfactory’ and that 
the Court had to have regard to the language of the statute, which did not speak of a 
‘lurking doubt.’ He said that some of the senior judges did not regard Lord Widgery’s 
interpretation as authoritative (Justice, 1989, para. 4.16). JUSTICE was only able to find 
six reported cases since Cooper when the Court had quashed the conviction on the 
grounds that there was a lurking doubt because the conviction was against the weight of 
the evidence, and where nothing had arisen since the trial2 4 5
In later cases the concept of a ‘lurking doubt’ remained but the wording changed. For 
example, in R v Wellington2 4 6  Lord Lane CJ explained:
We have to consider the matter as it has been presented to us and to decide 
whether, in the light of the further arguments which we have heard, the verdict is 
safe and satisfactory or whether we feel a reasoned or substantial unease about 
the finding of guilt.’
Although in other cases, the judges have preferred to adopt the language of the statute. 
In R v Maguire,247 Stuart-Smith LJ stated ‘we have ourselves not found it helpful to seek
244 [1973] 3 All ER 722, 764.
245 R v Pattinson and Laws 58 Cr. App. R. 417; R v Thome and Others 66 Cr. App. R. 6; R v Lamb 71 Cr. App. 
R. 198; R v Thompson 74 Cr. App. R. 315; R v Pope 85 Cr. App. R. 201; R v O ’Leary (1988) Crim L.R. 827.
246 (1991) Crim L.R. 543.
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an answer to the question of whether we think the verdicts were unsafe or unsatisfactory 
by posing some other question.’
The lurking doubt ground was discussed by the Royal Commission on Criminal Justice 
The Royal Commission on Criminal Justice
The RCCJ discussed that they ‘fully appreciate the reluctance felt by judges sitting in the 
Court of Appeal about quashing a jury’s verdict’ as ‘the jury has seen all the witnesses 
and heard their evidence; the Court of Appeal has not.’ But their conclusion was that:
‘Where, however, on reading the transcript and hearing argument the Court of 
Appeal has a serious doubt about the verdict, it should exercise its power to 
quash. We do not think that quashing the jury’s verdict where the court believes 
it to be unsafe undermines the system of jury trial. We therefore recommend 
that, as part of the drafting of section 2, it be made clear that the Court of Appeal 
should quash a conviction, notwithstanding that the jury reached their verdict 
having regard to all the relevant evidence and without any error of law or 
material irregularity having occurred’ (RCCJ, 1993, p. 171).
The RCCJ clearly wanted the Court to take a more liberal approach to these appeals 
and as discussed in chapter one, the test proposed by the RCCJ was whether a 
conviction ‘is or may be unsafe.’ This was rejected by the Government who preferred a 
simpler ‘is unsafe’ test. In a consultation paper issued after the RCCJ report the 
Government stated that it accepted that ‘it is right that the Court’s freedom to act on a 
“lurking doubt” should be preserved’ (Home Office, 1994, para. 12) and in its response 
to the RCCJ, the Government stated that the concept of lurking doubt was incorporated 
into the unsafe ground. But the debates on the 1995 Criminal Appeal Bill showed there 
was concern that although the ‘is or may be unsafe’ test would have broadened the 
Court’s approach to the lurking doubt ground, the ‘is unsafe’ ground would restrict it. As 
discussed in chapter one, it had been suggested that prior to the enactment of the 1995 
CAA, the Court was acting under the Cooper standard and adopting a more liberal 
approach. The aim in changing the law, therefore, was to encapsulate this supposed 
more liberal approach. In light of this, research was required in order to determine the 
status of the ‘lurking doubt’ ground after the enactment of the CAA 1995 to see whether 
it had been incorporated into ‘unsafe’ and also to see whether the Court was taking a 
more liberal or restrictive approach to this ground of appeal.
The first interpretation of the new safety test was in R v Graham.2*6 The Lord Chief 
Justice, Lord Bingham appeared to suggest that the lurking doubt ground had been 
incorporated into the new test. He stated:
[1992] 2 All ER 433.
248 (1997) 1 Cr. App. R. 302.
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This new provision is plainly intended to concentrate attention on one question: 
whether, in the light of any arguments raised or evidence adduced on appeal, 
the Court of Appeal considers a conviction unsafe. If the court is satisfied, 
despite any misdirection of law, or any irregularity in the conduct of the trial or 
any fresh evidence, that the conviction is safe, the court will dismiss the appeal. 
But if, for whatever reason, the court concludes that the appellant was wrongly 
convicted of the offence charged, or is left in doubt whether the appellant was 
rightly convicted of that offence or not, then it must of necessity consider the 
conviction unsafe. The court is then subject to a binding duty to allow the 
appeal. ’ 2 4 9
This speech was cited with approval by Rose LJ in R v Dures,250 who agreed with 
counsel’s argument that ‘even when a trial has been conducted properly without any 
misdirection of law and no new significant evidence has subsequently come to light, this 
Court may still conclude that a verdict is unsafe.’ However, two years later in R v F, 2 5 1  
the Court appeared to suggest that lurking doubt was no longer a valid ground of appeal. 
Roch LJ stated:
The phrase ‘lurking doubt’ is not now, in our opinion, a proper approach. 
Parliament in section 2(1) of the Criminal Appeal Act 1968, as amended by the 
Criminal Appeal Act 1995, has laid down a simple test. In our view it is 
undesirable to place a gloss on the test formulated by Parliament which has the 
advantage of brevity and simplicity. The approach of this Court to the question 
which this Court has to decide on an appeal against conviction in any particular 
case should not be allowed to become an accretion to the simple and clear test 
set out in the statute which counsel may urge this Court to follow in future 
cases.’
But it was not clear whether Roch LJ was saying that the phrase ‘lurking doubt’ was no 
longer valid or whether the concept of lurking doubt was not incorporated into the new 
unsafety test. If he was saying the latter then this directly contradicted the views of the 
Government in enacting the test and the view of the Lord Chief Justice, Lord Bingham, 
as discussed above. Lord Bingham reiterated his view in R v Criminal Cases Review 
Commission ex p Pearson,252 which was decided after F, thereby reinforcing that lurking 
doubt had been incorporated into the ‘unsafety’ test. So it would appear that, despite 
the judgment in F, the lurking doubt ground has been incorporated into the unsafety test. 
Therefore, empirical research was needed in this area to determine whether the 
amendments to the fresh evidence provisions have brought about any changes to the 
Court’s approach to these appeals. As the above shows, the Court's approach to these 
appeals has largely been described as restrictive. But just as with fresh evidence 
appeals, without a normative baseline in which to measure the Court's approach it can 
be difficult to determine whether the Court is taking a restrictive approach as it is difficult 
to ascertain whether more convictions should be quashed. With that in mind, the
249 Ibid, 308.
250 (1997) 2 Cr. App. R. 247, 259.
251 (1999) Crim L.R. 306.
252 [1999] 3 All ER 247, 258-259.
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judgments in this chapter will be analysed in terms of whether it is possible to say 
whether the Court is being restrictive or liberal and if so, whether that approach can be 
attributed to the changes in the 1995 Act.
The 1990 and 2002 sample of judgments
Malleson’s research for the RCCJ (Malleson, 1993) revealed that the possibility of a 
‘lurking doubt’ was referred to directly in eight out of 300 appeals. She found that in two 
of those the Court held there was no lurking doubt:
There is no feature in our judgment in this case which gives rise to any lurking 
doubt in our minds as to whether an injustice has been done.’ Jenkins 9/4
‘ it does not give rise to any lurking doubt.’ Horridge 9/2
Malleson found that in a further two cases the phrase ‘lurking doubt’ was not referred to 
directly, but the Court appeared to have the principle in mind:
We have no uneasy feeling about the result.’ Wyatt 16/1
There are no features which cause us disquiet.’ Gottesman 22/1
Malleson also found that in six cases the Court held that there was a ‘lurking doubt’ 
sufficient to render the conviction unsafe and unsatisfactory (citing four of them):
The anxiety we feel about this case is such as to indicate to us that there is a 
lurking doubt that the verdict was unsafe and unsatisfactory.’ Dudley 16/2
‘It leaves us with a lurking doubt as to the safety of the conviction.’ Ettiene 8/2
‘Looking at the whole matter, we believe this case is one which at the end of the 
day there is a lurking doubt.’ King 15/2
There may be a lurking doubt.’ Payne 14/6
There was one case in the 1990 sample that directly referred to the Cooper case:
‘In the end we must look at the case as a whole and ask ourselves, in the words 
of Widgery L.J. in Cooper, whether we are left with a lurking doubt.’ Wallace 
27/7
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Malleson states (p. 12) that in the few cases where the principle was raised, the Court 
adopted a surprisingly unrestrained approach to the problem of deciding whether they 
were, at the end of the day, happy to let the judgment rest and, in one case, 
acknowledged the essentially subjective question which lurking doubt cases raised. She 
cited the following:
‘Lurking doubt cases always demand of the Court, as has been said, an 
exercise in pure judgment.’ Knight 5/7
Malleson found (p. 12) that in lurking doubt cases the grounds relied upon tended to be 
very general, such as: the identification evidence was weak; that the judge should have 
ruled that there was no case to answer after the prosecution evidence had been 
adduced, or that the verdict was unsafe and unsatisfactory overall. Only one lurking 
doubt case involved fresh evidence, suggesting that the Court usually reserved the 
lurking doubt principle for cases that share the same features as the Cooper case where 
the appeal was founded on the claim that the jury’s direction was wrong despite the 
absence of any new material or failing on the part of the judge. Her conclusions were:
The fact that the principle was directly or indirectly raised in only 10 of the 281 
appeals which were finally decided suggests that lurking doubt cases constitute 
a relatively small proportion of appeals, although interestingly the number of 
such cases was substantially higher than those identified in similar research 
carried out for Justice in 1989. The Court appears to regard the principle as a 
last resort for those cases where no criticism can be made of the trial, yet 
concern about the justice of the conviction still lingers. Its reluctance to interfere 
with the jury’s verdict undoubtedly inhibits the Court from expanding this 
category of appeal’ (Malleson, 1993, p. 12).
The 2002 sample of judgments revealed that the principle of lurking doubt was referred 
to directly or indirectly in seven of the 300 appeals, with one allowed and six dismissed 
or refused. In the one appeal allowed, lurking doubt was not actually raised as a ground 
of appeal but the concept of lurking doubt was referred to by the judges when quashing 
the conviction:
‘At the end of our reading, all three members of this Court have an uneasy 
feeling about the safety of these convictions and that unease must register in 
allowing this appeal against conviction. ’ 2 5 3
Lurking doubt was directly referred to in five of the six appeals dismissed or refused with 
one appeal referring directly to the Cooper case:
253 R v Marsh [2002] EWCA Crim 1497.
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The third point raised is that this Court should have a lurking doubt about the 
safety of the conviction ... .We have come to the conclusion that there are no 
doubts about the safety of the conviction. ’ 2 5 4
‘In those circumstances we conclude....that we feel neither a lurking doubt nor 
reason for substantial unease about these findings of guilt. ’ 2 5 5
There is no possibility, in our judgment, of applying the lurking doubt exception. 
We are satisfied that the verdicts are not even arguably unsafe. ’ 2 5 6
We do not feel a lurking doubt about the verdicts. ’ 2 5 7
The final matter which we have considered is Mr Evans’ submission that, when 
all the evidence is added up....should lead us, that is to say this Court, to what 
can be summarised as a lurking doubt in the Cooper sense. We are not left with 
such a doubt. ’ 2 5 8
The sixth appeal merely argued that ‘the convictions are unsafe’ which was listed as a 
separate ground of appeal, amongst others, but was not referred to by the judges when 
refusing the application as it was a renewed application to appeal. 2 5 9
This research confirms that, despite the ruling in RvF,  the concept of lurking doubt has 
been incorporated into the safety test and is still a valid ground of appeal. The samples 
show very similar numbers in terms of lurking doubt grounds argued with ten out of 300 
appeals in the 1990 sample and seven out of 300 appeals in the 2002 sample. This may 
indicate that changing the test to ‘unsafe’ has not had an impact on this ground of 
appeal. However, the 1990 sample shows that in six out of the ten appeals that raised 
the principle of a lurking doubt, the conviction was quashed whereas only one out of 
seven appeals was quashed in the 2002 sample. This may suggest that whilst the 
safety test did not have any impact in terms of numbers of appeals arguing lurking doubt 
grounds, the judges are now taking a much more restrictive approach in terms of when 
it will result in the conviction being quashed.
In two of the cases in the 2002 sample, the lurking doubt ground was the only ground of 
appeal, R v McGuirk and R v Baig. In R v McGuirk, the Court reviewed the evidence that 
the witnesses gave and the Court highlighted the difficulties that lurking doubt cases 
cause. The Court upheld the conviction and Kay LJ stated:
R v  Morris [2002] EWCA Crim 158.
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‘It seems to this court that this court is in no position, having heard none of the 
witnesses, to in any way conclude that the jury could not reach the verdicts that 
they did. ’ 2 6 0
This case confirms that if there is no procedural irregularity and no fresh evidence, then 
the appeal court is reluctant to interfere. Malleson’s view was that the Court’s deference 
to the jury verdict clearly has an impact on this ground of appeal. The 2002 sample 
appears to confirm this. The Court’s deference is based on two factors. The Court does 
not see or hear the trial witnesses, it reviews the case on paper. Therefore, it takes the 
view that the jury were in a much better position to view their credibility. Also, as the 
Court frequently states, issues of fact are for the jury to determine as the Court reviews 
the safety of the conviction. If the Court is being asked to reconsider the same evidence 
before the jury then it is not allowed to take a different view of that evidence because 
that contravenes the Pendleton principle, as discussed in chapter five, and its review 
function. Cases such as R v McGuirk show that even if the Court takes the view that the 
evidence of the witnesses was flawed it will generally not interfere because of the 
Court’s deference to the jury. This may result in injustice if the appellant is obviously 
wrongly convicted. Once again, it appears that the Court is deciding on the basis of 
whether the jury could convict and not whether they should have convicted but the 
lurking doubt ground was specifically created so the Court would look into whether the 
jury should have convicted.
In the other cases in the 2002 sample, the lurking doubt ground was one of a number of 
grounds which included a no case to answer submission not agreed to (R v Brownlie 
and R v Morris)’, similar fact evidence should not have been admitted (R v Martin)’, poor 
identification evidence {R v Graham)', biased summing up (Marsh) and misdirection on 
the law (R v Morris). Similarly to Malleson, only one of the lurking doubt cases involved 
fresh evidence (R v Baig). These appeals appear to be easier for the Court to consider 
because it is considering the lurking doubt ground in light of the other grounds. If the 
Court does want to quash the conviction it generally uses one of the other grounds to do 
so to avoid the problems as discussed above. But it is because of the problems 
discussed above that these appeals are so rare and even more rarely, successful.
The lurking doubt cases after 2002 will now be discussed.
Lurking doubt after 2002
There was a case soon after the sample where the then Lord Chief Justice, Lord Woolf, 
appeared to reinforce the Court’s lurking doubt power. In R v B, 2 6 1 the appellant was 
convicted of indecently assaulting his step-daughter. The offences had allegedly taken
260 R v McGuirk [2002] EWCA Crim 861, para 14-16.
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place approximately thirty years earlier. Prior to the trial an application had been made 
that it would be an abuse of process to try the appellant because of the length of time 
between the offences and the trial. The judge disagreed and the trial proceeded. On 
appeal, the appellant argued that the trial should have been stayed as an abuse of 
process. The appeal was allowed on the basis that the delay meant the appellant was 
not properly able to defend himself. The phrases ‘lurking doubt’ or ‘reasoned and 
substantial unease’ were not used in the judgment but Lord Woolf stated:
‘....there remains in this court a residual discretion to set aside a conviction if we 
feel it is unsafe or unfair to allow it to stand. This is so even where the trial 
process itself cannot be faulted. It is a discretion which must be exercised in 
limited circumstances and with caution. When we exercise that discretion we 
must be conscious that we are not only involved in deciding where justice lies 
for the appellant. We must do justice to the prosecution, whose task it is to see 
that the guilty are brought to justice. We must also do justice to the victim. But 
we also have to do justice to the appellant. At the heart of our criminal justice 
system is the principle that while it is important that justice is done to the 
prosecution and justice is done to the victim, in the final analysis the fact 
remains that it is even more important that an injustice is not done to a 
defendant. It is central to the way we administer justice in this country that 
although it may mean that some guilty people go unpunished, it is more 
important that the innocent are not wrongly convicted. ’ 2 6 2
This appears to reinforce the principle of lurking doubt that the Court has the power to 
quash convictions where there is no procedural irregularity and no fresh evidence but 
the Court feels that the appellant was wrongly convicted. Lord Woolf makes it plain that 
these appeals are about the Court remedying injustice and one interpretation of this is 
that the Court is entitled to come to a different view from the jury, when it is in the 
interests of justice to do so. But the Court’s review function means it is deciding whether 
the jury could convict on the evidence not looking at the wider implications of whether 
this person was wrongly convicted. This task is made all the more difficult because the 
Court is reviewing the case on paper which may not easily give rise to a lurking doubt.
The difficulty of the Court’s task when deciding on lurking doubt appeals was discussed 
by Leigh who examined a number of recent judgments where the ground of appeal had 
been argued including Rv B.  The 2002 sample shows that the judges in the Court of 
Appeal are using both the ‘lurking doubt' test and the ‘reasoned or substantial unease’ 
test and there is confusion as to whether there is any real difference between these two 
phrases. In R v Benton and Joseph,263 Henry LJ appeared to suggest that the ‘lurking 
doubt’ test was a more subjective test than the ‘reasoned or substantial unease’ test. He 
did not elaborate on this but stated that 'this Court is satisfied that both of these 
formulae, either of which we are happy with, lead to the same test at the end, was the
Ibid, para. 27.
263 Courts-Martial Appeal Court, unreported, transcript 23 February 2000, case number 9903948/4073 S2, 
paras 28-29.
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conviction unsafe?' Leigh also suggests that there may be differences between these 
two phrases. He states:
‘“Lurking doubt”....encapsulates a conclusion which may be the result of a 
reasoned analysis of the evidence, but which may equally amount to an 
instinctual approach to the case on the basis of a premise which may remain 
concealed from or inarticulate on the part of the judges concerned. The former 
approach, that of reasoned analysis, fully respects the jury’s role as decider of 
fact; the latter may not unless the court’s instinctual reaction to the case as a 
whole is ultimately defensible in analytical terms’ (Leigh, 2006, p. 811).
Leigh’s argument is essentially that a ‘lurking doubt’ must be founded on a combination 
of ‘evidence and circumstance’ which leads the court to the conclusion that there is a 
doubt about the safety of the conviction. He argues that where there was no apparent 
flaw, setting aside a verdict upon which a jury could properly arrive, strikes at the 
constitutional division between judge and jury and would contravene the Pendleton 
principle. He reviewed a number of cases where the lurking doubt ground was argued 
and his conclusions were that:
‘In my submission, the Court of Appeal has not, even in the most expansive 
modern cases, sought to substitute its view of the facts for that of a fully and 
properly-instructed jury in determining whether a conviction is unsafe. Were it to 
do so, the Court would fall foul of Pendleton. Nor, is it necessarily the case that 
Cooper need be regarded in that light. The general impression which the court 
has of a case need not be restricted to the question whether the jury’s verdict or 
verdicts was or were defensible on the evidence. It can relate to other matters 
such as whether the defendant had the opportunity to defend himself, or 
whether the prosecution evidence at its highest is capable of sustaining the 
charge, or whether, acknowledging that the evidence is such upon which a jury 
can convict, the case, for whatever reason, can safely be left to the jury. Cooper 
need not be so construed as to permit a purely visceral reaction to the case as a 
whole nor, it would seem, is it being applied in that way’ (Leigh, 2006, p. 815).
Leigh discussed R v B above. In his view ‘while the decision is placed on the ground of 
the residual discretion, it would appear that the true reason was that the appellant, 
because of the delay, was put in an impossible position to defend himself (Leigh, 2006, 
p. 811). Therefore, Leigh argues that R v B was not decided on the basis of a ‘lurking 
doubt’ but rather on the basis that there was a procedural irregularity in that the case 
should have been stayed because the appellant was not able to get a fair trial. As both 
the 1990 and 2002 samples show, the lurking doubt ground is usually argued with other 
grounds of appeal so it is extremely rare for it to be argued on its own. Therefore, the 
decision making process usually considers the lurking doubt ground along with those 
other grounds of appeal, making it very difficult to ascertain what approach is being 
taken to the lurking doubt ground itself. In RvB,  the ground of appeal was that the trial 
should have been stayed (with no mention of a lurking doubt) and because of this it 
could be argued that the Court is merely agreeing with the ground of appeal argued in
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the case. But the fact that Lord Woolf suggests that the Court does have a residual 
discretion to set aside a conviction on the basis that it is ‘more important that the 
innocent are not wrongly convicted’ and dismisses the ground that the trial should have 
been stayed, does suggest that the decision was made on the basis of the Court feeling 
an injustice had been done rather than a procedural irregularity had occurred.
There have been other cases after the 2002 sample that discussed Lord Woolf’s 
approach in R v B. In R v G, 2 6 4  the appellant was convicted of rape and indecent 
assault. This case was referred by the CCRC. The grounds relied on were: the 
prosecution should have been stayed as an abuse of process because of the delay 
between offence and trial; the directions as to delay were insufficient; and there was a 
lurking doubt. Clarke LJ referred to the case of Rv B  and stated:
‘In the case of B, although the court did not fault the trial process or indeed the 
summing up in any way, this court allowed the appeal and did so on the basis 
that it was one of those residual cases in which the court should set aside the
conviction, as Lord Woolf put it.... “in the interests of justice” it is an example
of what used to be called a “lurking doubt. ’ ” 2 6 5
This would suggest that R v B  was not decided on a procedural irregularity but a lurking 
doubt about the conviction generally. In R v G, the appeal was dismissed as the Court 
decided that the appellant had been able to challenge the complainant’s credibility and 
was able to mount a defence, despite the delay. In R v W, 2 6 6  the appellant was 
convicted of indecent assault and buggery. The grounds were similar to the above 
cases. They were that the judge should have stayed the proceedings on the basis of an 
abuse of process because of delay; the judge erred in rejecting a ‘no case to answer’ 
submission; the judge misdirected the jury and ‘the case falls into the category of 
residual cases where it is in the interests of justice to set the conviction aside. ’ 2 6 7  Clarke 
LJ stated ‘this court has always recognised that it has the power and indeed the duty to 
quash a conviction if it has, as it used to be put, a lurking doubt as to the safety of the 
conviction. ’2 6 8  However, the Court dismissed the appeal with Clarke LJ stating ‘given our 
conclusion that there was no failing in the trial process, we have reached the conclusion 
that there is no proper basis on the facts of this case upon which we could hold that 
these convictions are unsafe. ’ 2 6 9
In R v Gamble,270 the appellant was convicted of rape. The sole ground of appeal was 
lurking doubt. The Court again referred to Lord Woolf’s speech in R v B  with Pill LJ
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stating ‘the Court’s power and duty to exercise, in an appropriate case, a residual 
discretion to set aside a conviction it feels to be unsafe has been reaffirmed in R v S. ’ 2 7 1  
But he went on to say that ‘the trial process depends on our confidence in the jury 
system, as the Lord Chief Justice [Lord Woolf] has recently made clear. We rely on the 
collective experience and knowledge of life of jurors. We rely on the jury’s assessment of 
evidence, along with their knowledge of behaviour and events such as those, and 
including those, which form the background to the issue before the jury in this case. ’ 2 7 2  
The Court dismissed the appeal and Pill LJ stated ‘having considered the evidence, and 
heard the submissions of counsel, we have confidence that the jury who carefully and 
conscientiously considered the evidence, which was their duty and task, reached a 
correct verdict. ’ 2 7 3  In R v Bailey, 2 7 4  the appellant was charged with supplying Class A 
drugs. The appellant argued that a no case to answer submission should have been 
acceded to and there was a lurking doubt. In relation to the lurking doubt, Kay LJ stated 
‘it is plainly the case that this court retains a discretion to hold a conviction to be unsafe 
in such circumstances, notwithstanding the change in the statutory test for allowing 
appeals against conviction. ’ 2 7 5  He referred to Lord Woolf’s speech in R v B, and stated 
‘in our judgment, it would be wholly exceptional, and in the circumstances of this case 
quite wrong, for us to go behind the verdicts of the jury. In a short and uncomplicated 
case, they were able to assess the witnesses, including the appellant, and to apply the 
careful and forthright directions of the judge. It is not for this court to form a different view 
of the evidence. ’ 2 7 6  He went on to say that:
“We have considered the authorities referred to in the current edition of 
Archbold at paras 7-47 to 7-48. The case of Cooper 53 Cr App R 82 was one 
in which there was an issue about identification with obvious causes for 
concern. Pattinson and Laws 58 Cr App R 417 was a case where the lurking 
doubt related to the unreliability of a confession and of a particular witness. In 
the judgment in that case there is a reference to other cases of lurking doubt 
which had features such as complications arising out of the acquittal of co­
defendants upon the same evidence. These authorities, exceptional in 
themselves, are in a wholly different territory from the present case. We are 
satisfied that the convictions were safe and we accordingly dismiss this 
appeal. ’ 2 7 7
This would seem to suggest that Kay LJ was saying the lurking doubt should derive from 
the other arguments in the case such as the weakness of identification evidence, the 
unreliability of confessions or inconsistent verdicts. This would explain why the lurking 
doubt ground is generally argued with other grounds of appeal. But Kay LJ highlights the
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problem of the Court’s review function which does not allow it to form a different view of 
the evidence so in that he is correct.
Despite Lord Woolfs reinforcement of the lurking doubt principle, it would appear that 
the ‘residual discretion’ test has not proved to be an authoritative alternative for ‘lurking 
doubt’ appeals. This may be explained by the case dealing with the issue of abuse of 
process in relation to delay between the offences and the trial. It may also be explained 
by the confusion as to the basis of the decision. For example, in R v E, 2 7 8  the appellant 
was convicted of buggery and he argued he was unable to mount an appropriate 
defence because of the lapse of time. The Court considered R vB  and Hooper LJ held:
‘We have two comments to make about B. We see a degree of tension between 
para. 19 and paras 27-29. It is questionable that the judge was right to conclude 
at the close of the evidence that it would not have been unsafe for the jury to 
convict the defendant if it had been impossible for the defendant to defend 
himself. Secondly, although the Court spoke of a “residual discretion”, we 
remind ourselves that if the Court concludes that the conviction is unsafe, it 
must be set aside. We approach this appeal in that way. ’ 2 7 9
In this case the appeal was upheld because the defendant was able to mount a 
defence. It would appear that, if there is a lasting legacy to Lord Woolfs residual 
discretion test, it is in relation to abuse of process and delay rather than lurking doubt 
arguments. 2 8 0  There have been cases more recently that have considered the 
residual discretion test without arguments in relation to abuse of process and delay 
but these are very rare. For example, in R v Roberts, 2 8 1 the ground of appeal was that 
the judge had misdirected on diminished responsibility and the Court should 
substitute a manslaughter conviction for murder on the basis that the conviction was 
‘unsafe or unfair’ using Lord Woolf’s terminology. The Court was essentially being 
asked to review the evidence of the psychiatrists at trial and substitute its own verdict 
for that of the jury. Gage LJ stated:
‘we accept that this court has a residual discretion to quash a conviction 
where it feels that the conviction was unsafe or unfair to allow it to stand. Lord 
Woolf said so in R v B [2003] 2 Cr App Rep 13, see p 204. But Lord Woolf 
added:
“It is a discretion which must be exercised in limited circumstances and with 
caution.”
In the final analysis, it was for the jury to decide whether on a balance of 
probabilities the defence of diminished responsibility had been made out. ’ 2 8 2
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It would appear that in this case the Court is being asked to review all the evidence at 
trial and come to a different decision than the jury. The Court appears to accept it can do 
this but chooses not to in this case as these were matters for the jury to consider. But it 
does at least show that Lord Woolf’s residual discretion test is an alternative to the 
‘lurking doubt’ or ‘reasoned and substantial unease’ test even if it is not used very often. 
This does at least appear to reinforce ‘lurking doubt’ type arguments even if it adds to 
the confusion as to how these cases are decided by the Court.
Whilst it may be debatable as to the reasoning in R vB  - whether the Court did second 
guess the jury and come to its own conclusions on the evidence, and cases such as R v  
Roberts show the Court is reluctant to do this - there are certainly cases after the 2002 
sample which seems to suggest the Court did do this. In R v Taghibeglou,283 the 
appellant was convicted of indecent assault. The prosecution case was that the 
appellant posed as a minicab driver and picked up two women. He dropped the first 
woman off and then drove to a quiet road where he got in the back seat and allegedly 
indecently assaulted the second woman. The following day, the appellant had rung the 
woman’s mobile telephone and spoken to her mother. The appellant was then arrested 
and picked out at an identification parade. The prosecution alleged that in order to get 
the mobile telephone number of the victim, the appellant would have had to get hold of 
the victim’s phone and call his own mobile telephone to log the number of the victim. 
The prosecution case was that he must have done this whilst carrying out the indecent 
assault. The defence case was that the appellant had met the woman earlier in the 
evening and had swapped numbers with the woman. He had a different car than the one 
described and there was no record of his number being dialled from the victim’s 
telephone. The phone records for the victim’s phone and the appellant’s phone were not 
checked during the six month period in which they are kept. The grounds for appeal 
were that the judge should have acceded to a no case to answer submission, the 
judge’s summing up was inadequate and there was a lurking doubt. The Court rejected 
the judge’s summing up ground but did express concern about the safety of the 
conviction as it clearly had doubts about the prosecution case. The Court expressed 
concern about the inadequacy of the investigation with the phone records not checked, 
no CCTV evidence, and a lack of evidence relating to the cab office and whether the 
appellant was a taxi driver. The appeal was allowed with Richards LJ stating that the 
prosecution case ‘offended common sense. ’ 2 8 4
The Court in this case seemed to form its own view of the prosecution evidence as it 
discussed in detail the elements of it that troubled it. However, because of the rejection 
of the no case to answer submission, the Court was able to use that as the reason for
283 [2005] EWCA Crim 3453.
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quashing the conviction and did not have to decide the case solely on the lurking doubt 
which it appears it had. Similarly, in R v Malkin,265 the appellant was convicted of 
indecent assault. The Court allowed the appeal on the basis that because the two 
prosecution witnesses contradicted each other the judge should have agreed to the no 
case to answer submission. The lurking doubt ground was dismissed. Again, in R v 
Hodnitt266 the appellant was convicted of careless driving of a motorbike on the basis he 
was over the blood alcohol limit at the time of an accident. The ground of appeal was 
that a no case to answer submission should have been acceded to. The Court reviewed 
the evidence and allowed the appeal. Mantell LJ stated:
They [the prosecution] are unable to remove from consideration the real 
possibility that drink had been taken in the hour before the accident, or the real 
possibility that some other agency may have been involved in the accident 
which need not necessarily have come about through the appellant's careless 
driving. This may be one of those rare cases where the court is left with a lurking 
doubt. Whether for that reason or for others which we have expressed, we do 
not consider this conviction to be safe. Accordingly, it will be quashed and the 
appeal allowed. ’ 2 8 7
This appears to suggest that the Court was not satisfied that the prosecution had proved 
the elements of the offence. Whilst it could be argued that the Court was merely stating 
that the jury was not entitled to convict on the evidence, it could also be argued that the 
Court is making its own evaluation of the evidence, contravening the Pendleton 
principle.
The Court also allowed the appeal in R v Green.266 The appellant and a co-accused 
were charged jointly with murder and the appellant was also charged with robbery and 
theft. The appellant was convicted of murder and the co-accused was convicted of 
manslaughter. On appeal, it was argued that the verdicts were inexplicable and counsel 
for the appellant also raised the possibility of a lurking doubt. The Court reviewed the 
evidence and Kennedy LJ stated ‘in the circumstances, we are satisfied that, while not at 
least in theory to be regarded as logically inconsistent, the verdicts were ones which no 
reasonable jury who had applied their minds properly to the facts of the case could 
reach. ’ 2 8 9  The Court substituted a manslaughter conviction for a murder conviction. The 
basis for the Court’s decision was that the prosecution had advanced a case where the 
co-accused had wielded the knife and stabbed the victim and not the appellant. 
Therefore, for the jury to decide the appellant was guilty of murder and the co-accused, 
guilty of manslaughter meant the appellant’s murder conviction was unsafe.
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The Green case was discussed by Leigh. He argues that:
‘In cases such as these, although the phrase ‘lurking doubt’ is sometimes 
invoked, it seems to have little functional part to play in the court’s decision. 
Courts sometimes suggest that there may well be truly exceptional cases where 
the court can find no logical inconsistency and yet allow the appeal solely on the 
basis that a jury arrived at different verdicts either as to individual defendants 
jointly charged, or as to the different counts in the indictment’ (Leigh, 1996, p. 
814).
One such case is R v Daniels.290 The appellant and a friend, Dunne, had been recruited 
by another co-defendant, Pinnock, to travel to Amsterdam to bring a bicycle back. When 
they arrived, Pinnock informed them that the arrangements had changed and they were 
bringing back packages that they were told contained money. Dunne and Daniels both 
checked the packages and thought they contained money. They did, in fact, contain 
heroin. Both Pinnock and Daniels were convicted and Dunne was acquitted. The trial 
judge clearly had problems with the verdict and had discussed with both counsel the 
possibility of issuing a trial certificate for appeal. But he then declined to do so. Daniels 
appealed on the grounds that the verdicts were inconsistent and in the alternative that 
the convictions were unsafe (on the basis of a lurking doubt). The Court considered that 
there were differences between the cases of Dunne and Daniels that may have justified 
the differing verdicts, though it acknowledged that the case presented by the prosecution 
at trial was that there were no differences between the two defendants. Therefore, the 
Court was not satisfied that the verdicts were inconsistent. The Court allowed the appeal 
with Hallett LJ stating ‘given all those circumstances, in particular the agreed basis upon 
which the case was presented at trial, with some considerable degree of hesitation, we 
have come to the conclusion that there is a doubt about the safety of the 
conviction. ’ 2 9 1 Hallett LJ also stated ‘the appellant, we should add, should consider 
himself a very fortunate young man. ’ 2 9 2
It would appear that this is a case where the Court disagreed with the jury and allowed 
the appeal on that basis. It rejected the inconsistent verdict argument and allowed the 
appeal agreeing with the trial judge that an ‘injustice’ had occurred. This case was 
decided after the publication of Leigh’s article and was not, therefore, considered by him 
but it does appear to contradict his assertion that ‘the Court of Appeal has not, even in 
the most expansive modern cases, sought to substitute its view of the facts for that of a 
fully and properly-instructed jury in determining whether a conviction is unsafe.’ The 
Court clearly disagreed with the jury because it was satisfied there were differences 
between the two cases that could have justified them coming to different verdicts as it 
decided the verdicts were not inconsistent. The basis of the decision to quash the
290 [2008] EWCA Crim 498.
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conviction, therefore, seems to be because of a lurking doubt and it is difficult to see on 
what basis the decision was made other than the Court deciding in its opinion that the 
appellant should not have been convicted.
The cases that have argued a lurking doubt and have been allowed since the 2002 
sample have confirmed that the ground tends to be argued with other grounds such as 
that no case to answer submissions should have been acceded to or the verdicts were 
inconsistent. If the court is deciding on one of those grounds, other than the lurking 
doubt ground, then it is possible to argue that the basis of the decision is a procedural 
irregularity. But if the Court dismisses the procedural irregularity but goes on to quash 
the conviction because of the lurking doubt, then it seems that the Court is making its 
own evaluation of the evidence and deciding if the appellant was rightly convicted. This 
is illustrated by the speech of Lord Rodger in the Privy Council case of Dookran and 
another v The State:2 9 3
‘Although reference to lurking doubt has been criticised from time to time as an 
unwarranted gloss on the language of the statute regulating appeal proceedings 
in England and Wales, it is really just one way in which an appeal court 
addresses the fundamental question: is the conviction safe? In the vast majority 
of cases the answer to that question will be found simply by considering whether 
the rules of procedure and the rules of law, including the rules on the 
admissibility of evidence, have been applied properly. Very exceptionally, 
however, even where the rules have been properly applied, on the basis of the 
'general feel of the case as the Court experiences it', there may remain a lurking 
doubt in the minds of the appellate judges which makes them wonder whether 
justice has been done. ' 2 9 4
He went on to say that ‘as Widgery LJ indicates [in Cooper], any impression of this kind 
is something which the judges in an appeal court will tend to form for themselves on the 
basis of an overall view of the specific features of the particular proceedings. As such, it 
is unique to those proceedings and will not be replicated in other cases. ’ 2 9 5  In that case 
the conviction was quashed of one of the appellants as the judges could not ‘....avoid a 
residual feeling of unease about whether justice has been done. ’ 2 9 6
This definition of what is justice or injustice would seem to suggest that the Court has 
the power to quash the conviction if it feels the appellant was wrongly convicted. This is 
also reinforced by Lord Woolfs speech in R v B  above. If the Court is able to evaluate 
the evidence for itself and quash the conviction on the basis that it feels the appellant did 
not commit the crime then it is difficult to see how this is not contravening the Pendleton 
principle. It also shows the Court is able to disagree with the jury verdict and come to a 
different conclusion on the evidence when it wants to, which contradicts Leigh’s
293 [2007] UKPC 15.
294 Ibid, para. 15.
295 Ibid, para. 16.
296 Ibid, para 36.
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assertion above that the Court has never done this. As the analysis above 
demonstrates, the Court clearly does not do this very often. Although cases where the 
conviction has been quashed illustrate that the Court has taken a more liberal approach, 
there are far more cases after the 2002 sample which potentially show the Court taking 
a restrictive approach. These will now be discussed.
There were a number of cases where the Court decided it did not have a lurking doubt 
about the conviction. For example, in R v Donovan,297 R v Melville 298 R v Parry and 
another,299 and R v H and another.300 In R v Duncan,301 R v Matthews and Alleyne,302 
and R v Mullings; R v Morgan,303 the Court made a point of saying that this was a case 
pre-eminently for the jury. These cases are potentially evidence of a restrictive approach 
as they emphasise that the jury is the fact finder and not the Court.
The Court appeared to take a slightly different view in R v Heron.304 In this case the 
appellant was convicted of murder and grievous bodily harm with intent. There were a 
number of grounds advanced such as the judge was wrong to reject a submission of ‘no 
case to answer’, there were misdirections to the jury, there was a lurking doubt, and new 
evidence. The appeal was dismissed but in relation to the lurking doubt ground, Scott 
Baker LJ stated:
‘Given that there was a case to leave to the jury and given that the appellant 
elected not to give evidence, it is difficult to see how the court can be persuaded 
that there is a lurking doubt about the safety of this conviction in the absence of
a specific factor to create one in our judgment, if we are not persuaded for
some specific reason that the conviction is unsafe, the appellant does not 
succeed on lurking doubt or any general feeling of unease about the 
conviction. ’ 3 0 5
The Court gave no further guidance on what a ‘specific factor1 may be but this seems to 
suggest that the appellant has to raise a specific argument that leads to a lurking doubt 
rather than just asking the Court to review the evidence and come to its own subjective 
view as to whether an injustice had been done. This appears to narrow the lurking doubt 
ambit.
There were a number of cases where the Court made reference to how rare lurking 
doubt appeals are. In R v O’Brien,306 May LJ stated ‘we are not persuaded that this is
297 [2002] EWCA Crim 2784.
298 [2005] EW CA Crim 1668.
299 [2002] EWCA Crim 2170.
300 [2002] EWCA Crim 1880.
301 [2003] EW CA Crim 3184.
302 [2003] EW CA Crim 192.
303 [2004] EWCA Crim 2824.
304 [2005] EWCA Crim 3245.
305 Ibid, para. 37-38.
306 [2006] EWCA Crim 1419.
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one of those comparatively rare cases where, notwithstanding that no persuasive point 
can be made in support of the appeal other than a lurking doubt, that for that reason the 
verdicts are unsafe. We are quite satisfied they were not. ’ 3 0 7  Similarly, in R v 
Robinson,308 Hallett LJ stated:
‘In our view, in a case such as this, it will be rare indeed that a judge will step in 
and withdraw a case from a jury and it will be rarer still that the Court of Appeal 
(Criminal Division) will step in and say, without having seen the witnesses, that 
there remains a lurking doubt. Despite the very thorough and helpful 
submissions of Miss Dempster, we are not persuaded that this is one of those 
exceptional cases where there remains a lurking doubt. Accordingly this appeal 
must be dismissed. ’ 3 0 9
In R v Be/ / , 3 1 0  Elias J stated ‘we do not think that this is one of those very exceptional 
cases which cries out for judicial intervention on the grounds that there is a lurking doubt 
as to the safety of the verdict. ’ 3 1 1
There was evidence of a potentially restrictive approach in R v Webster.3'2 The 
appellant was convicted of rape and the trial judge issued a certificate for appeal on the 
basis that the jury had only taken one hour and seventeen minutes to deliberate. The 
judge felt this was not a suitable length of time for a trial that had lasted four and a half 
days. In deciding whether to issue the certificate, the judge appeared to indicate that this 
would be a difficult case to get leave for which is why he was considering issuing the trial 
certificate. The Court dismissed the appeal and Laws LJ stated:
‘It seems to us to be very questionable whether apprehensions of the kind 
apparently felt by the judge here could form a proper basis for a trial judge's 
certificate. For our part, looking at the facts of this case overall, we are of the 
clear view that this is not a lurking doubt case. We repeat, the jury were 
required to decide who they believed. They were in the best position to decide 
that question. There is no basis with hindsight to hold that their verdict is 
unsafe.’
In R v Wesf, 3 1 3  the Court was asked to consider whether there was a lurking doubt as to 
whether the appellant had the necessary intention for a murder conviction. The Court 
was asked to substitute a manslaughter conviction for the murder conviction. This was 
on the basis of the appellant’s behaviour after the shooting. The Court outlined the 
difficulty in a case such as this. May LJ stated:
This court occasionally allows an appeal against conviction by concluding that, 
because of “a lurking doubt”, the conviction should be regarded as unsafe. The
307 Ibid, para. 10.
308 [2006] EWCA Crim 1262.
309 Ibid, para. 42.
310 [2006] All ER (D) 219.
311 Ibid, para. 23.
312 [2006] All ER (D) 219.
313 [2007] All ER (D) 346
127
court does not often reach such a conclusion, for obvious reasons. If lurking 
doubt is the only suggested basis why the conviction should be seen as unsafe, 
it will necessarily be the case that the trial was properly conducted and the 
judge's summing-up is not open to criticism. A jury's verdict, unanimous in this 
case, is normally, in these circumstances, to be taken as a safe conclusion that 
they were sure of the Defendant's guilt, by means of properly directed thought 
processes. They are the judges of fact, the judges of the question of whether 
they were sure that the Applicant's evidence was in all material respects 
untrue. ' 3 1 4
The application for leave to appeal was rejected and May LJ set out the Court’s 
reasoning as follows:
‘...although we are emphatically not the judges of fact in a situation such as 
this, our own reading and consideration of the papers and the summing-up 
does not lead us to think that this was in truth a borderline case as to intent or 
indeed in any other respect. For instance, the evidence of the Crown's 
firearms expert, Mr Tomei, reads in the summing-up more persuasively than 
that of the Defendant's expert, Mr Dyson, in so far as they differed, which was 
not enormously. ’ 3 1 5
This type of lurking doubt case is clearly the most difficult for the Court as it is really 
being asked to disagree with the verdict of the jury and come to a different decision. It is 
being asked to decide the same factual issue that the jury had to determine, whether the 
appellant had intention, but without the benefit of seeing or hearing the witnesses, and 
reading the case on paper. It is not surprising that the Court would be very reluctant to 
interfere in such a case as this contradicts the Court’s review function and its decision 
making process is not conducive to determining these appeals. If the lurking doubt 
ground is being argued with a number of other grounds then the Court may use the 
other grounds to overturn the conviction if it wishes to. That is much more difficult to 
justify in cases such as this where there are no other grounds and the overturning of the 
conviction would clearly be a disagreement with the verdict and a usurping of the jury’s 
role. This would go further than just assessing whether there was evidence upon which 
the jury could convict and would stray into the territory of the Pendleton principle with the 
Court deciding the issue for itself. But whilst it is clear from cases such as this why the 
Court would be reluctant to interfere, it is not overly clear what the differences are 
between this sort of case and the cases where the Court decides that the verdicts were 
inconsistent so one should be quashed or that the no case to answer submission should 
not have been rejected. These cases also seem to require the Court to form a view of 
the evidence, but the difference is those cases are easier for the Court because they are 
seen to be decided on the basis of a procedural irregularity rather than a lurking doubt, 
as Leigh argued above. But in practice the arguments appear to be much the same with 
the Court making a subjective judgment about the conviction based on the evidence.
314 Ibid, para. 25.
315 Ibid, paras. 26-27.
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The case of R v West can be contrasted with the case of R v Conner316 in the sample. In 
this case the appellant was convicted of murder. It was accepted that the appellant had 
been very drunk when he had assaulted an elderly man. The victim had been taken to 
hospital and had developed a chest infection as a result of his injuries and he had a 
heart attack and died. The grounds of appeal were that there was insufficient evidence 
that the appellant intended either to kill the deceased or to cause him really serious 
harm to leave that question to the jury. Alternatively, it is said that the judge misdirected 
the jury in a number of respects and that, in any event, the jury could not safely conclude 
that the appellant had the necessary intention. The Court agreed with Clarke LJ stating 
that ‘in all the circumstances, we do not think that a reasonable jury properly directed 
could safely conclude that the appellant had the relevant intention. It follows that the 
judge should have withdrawn the count of murder from the jury.’ The Court substituted a 
manslaughter conviction for a murder one. This case was decided on the basis of a 
procedural irregularity (not withdrawing murder from the jury) rather than a lurking doubt, 
however, the Court is essentially being asked to assess the same issue - whether the 
appellant had the necessary intention. This was rejected in West but accepted in Conner 
and whilst the Court is deciding whether a procedural irregularity occurred in Conner, it 
is difficult to see the differences between the two cases other than the Court usurping 
the role of the jury and deciding the issue for itself. This is illustrative of the Court’s 
inconsistency.
If the Court does have a power to quash convictions where there is no procedural 
irregularity and no fresh evidence which the lurking doubt ground is supposed to 
represent, as emphasised by the Privy Council in Dookran v The State, then arguably it 
can quash convictions such as R v West above and should be doing so if it feels an 
injustice has occurred. But, clearly its deference to the jury, its review function and 
decision making process largely prevent it from doing so. It is clear that there is a large 
amount of inconsistency and confusion in this particular area.
Summary
There is contradictory evidence as to whether the CAA 1995 has made any difference to 
this ground of appeal. On the one hand, the similar number of grounds between the two 
samples with ten out of 300 cases in 1990 and seven out of 300 cases in 2002 would 
suggest that changing the test to unsafe has not resulted in any major changes. The 
figures are so negligible in both samples that it is difficult to draw any conclusions as to 
this ground of appeal quantitatively. It would appear that the RCCJ’s hope that the Court 
would adopt a more liberal approach to these appeals has not been achieved. It is 
difficult to know whether there are fewer lurking doubt grounds being argued or whether
316 [2002] EWCA Crim 471.
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there are fewer going through the leave filter, but the 2 0 0 2  sample confirms that these 
appeals are extremely rare. As the leave process is decided on paper, it is perhaps not 
surprising that the Cout does not hear many of these appeals. If there are doubts it is 
going to be difficult to assess this reading a transcript of the judge’s summing up. The 
doubt may be raised by the believability of the witnesses, for example, and that just does 
not translate to paper.
There were differences in the success rate of the appeals in the two samples which may 
be an indication of change. In the 1990 sample, six of the ten appeals were successful 
but in 2002, only one of the seven appeals was successful. This may be further 
evidence that the CAA has not succeeded in liberalising the Court’s approach. There 
were far more lurking doubt appeals dismissed after the 2 0 0 2  sample than there were 
allowed which is also potentially further evidence of a restrictive attitude. The 
quantitative evidence therefore, would seem to show that rather than encapsulating a 
supposed liberal approach prior to the enactment of the CAA 1995, the Act succeeded in 
the Court taking a more restrictive approach to these appeals. The qualitative evidence 
is also contradictory.
The lurking doubt appeals show that it is extremely rare for it to be argued on its own as 
a ground of appeal. It is usually linked to a number of others, most notably inconsistent 
verdicts, and the rejection of a no case to answer submission. As it is usually linked with 
different grounds it is often difficult to ascertain the approach the Court takes to the 
lurking doubt ground. But the cases show the Court is reluctant to consider this ground 
largely because of its deference to the jury. The jury has seen and heard the witnesses, 
the Court has not, and issues of fact are for the jury to determine, not the Court. If the 
Court is asked whether it feels a lurking doubt about the case, it is often being asked to 
review the evidence the jury saw and heard and assess whether the verdict is correct. 
As this ground is usually considered with other grounds it tends to use those other 
grounds to allow the appeal in order to counter criticism that it is usurping the role of the 
jury. This gives the impression that the Court is assessing a procedural irregularity in the 
appeal rather than the Court forming its own subjective view of the evidence.
But as shown above, there are cases where the Court does appear to form its own 
subjective view of the evidence and case law would suggest that this is what the lurking 
doubt ground requires. It appears that the Court does have the power to quash 
convictions where there are no procedural irregularities and no new evidence and the 
Court feels that an injustice has occurred. This suggests that the Court can quash the 
conviction if it believed the appellant was wrongly convicted but the Court does this 
reluctantly because of its deference to the jury verdict. Although Leigh may argue that 
the Court has never supplemented its view of the evidence for that of the jury, as this
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would fall foul of the Pendleton principle, there are certainly cases where this appears to 
have occurred and cases which suggest this is allowed. The Court’s deference to the 
jury verdict clearly prevents it from doing this too often but the fact that it does appear to 
do this shows it can.
The changes in the CAA 1995 do not appear to have made any difference to this ground 
as the Court’s seemingly restrictive approach has continued after it. But cases such as R 
v B at least show that the Court is capable of taking a liberal approach even if this is not 
the Court’s general approach to these appeals. The cases demonstrate the inconsistent 
approach of the Court and its decision making process.
The Court’s approach is certainly hampered by its deference to the jury but its review 
function ensures that the predominant approach is to be restrictive. The Court reviews 
whether the jury could have convicted and in the absence of any errors which may have 
affected their decisions and any new evidence which may cast doubt on the verdict, the 
Court is reluctant to interfere. This ground was deliberately created so the Court would 
take a more interventionst approach to determining the appeal and specifically where it 
considered there to be injustice. In this sense it set itself up to fail as the Court’s decision 
making process is not conducive to determining these appeals. As the late former Court 
of Appeal judge Sir Frederick Lawton has stated:
The court does not re-try cases...It has to proceed on the basis that findings of 
fact implicit in the jury’s verdict are the facts of the case. It can only disregard 
them if there is new evidence, or the findings of the jury were perverse, or the 
court has a lurking doubt. Reading a transcript of evidence is not conducive to 
raising a lurking doubt. ’ 3 1 7
This will be discussed in more detail in chapter nine with proposals for reform. In chapter 
seven the appeals where there is a procedural irregularity will be discussed.
317 The Times, 23 October 1990.
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CHAPTER SEVEN: APPEALS BASED ON 
PROCEDURAL IRREGULARITIES
As the previous two chapters have shown, the term ‘unsafe’ is applicable to appeals 
based on factual error which generally means the jury made a mistake and the appellant 
was wrongly convicted in the sense that he/she did not commit the crime. This chapter 
analyses the Court’s approach to the term ‘unsafe’ in the context of procedural 
irregularities. 3 1 8  These irregularities may occur in a number of ways and these appeals 
generally have two strands to them. The appellant may be factually innocent and the 
procedural irregularity has made the conviction unsafe. But the appellant may also be 
factually guilty in these cases but may still be entitled to the quashing of the conviction. 
This emphasises an important function of the Court which is to uphold the integrity of the 
trial process and to protect the right of the appellant to a fair trial which is conducted 
according to law.
As discussed in chapter three, the Court of Appeal has always shown itself to be more 
conducive to arguments based on procedural error than those based on factual error. 
There are far more appeals based on procedural irregularities and far more are 
successful than those based on factual error, but it is not clear whether this is because 
more are brought to the Court or whether more are getting through the leave filter. On 
one level this is easy to understand. An appellant has twenty-eight days in which to 
appeal after conviction so it is possible in that time to review the pre-trial and trial 
process to assess whether there were any procedural irregularities. Also, as Pattenden 
has argued, the principal influence against review of errors of fact has been the Court’s 
reluctance to usurp the role of the jury. The quashing of a conviction because of a legal 
or procedural irregularity is different because decisions on questions of law and 
procedure are not the jury’s proper province (1996, p.76). This would suggest that the 
Court has less attachment to its deference for the jury verdict in these appeals which 
allows for more flexibility. But whatever the reason, the upshot is that a defendant is far 
more likely to have his conviction quashed on the basis of an error of law or procedure 
than an error of fact. A consequence of this is that many factually innocent appellants 
are forced to frame their appeals in technicalities as they (or their lawyers) know that this 
will give them a higher chance of success. But the problem with that for the factually 
innocent is that it enforces arguments of procedure on appeal and downplays arguments 
of factual innocence which leads to the difficulties discussed in chapters five and six.
This chapter analyses the impact the safety test has had on procedural irregularity 
appeals. It analyses the Court’s historical approach to determining these appeals and
318 This term is being used to describe grounds of appeal that are not based on fresh evidence nor a lurking 
doubt. Therefore, it encompasses all kinds of due process appeals.
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will compare the cases from the 1990 and 2002 samples. It also analyses the decision 
making process of these appeals from the 2 0 0 2  sample in order to ascertain what errors 
will result in the conviction being quashed and what errors will result in the conviction 
being upheld. This is necessary to determine what effect the CAA 1995 may have had 
on these grounds of appeal. There has been a major change between the two samples 
and that is the enactment of the Human Rights Act 1998 which came into force on 2 
October 2000 and this chapter will also analyse the impact the HRA has had on the 
Court’s decision making process.
The historical approach to deciding procedural irregularity appeals
As well as giving the Court the power to allow the appeal ‘if they think that the verdict of 
the jury should be set aside on the ground that it is unreasonable or cannot be 
supported having regard to the evidence,’ the CAA 1907 also gave the Court the power 
to set the verdict aside on the ground of a wrong decision on a question of law or that on 
any ground there was a miscarriage of justice. 3 1 9  There was also a proviso to all of these 
grounds which allowed the Court to uphold a conviction where there had been an 
irregularity at the trial but the appellant’s guilt had been established by the evidence. 3 2 0
The test used to determine the proviso was essentially the one set out in Stirland v 
DPP, 3 2 1 where the Lord Chancellor, Lord Simon, with whom the rest of their Lordships 
agreed, stated:
‘....it is evident that no reasonable jury, after a proper summing up, could have 
failed to convict the appellant on the rest of the evidence to which no objection 
could be taken. There was, therefore, no miscarriage of justice and this is the 
proper test to determine whether the proviso to section 4(1) of the Criminal 
Appeal Act 1907 should be applied.’
This test appeared to be an objective one with the Court putting itself in the place of a 
reasonable jury and assessing the evidence. The difficulty that arose from this was 
whose standards was the Court supposed to use? Was the Court to judge it by its own 
standards or the standards of a reasonable jury?
The paradox which was created by the use of the proviso (and the assessment of error) 
was that in applying it, the Court was usurping the role of the jury in weighing up the 
evidence against the appellant and coming to a conclusion of fact. As chapters five and 
six showed, this was the very thing that the majority of the Court would not do when
Section 4.
320 'Provided that the Court may, notwithstanding that they are of the opinion that the point raised in the appeal 
might be decided in favour of the appellant, dismiss the appeal if they consider that no substantial miscarriage 
of justice has actually occurred.’
321 30 Cr. App. R. 40,46-47.
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deciding appeals on errors of fact. Pattenden has argued (1996, p. 182) that the appeal 
judges were not disturbed by the fact that in order to apply the proviso they had to some 
extent to take upon themselves the function of the jury and weigh up the evidence 
against the accused because they wholeheartedly approved of the proviso’s purpose.
But there is conflicting evidence as to whether the Court’s reluctance to decide issues of 
fact generally had an impact on its use of the proviso. For example, from its early years, 
the Court gained a reputation for allowing guilty people to go free if there was a serious 
error because its reluctance to substitute itself for the jury meant that it was unable to 
apply the proviso. This is illustrated by the conclusions of the Tucker Committee, which 
was set up in 1954 to consider whether the Court should be given the power to order a 
retrial:
‘....the Court of Appeal have never considered it to be any part of their duty to 
substitute their verdict for that of the jury or to make use of their supplemental 
powers to bring about drastic change in a matter fundamental to criminal
practice in indictable cases in this country being the way the Criminal Appeal
Act has worked in practice it was soon found that there were a number of cases 
in which there had been some irregularity or misdirection at the trial which could 
not be dismissed as trivial, and it being impossible to apply the proviso, the 
Court had no alternative but to quash the conviction and enter a verdict of 
acquittal, although they might feel little doubt of the appellant’s guilt’(paras. 6-7).
This was further illustrated by the speech of the Lord Chancellor when introducing the 
1966 Criminal Appeal Bill, which amended the Court’s powers, in the Lords for the 
second reading:
There has been a general feeling in the legal profession that if you go to the 
Court of Criminal Appeal for an obviously guilty client who has some technical 
point, if the technical point is good, then the guilty man gets off; but that if your 
only complaint is that your client is entirely innocent and had nothing at all to do 
with the crime, then it is much more difficult. ’ 3 2 2
However, it was the conclusion of Michael Knight, who conducted a study of all the 
reported cases from 1907 -  1966, that the ‘great majority of cases where the power [of 
the proviso] has been exercised are cases of serious error’ in the trial (1970, p. 15). He 
stated that ‘the court metaphorically blot out the fault...and ask if, without it, there is a 
strong enough case for an inevitable conviction. And if they can answer ‘yes’ to this 
question, they show the Nelson Touch by turning a blind eye to the fault’ (p. 16). Knight 
could give numerous examples where the proviso was applied in spite of serious errors 
in the trial3 2 3  but he also concluded that (p.2 1 ):
322 H.L. Debs, 12 May 1966, col. 812.
323 For example, see R v Haddy (1944) 29 Cr. App. R. 182, R v Farid (1945) 30 Cr. App. R. 168, R v Whybrow 
(1951) 35 Cr. App. R. 141, R v Stinger (1961) 46 Cr. App. R. 244.
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‘Occasionally, use of the proviso is declined because a particular fault is of 
nature so serious that, even though the appellate court would like to uphold the 
conviction, and, even though there probably would be sufficient evidence and 
direction apart from the fault to justify in their opinion an inevitable finding of 
guilty by a reasonable jury, their desire to have a deserved conviction must be 
sacrificed to the general principles of fairness in our criminal trial. This is the 
principle stated in Maxwell v DPP that “it is better that one guilty man should 
escape than that the general rules evolved by the dictates of justice for the 
conduct of criminal prosecutions should be disregarded and discredited. ” *3 2 4
There were amendments to the Court’s powers in the 1966 Criminal Appeal Bill in 
relation to procedural irregularities. These were that the words ‘on any ground there was 
a miscarriage of justice’ were replaced with ‘there was a material irregularity in the 
course of the trial’ and the word ‘substantial’ was deleted from the proviso. This was the 
result of a recommendation of the Donovan Committee who felt the word substantial 
was ‘devoid of practical significance’ (1965, para. 164).
The new power of the Court to review convictions was set out in section 4(1) of the CAA 
1966 (consolidated in the CAA 1968) which now provided:
The Court of Criminal Appeal on any such appeal against conviction shall allow 
the appeal if they think that the verdict of the jury should be set aside (a) on 
the ground that under all the circumstances of the case it is unsafe and 
unsatisfactory, or (b) that the judgment of the court before whom the appellant 
was convicted should be set aside on the ground of a wrong decision on any 
question of law, or (c) that there was a material irregularity in the course of the 
trial, and in any other case shall dismiss the appeal.’
The proviso now read:
‘Provided that the court may, notwithstanding that they are of the opinion that 
the point raised in the appeal might be decided in favour of the appellant dismiss 
the appeal if they consider that no miscarriage of justice has actually occurred.’
Pattenden has argued that after the enactment of the CAA 1966 (and the CAA 1968), 
the Court continued to apply the Stirland test to determine the proviso. She stated that 
this was ‘sometimes contracted to the simpler form of: Is the evidence against the 
appellant overwhelming?’ (Pattenden, 1996, p.184).326
The operation of the proviso, and procedural error appeals generally, was discussed by 
the Royal Commission on Criminal Justice.
324 Lord Sankey, Maxwell v DPP  (1934) 24 Cr. App. R. 152, 176.
325 The phrase Verdict of the jury’ was changed to ‘conviction’ by section 44 of the Criminal Law Act 1977 to 
allow the Court to quash a conviction where the appellant had pled guilty at trial.
326 Citing the cases of R v Gent (1989) 89 Cr. App. R. 247, 251; R v Emmerson (1991) 92 Cr. App. R. 284, 
287; R v Kabariti (1991) 92 Cr. App. R. 362, 368; R v Berry CA, 12 May 1992; R v Mitchell [1992] Crim LR 
594; R v Vye [1993] 3 All ER 241, 252.
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The Royal Commission on Criminal Justice
The RCCJ stated that there was potential confusion as to the scope of the proviso. They 
stated that its use may be appropriate where there was a material irregularity during the 
course of the trial but the wording seemed difficult to reconcile with the unsafe and 
unsatisfactory ground or the wrong decision on a question of law ground. They stated 
that it seemed from the decided cases that the court did consider whether the 
unsatisfactory nature of a conviction under either of those two grounds is nevertheless 
outweighed by the consideration that no miscarriage of justice appears to have occurred 
(RCCJ, ch. 10, para.30).
As stated in chapter one, the majority of the RCCJ recommended that the grounds 
should be redrafted to a single ground of appeal. This single ground was whether a 
conviction ‘is or may be unsafe.’ If the court is satisfied that the conviction is unsafe it 
should allow the appeal, but if the court felt it may be unsafe then it should quash the 
conviction but order a retrial unless a retrial was not possible. The majority saw no need 
for the proviso because if the court was not convinced the conviction ‘is or may be 
unsafe’ it simply dismisses the appeal (ch. 10, para. 32). The RCCJ, therefore, 
recommended the proviso be abolished which the Government accepted.
The RCCJ had discussed the problem of procedural irregularities and the Court’s 
supervisory role in checking malpractice and misconduct in the trial and pre-trial 
process. The Commission was split as to what to do about errors at trial. Three of them 
considered that where there was an error at trial which was sufficiently serious materially 
to affect the trial, but which did not render the conviction unsafe, the court should 
generally order a retrial rather than simply quash the conviction. But the majority did not 
believe that a person who was clearly guilty should be accorded a retrial merely because 
there was an error at trial (RCCJ, ch. 10 para. 37). The Committee concluded that what 
they were in agreement about was that appellants should not be able to exploit purely 
technical irregularities in the conduct of the trial (ch.10, para. 39).
The Commission stated they were not unanimous on what should happen in cases of 
serious malpractice but nevertheless there was other strong evidence of guilt. Two of 
them thought that if the pre-trial irregularity or defect was sufficiently serious materially to 
affect the trial but not render the conviction unsafe, the Court should order a retrial or 
quash the conviction depending on its view of the gravity of the defect. The rest of the 
Commission felt that the Court should not quash the convictions on the ground of pre­
trial malpractice unless the court thought the conviction was unsafe (ch. 10, para. 48).
The reason for the view of the majority was that it could not be morally right for a person 
who had been convicted on abundant other evidence and could be a danger to the
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public should walk free because of a criminal offence by someone else such as police 
malpractice. The view of the minority was set out by Michael Zander in his Note of 
Dissent:
The moral foundation of the criminal justice system requires that if the 
prosecution has employed foul means the defendant must go free even though 
he is plainly guilty. Where the integrity of the process is fatally flawed, the 
conviction should be quashed as an expression of the system’s repugnance at 
the methods used by those acting for the prosecution....The majority’s position 
would I believe encourage serious wrongdoing from some police officers who 
might be tempted to exert force or fabricate or suppress evidence in the hope of 
establishing the guilt of the suspect’ (para. 69).
In response to the RCCJ, the Government issued a consultation paper in 1994 (Home 
Office, 1994). With regard to redrafting section (2) the Government stated it was 
attracted to the broad approach described by the Commission and it was inclined to 
support the majority’s view that the Court should be concerned only with the safety of 
the conviction and not with acting as a ‘quasi-disciplinary body punishing errors or 
incompetence occurring in the original trial process’ (para.10). With regard to errors at 
trial, the Government agreed with the majority view ‘as a sensible consolidation of the 
Court of Appeal’s practice’ (para. 11).
The Court’s interpretation of the safety test will now be discussed.
The new interpretation of ‘unsafe’
There has been much judicial and academic debate after the enactment of the CAA 
1995 in relation to errors of law and procedure and the safety test. 3 2 7  The debate has 
centred round the role of due process on appeal in light of the changes to the law and 
also the impact the Human Rights Act 1998 has had. The concept of due process on 
appeal can appear to be complicated as it may have a number of facets which may or 
may not require different decision making approaches. As Nobles and Schiff have 
stated:
‘....the value identified in due process other than its contribution to truth is 
elusive. Sometimes it is articulated in terms of suspects’ rights. At other times it 
is seen as a general right to fairness, requiring that a person be subjected only 
to fair procedures and treatment. And at its most general level it is associated 
with the theme of the rule of law1 (Nobles and Schiff, 2001, p. 911).
The difficulty for the appeal court is deciding when the irregularity will result in the 
conviction being quashed, particularly when the appeal court views the appellant as 
guilty. This involves the appeal court adjudicating upon notions of rights and fairness 
which may not be easy to articulate or encapsulate given the general inconsistency of 
appeal court decision making. As the history of the proviso has shown above, the Court
327 See, for example, Dennis (2003), Nobles and Schiff (2001), Clarke (1999), and Ormerod and Taylor (2004).
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had up to the CAA 1995, the power to uphold convictions where it considered breaches 
of due process to be insignificant. The question after the enactment of the CAA 1995, 
was what approach would the Court take to procedural irregularity appeals; did the 
amending of the test narrow the Court’s powers or did it, as discussed during the 
debates on the bill, merely restate the existing practice of the Court? Before the 
judgments are analysed, it is necessary to outline the case law from 1995 to 2002 in 
order to put the 2002 judgments in context. This will help to understand any potential 
changes either as a result of the new safety test or the Human Rights Act 1998 which 
came into force in 2 0 0 0 .
As discussed above, it had been settled law prior to the amendment by the CAA 1995 
that the Court of Appeal had the power to quash convictions regardless of whether the 
Court considered the appellant to be factually guilty. For example, in R v Madhi328, the 
Court of Appeal quashed the conviction on the basis of an abuse of process, 3 2 9  even 
where there was no suggestion of the defendant not having a fair trial. 3 3 0  It would appear 
that this approach was initially followed after the enactment of the CAA 1995. In R v 
Hickey and others, 3 3 1 Roch LJ stated:
This court is not concerned with the guilt or innocence of the appellants; but 
only with the safety of their convictions. This may at first sight, appear an 
unsatisfactory state of affairs, until it is remembered that the integrity of the 
criminal process is the most important consideration for courts which have to 
hear appeals against conviction. Both the innocent and the guilty are entitled to 
fair trials. If the trial process is not fair; if it is distorted by deceit or by material 
breaches of the rules of evidence or procedure, then the liberties of all are 
threatened.’
However, in R v Chalkley, R v Jeffries3 3 2  it was held that the Court of Appeal did not 
have the power under the new test to allow an appeal if it thought the appellant was 
factually guilty but was dissatisfied in some way with the trial process. The approach 
taken in Chalkley appears to echo the views of the Government in its response to the 
RCCJ that the Court was not to act as a ‘quasi-disciplinary body’ as discussed above. 
This directly contradicts the views of those during the debates on the Criminal Appeal 
Bill that the changes were to restate existing practice. It would appear that in 
changing the test, the Government wished to curtail the Court’s power of quashing the
328 [1993] Crim LR 793.
329 The judge has the power to stay proceedings where there is improper or unlawful conduct by a state agent. 
The Court of Appeal will generally be called upon to decide whether this should have happened if a request by 
the defence was refused and the defendant appeals on that basis. See generally Choo (2008) and Corker and 
Young (2003).
330 See also R v Blackledge [1996] 1 Cr. App. R. 326, where it was held that a material irregularity could result 
in the conviction being quashed even when there was no doubt that the appellant was guilty. In this case the 
conviction was quashed despite a plea of guilty.
331 CA, unreported, transcript 30 July 1997. Case No: 96/5131/S1.
332 [1998] 2 All ER 155.
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convictions of those it considered to be guilty. If so, the Court in Chalkey was 
interpreting the new test in this context.
This case was followed a number of times by the Court3 3 3  and there has been confusion 
as to whether it was effectively overruled by the case of R v Mullen334 and the 
subsequent enactment of the HRA. The appeal court in Mullen followed the approach of 
Hickey and adopted a broad interpretation of unsafe which moved away from Chalkley 
to revert back to the approach taken by the Court of Appeal prior to the 1995 Act. This 
emphasised that the Court still performed a supervisory role in assessing the overall 
fairness of the prosecution process. Mullen’s conviction had been secured after he was 
illegally extradited from Zimbabwe and he argued there was an abuse of process. There 
was no suggestion that he had not had a fair trial, his argument was that it was not fair to 
try him. There was authority for Mullen’s position from R v Horseferry Road Magistrates’ 
Court ex p Bennetf35 and R v Latif and Shahzad336 where the abuse of process doctrine 
had been extended to those where the fairness of the trial was not in issue. But in R v 
Martin337 the House of Lords was asked to decide whether a Court-Martial trial was an 
abuse of process. The Lords appeared to suggest that an abuse of process would not 
be sufficient to quash the conviction as the decision would then have to be made as to 
whether the abuse had made the conviction unsafe.
But the appeal court in Mullen adopted a broad interpretation of unsafe with the Court 
deciding that the amendment in the CAA was to restate the existing practice of the Court 
of Appeal. Cases such as Bennett and Latif showed that the conviction could be 
overturned as a result of an abuse of process even where the appellant had had a fair 
trial. Therefore, the Court’s authority to quash the convictions of those considered guilty 
was reinstated despite Auld LJ’s judgment in Chalkley, and the Government’s response 
to the RCCJ. This position was to gain much more prominence with the enactment of the 
Human Rights Act but there was initially confusion as to which judgment to follow, 
Mullen or Chalkley.
The Human Rights Act and1unsafe'
There has been much debate on the impact the HRA has had on criminal appeals. This 
debate has largely derived from the rights provided in Article 6  and the role of 
‘unfairness’ on the test of unsafety. This is not a new language for the Court as from its
333 R v Rajcoomar [1999] Crim LR 728; R v Callaghan 5 March 1999, unreported; R v Hewitson and Bramich 
[1999] Crim LR 307; R v Thomas [2000] 1 Cr. App. R. 447; R v Blackwood (Junior) 10 March 2000, 
unreported; R v MacDonald [1998] Crim LR 808.
334 [2000] Q.B. 520.
335 [1993] All ER 138.
336 [1996] 1 All ER 353. The appeal was upheld but eventually quashed in 2007 on the basis of non disclosure 
of evidence after a reference by the CCRC [2007] EWCA Crim 307.
337 [1998] 1 All ER 193.
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early days the Court has considered part of its role is to ensure that the accused had a 
fair trial. 3 3 8  But the HRA made fairness much more of an issue for the Court in relation to 
section 6  which states that it is unlawful for a public authority to act in a way which is 
incompatible with a Convention right. Also, section 3 which states ‘so far as it is possible 
to do so, primary legislation and subordinate legislation must be read and given effect in 
a way which is compatible with the Convention rights.’ This required the safety test to be 
compatible with the Convention, most notably the concept of fairness in Article 6 . There 
were some who thought the law may have to be changed. Lord Justice Buxton, for 
example, argued that section 2 of the CAA 1995 might have to be redrafted in order to 
ensure compliance with the Convention (Buxton, 1999, p. 12). In the case of Condron v 
United Kingdom,339 the European Court of Human Rights (ECtHR) made clear that the 
question of fairness could not be subsumed within that of safety in the sense of factual 
guilt.
There have been a number of different approaches to the issue of fair trials and safety. 
This is not surprising given the inconsistency of the Court’s decision making. Dennis 
(2003) divides the approach of the Courts into three positions, the contingent position, 
the quasi-absolutist position and the absolutist position.
The contingent position is represented by a number of cases and would appear to be the 
predominant approach. This essentially means that unfairness is a matter of degree and 
it is not all cases of unfairness that will result in an unsafe conviction. This is illustrated 
by cases such as R v Davis, Rowe and Johnson,340 and R v Francom,341 where the 
Court applied the Stiriand test to determine the appeal. 3 4 2  Davis followed the approach 
taken in Mullen and quashed the conviction despite declaring ‘this is not a finding of 
innocence, far from it.’ It is further illustrated by cases such as R v Botmeh and Alami343 
and R v Cranwell344
The quasi-absolutist approach is illustrated by the case of R v Togher.345 In this case, 
the appellants had pled guilty at trial and the Court was deciding between Chalkley and 
Mullen in terms of which authority to follow. The Court chose Mullen stating that an 
unfair trial would almost inevitably be unsafe. This case was endorsed by two judgments 
of the House of Lords, R v Forbes,3 4 6  and R v A347 which appeared to apply the
338 R v Christie [1914] A.C. 545. For a discussion on this see Dennis (2003).
339 [1999] Crim.L.R. 679.
340 [2001] 1 Cr App R 115. They are more commonly known as the ‘M25 three.’
341 [2000] All ER (D) 1131.
342 See also R v Williams [2001] EWCA Crim 932 and R v Fitton [2001] EW CA Crim 215 which follow Francom 
and apply the Stiriand test.
343 [2002] 1 Cr. App. R. 28, at para 27.
344 [2001] EWCA Crim 1216.
345 [2001] 3 All ER 463.
346 [2001] 1 A.C. 473.
347 [2001] 1 A.C. 473.
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absolutist approach that if the trial was unfair then this should lead to an unsafe 
conviction, though this appeared to be refuted by the House in R v Lambert. 3 4 8  The 
evidence was therefore conflicting as to the approach that should be adopted when the 
Court was deciding whether unfairness had led to unsafety and when the conviction 
would be quashed.
It is important to point out at this stage that the quashing of the conviction is not the only 
remedy provided for breaches of fairness under the Convention. Whilst the majority of 
judicial and academic opinion has focussed on when fairness will result in an unsafe 
conviction, the Court does have other options other than overturning the conviction. 
Under section 8  of the HRA, the Court has the power to order any remedy which is 
‘within its powers as it considers just and appropriate.’ The Court may make a 
declaration of violation. It would also appear that the Court has the power to remedy a 
fundamental defect that has occurred at trial by the appeal proceedings. This may occur 
where evidence is admitted on appeal that was not disclosed at the original trial as in 
Edwards v United Kingdom.349 This case was used as authority in R v Craven350 where 
the Court weighed up evidence of an undisclosed fingerprint against DNA evidence in 
the form of blood on the shirt of someone close to the victim at the time of the attack. 
The Court appeared to conclude that the appellant was guilty and upheld the appeal. 3 5 1  
It has also been suggested that the Court may be able to grant a remedy in damages or 
reduce the sentence. (Emmerson and Ashworth, 2001, p. 530-531).
Dennis has argued that there are two key principles for defining the relationship between 
fairness and safety. The first principle relates to the nature of the violation of the 
defendant’s right to a fair trial:
‘Improper conduct by the investigating or prosecuting authorities may make it 
unfair to try the defendant at all. If the trial was unfair in this sense then the 
conviction is necessarily unsafe. This principle thus reflects a strong meaning of 
the term “abuse of process” ’ (Dennis, 2003, p. 214).
Dennis suggests that unfairness of this type will always render the conviction unsafe. 
The second principle is concerned with the effects of a violation of the right to a fair trial:
‘It asks whether the irregularity had the effect of significantly hampering the 
defendant in the conduct of the defence so that the outcome of the trial might 
have been different but for the irregularity. If so the conviction is unsafe, and it 
would therefore be an abuse of process (in a different sense) to let it stand’ 
(Dennis, 2003, p. 214).
348 [2001] 3 All ER 577.
349 (1992) 15 EHRR 417.
350 [2001] 2 Cr. App. R. 12.
351 See page 92 above.
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Dennis indicates that here the safety of the conviction depends on a number of factors 
and although he would consider this an abuse of process ‘it ‘lacks some of the pejorative 
impact’ of the type above. This distinction between ‘unfair to try’ and ‘fair to try but an 
unfair trial’ can be illustrated from the above cases so in this sense it could be argued 
that the Court has produced a consistent approach in these cases. But whilst we may be 
able to draw a distinction between these cases on this basis, concepts such as integrity 
and fairness are not so easy to define in terms of the Court’s decision making process. 
Nor is it easy to predict when the conviction will be quashed.
There is some general guidance from the cases as to how the Courts define ‘unfairness.’ 
In R v Hanratty (in the 2002 sample), Lord Woolf drew a distinction between ‘procedural 
flaws which are technical and those which are not. ’ 3 5 2  He cited this speech by Lord 
Bingham in Randall v The Queen:
‘While reference has been made above to some of the rules which should be 
observed in a well-conducted trial to safeguard the fairness of the proceedings, 
it is not every departure from good practice which renders a trial unfair. 
Inevitably, in the course of a long trial, things are done or said which should not 
be done or said. Most occurrences of that kind do not undermine the integrity of 
the trial, particularly if they are isolated and particularly if, where appropriate, 
they are the subject of a clear judicial direction. It would emasculate the trial 
process, and undermine public confidence in the administration of criminal 
justice, if a standard of perfection were imposed that was incapable of 
attainment in practice. But the right of a criminal defendant to a fair trial is 
absolute. There will come a point when the departure from good practice is so 
gross, or so persistent, or so prejudicial, or so irremediable that an appellate 
court will have no choice but to condemn a trial as unfair and quash a conviction 
as unsafe, however strong the grounds for believing the defendant to be guilty. 
The right to a fair trial is one to be enjoyed by the guilty as well as the innocent, 
for a defendant is presumed to be innocent until proved to be otherwise in a 
fairly conducted trial. ’ 3 5 3
It would appear that ‘technical’ unfairness does not always result in the conviction being 
quashed whilst gross procedural unfairness does. But whilst the judges may make these 
distinctions, it is not overly clear how they decide what is ‘technical’ and what is ‘gross.’
There is a theoretical argument underpinning the relationship between fairness and 
safety and the Court’s role in deciding these appeals. Dennis likens the relationship 
between unfairness and safety to the jurisprudence of section 78 of PACE. He argues 
that the rationale of the exclusionary discretion under section 78 is the need to 
safeguard the legitimacy of the verdict. He says that when the Court of Appeal reviews 
the safety of the conviction it is performing the same function ie safeguarding the 
legitimacy of the verdict. Dennis seems to be suggesting that section 78 can be viewed
352 [2002] EWCA Crim 1141.
353 [2002] UKPC 19, at para. 28.
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in the same way as an abuse of process in that if there is misconduct on the part of the 
authorities then the evidence can be excluded in the same way that the trial proceedings 
may be stayed as an abuse of process. Therefore, in applying legitimacy theory to the 
Court’s role in determining fairness and safety, Dennis is suggesting that if the moral 
legitimacy of the conviction is weakened then this is an abuse of process and the 
remedy should be the quashing of the conviction.
Ashworth and Redmayne, however, are not so keen on terms such as legitimacy and 
integrity. They state:
‘...in developing a framework for considering when unfair convictions should be 
quashed and when upheld we are not attracted to solutions which put significant 
weight on such vague concepts as legitimacy and moral integrity, unless more is 
said about what those terms mean’ (Ashworth and Redmayne, 2005, p. 357).
But this has been criticised by Choo. He states:
The notion of moral integrity, which some believe may have been ‘oversold’,354 
has been criticised for its supposed vagueness and for its supposed failure to 
treat violations of defendants’ rights, especially important rights such as 
Convention rights, with the seriousness that they deserve. This is not, however, 
so’ (Choo, 2008, p. 190).
This notion of moral legitimacy, or moral integrity,355 has been discussed by Ormerod 
and Taylor in relation to fairness and safety. They argue that ‘although moral integrity is 
a significant foundation of abuse of process and has a part to play in the determination 
of safety that does not mean that the two are synonymous concepts. The concepts of 
safety and abuse are not coterminous: there is a gap’ (Ormerod and Taylor, 2004, p. 
268). They went on to say that ‘there are many instances where a verdict might be 
considered to be unsafe yet the conditions to satisfy an abuse are not met’ (p. 282). 
They also argue that the Court’s ‘refusal to accept a direct correspondence between 
unfairness and unsafety...offers an incoherent scheme of appellate control in the 
criminal process. In particular, it permits the Court to place too much weight on the 
factual guilt of the appellant’ (p. 279). They stated that ‘unfairness and unsafety are not 
coterminous but the gap between them ought to be narrow1 (p. 283). They hoped for the 
Court to develop a more ‘principled’ approach to decision making which is based on the 
grossness of the violation, not on the more ‘pragmatic’ approach of whether the 
appellant committed the crime.
354 Citing Ashworth and Redmayne, 2005, p. 333.
355 For a wider discussion on the integrity principle, see Ashworth (2003).
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This hope for a more principled approach was echoed by Lord Browne-Wilkinson. He 
states that traditionally the approach to judicial decision making is what he calls the ‘dirty 
dog principle’:
This is the principle which lies at the heart of the common law. It is the basis by 
which the overwhelming majority of cases are decided. The judge looks for what 
are called ‘the merits’ and having found them seeks to reach a result, consistent 
with legal reasoning, whereby the deserving win and the undeserving lose.’ 
(Browne-Wilkinson, 1998 p. 21)
He states that this judicial method is seldom reflected in judicial behaviour or in the 
reasons given by judges for their decisions. He states that as a result of the dirty dog 
principle the features of current judicial reasoning are:
‘First, the actual decision is primarily based on moral, not legal, factors. Second, 
those moral reasons are not normally articulated in the judgment. Third, the 
morality applied in any given case is the morality of the individual judge, 
although this will to some extent reflect the values of contemporary society’ (p. 
22).
This dirty dog principle reflects the crime control model and would explain a number of 
problems associated with the Court such as the Court’s unwillingness to admit fresh 
evidence, the Court’s reluctance to interfere with jury verdicts in the absence of any 
errors, its willingness to uphold convictions when it deems the error has been harmless 
and its willingness to uphold convictions when there is strong prosecution evidence. 
However, Browne-Wilkinson went on to say that with the advent of the Human Rights 
Act, ‘moral attitudes which have previously been the actual, but unarticulated, reasoning 
behind judicial decisions will become the very stuff of decisions on Convention points.’ 
Further, he argues that:
The moral judgment involved will no longer be the moral viewpoint of the 
individual judge. Once the moral and practical reasons which are the basis of 
the judge’s decision are stated in the reasons given by the judge, higher courts 
will have to review and if necessary modify those decisions. There should 
emerge, as there has indeed under the Strasbourg jurisprudence, a code of 
morals reflecting the input of many different viewpoints and not merely the 
prejudices of the individual. This will, I hope, put an end to the most extreme 
versions of the dirty dog principle -  now primarily espoused by the tabloid press 
-  that because an individual is guilty of a serious crime he has lost all his rights 
to fair treatment’ (p.22).’
It would seem that what Browne-Wilkinson, and Ormerod and Taylor, hoped for was the 
HRA resulting in a resurgence in moral integrity or moral legitimacy into the judicial 
decision making process. This would presumably mean more focus on the seriousness 
of the procedural irregularity, and more unfairness resulting in unsafe convictions, even
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if the appellant was guilty. However, Nobles and Schiff were doubtful whether this shift in 
approach would take place. After reviewing the Togher case, their conclusions were:
‘Changing the Court of Appeal’s legal authority by statutory amendment has, in 
the past, done little to alter its treatment of appeal cases. The Human Rights Act 
can be viewed as simply another alteration to the formal grounds for appeal. But 
unless it alters the Court’s view of what constitutes a serious irregularity it will 
make little difference to the outcome of appeals. While the language of rights 
may be a new addition to Court of Appeal judgements it will not, by itself, alter 
the Court’s view of which irregularities justify freeing those thought to be guilty, 
and who on their own admission have admitted to being guilty, of serious 
offences’ (Nobles and Schiff, 2001, p. 922).
Nobles and Schiff, therefore, appeared to be doubtful that the HRA would bring about a 
significant change with the Court continuing to focus on the guilt of the appellant rather 
than the seriousness of the irregularity. This is a difficult area to analyse because there 
are differing views as to which one the Court should prioritise, and how we define the 
Court’s approach. Whilst Ormerod and Taylor may argue that if the Court focuses on the 
seriousness of the irregularity it is being ‘principled’ and if it focuses on the guilt of the 
appellant it is being ‘pragmatic,’ these terms are interchangeable and can apply equally 
to both approaches. If the Court is upholding the conviction despite a serious irregularity 
because it considers the appellant to be guilty then this could be considered to be a 
‘principled’ approach if the view is taken that the Court should prioritise upholding 
convictions of those it considers to be guilty.
It is also difficult to define the Court’s approach to this area as being liberal or restrictive. 
For fresh evidence or lurking doubt appeals it may be possible to define the quashing of 
the conviction as the Court taking a more liberal approach because the appellant is 
essentially arguing he/she did not commit the crime. Therefore, these appeals do not 
require the balancing exercise the Court has to perform in procedural irregularity appeals 
where it has to weigh up the seriousness of the irregularity against other factors to 
conclude whether the irregularity made the conviction unsafe. If the Court quashes the 
conviction of someone considered to be guilty because the irregularity is a serious one 
then it is difficult to argue that the Court is taking a more liberal approach here. The fact 
that the conviction is overturned can be used by those who use successful appeals to 
argue the Court is being liberal but for those who would say the role of the Court is only 
to overturn the convictions of those who are factually innocent, then the Court’s so-called 
‘liberal’ approach in quashing the conviction could be subject to criticism.
Therefore, this chapter will analyse the Court’s approach to procedural irregularities on 
the basis of whether it is taking a strict or less strict approach to the procedural 
irregularity itself in the sense of whether it is giving more weight to the procedural 
irregularity (less strict) or to the guilt of the appellant (strict). The 1990 and 2002 samples
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will be compared in order to ascertain any differences between them. There will then be 
an analysis of the 2002 sample in terms of the Court’s decision making process in these 
appeals. This will be necessary to see if there are any identifiable approaches the Court 
uses to determine these appeals and whether there are any identifiable categories of 
procedural irregularity in terms of what will result in the conviction being upheld or 
overturned. There will also be an analysis of what impact the HRA has had on criminal 
appeals. The 1990 and 2002 samples will now be analysed.
The 1990 and 2002 sample of judgments
The general findings of tables 4.3 and 4.4 in chapter four will now be compared in order 
to provide a general picture of the differences between them. These tables are taken 
from the 1990 and 2002 samples of judgments.
Both samples show that the majority of grounds are procedural irregularities with very 
few based on factual error. In the 1990 sample, fresh evidence grounds were 7% of the 
total grounds with 6% in the 2002 sample, and ‘lurking doubt’ type grounds were 2% in 
1990 (generally unsafe and unsatisfactory) and 1% in 2002. Therefore, the 2002 sample 
appears to confirm Malleson’s findings that most of the Court’s time is spent reviewing 
the decisions of the trial judge and that it is rare for the Court to hear fresh evidence or 
consider the existence of a ‘lurking doubt’ (Malleson, 1993, p. 15).
In the 1990 sample just over one third of the appeal grounds reviewed were allowed 
(101 )356 which represents 31% of the total grounds. In the 2002 sample, there were 
76 appeal grounds allowed which represents 12% of the total grounds so the Court 
was clearly allowing fewer appeal grounds in 2002 than in 1990. If those grounds of 
appeal are removed which include fresh evidence and lurking doubt this gives us a 
clearer picture of the approach to procedural irregularity appeals. We can also 
discount the ‘other’ or ‘not specified’ category as these may not necessarily be 
procedural errors. The fresh evidence, lurking doubt (generally unsafe), ‘other’ and 
‘not specified’ amount to thirteen grounds allowed in the 1990 sample so if those 
figures are deducted we get a procedural irregularity figure of eighty-eight grounds 
allowed. There were thirty-nine of these grounds dismissed or refused so they can 
also be deducted from the total grounds along with the figures adjourned (six). This 
means of the total grounds in 1990, 271 were based on procedural irregularities. 
Therefore, of the 271 procedural irregularity grounds, eighty-eight were allowed which 
equates to 32%.
If we replicate these figures for 2002, the number of procedural irregularity appeals 
allowed is fifty-eight (eighteen deducted). The number of procedural irregularity
356 There is a discrepancy in the figures. The table says 102 grounds allowed but the figures add up to 101.
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grounds dismissed is 510 (eighty-six deducted). There was one ground deducted for 
being adjourned. Therefore, of the 590 procedural irregularity grounds, fifty-eight were 
allowed which equates to 10%. The differences between the samples are partly 
explained by the large increase in grounds in 2002. This shows that despite the large 
increase in grounds, it has become more difficult to succeed as there was a much 
higher chance of success with a smaller number of grounds in 1990. This shows that 
increasing the grounds of the appeal does not necessarily result in a higher chance of 
success.
The most common grounds argued in both samples were the same, being errors of the 
trial judge. In Malleson’s sample these constituted 59% of the total grounds and 49% in 
the 2002 sample. When comparing the three most common grounds in the samples -  
misdirection on the law or evidence, defective or unbalanced summing up and evidence 
wrongly excluded or included, they all show there were more appeals allowed in the 
1990 sample than the 2002 sample. In the 1990 sample, seventy-seven (40%) of these 
grounds were allowed with 115 (60%) dismissed or refused. In the 2002 sample, fifty- 
seven (18%) of these grounds were allowed with 256 (82%) dismissed or refused. This 
shows that fewer appeals were allowed in 2002 with these grounds and appears to 
confirm the general statistics discussed in chapter four that there were fewer appeals 
allowed in 2002.
The 2002 sample shows the impact the HRA has had on criminal appeals. There were 
22 grounds based on breaches of Article 6 with none of them successful. There were 5 
grounds based on breaches of other Articles in the HRA but again, none of them were 
successful. This is potentially evidence that whilst the HRA had given appellants an 
additional basis for arguing the appeal, the Court at this stage was not being too 
receptive to them. Similarly, there were 23 grounds based on an abuse of process but 
again, none of them were successful. This would appear to show that the Court was 
adopting a strict approach to deciding these issues as, as discussed above, the abuse of 
process ground and fairness arguments relating to Article 6 are potentially the most 
illustrative of the Court's approach to the HRA. This is because the abuse of process 
ground relates to whether it is fair to try the defendant and the fairness arguments 
generally relate to whether the defendant had a fair trial. This will be discussed in more 
detail below when the individual appeals are analysed.
Despite potential evidence that the Court has adopted a strict approach to procedural 
irregularities, the HRA has clearly contributed to the expansion of grounds argued and 
may also have had an impact on the abuse ground in terms of more being argued as 
Malleson does not list any abuse grounds in her sample. This may be the impact of 
cases such as Bennett, Latif and Mullen where these arguments are now being made
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much more frequently than prior to 1990 once the Court confirmed they came within the 
safety test. Though as the above has shown these arguments are not necessarily being 
successful in terms of convictions overturned. The impact the HRA had initially on the 
Court was outlined in the Annual Review of the Criminal Division of the Court of Appeal 
by Lord Woolf. He stated:
‘On the 2 October 2000 the provisions of the Human Rights Act 1998 came into 
force. In the period between October 2000 and the end of March 2001 some 
13.6% (137 cases) of appeals against conviction and some 3.8% (107 cases) of 
appeals against sentence raised a human rights issue....In general, the issues 
that have been raised are part of other more general grounds of appeal (e.g. 
abuse of process, admissibility of evidence). Very few cases have been initiated 
solely on human rights issues.’357
This is borne out by the 2002 sample and shows that the HRA has impacted on the 
number of appeals to the Court and also the number of grounds. The rise in the number 
of grounds could also be explained by the contribution the CCRC has made. In a recent 
review of cases referred to the Court, former Commissioner Laurie Elks stated:
‘....there remains a case to answer [for the CCRC] that in pursuing the issue of 
the safety of convictions brought before it, the Commission has, at times, given 
undue consideration to technical legal considerations in its investigation and 
referrals’ (Elks, 2008, p. 345).
This may partly explain the increase in the different types of procedural irregularity but 
little difference with the fresh evidence and lurking doubt grounds. As Elks himself 
concedes ‘it is...quite a long step from the redress of the kind of miscarriages of justice 
which prompted the formation of the Commission, to the referral of a conviction upon the 
ground that the jury should have been warned in slightly different terms about the 
considerations to be applied in deciding whether to draw any adverse inferences from 
silence’ (Elks, 2008, p. 345).
This last point also illustrates a possible reason for the rise in procedural irregularities 
between the two samples which is the changes in procedure such as the right to 
silence and the disclosure regime. This possibly explains the rise in the non­
disclosure of evidence grounds which do not feature in the 1990 sample. But 
surprisingly there are no grounds based on police or prosecution malpractice in 1990 
whereas in 2002, there were 3 appeals allowed on the basis of police malpractice and 
1 allowed for prosecution ‘errors.’ There were 9 prosecution error grounds rejected 
and 8 police malpractice grounds rejected in 2002 which shows that whilst the Court
357 Annual Review of the Criminal Division of the Court of Appeal April 2001 to March 2002. Available from 
http://www.hmcourts-service.gov.uk/cms/1500.htm.
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is able to accept it does happen, the grounds are more likely to be rejected than 
accepted.
The 2002 sample appears to confirm Ormerod and Taylor’s argument that there is a 
gap between abuse and safety. The wide variety of procedural irregularities shows 
that an abuse of process is only one of them, albeit that it might encompasses a large 
number of areas and some of those areas may be listed separately in the table. The 
grounds listed as an abuse of process are where the appellant specifically referred to 
that term, though the police malpractice grounds and the prosecution errors may well 
have come within that broader definition.
The 2002 sample will now be analysed qualitatively in order to determine what the 
Court’s approach is to determining these appeals.
The Court’s approaches to determining the appeal
As discussed in chapter two, as well as replicating Malleson’s study, I also added an 
additional element which was to collate the various decision making processes of the 
Court in order to determine what the approaches were. The aim in collating the 
different approaches was to see how the Court approaches its task in order to try and 
ascertain why the decision making of the Court can be so problematic.
Whilst the 2002 table shows that a large number of irregularities can be identified from 
the judgments, the Court uses a small number of approaches to determine procedural 
irregularity appeals as the diagram in chapter four shows.358 By far the most common 
approach used was the Court disagreeing that an irregularity had in fact occurred with 
the appeal being upheld. This approach was taken in 179 appeals. In contrast, the 
second most common approach was the Court determining that the irregularity had 
made the conviction unsafe or leave granted. There were 45 of those appeals. The 
third most common approach was that the irregularity may have had an impact on the 
jury and the conviction was unsafe or leave granted. There were 17 of those appeals. 
The fourth most common approach was that the Court considered the irregularity did 
occur but that there was strong prosecution evidence so the appeal was upheld. This 
occurred in 14 appeals. The fifth most common approach was that the Court 
considered the irregularity to be minor and the conviction was upheld as it did not 
impact on the safety of the conviction. There were 11 of those. The final approach is 
the Stirland test of would the jury have inevitably convicted if the irregularity did not 
occur. This would result in the conviction being upheld if yes and quashed if no. This 
occurred in 3 appeals. There did not appear to be any decisions of the Mullen type
358 See page 69. The word ‘error’ in the diagram is used to signify a procedural irregularity. See appendix two 
for the form used to collate the approaches.
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where the conviction is quashed with the Court overtly viewing the appellant as guilty 
though this may have been implied from some of the judgments. There were also no 
references to the appellant’s innocence directly in the judgments. The decision to 
include those where leave was granted, rather than just concentrate on those where 
the appeal was determined, was made to analyse as many judgments as possible 
and also the Court often decides whether the conviction is unsafe at the renewed 
application for leave stage so it is not always possible to separate them in those 
cases.
On a general view, these approaches appear to show the Court taking a fairly strict 
approach to determining the appeal and either deciding that the irregularity did not 
occur or that it was minor or that there was strong prosecution evidence. In a large 
number of appeals, the Court is disagreeing that the irregularity took place and the 
appellant or counsel for the appellant is unable to persuade the Court otherwise. The 
judgments show the Court weighing up the evidence in the case against the strength 
of the irregularity and either deciding on the basis of what the Court itself thought or 
what a jury would have made of the irregularity. The types of grounds argued and how 
these appeals are decided in practice will now be discussed. First, the appeals 
allowed by the Court will be analysed.
The Court thinks the irregularity made the conviction unsafe
This section sets out the grounds of appeal argued by the appellant/applicant where 
the Court uses a subjective approach and decides the irregularity made the conviction 
unsafe or that leave to appeal should be given. This is the largest category of appeals 
allowed. These cases all potentially show the Court taking a less strict approach to 
the procedural irregularity as the conviction is overturned. This decision making 
process is illustrated by the following cases.
There was evidence in this category that the HRA had had an impact on the Court’s 
decision making. For example, there were judgments where the appellant had not 
raised the issue of a fair trial, but the Court used this terminology in deciding the 
appeal was allowed. These cases included previous convictions being incorrectly 
included;359 misdirection on the burden of proof;360 and an unbalanced summing 
up.361 But there were two other cases which were potentially raising HRA-type 
grounds as both involved police malpractice. In R v Irvine,362 the appellant was 
convicted of robbery and manslaughter. He was tried with two co-accused, Twitchell 
and McCloy. The conviction of Twitchell was overturned on appeal due to the police
359 R v Bartholomew [2002] EWCA Crim 1312.
360 R v Davies [2002] EWCA Crim 268.
361 R v J  [2002] EWCA Crim 1218.
362 [2002] EWCA Crim 29.
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being discredited and Irvine’s case was then referred to the Court. The appeal was 
allowed as the confession of Twitchell was discredited and the only other evidence 
was what he had supposedly said in the police car which was now accepted not to be 
true. Similarly, in R v Brignall, R v Barnes,363 two police officers involved with the case 
were awaiting trial for allegedly perverting the course of justice in another case. There 
was also a suspicion by other police officers that the van they were in which had been 
seized because it contained drugs had significantly less drugs in it when it arrived at 
the police station so by implication those officers had stolen it some of it. The appeals 
were allowed because of this and a retrial was not ordered because of the behaviour 
of the police in the case. These cases show that the procedural irregularity may have 
an impact on the quality of the evidence. If the proper procedures are not followed to 
obtain the evidence then it may be fabricated in order for it to be viewed as 
overwhelming evidence of guilt. If the evidence has been fabricated then it is 
important that the Court does not just accept it as evidence of guilt and gives weight 
to the procedural irregularity that resulted in it being obtained. This can be a difficult 
balancing exercise for the Court but these cases are examples of the seriousness of 
the irregularity outweighing what can appear to be strong evidence of guilt which may 
have been fabricated. They could also be examples of the Court acting in a 'quasi- 
disciplinary' way and allowing the appeals as a punishment to the police contrary to 
the views of the RCCJ and the Government as discussed above.
There was no reference made to a fair trial in the other cases in this category but 
there were two cases which raised interesting issues. In R v Johnson 364 the Court 
noticed the judge’s misdirection of the law relating to aggravated burglary. This had 
not been raised in the grounds of appeal. The Court allowed the appeal and 
substituted a verdict of affray. This shows that the Court is capable of taking an 
interventionist approach when it wants to and is not bound by the grounds of appeal 
that leave was granted for. In R v Deacon, R v Seymour,365 Mr Justice Gibbs made 
reference to the written reasons of the single judge in refusing leave. These reasons 
were described as ‘unanswerable’ by Justice Gibbs but he then went on to say with 
the benefit of oral argument from appellant counsel, the Court was persuaded to grant 
leave. This shows the problems of the leave decision being made on paper and the 
benefit of oral argument. This possibly suggests that if the leave process was one of 
oral argument there may be more applicants granted leave to appeal. However, this 
appeal was later heard in the sample and the appeal was dismissed.366 There was 
one case in this category which required that the Court make a declaration of the law.
363 [2002] EWCA Crim 569.
364 [2002] EWCA Crim 933.
365 [2002] EWCA Crim 260.
366 [2002] EWCA Crim 1460.
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In R v Natji367 the Court held the Public Bodies Corruption Practices Act 1889 did not 
apply to civil servants.
The majority of cases in this category argued errors by the trial judge as the 
procedural irregularity. These ranged from the judge intervening too much during the 
trial, to wrongly telling the jury to draw adverse inferences from silence, to the judge 
misdirecting on the standard and burden of proof.368 These cases all illustrate that the 
Court viewed the judge’s error to have made the conviction unsafe.
There were other cases in this category that did not relate to errors of the trial judge. For 
example, in R v Bains,369 evidence emerged that the complainant had misled the jury 
about her relationship with another man; in R v Atkinson 370 there were inconsistent 
verdicts with a co-defendant; in R v Shepherd371 an application was made under section 
6 of the Criminal Appeal Act 1968; in R v Hail372 the barrister at the trial was seriously ill 
with cancer; in R v Sims 373 there was non-disclosure of evidence that one of the 
complainants had had counselling prior to the trial; in R v Farah,374 a witness who 
testified that the applicant had confessed to him now wanted to retract that statement; in 
R v Fernandez,375 the law had now changed in R v K376 and the Crown no longer sought 
to uphold the conviction; in R v Smith 377 the appellant was convicted of murder. After 
the conviction for the murder, the appellant killed his cell mate and was able to 
successfully plead diminished responsibility for the second murder. He argued his 
conviction for the first murder was unsafe because of the personality disorder diagnosed 
for the second killing. The Court agreed and substituted a manslaughter conviction for a 
murder one. The final case in this category is R v Downing 376 This was discussed in 
chapter five in relation to fresh evidence. The appellant was convicted of murder and the 
grounds of appeal were new forensic evidence of bloodstaining and also his confession 
was unreliable and should have been excluded. The Court considered that the 
confession was not reliable and quashed the conviction.
367 [2002] EWCA Crim 271.
368 In R v Logindice [2002] EWCA Crim 929; R v P  [2002] EWCA Crim 216; R v McHale [2002] EW CA Crim 
183; R v Shanks [2002] EWCA Crim 489; R v Jacobs [2002] EWCA Crim 610; R v Lester [2002] EW CA Crim 
947; R v Rhodes [2002] EWCA Crim 1390; R v Kinneir [2002] EWCA Crim 902; R v G  [2002[ EWCA Crim 550; 
R v D  [2002] EWCA Crim 157; R v Davies [2002] EWCA Crim 85; R v Harris [2002] EWCA Crim 1597; R v Fox 
[2002] EWCA Crim 1242; R v Hassam [2002] EWCA Crim 1263; R v Marsh [2002] EWCA Crim 1497; R v 
Snooks [2002] EWCA Crim 1104; R v McCamon [2002] EWCA Crim 1347; R v Davies [2002] EW CA Crim 
1061; R v McGhee [2002] EWCA Crim 995; R v Bedford [2002] EWCA Crim 893; R v White [2002] EW CA  
Crim 899; R v Bangura [2002] EWCA Crim 866; R v Wood [2002] EW CA Crim 856; R v Metcalf [2002] EWCA  
Crim 703; R v Devine [2002] EWCA Crim 691; R v Hardwick [2002] EWCA Crim 1212; R v Deadman [2002] 
EWCA Crim 435; R v Munn [2002] EWCA Crim 644.
369 [2002] EWCA Crim 83.
370 [2002] EWCA Crim 536.
371 [2002] EWCA Crim 1091.
372 [2002] EWCA Crim 1076.
373 [2002] EWCA Crim 1153.
374 [2002] EWCA Crim 956.
375 [2002] EWCA Crim 1318.
376 [2001] 3 WLR 471.
377 [2002] EWCA Crim 840.
378 [2002] EWCA Crim 263.
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These cases show that the appellant/applicant has the most chance of success when 
the judge makes an error and the Court decides for itself that the judge’s error made the 
conviction unsafe. The Court in these cases appears to be focusing on the seriousness 
of the irregularity and in its opinion whether it has made the conviction unsafe. There 
were also a number of appeals where the prosecution did not wish to uphold the appeal 
which may have had an impact on the Court as it was not being persuaded to uphold the 
conviction. There was only one case in this category where the Court appeared to be 
clarifying the law (Natji). These cases, therefore, show the Court taking a less strict 
approach to the irregularity and granting leave or quashing the conviction on the basis of 
it.There did not appear to have been any consideration in these appeals as to the guilt of 
the applicant/appellant as this arose in other categories in the sample. Therefore, the 
Court was solely focussed on the seriousness of the irregularity without weighing that 
against the guilt of the appellant.
Those cases where the Court decided the irregularity may have had an impact on the 
jury will now be discussed.
The Court thinks the irregularity may have had an impact on the jury
This section sets out the grounds of appeal argued by the appellant/applicant where 
the Court applies an objective test and decides the irregularity may have had an 
impact on the jury. This is the second largest category of appeals allowed and again, 
shows the Court taking a less strict approach to the irregularity in overturning the 
conviction. This decision making process is illustrated by the following cases.
Similarly to the category above, there were judgments in this category where the 
appellant had not raised the issue of a fair trial, but the Court used this terminology in 
allowing the appeal. In RvBagga,319 the judge had failed to properly and fairly put the 
defence case and the Court appeared to take a contingent approach to fairness and 
safety. Latham LJ stated ‘...it seems to us that the summing-up was deficient to an 
extent which we consider renders the trial process unfair. That does not necessarily 
equate to rendering the verdicts unsafe.’380 The second ground of appeal was that 
the judge failed to direct the jury properly on the appellant’s good character. The 
Court agreed and allowed the appeal as ‘the one thing we cannot say is that we are 
satisfied that it would not have had an effect on the jury.’381 In R v Wood,382 the 
judge’s interruptions during the trial meant that the appellant did not have a fair trial. In
379 [2002] EWCA Crim 1049.
380 Ibid, para. 25.
381 Ibid, para. 27.
382 [2002] EWCA Crim 832.
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R v A 383 the Court allowed the appeal as ‘the failures to which we have referred did, 
in our judgment, affect the fairness of the trial and the ability of the jury to assess the 
evidence sufficiently and accurately.’384 In R v H,385 the appellant was convicted of 
indecent assault. The appeal was allowed as ‘in our view, the fairness of the 
proceedings was demonstrably affected.’386 These cases are potentially evidence of 
the HRA having an impact on the Court because the Court is using the term ‘fairness’ 
to quash the conviction without the argument being made by the appellant.
But there was no mention of fairness in the other cases. The Court quashed the other 
convictions in the category as errors of the trial judge may all have had an impact on 
the jury.387 Similarly to the first category, these ranged from the judge interrupting to 
defective summing up to misdirection on the elements of the offence and to 
misdirection on the burden of proof, amongst others.
There were other cases in the category that did not argue errors of the trial judge. For 
example, the abuse of process ground was discussed and dismissed in R v Byrne.3*6 
The appellant was convicted of manslaughter. He had been tried three years after the 
incident as he had fled to Ireland and had to be extradited. After he was convicted at 
his first trial he appealed against his conviction and it was quashed with a retrial 
ordered. At his second trial, the jury were unable to reach a verdict and he was then 
tried again and convicted. The four grounds on this appeal were that the trial should 
have been stayed as an abuse of process because of the delay in bringing him to trial 
and because it was the third trial; the evidence of a prosecution witness should not 
have been admitted; a no case to answer submission should have been acceded to 
and the judge misdirected on the mens rea of manslaughter. The Court dismissed the 
abuse of process ground as the delay was partly caused by the appellant leaving for 
Ireland and having to be extradited. It also dismissed the argument of it not being fair 
to try him a third time. The Court did agree that the evidence of the prosecution 
witness should not have been admitted. The witness was the victim’s wife who 
witnessed the attack and the evidence was that the appellant had a knife and used it 
to stab her husband. This was not the case the prosecution advanced and Kennedy 
LJ stated ‘as we have no idea how the jury reacted to this irrelevant, inadmissible and 
prejudicial evidence, we feel bound to conclude that the conviction of manslaughter
383 [2002] EWCA Crim 370.
384 Ibid, para. 33.
385 [2002] EWCA Crim 399.
386 Ibid, para. 26.
387 In R v  Fahy [2002] EW CA Crim 525; R v Hart [2002] EWCA Crim 591; R v- Johnson [2002] EWCA Crim 
532; R v Blakeney [2002] EWCA Crim 391; R v Round [2002] EWCA Crim 1521; R v Cakmak and others 
[2002] EWCA Crim 500; R vAnands [2002] EWCA Crim 1074; R v Khan and others [2002] EWCA Crim 945; R 
v Lang, R v Deadman 2002] EWCA Crim 298; R v Jones [2002] EWCA Crim 287.
388 [2002] EWCA Crim 161.
154
was unsafe.’389 In R v Adam and others,390 it was discovered after the trial that the 
principal prosecution witness had received cautions which were not disclosed to the 
defence by the prosecution. Finally, in this category, in R v Ram,391 a defence witness 
had failed to turn up and the defence and the prosecution had taken the decision to 
allow a statement to be read instead. The Court quashed the convictions in both 
cases.
Once again, this category shows that errors by the trial judge were the most common 
ground. The Court weighs up the seriousness of the irregularity and decides whether 
it would have had an impact on the jury verdict. This category also represents the 
Court taking a less strict approach to the irregularity as the convictions were quashed 
or leave granted. The grounds of appeal were very similar to the previous category 
but it is not clear why the Court chose different approaches to allowing the appeals. 
But both categories do show that either the Court deciding the issue for itself or 
applying the jury impact test results in the convictions being overturned.
The cases in the sample that used the Stirland test to determine the appeal will now 
be discussed.
If the error had not occurred would the Jury have inevitably convicted?
This section sets out the grounds of appeal argued by the appellant/applicant where the 
Court decides the conviction may or may not be unsafe or leave given on the basis of 
the Stirland test. As discussed above, the Stirland test was the one officially adopted by 
the Court when applying the proviso. This caused problems because it required the 
Court to place itself in the position of a reasonable jury and decide whether despite the 
irregularity the jury would have inevitably convicted. As the cases of Davis, Rowe and 
Johnson, Francom, Williams and Fitton discussed above showed, the Stirland test had 
survived the changes in the safety test. But there were only three cases in the sample 
which used the wording of this test exactly which shows it is not being used overtly too 
often, though the jury impact test above is a similar approach. This decision making 
process is illustrated by the following cases.
In R v Conner,392 there was insufficient evidence that the appellant intended either to kill 
the deceased or to cause him really serious harm to leave that question to the jury. 
Alternatively, the judge misdirected the jury in a number of respects and that, in any 
event, the jury could not safely conclude that the appellant had the necessary intention. 
The Court agreed with Clarke LJ stating that ‘in all the circumstances, we do not think
389 Ibid, para. 35.
390 [2002] EWCA Crim 613.
391 [2002] EWCA Crim 372.
392 [2002[ EW CA Crim 471.
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that a reasonable jury properly directed could safely conclude that the appellant had the 
relevant intention. It follows that the judge should have withdrawn the count of murder 
from the jury.’ The Court substituted a murder conviction for a manslaughter one. This 
case can be contrasted with R v Wes?93 where the ground of appeal was whether there 
was a lurking doubt relating to the issue of intention. The Court upheld the conviction in 
that case stating that intention was an issue of fact for the jury to determine. This is 
illustrative of the Court’s inconsistency. But it may also be illustrative that the appellant 
has a far higher chance of success framing the appeal in a technicality than arguing a 
lurking doubt.
In R v Edwards,394 the appellant was convicted of cheating the public revenue. He was 
accused of using a forged tax certificate to obtain from employers of his company’s 
services a payment in gross rather than a tax deducted basis. The main ground of 
appeal was that evidence of two schedules of receipts should not have been admitted 
due to the prejudicial effect or if they were to be admitted, the defence should have had 
the opportunity to deal with that evidence with the assistance of expert accounting 
evidence. The Court allowed the appeal and Rix LJ stated:
‘it falls to this Court, therefore, to consider for itself how we would have 
exercised the judge’s discretion in his position. We think that we would have 
exercised that discretion against admitting that material. On that basis we have 
to ask ourselves whether the conviction is unsafe. We are bound to consider it 
unsafe unless we are satisfied that had this evidence not been admitted the only 
reasonable and proper verdict would have been guilty or, to put it another way, 
unless a reasonable jury would have been bound to return a verdict of guilty. We 
are not satisfied against the background of the evidence which was put before 
the jury, that this test is satisfied.
The two cases above show this test being used to quash the conviction. However, the 
third case in this category showed the test being used to uphold the appeal. In R v 
Motherwell,396 the appellant was convicted of grievous bodily harm with intent. The 
ground of appeal was that there were a number of discrepancies in the judge’s 
summing up namely that he did not point out the inconsistencies between the 
prosecution witnesses and there was no summary of the factual issues. The Court 
agreed that there were mistakes made in the summing up and Mr Justice Moses 
stated ‘the second issue is whether, and not withstanding those defects in the 
summing up the conviction is unsafe. That question must be determined according to 
whether we are sure that a jury properly directed, both as to the defence relied on and 
the evidence and issues in the case, would have convicted.’397 The appeal was
393 [2007] All ER (D) 346.
394 [2002] EWCA Crim 810.
395 Ibid, para. 38-39.
396 [2002] EWCA Crim 679
397Ibid, para 30.
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dismissed with Justice Moses stating that ‘we are sure that even had the issues and 
factual matters properly been laid before the jury, the jury would have convicted this 
appellant.’398 The Court made reference in this case to the ‘overwhelming evidence’ 
which was ‘uncontradicted.’ It appears that is a factor in weighing up whether, despite 
the irregularity, a reasonable jury properly directed would have convicted.
With such a small number of cases it is difficult to draw any noticeable conclusions 
regarding this category of decision making, other than the ones discussed under the 
historical approach above. It may be that the Court is reluctant to use this approach 
because it involves the Court having to put itself in the place of the jury and come to 
its own assessment of the evidence minus the irregularity that has occurred. But this 
is really no different than the Court using the jury impact test to decide whether the 
irregularity may have had an impact on the jury which it chooses to use more often 
than the Stirland test. But this is at least evidence that the decision making of the 
proviso has survived despite it being abolished in the CAA 1995.
The cases where the irregularity occurred but there was strong prosecution evidence 
will now be discussed.
The Irregularity did occur but there was strong prosecution evidence
This section sets out the grounds of appeal argued by the appellant/applicant where 
the Court decides the irregularity did occur but there was strong prosecution evidence 
and upholds the appeal. In these cases, the Court makes an assessment of the 
irregularity and weighs it against the other evidence in the case. These cases 
potentially show the Court taking a strict approach to the irregularity and upholding the 
appeal in spite of it. This decision making process is illustrated by the following cases.
It would appear from these cases that the Court is making an assessment of the guilt 
of the appellant. In R v Rodger,399 the appellant had been questioned without caution 
on the 7th and 8th April and then arrested on the 9th April. The evidence of the 
interview was included after an argument made to exclude it and the first ground of 
appeal was that the evidence should have been excluded as a serious breach of 
PACE. The second main argument on appeal was that the trial judge should not have 
allowed the trial to take place at all as he should have acceded to an application to 
stay the trial as an abuse of process. A further ground was based on fresh evidence 
which was discussed in chapter five. With regard to the evidence not being excluded, 
the trial judge decided this was not a ‘deliberate or flagrant’ breach and refused to 
exclude the evidence. The appeal court agreed that the trial judge had exercised his
398 Ibid, para. 33.
399 [2002] EWCA Crim 660.
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discretion wrongly, and stated ‘it therefore falls to this Court to exercise that discretion 
afresh.’ Counsel for the appellant argued that as this was a significant and substantial 
breach then the evidence obtained by the breach should have been excluded. Also, 
that the breaches of the code had a significantly unfair effect on the fairness of the 
proceedings, in particular, because the Crown used answers given by the appellant 
during the interviews to undermine the appellant’s credibility. The Court agreed with 
the defence argument and Dyson LJ stated:
‘In our judgement the evidence of both interviews should have been excluded. 
The breaches were substantial and significant. The more substantial and 
significant a breach the more likely the evidence will be excluded, otherwise 
there is a danger that officers will be tempted to commit breaches of the 
codes, whose provisions contain important safeguards for potential 
defendants. Furthermore, the more substantial and significant the breach the 
more likely it is that it will have an adverse effect on the fairness of the 
proceedings.’400
It would appear here that Dyson LJ is giving effect to the integrity principle as 
discussed above. He went on to say that:
‘In our judgment the judge should have focused on the effect on the fairness 
of the proceedings. The breach was significant and substantial. In our view it 
resulted in an unfairness to the appellant because it led to him giving answers
which, had the caution been administered, he might not have given We are
in no doubt that the evidence should have been excluded. But does the 
wrongful admission of the two interviews render the conviction unsafe?’401
The Court reviewed both defence and prosecution arguments why the conviction 
should or should not be unsafe and decided on this ground that the conviction was 
not unsafe as:
‘in our judgment, it is the cumulative effect of the points made by the Crown 
that made the case against the appellant so strong, even without the support 
afforded by the answers given in two interviews....we are in no doubt that this 
is a safe conviction and accordingly we reject the first ground of appeal.’402
It would appear that whilst the Court was upholding the principle of legitimacy by 
agreeing that the evidence was wrongly included, that was outweighed by the strong 
evidence of the defendant’s guilt. A further argument was made ‘that the conviction of 
the appellant was unlawful because it derived from a voluntary bill process which was 
incompatible with Article 6’ which the Court rejected with Dyson LJ stating:
400 Ibid, para. 37.
401 Ibid, para. 38.
402 Ibid, para. 41.
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‘....for the reasons that we have given earlier when considering ground 1, 
there was a strong prima facie case against the appellant and the judge was 
quite right to refuse the application to stay the proceedings.’403
This case illustrates the difficult balancing exercise the Court has to perform. If there 
is strong evidence of guilt obtained by breaching the rules, then it will be difficult for 
the Court to ignore that strong evidence in favour of quashing the conviction. Whilst 
there are cases where the irregularity will outweigh the evidence of guilt this is not an 
easy exercise for the Court to perform. This case is also illustrative of the difficulty of 
defining the value of due process. If the value is measured in the overturning of the 
conviction then due process does not appear to have any value here. But if the value 
is measured in the declaration of an error and the rhetoric around the reinforcement of 
the message that Dyson LJ sends that substantial and significant breaches of PACE 
will result in evidence being excluded then it could be argued that due process does 
have some value here. This will be discussed in more detail below.
Further evidence of the Court deciding on the basis of the guilt of the appellant was R 
v Pryor*04 In this case the appellant had been interviewed and then denied any 
involvement in a robbery. He then submitted a written statement again denying 
involvement but providing details of what his arguments were at trial. He was then 
interviewed again and made no comment interviews. The judge ruled that this was a 
case where a silence direction under section 34 of the CJPOA should not have been 
given but did not state this to the jury. The ground of appeal was that the judge should 
have clearly stated to the jury that a direction should not have been given in relation to 
the first interview. This was a case therefore, of non-direction as opposed to 
misdirection. The Court reviewed the decisions of Condron and Francom in relation to 
the silence provisions and Article 6 and came to the conclusion that there was no 
unfairness and that the conviction was safe as the appellant was fortunate not to have 
an adverse inference direction given and ‘the evidence against the appellant in this 
case was in fact overwhelming.’405
This approach also appeared to be further followed in R v Mason and others.406 The 
police had been involved in a covert operation as they were having difficulties 
obtaining evidence in relation to those they thought were responsible. Three suspects 
were arrested and placed in a cell where covert taping of their conversations took 
place. There were a number of grounds of appeal which were that the judge was 
biased because he knew the Chief Constable (which the judge acknowledged); the 
judge should have made it known earlier that he knew the Chief Constable; the covert
Ibid, para. 48.
404 [2002] EWCA Crim 1112.
405 Ibid, para. 28.
406 [2002] EWCA Crim 385.
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recordings should not have been admitted as they were contrary to sections 76 and 
78 of PACE; there was a breach of the right to privacy in Article 8; there was a breach 
of Article 5; there was a breach of Article 6; the proceedings should have been stayed 
as an abuse of process; the judge misdirected on the silence provisions. The Court 
rejected that the judge was biased towards the prosecution. With regard to the tape 
recordings, the Crown invited the Court to deal with the appeal on the basis that the 
Human Rights Act had come into force even though the trial took place prior to this. 
The Court accepted this suggestion. The Court reviewed whether the tape recordings 
should have been admitted in light of section 76 and 78 of PACE and the provisions 
of the HRA. The Court discussed the cases of R v Bailey and Smith, R v Ali and 
Hussein, R v Stewart and R v Shaukat Ali and followed the authority that it was 
neither unlawful to have obtained nor unfair to have admitted the taped conversations 
and rejected those grounds under sections 76 and 78. The Court agreed that the 
covert taping was a breach of Article 8 but Lord Woolf stated that:
‘...the remedy does not have to be the exclusion of the evidence. The remedy 
can be the finding, which we have now made, that there has been a breach of
Article 8 or it can be an award of compensation The infringement is...a matter
which the trial judge was required to take into account when exercising his 
discretion under section 78 PACE.407
The Court rejected the argument that there was a breach of Article 5 and also rejected a 
breach of Article 6 as ‘article 6 for the purposes of the present case does not add 
anything to section 78.’ With regard to the abuse of process ground, Lord Woolf stated:
‘..this argument depends on the submissions we have already dealt with so it is 
also rejected. The critical findings are that there was no bad faith on the part of 
the prosecution, nothing unlawful which was done and nothing unfair in 
admitting the tapes in evidence. We reject the arguments to the contrary 
individually and collectively.’408
With regard to the final ground, the Court appeared to agree that there were problems 
with the silence direction but:
‘in our judgment the judge’s failure to give the conventional direction in the 
circumstances of this particular case does not render unsafe or unfair the 
conviction of any defendant upon any count. In each case the covert tapes 
provided overwhelming evidence against them.’409
It would appear that in this case the overriding consideration was the fact that the tapes 
had produced overwhelming evidence of guilt which outweighed the methods used to
407 Ibid, para. 67.
408 Ibid, para. 76.
409 Ibid, para. 87.
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obtain the evidence. Similarly, in R v Aladesuyi,4'° the appellant was convicted of 
robbery. There were two grounds of appeal and the first was that the judge should have 
excluded identification evidence and the second was that the judge appeared to give his 
own opinion of the appellant’s guilt in his summing up. In this case Latham LJ stated 
‘...were it not for the fact that, in our judgment, the case against this appellant was so 
overwhelming that we cannot conclude that the verdict was unsafe, we would have 
serious misgivings about the safety of the conviction.’411
This approach was followed in further cases. In R v Barrett412 the ground of appeal was 
that there had been a defective summing up in relation to similar fact evidence. In R v 
Elliott,413 the appellant argued that the judge should not have given an adverse inference 
of guilt direction in relation to silence. Similarly, in R v Scott,414 the police had been 
watching some premises as they suspected the appellant of committing a murder. There 
were two grounds of appeal. The first was that there were defects in the summing up 
and the second was that the judge was wrong to rule that he could not stop two co­
accused from informing the jury they were not the target of police observations. The 
Court agreed with the second ground but upheld the appeal as 'the evidence against this 
appellant was extraordinarily strong.’ In R v Bromfield,4'5 the grounds of appeal related 
to misdirections on the silence provisions. In R v C,416 the ground of appeal was that 
there was unfairness in the summing up. In R v Miller,4'7 the grounds of appeal were 
that the summing up was defective and also that the judge should have left the 
alternative of careless driving for the jury. In R v Denton,4'8 the appellant was convicted 
of murder. There were a number of grounds of appeal such as the Crown Prosecution 
Service (CPS) should have told the appellant’s lawyers he was a police informant; the 
CPS should have told the judge he was an informant; the judge should not have granted 
Public Interest Immunity (Pll); CPS should have told the appellant and his lawyers that 
certain prosecution witnesses knew he was an informant; when the press and members 
of the public found out about the appellant’s status it should have been disclosed to the 
judge, the appellant and the lawyers. The Court agreed there was some substance in 
the last ground of appeal but the conviction was upheld as ‘the evidence of guilt was 
overwhelming.’
The final case in this category of appeals is R v Hanratty419 The grounds of appeal in 
this case were numerous. It was discussed in chapter five in relation to fresh evidence
10 [2002] EWCA Crim 1167.
11 Ibid, para. 23.
12 [2002] EWCA Crim 1372.
13 [2002] EWCA Crim 931.
14 [2002] EWCA Crim 529.
15 [2002] EWCA Crim 195.
16 [2002] EWCA Crim 312.
17 [2002] EWCA Crim 266.
18 [2002] EWCA Crim 272.
19 [2002] EWCA Crim 1141.
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but there were also a number of procedural irregularity grounds. There were 11 grounds 
of failing to disclose evidence; one ground relating to the conduct of an identification 
parade; one ground relating to the reliability of evidence of interviews and 4 grounds that 
the summing up was defective. The Court agreed that there was some substance in 
some of these arguments but this was countered by the evidence admitted from the 
prosecution of DNA evidence which was a match from the evidence of the crime and 
DNA taken from Hanratty’s exhumed body. The conviction was upheld with Lord Woolf 
stating ‘in our judgment for reasons which we have explained the DNA evidence 
establishes beyond doubt that James Hanratty was the murderer. The DNA made what 
was a strong case even stronger.’420 Lord Woolf made reference to the real issue in the 
case which was namely, whether James Hanratty was the killer and ‘on that issue the 
jury came to the right answer.’ The Court in this case appears to be usurping the role of 
the jury and concluding that Hanratty was guilty but it could be argued that that is true of 
all the cases in this category of decision making where the Court weighs the irregularity 
versus the evidence of guilt. If the evidence of guilt is strong then the Court will ignore 
the irregularity.
These cases seem to revert to the Chalkley approach by analysing safety in terms of 
whether the appellant committed the crime and not within the wider examination of the 
irregularity on its own merits. It would appear, therefore, that the Court takes a strict 
approach to the irregularity in these appeals. However, there is some rhetoric in these 
cases about rights and fairness, which of itself is useful to the fairness and safety 
debate, and we do get some guidance on what the Court considers an irregularity to be. 
So the Court does at least assess the irregularity rather than just focusing on the guilt of 
the appellant.
Whilst the Court could be criticised for seemingly adopting the 'dirty dog principle’ and 
upholding the conviction because it views the appellant as guilty, it does not appear to 
do this without consideration of the rights of the appellant. In some of the cases it does 
concede that the irregularity occurred and its reluctance to allow a person who it 
considers to be guilty go free is understandable. Whilst the Court’s role of upholding the 
integrity of the trial process and protecting the right of the appellant to a fair trial which is 
conducted according to law is important, so is protecting the public which makes the 
balancing acts the Court has to perform so complicated. It would appear that in the 
majority of these appeals the Court does appear to carry out that balancing act by 
agreeing that the irregularity occurred whilst at the same time deciding in favour of the 
guilt of the appellant. And whilst Ormerod and Taylor may criticise this approach for 
giving weight to 'pragmatism' over 'principle,’ the Court is at least protecting the public
420 Ibid, para. 211.
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from potentially dangerous criminals going free which many would argue, should be its 
role and function.
The cases where the irregularity was too minor to have an impact on the safety of the 
conviction will now be explored.
Minor irregularity which did not impact on the safety of the conviction
This section sets out the grounds of appeal argued by the appellant/applicant where the 
Court decides the irregularity did occur but it was minor and did not impact on the safety 
of the conviction. These cases also potentially show the Court taking a strict approach to 
procedural irregularities as the conviction is upheld. This decision making process is 
illustrated by the following cases.
There was one case in this category which discussed the fairness of the trial. In R v 
Halsall,421 the ground of appeal was that the appellant did not have a fair trial. This was 
based on the fact that some of the defence witnesses had been given sight of 
prosecution witnesses’ statements by the appellant’s solicitors. In summing up the judge 
made reference to this and that the defence witnesses may have been tainted by seeing 
the statements. The appellant’s counsel on appeal argued that the jury would have been 
influenced by the judge’s disapproval that the defence witnesses had seen the 
statements. However, this was dismissed by the Court who stated that the defence 
witnesses seeing the statements formed a small part in the trial and whilst it would have 
been preferable for the judge to use the word ‘affected’ rather than ‘tainted’ the 
conviction was safe.
Once again, a large number of the grounds in this category related to errors of the trial 
judge. In R v Roe422 the judge intervened when an expert was giving evidence. The 
Court agreed there was ‘some force’ in these arguments but they did not undermine the 
safety of the conviction. In R v Jones,423 there were a number of counts and the grounds 
of appeal were that the judge did not put the defence case fairly in the summing up. The 
Court had some sympathy with the argument but it had no doubt about the safety of the 
conviction. In R v Wilson,424 the ground of appeal was that the judge did not outline 
properly the prosecution case in relation to a video which was played to the jury. The 
Court agreed that it would have been preferable for the judge to identify for the benefit of 
the jury the precise ambit of the prosecution case however it did not agree that this had 
made the conviction unsafe. In R v M,425 there were a number of grounds of appeal such
421 [2002] EWCA Crim 1450.
422 [2002] EWCA Crim 1627.
423 [2002] EWCA Crim 1264.
424 [2002] EWCA Crim 1499.
425 [2002] EWCA Crim 1192.
163
as the judge had misdirected on the medical evidence; the judge misdirected on the 
issue of collusion between the complainants and the judge failed to point out to the jury 
in the summing up the fact that one of the complainants had changed her story. The 
Court agreed that the final point was a ‘glaring omission’ but this did not render the 
conviction unsafe. In R v Fleckney, R v Smith,426 the police had bugged Fleckney’s 
house with a covert listening device. The first ground was that the evidence obtained 
from the listening device should have been excluded and there were also complaints 
made about the hearing the judge conducted at trial when deciding to admit the 
evidence which had been conducted without the presence of the defence because of 
public interest factors. The Court dismissed this ground. The second ground was that 
the prosecution should not have put forward a police officer, DC Clark, as a witness of 
truth because he was later convicted of corruption. He was also having a relationship 
with Fleckney. The Court accepted that the judge ought to have given the jury some 
guidance as to how to approach Clark’s evidence but its overall view was that it had no 
doubt about the safety of the convictions. In R v Sharp 427 the first ground was that the 
judge had failed to give the proper direction in relation to circumstantial evidence. The 
Court agreed it was deficient but disagreed that the summing up as a whole failed to 
direct the jury properly on circumstantial evidence. The other grounds related to 
criticisms that the judge had not properly put the prosecution case in summing up. In the 
Court’s view ‘it is undoubtedly the case that some of them are justified’ but decided the 
verdict was safe. In R v Quartsi426 the appellant raised the defence of duress at trial. 
The ground of appeal was that the judge had misdirected on duress. The Court 
accepted that parts of the judge’s summing up could have been better and ‘the question 
is whether the verdict of this jury was unsafe in the absence of such a direction.’ It 
reached the conclusion that the conviction was safe. In R v Gregory,429 there had been 
an alternative count of wounding with intent and it was decided by the appeal court that 
the judge’s directions of wounding with intent were wrong but the conviction at that point 
was safe because the appellant was convicted of unlawful wounding not of wounding 
with intent. There were further grounds which were that the judge should have reminded 
the jury in the summing up that two of the prosecution witnesses had had cautions. The 
Court agreed that it would have been better if the judge had done so but did not view 
this as a major point because the jury were aware of the cautions. The final ground was 
that two members of the jury had to be discharged as they were unable to return to the 
court on the following Monday and the rest of the jurors decided in a very short space of 
time that the appellant was guilty. The Court dismissed that ground and the appeal. In R 
v Simms, R v Ogie430 the grounds of appeal for Simms were that the judge erred in the 
summing up by suggesting Sims was involved in count 2. The Court accepted that was
426 [2002] EWCA Crim 992.
427 [2002] EWCA Crim 922.
428 [2002] EWCA Crim 522.
429 [2002] EWCA Crim 204.
430 [2002] EW CA Crim 149.
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an error as count 2 solely related to Ogle, but did not accept that ‘this slip of the tongue 
rendered a subsequent conviction unsafe.’ The applicant Ogle had argued that the judge 
had incorrectly allowed evidence to be admitted concerning a murder he had originally 
been charged with. Also evidence of a witness should not have been admitted. The 
Court dismissed these grounds and the applications for leave were refused.
The above cases show that once again, the predominant ground of appeal for this 
category of decision making is errors of the trial judge. But there was one case in this 
category which related to non-disclosure of evidence. In R v M,431 the appellant argued 
that a report from the complainant’s doctor was only disclosed to the defence after the 
trial had concluded. If the report had been disclosed prior to the trial it could have been 
used to contradict evidence from a forensic medical examiner given in court. The Court 
agreed, and the prosecution agreed, that the report should have been disclosed but the 
Court was not persuaded the conviction was unsafe because the appellant had not 
shown what difference the report would have made.
This category of decision making would appear to show the Court taking both a strict 
and less strict approach to the procedural irregularity. It is less strict in the sense that the 
Court agrees that the irregularity had occurred but strict in the sense that the appeal was 
upheld. This category of decision making appears to be very similar to the one where 
the Court views the irregularity to have occurred but there is strong prosecution 
evidence. If the Court is viewing that the conviction is safe despite the irregularity then it 
is presumably taking a view on the evidence of guilt of the appellant. But there was no 
expressed reference in these cases to the strength of the prosecution case.
As with all the other categories so far, the majority of appeals were based on the errors 
of the trial judge with only one appeal based on non-disclosure of evidence so once 
again, errors of the trial judge is the predominant ground. The grounds in this category 
are very similar to those argued in the appeals above where the conviction was 
overturned, so it is not overly clear what the differences are between them other than, 
perhaps, the strength of evidence against the appellant. If the Court views the 
irregularity occurred then it clearly either quashes the conviction because it views the 
conviction unsafe, applies the jury impact test and concludes the conviction is unsafe, 
upholds the appeal because of the strength of the prosecution case or concludes the 
irregularity is too minor to impact on the safety of the conviction. The grounds of appeal 
that resulted in the conviction being upheld and the conviction being quashed seem very 
similar and whilst the strength of the prosecution case will vary in each case, the 
differences between the cases in the other categories are harder to determine.
431 [2002] EWCA Crim 715.
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The final, and largest, category of appeals will now be explored which is where the Court 
decides the irregularity did not occur.
The Court thinks the irregularity did not occur
This section sets out the grounds of appeal argued by the appellant/applicant where the 
Court decides the irregularity did not occur. In these cases the Court makes an 
assessment of the irregularity itself and disagrees that there was an irregularity at all. 
This was, by far, the largest category of appeals. The Court is taking a strict approach to 
the procedural irregularity by concluding that it did not occur. There were a number of 
cases in this category of appeal that either raised human rights grounds or raised abuse 
of process grounds or both. These will now be analysed first in order to assess any 
possible impact the HRA may have had and the Court’s approach to these appeals.
The human rights grounds raised a number of different issues. For example, there were 
cases that argued that the Misuse of Drugs Act was incompatible with Article 8 which the 
Court disagreed with.432There were also arguments that appellants who represented 
themselves at trial did not get a fair trial.433 There was a further Article 8 argument made 
in R v McLeod,434 where a covert listening device was placed in the back of a police van. 
The trial judge followed R v Mason435 and decided whilst it did breach Article 8 it should 
not have been excluded as it did not adversely effect the fairness of the proceedings. 
The appeal court held the judge was correct in not excluding the evidence. The reasons 
given by Waller LJ were that there was a probable breach of Article 8 but it was fair to 
admit the evidence because authority for the device was granted by using the proper 
guidelines and there was no illegality in the gathering of the evidence as the appellant 
was not tricked into making incriminating remarks. This reinforces that breaches of 
Article 8 do not necessarily result in convictions being quashed.
There were cases where both human rights and abuse of process arguments were 
made. In R v Mould,*36 both were argued because a can at the scene of the crime had 
been examined for DNA and then discarded. The defence argued they should have had 
the right to examine the can. The application was refused as the defence had had the 
opportunity to dispute the findings from the can. Similarly, in R v Elliot, R v Clarkson,437 
the drugs which were the evidence in the case had been destroyed and the defence had 
not had the opportunity to have them tested. The Court dismissed the appeal as they 
could find nothing in the argument that there was a breach of Article 6 (or there had 
been an abuse of process).
432 See R v Morgan [2002] EWCA Crim 721; R v Ham  [2002] EWCA Crim 1353.
433 See R v Lockwood [2002] EWCA Crim 60; R v Rowe [2002] EWCA Crim 203.
434 [2002] EWCA Crim 989.
435 See above, n.406.
436 [2002] EWCA Crim 349.
437 [2002] EWCA Crim 1199.
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There were also other cases which illustrate this approach. In R v Henrick438 the 
appellant was convicted of dangerous driving. The grounds of appeal were that the 
judge was biased against the appellant in the summing up which was a breach of Article 
6. The Court applied the ‘fair-minded and informed observer test’ from Magill and 
Porter139 and concluded the conviction was safe. In R v Sood,440 the applicant cited his 
own grounds and one of these was that the applicant did not get a fair trial because one 
of the jurors was asleep. The Court was satisfied that if this was the case the judge 
would have been able to deal with it and the application to appeal was refused. In R v 
Holdsworth,441 the applicant was convicted of indecent assault. The applicant had been 
identified by his car and close to the scene was a shop that had a video tape running 
which showed the inside of the shop. The police did not seize the tape because it did not 
show the outside of the shop and the applicant argued he did not get a fair trial as the 
police were in dereliction of their duty by not seizing the tape. The Court refused the 
application. In R v Rees,442 the appellant made what the Court called an ‘ambitious 
submission’ about Article 6. He was convicted of indecent assault and there was some 
CCTV evidence from a shop. There were moments when the assault was not captured 
on camera and in summing up, the judge had suggested why this would be. The 
appellant argued that the judge’s suggestions were a breach of Article 6 because under 
Article 6(3)(b) the accused has a fundamental minimum right to have adequate time and 
facilities for the preparation of the defence. The appellant argued that the judge’s 
suggestion to the jury, which had not been raised by the prosecution, had deprived the 
defence of adequate time to prepare the appellant’s defence. But the Court rejected this 
argument as there was nothing new in what the judge was suggesting. In R v Hammond, 
R v McIntosh, R v Gray,443 the applicants were convicted of conspiracy to defraud. A 
prosecution witness was unable to attend and the judge decided to admit her witness 
statement under section 23 of the Criminal Justice Act 1988 after deciding that the 
requirements under section 26 had been satisfied. It was argued on appeal that this was 
contrary to Article 6(3)(d) which states that everyone charged with a criminal offence has 
the right ‘to examine or have examined witnesses against him.’ The Court referred to 
previous judgments where it was held that the provisions in section 26 where the Court 
had to grant leave for the evidence to be admitted was compliant with the convention. 
The applications were refused.
438 [2002] EWCA Crim 308.
439 [2001] UKHL 67. The test is ‘...the court had first to ascertain all the circumstances which had a bearing on 
the suggestion that the judge was biased and then ask whether those circumstances would lead a fair-minded 
and informed observer to conclude that there was a real possibility, or a real danger, the two being the same, 
that the tribunal was biased.'
440 [2002] EWCA Crim 639.
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A detailed human rights argument was made in R v Perrin,444 The appellant was 
convicted of publishing an obscene article on the internet contrary to the Obscene 
Publications Act. He argued that the offence contradicted Article 10 which is freedom of 
expression. He argued that under Article 10(2) the offence was not sufficiently 
‘prescribed by law’ because the ‘statutory definition of obscenity lacks sufficient 
precision and the restriction which the statute imposes is not shown to be necessary in a 
democratic society.’ The Court decided that the offence did fall within the scope of 
Article 10(2) as ‘for a legitimate purpose the offence was prescribed by law.’ The appeal 
was dismissed. A similar argument was made in R v Cotter and others445 The case 
concerned whether the offence of perverting the course of justice complied with Article 7 
of the ECHR. The appellants were all involved in a conspiracy to obtain money from the 
press as one of them was the partner of an athlete, Ashia Hanson. It was argued on 
appeal that the elements of the offence were so uncertain they infringed Article 7 which 
requires any criminal charge to be clearly defined by law. The Court reviewed the case 
law of the offence and concluded it was compatible and the appeal was dismissed.
A similar definition of the law was provided by R v Kearns446 The appeal concerned 
whether section 353(3)(a) of the Insolvency Act 1986 -  failing to account for the loss of a 
substantial part of property when required to do so by the official receiver -  was 
compatible with Article 6. The appellant argued that the Act forced the bankrupt to give 
information to the official receiver and if he failed to so without reasonable excuse he 
committed an offence. This meant the section was contrary to the right to remain silent 
and also the right not to incriminate himself. The appellant had pled guilty at trial. The 
Court reviewed the Strasbourg and UK cases and came to some conclusions in relation 
to the right to silence, the right not to incriminate oneself and Article 6. These were that 
Article 6 is concerned with the fairness of a judicial trial where there is an ‘adjudication.’ 
It is not concerned with extra-judicial enquiries as such; the rights to silence and not to 
incriminate oneself are implicit in Article 6; the rights to silence and not to incriminate 
oneself are not absolute, but can be qualified and restricted. A law which qualifies or 
restricts those rights is compatible with Article 6 if there is an identifiable social or 
economic problem that the law is intended to deal with and the qualification or restriction 
on the rights is proportionate to the problem under consideration. The Court dismissed 
the appeal holding that ‘in our view the regime of section 354(3)(a) is a proportionate 
legislative response to the problem of administering and investigating bankrupt estates.’ 
A similar declaration was required in R v Daniel,447 in terms of whether the statutory 
defence in section 352 of the same Act imposed a legal or evidential burden. The Court 
decided it was a persuasive burden and upheld the appeal.
444 [2002] EWCA Crim 747.
445 [2002] EWCA Crim 1033.
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447 [2002] EWCA Crim 959.
168
The contingent approach to fairness and safety appeared to be taken in R v Skuse,448 
The Court was asked to determine whether a conviction was unsafe on the basis that a 
naval court martial is incompatible with Article 6 because the judge is appointed from 
barristers who are also serving officers. The Court reviewed the remedies available to it 
if it had found there had been a breach of Article 6. Rix LJ stated ‘we would tentatively 
express the view that in a case such as this, had we held that there had been a breach 
of Article 6(1), we consider that we would not have been bound to hold the conviction to 
be unsafe.’449
The issue of delay arose in R v James450 The appellant was convicted of conspiracy to 
defraud. The appellant had been tried and the jury were unable to reach a verdict. The 
judge ruled he should be retried. He was retried and then convicted. He argued on 
appeal that the delay in bringing his prosecution to a conclusion meant there was a 
breach of Article 6(1) in as much as it requires a ‘criminal charge’ to be determined at a 
public hearing ‘within a reasonable time.’ The Court reviewed the case law and came to 
the decision that the sentence James had received was a reflection of the difficulties 
with this case where there were a number of defendants tried at different times. And Rix 
LJ stated ‘we think that even if there had been any breach of James’ rights under Article 
6(1), a sufficient and appropriate remedy was provided. It could not be said that his 
conviction should be regarded as unsafe by reason of any such breach.’451 This appears 
to be saying that the appropriate remedy for the breach was the sentence given which is 
evidence that the quashing of the conviction is not the Court’s only remedy.
The above cases show that the HRA has given appellants/applicants new arguments to 
bring to appeal and the Court has had to adjust to those new arguments in line with the 
Strasbourg jurisprudence. In that sense it could be argued that the HRA has had an 
impact on the Court's decision making. This is counterbalanced though by the fact that 
none of these convictions were overturned or applications for leave granted which is 
evidence that whilst the Court is hearing more HRA-type arguments, it is not being 
particularly receptive to them in the sense of overturning convictions. This is obviously 
disadvantageous to the appellant who loses the appeal but there is some value in these 
cases in developing points of legal principle that may be useful for other appellants and 
the jurisprudence of the Court generally. This can also be analysed in terms of the 
abuse of process arguments in the sample which will now be discussed.
[2002] EWCA Crim 991.
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In R v Larner,*52 the applicant was convicted of intimidating a witness. One of the 
applicant’s own grounds was that there had been an abuse of process. This referred to 
the fact that the defence had not been provided with proper documents by the 
prosecution. The Court refused the application as there was nothing to justify the 
conviction being unsafe. There appeared to be similarities to the Mullen453 case in R v 
Hooper454 The appellant was convicted of conspiracy to import drugs. He argued duress 
at the trial. On appeal he argued that the judge should have dismissed the trial as an 
abuse of process as one of the co-conspirators, Michael, had been known to a police 
office, Carpenter, as he was a police informant. The police were using this person, 
Michael, to catch a more prolific drug dealer, Green. The prosecution had argued that 
Carpenter was acting corruptly and outside his powers as a police officer. This meant 
there was no official involvement by the police in Michael’s activities. The appellant had 
had no dealings with the police himself. There were two strands to the abuse argument, 
the first was that it was entrapment as Hooper had been recruited by Michael acting as a 
police informer with the agreement of Carpenter. The second abuse ground was that 
there were serious failings of procedure and propriety in the handling of Michael as a 
police informer and that it should have been known that he was involved in drug dealing 
and those activities should not have received any support. It was said that it was an 
affront to the public conscience for a prosecution to be brought in respect of offences 
that were connected with Michael’s activities which would not have been committed if 
the police had properly intervened to stop those activities.
With regard to entrapment, the Court reviewed the authority of R v Looseley455 and was 
guided, after some discussion, by Lord Hoffman’s statement that ‘entrapment occurs 
when an agent of the state -  usually a law enforcement officer or a controlled informer -  
causes someone to commit an offence in order he should be prosecuted.’ The Court 
decided that the entrapment ground failed because Hooper was not entrapped or lured 
into committing the offences in order that he should be prosecuted. With regard to the 
abuse ground, the Court also reviewed the law, in particular the balancing exercise as 
stated by Lord Steyn in Latif455 The Court decided there was no abuse of process on 
the basis that any abuse complained of did not involve Hooper directly and he was not 
enticed as he continued to deal in large amounts of drugs over a long period of time. 
Buxton LJ stated that:
‘...it is not an affront to public conscience for Mr Hooper to be prosecuted. 
Rather, it would be a serious, we would say a gross, affront to the public 
conscience if the arguments advanced by Mr Hooper even taken at their height 
and accepting everything that he contends were permitted to prevent Mr
452 [2002] EWCA Crim 597.
453 See above, n.334.
454 [2002] EWCA Crim 621.
455 [2001] UKHL 53.
456 See above, n.336.
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Hooper’s conviction of an enormously serious offence of which he was 
convicted on overwhelming evidence.’457
There are some similarities here with the case of Mullen in that Hooper had also argued
duress on appeal so there was no question he had committed the acts he was alleged to
have done. Mullen was also convicted of a serious offence on overwhelming evidence
(he too argued duress) but clearly the appeal court in Mullen quashed the conviction. It
would appear that the weighing exercise as outlined by Lord Steyn in Latif came down in
favour of Mullen because of the seriousness of the abuse, which involved the British
Government, and the direct link between the abuse and Mullen’s prosecution on the
basis of it. Whereas with Hooper the Court is deciding in favour of the seriousness of the
offence and the overwhelming evidence and against the abuse by saying that the abuse
did not directly affect Hooper and he was not enticed by it to commit a crime. So it would
appear in Mullen the Court took a less strict approach to the procedural irregularity in
quashing the conviction whereas in Hooper it took a strict approach to the procedural
irregularity on the basis of the evidence.
A similar case was that of R vAkiner, R v Mustafa458 They were both convicted of being 
part of the importation of heroin. The applicants had argued the trial should have been 
stayed as an abuse of process on account of the late disclosure of documents and also 
on the first day of the trial, the prosecution had applied to have some documents subject 
to Public Interest Immunity (Pll) to protect other drug operations. The applicants argued 
at trial that the prosecution were acting in bad faith, or at least with gross incompetence, 
in making the Pll application. On appeal they decided the prosecution did not act in bad 
faith but they did consider them to be incompetent. The trial judged rejected these 
arguments as did the appeal court. The Court held that the applicants did not suffer any 
prejudice by the decisions of the prosecution and the applications were refused. In R v 
King,459 the appellant was convicted of possessing crack cocaine with intent to supply. 
The drugs had been obtained from a car, the key of which had been discovered during a 
raid of the appellant’s home. One of the police officers had testified that although the 
police had entered the property at 6.00am, he had not had access to the bedroom where 
the key was found until 8.55am as the bedroom door had been closed and the appellant 
and two police officers were inside the room. It was argued at trial that the trial should 
have been stayed as an abuse of process because the defence were precluded from 
cross examining the police officers who had been in the room with the appellant in case 
it was revealed that the appellant was an informant. This was supposedly too prejudicial 
to the defence. The judge declined and it was argued on appeal that the trial should 
have been stayed. The Court concluded there was nothing in this point and the appeal 
was dismissed.
457 See above, n. 454 para. 42.
458 [2002] EWCA Crim 957.
459 [2002] EWCA Crim 898.
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A further abuse of process ground was argued in R v Izzigil, R v Kaan and R v 
Onbasi.460 The appellant had argued at the trial that there had been an abuse of 
process on the basis that the CPS had offered to drop the conspiracy charge and 
replace it with a charge of being concerned in the supply of heroin. The CPS had then 
decided to proceed with the conspiracy charge. The judge had accepted that the 
undertaking by the CPS had occurred but rejected that there had been an abuse of 
process. The appeal court agreed and upheld the appeal as there was no prejudice.
An important legal principle for appellants was decided in the case of R v Thomas.46' 
The appellant had been convicted of murder and the first conviction was quashed on 
appeal and a retrial ordered. He then appealed the second conviction which was upheld. 
He was now appealing for the third time as a result of a reference by the CCRC. He was 
arguing on the second appeal that his conviction should be quashed as his conviction 
was quashed on the first appeal because evidence of child witnesses had been 
excluded from the trial which would have assisted his case. That same evidence was not 
in the retrial so he was essentially going back to the appeal court with the same 
argument.
The Court considered that the power of the CCRC to refer cases where there were 
exceptional circumstances without new evidence or argument extended the power of the 
Court in exceptional circumstances to depart from its previous decision where there was 
no new evidence or argument. Auld LJ suggested that exceptional circumstances could 
be where there had been some form of jurisprudential ‘drift’ or there may be others 
arising out of possible tension between the statutory criteria for the safety of a conviction 
and the ECHR concept of a fair trial. But in this case he concluded this point by saying 
‘...there is clearly nothing exceptional about the circumstances relating to this ground of 
appeal, whether by necessary implication from section 13(2) of the 1995 Act [the CCRC 
reference] or under the Court’s general statutory jurisdiction, that would enable this 
Court to overrule the correct decision of the second Court of Appeal on the same facts 
and essentially the same argument. 1462
It would appear in this case that Auld LJ is developing a point of principle, which is that if 
there is tension between ‘safety’ and ‘unfairness’ then this would enable the Court of 
Appeal to depart from a previous decision where there was no new evidence or 
argument. This would be an important development arising out of the HRA for appellants 
even if, as Auld LJ stated, ‘the Court should in any such cases be very slow to differ 
from its previous judgment.’ The problem here for the appellant was that this point of
460 [2002] EWCA Crim 925.
461 [2002] EWCA Crim 941.
462 Ibid, para. 76.
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legal principle did not result in the conviction being quashed. This shows the difficulty of 
evaluating these appeals in terms of the approach the Court is taking after the HRA. But 
the benefit for other appellants may be seen in cases such as R v Mills and another4 6 3  
where this case was discussed, again by Auld LJ, and the conviction was quashed after 
previous appeals were upheld by the Court of Appeal and the House of Lords.
An abuse of process argument was also raised in R v Saftdev. 4 6 4  The appellant was 
convicted of a racially aggravated assault. Police officers had gone to stop him coming 
out of an underground station and he had refused to stop. He had shouted racial abuse 
and spat at two officers whilst waving a Stanley knife. He claimed he had acted in self 
defence. There had been an application to stay the trial after the prosecution had seized 
video tapes from cameras in the area but it was discovered there were other cameras 
that the police did not know about. The Court dismissed the appeal as it was satisfied 
the appellant had had a fair trial and that the convictions were safe. With regard to the 
abuse of process, Mr Justice Goldring stated ‘in all the circumstances, we have come to 
the conclusion that submissions regarding abuse of process in this case cannot be 
sustained as they cannot in very many cases. ’ 4 6 5  This would suggest that the Court 
rarely overturns the appeal on the basis of an abuse which is borne out by the 2 0 0 2  
sample. In R v Gilmour,4 6 6  the applicant was convicted of indecent assault and gross 
indecency with a child. The ground of appeal was that the trial should have been stayed 
as an abuse of process as a result of the late disclosure by the prosecution. The Court 
refused this ground because defence counsel had not applied for an adjournment and 
had made all the points worthy of consideration by the jury. The Court stated it may have 
taken a different view if the defence had applied for an adjournment and it had been 
refused.
The final abuse of process case is R v Mirza. 4 6 7  The appellant was charged with 
indecent assault. The appellant argued there had been a breach of Article 6  because a 
juror had sent a note to the judge stating that members of the jury thought the use of an 
interpreter by the appellant was a devious ploy. So the jury had reached a verdict not 
solely on the basis of the evidence but because of suspicions about the appellant’s need 
for an interpreter and they were influenced by prejudice. The Court dismissed the appeal 
as it said it was bound by the decision of R v Queresh? 6 8  and section 8  of the Contempt 
of Court Act prevented it admitting into evidence the terms of the letter written.
463 [2003] EWCA Crim 1753.
464 [2002] EWCA Crim 1064.
465 Ibid, para. 25.
466 [2002] EWCA Crim 1355.
467 [2002] EWCA Crim 1235.
468 [2002] 1 Cr App R 433. This case eventually went to the House of Lords where it was held that the secrecy 
of jury deliberations did comply with Article 6. See R v O ’Connor, R  v Mirza [2004] UKHL 2. This House of 
Lords judgment also encompassed another case in the sample, R v Rollock [2002] EWCA Crim 1236 which 
dealt with the same issues as R v Mirza and the application was refused.
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These cases show that the evidence is contradictory as to whether the HRA has had an 
effect on the Court’s decision making. Whilst the abuse of process doctrine was well 
established prior to the enactment of the HRA, it is a ground of appeal that particularly 
lends itself to HRA-type arguments because of Article 6 . It would appear from Mr Justice 
Goldring’s comments in Sahdev that the Court is not particularly receptive to the 
arguments. This is illustrated by the fact that none of the convictions were overturned as 
this category of appeals demonstrates the Court deciding the irregularity did not occur, 
though cases such as Thomas show that these cases are able to produce useful legal 
points of principle for appellants even if the conviction is not overturned.
The other appeals in this category contained very similar grounds to the other 
categories. The main grouping of appeals was, once again, errors of the trial judge but 
the other appeals included inconsistent or perverse verdicts; 4 6 9  there was a biased 
tribunal because members of the jury were known to the appellant or connected to the 
police;4 7 0  there were lawyer errors; 4 7 1 there was non-disclosure of evidence, 4 7 2  there was 
no case to answer, 4 7 3  and the appellant was pressurised into pleading guilty.4 7 4  This is 
consistent with the other categories where the errors of the trial judge also consisted of 
the largest number of appeals. There were also a small number of appeals which raised 
grounds that did not belong to a particular grouping but were particular to the individual 
case. Some of these were own grounds appeals where the applicant/appellant had 
drafted his/her own grounds of appeal which were not capable of being grouped with 
others as they did not conform to general appeal grounds.
The errors of the trial judge made up the largest group and were basically split into three 
groupings. These were the evidence was wrongly included or excluded, there were 
misdirections of law, and the judge made errors in the summing up. These will now be 
briefly analysed to provide a picture of the main grounds of appeal which the Court 
dismissed or refused.
469 See, for example, R v Davis [2002] EWCA Crim 323; R v James [2002] EWCA Crim 1119; R v Franks 
[2002] EWCA Crim 51; R v G [2002] EWCA Crim 224; R v Rees [2002] EWCA Crim 265; R v Ashmore [2002] 
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EWCA Crim 639; R v Deacon, R v Seymour [2002] EWCA Crim 1490; R v Rawson [2002] EWCA Crim 1044.
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Crim 1119.
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There were a number of grounds where it was argued that the trial judge should have 
excluded evidence. These included a CCTV video where it was argued it would be 
prejudicial for the appellant; 4 7 5  evidence of similar fact; 4 7 6  evidence of identification of 
photographs of the appellant by four police officers; 4 7 7  identification evidence which had 
been obtained in breach of PACE; 4 7 8  a previous conviction of having a false passport; 4 7 9  
a police interview; 4 8 0  an interview with customs; 4 8 1 a complainant’s video given as 
evidence in chief; 4 8 2  a telephone conversation in breach of Code C of PACE;4 8 3  birthday 
cards to rebut the defence of duress; 4 8 4  the victim’s credit card found in the appellant’s 
shoe; 4 8 5  evidence of previous trips to London (drug trafficking) ; 4 8 6  scientific evidence of 
contamination of bank notes by drugs; 4 8 7  evidence of a conversation between appellant 
and police officers; 4 8 8  evidence of drug paraphernalia found in the applicant’s home; 4 8 9  
evidence of an identification parade; 4 9 0  interview with the police that took place after the 
appellant should have been charged contrary to Code C of PACE. 4 9 1 These are all 
illustrations of the types of evidence that were argued should have been excluded where 
the Court decided the judges were correct in not excluding them.
Alternatively, there were also a number of cases where it was argued that the evidence 
should not have been allowed to be included such as evidence of the applicant giving a 
false name on arrest; 4 9 2  evidence of a fight between the appellant and the victim; 4 9 3  
similar fact evidence; 4 9 4  identification evidence; 4 9 5  a filofax containing lists of drugs; 4 9 6  a 
list of names and addresses found in a car said to be drug customers; 4 9 7  testimony from 
a witness said to be prejudicial; 4 9 8  taped telephone conversations; 4 9 9  evidence of 
previous violent behaviour; 5 0 0  and evidence of computer access in benefit fraud. 5 0 1  
There were also a number of cases where it was argued the evidence should have been 
included such as evidence of a wife’s bad character who had accused him of robbery
475 R v Briggs [2002] EWCA Crim 612.
476 R v Ingram [2002] EWCA Crim 512.
477 R v Hardy [2002] EWCA Crim 296.
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482 R v Deacon, R v Seymour [2002] EWCA Crim 1460.
483 R v Doyle [2002] EWCA Crim 1176.
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497 R v Naylor [2002] EWCA Crim 857.
498 R v Wharton [2002] EWCA Crim 630.
499 R v Goodman [2002] EWCA Crim 903.
500 R v Dodds [2002] EWCA Crim 239.
501 R v Naiwo [2002] EWCA Crim 398.
175
and indecent assault; 5 0 2  and the full indictment to which a co-accused had pleaded 
guilty. 5 0 3
These cases all required the Court to make an assessment of the evidence and decide 
whether it should have been included or excluded and whether the decision made to 
include it or not exclude it made the conviction unsafe. These appeals generally require 
the Court to decide if there was a breach of PACE and/or the Codes and more generally 
whether it would have an adverse affect on the fairness of the proceedings for it to be 
included or whether the evidence should have been admitted under some other 
mechanism such as section 23 of the Crimnal Justice Act 1988. In this category of 
appeals, the Court is making its own assessment of the evidence rather than deciding 
what impact the evidence may have had on the jury. The large number of these grounds 
upheld shows the Court does not like to interfere with the discretion of the trial judge too 
often.
The other two groupings of errors by the trial judge are defects in the summing up and 
misdirections of the law. These two are often used interchangebly as the misdirection 
may have been given in the summing up but the grounds were separated on the basis of 
whether a misdirection had been listed or whether the summing up had been referred to. 
There were two main areas for errors in the summing up. It was either considered to be 
unbalanced or biased or unfair against the appellant/applicant; 5 0 4  or it was defective or 
misled the jury. 5 0 5  The Court’s review function and decision making process is suited to 
these appeals. It is possible for the Court to view the summing up on paper and assess 
whether these criticisms of it are correct and whether the criticisms have made the 
conviction unsafe. The Court itself is deciding whether the summing up is biased or 
defective and it is well suited to this role. The fact that so many of these grounds are 
upheld shows it is not a ground the Court often agrees has made the conviction unsafe.
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There were a number of different grounds that encompassed misdirections of the law. 
Some of these are specific to the case itself but others are generally recognised 
directions. For example these included the judge misdirecting on the burden of proof; 5 0 6  
the judge misdirected on the issue of delay; 5 0 7  the judge misdirected on mens rea; 5 0 8  the 
judge should have given the Ghosh direction; 5 0 9  a character direction was not 
appropriate; 5 1 0  judge failed to give a good character direction; 5 1 1 judge should have put 
the issue of provocation to the jury; 5 1 2  judge should not have given a right to silence 
direction; 5 1 3  there was a misdirection on manslaughter; 5 1 4  judge misdirected the jury on 
duress; 5 1 5  judge erred in giving a Watson direction; 5 1 6  judge should have given a Lucas 
direction; 5 1 7  judge should have allowed a defence under section 179(3) of the Town and 
Country Planning Act 1990;518 judge misdirected on self defence; 5 1 9  the judge failed to 
properly direct on the ingredients of the offence; 5 2 0  judge should have directed the jury 
not to draw any inferences from silence; 5 2 1 judge misdirected on recklessness; 5 2 2  and 
judge should have given an accomplice direction. 5 2 3  In the Court’s view none of these 
irregularities occurred.
There were also a large number of cases where it was alleged the judge had made 
further errors. These included the judge unfairly intervened; 5 2 4  judge should have ruled 
that a witness should not give evidence at a retrial as she had committed perjury during 
the first trial; 5 2 5  judge did not deal adequately with a jury note; 5 2 6  judge should have 
stopped the trial as there was insufficient evidence for the jury to consider; 5 2 7  judge 
should not have allowed the indictment to be amended; 5 2 8  judge should have discharged 
the jury after a witness let slip the appellant was known to the police; 5 2 9  judge should not 
have allowed the prosecution to cross examine a witness in the way he did; 5 3 0  judge 
should not have allowed the prosecution to cross examine him on his defence
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statement; 5 3 1 the indictment should have been severed; 5 3 2  judge failed to adequately 
direct the jury in relation to a previous conviction; 5 3 3  judge should have allowed an 
adjournment to call a witness; 5 3 4  judge should have stopped the trial because of the 
appellant’s mental condition5 3 5  and the judge wrongly directed the jury in answer to a 
question from them. 5 3 6
There were irregularities in this category that had caused the conviction to be unsafe in 
the other categories such as the judge misdirecting on the burden and standard of proof, 
the judge intervening too often, defective silence directions etc. It was not overly clear 
what the difference was in those categories where the conviction was quashed and the 
difference in this category where the Court decided the irregularity did not occur. The 
sheer number of appeals in this category shows that it is very rare for the Court to 
decide that an irregularity did occur and even rarer still for it to decide that the irregularity 
has made the conviction unsafe. Whilst there may be some evidence from the human 
rights cases or the abuse of process cases that a less strict approach to the irregularity 
may be being taken, it is difficult to argue that this category is not evidence of a mainly 
strict approach with the sheer number of appeals upheld.
The law after the 2002 sample will now be discussed in order to ascertain whether there 
have been any major developments.
Procedural Irregularities after 2002
There have been a series of judgments after 2002 which have sought to extend the 
judgment of R v Pendleton537 to the Court’s decision making process for procedural 
irregularity appeals. In R v Mills and another, 5 3 8  Auld LJ stated:
‘In our view, the Pendleton jury impact test, looked at as a range of permissible 
intrusion into the jury's thought processes for confirmatory purposes, is equally 
applicable where the new matter is one of argument, either of law or of 
interpretation of, or of inference from, the evidence at trial. The Court may also 
have to ask itself similar questions as to the effect on the jury of evidence 
improperly given or of other irregularities at trial. ’ 5 3 9
As the above has shown, the Court is able to use the jury impact test when quashing 
convictions as part of its decision making process in deciding whether the irregularity 
has made the conviction unsafe. But as discussed in chapter five, this approach does
531 R v Coates [2002] EW CA Crim 963.
532 R v Jones [2002] EWCA Crim 735. See also R v Thomson [2002] EWCA Crim 431 and R v Bell [2002] 
EWCA Crim 1719.
533 R v Pinfield [2002] EW CA Crim 348.
534 R v Watson [2002] EWCA Crim 420. See also R v Ervens [2002] EWCA Crim 1085.
535 [2002] EWCA Crim 1160.
536 R v Spriggs [2002] EWCA Crim 1086.
537 [2002] 1 W LR 72. See chapter five.
538 [2003] All ER (D) 221.
539 Ibid, para. 64.
178
not necessarily result in the Court quashing the conviction. As the case of Pendleton 
showed there were differing opinions as to how Pendleton should be interpreted. Lord 
Hobhouse preferred the reinforcement of Stafford which allowed the Court to decide the 
issue for itself whereas Lord Bingham emphasised the jury impact test as a way of 
confirming what the Court’s view of the new evidence was (and what Auld LJ is referring 
to). The cases from the 2002 sample showed that in relation to fresh evidence, the 
Stafford approach resulted in more convictions being quashed and it would appear that 
this approach has also resulted in more procedural irregularity convictions being 
quashed. So the reinforcement of the jury impact test in relation to procedural 
irregularities is not necessarily beneficial to those trying to get their convictions 
overturned over the Court deciding the issue for itself. But the Court is used to a 
procedural irregularity test which involves testing the irregularity on a jury because this 
was the approach taken to the proviso under Stirland. It would appear, therefore, that 
Auld LJ is not suggesting anything new.
The Court has specifically extended Lord Bingham’s jury impact test to the approach of 
the Court when assessing undisclosed evidence at trial in R v Nawaz, Latif, Shahzad, 
Osman and and Rasool,540 This case was originally heard as R v Latif and Shahzad as 
discussed above5 4 1 and previous Court of Appeal and House of Lords judgments had 
been upheld. In relation to the appeal of Osman, Lord Justice Hooper stated ‘this court 
is required under the law as it currently stands to consider what impact the undisclosed 
material might have had on the jury's verdict had it been available to them at trial’ citing 
Lord Bingham’s speech in Pendleton. If the Court is being asked to assess non disclosed 
evidence then this is, in effect, similar to its role in deciding fresh evidence appeals by 
having to review the evidence the jury saw and the evidence the jury did not see and then 
deciding if the conviction is unsafe. In that sense, it is logical that Pendleton would be seen 
to be applying to the Court’s decision making process for non disclosure appeals. These 
appeals can also appear to be fresh evidence appeals if the non-disclosure has produced 
new evidence. But, as discussed above, this does not necessarily mean that more 
convictions will be quashed as a result of it.
There have also been developments in the Court’s approach to unfair trial and unfair to try 
decisions and safety. Despite there being no cases in the 2002 sample that were quashed 
on the basis of an abuse of process, there have been cases since that have been 
overturned. In R v Early and others,542 the 8  appellants were convicted of various offences 
involving fraud on the public revenue. They had been tried at 3 separate trials but had all 
pled guilty. The prosecution had concealed from the judge in a Public Interest Immunity
540 [2007] EW CA Crim 307. See also R v Beardall and another [2006] EW CA Crim 577; R v Vemett-Showers 
and others [2007] EWCA Crim 1767.
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(Pll) hearing that certain witnesses were informants. The appellants had argued that there 
had been an abuse of process but the judge conducted that hearing without the information 
of the informants and dismissed the argument. But the appeal court quashed the 
convictions following Mullen and Togher despite the guilty pleas. 5 4 3  In R v Grant,544 the 
police had placed covert listening devices in the exercise yard at police stations and had 
recorded conversations between suspects and their lawyers. He had been convicted of 
conspiracy to murder. The appellant had argued at trial that there had been an abuse of 
process. The Court allowed the appeal with Laws LJ stating ‘in all these circumstances, 
we conclude that there was abuse of the process here and Astill J should have stayed 
the proceedings in consequence. We understand it to be accepted that if the court 
reaches this conclusion, the conviction falls to be treated as unsafe. ’ 5 4 5
The Court appears to be saying that if it decides there was an abuse of process then the 
conviction must be unsafe but this view was disputed in R v All and another. 5 4 6  In this 
case the conviction was quashed as important documents had been destroyed during the 
period of what the Court called unjustified delay. In the judgment, Moses LJ drew a 
distinction between when unfair to try and an unfair trial would result in a conviction 
quashed. He stated:
‘We acknowledge that in cases where it was unfair to try the defendant at all, 
because of bad faith or executive manipulation, the verdict itself may not be 
unsafe. But in general, where this court concludes that a hearing was unfair, it 
will not be able to avoid the conclusion that the verdict was unsafe. ’ 5 4 7
And that:
‘Safe verdicts depend upon a fair resolution of the issue of guilt or innocence. 
Attempts to draw a distinction between the fairness of the process and the 
safety of the verdict have, traditionally in this court, failed. ’ 5 4 8
This appears to be suggesting that where it is unfair to try the appellant (as in Grant) 
then this does not necessarily mean that the conviction is unsafe whereas if it is an 
unfair trial then this does lead to an unsafe conviction. This seems to be saying that in 
Mullen type situations the abuse would not necessarily lead to the quashing of the 
conviction.
543 See R v Gell [2003] EWCA Crim 123 and R v Choudhery [2005] EWCA Crim 1788 for appeals allowed in 
similar circumstances.
544 [2005] All ER (D) 44.
545 Ibid, para. 58.
546 [2007] EWCA Crim 691.
547 Ibid, para. 28.
548 Id.
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It is worth briefly mentioning at this point recent Government proposals in this particular 
area which have since been dropped but give an illustration of the current political 
climate in which the Court is operating. This may or may not have had an effect on the 
Court’s decision making process. In September 2006, a consultation was issued by the 
Office for Criminal Justice Reform from the Home Secretary, the Attorney General and 
the Lord Chancellor which proposed changes to the appeal process. 5 4 9  It was stated in 
the introduction that:
‘it may come as a surprise to some that the existing law empowers the Court of 
Appeal to quash a conviction on purely procedural grounds even where the 
judges of that Court have no doubt the appellant is guilty. Such outcomes are 
damaging to public confidence in the criminal justice system. They may also put 
the public at further risk of crime.’
The Government wished to change the law to address this but the consultation paper 
made it clear that the Government was not consulting on whether the law should be 
changed but how the law should be changed and asked for comments on that basis. 
There then followed a fairly superficial analysis of the law which included a mention of 
the ‘1985 Royal Commission on Criminal Justice’ which presumably was meant to be 
the 1993 Royal Commission on Criminal Justice. The Government set out its view that:
‘the Government believes that the law should not allow people to go free where 
they were convicted and the Court are satisfied they committed the offence. The 
Government believes that legislation is now needed to change the position 
because the approach of the Court of Appeal appears now to be settled. 
Moreover, it is right that Parliament should debate the desired effect of the test 
which it has itself provided (and amended)’ (Office for Criminal Justice Reform, 
2006, paras. 31-32).
There were three proposals designed to achieve this which were to ‘re-instate a proviso 
similar to that which was part of the original statutory test so as to provide that the 
appeal should not be allowed, even if there is a procedural irregularity, if the Court 
consider no miscarriage of justice actually occurred’ or ‘replace the proviso with another 
formulation, designed to achieve the same end, and perhaps addressing more directly 
the Court’s view (where they have reached one) of the guilt of the appellant’ or ‘recast 
the test and the task of the Court of Appeal so as to require a substantial re-examination 
of the evidence (akin to the task of the jury)’ (para. 33).
There was widespread objection to these proposals on the basis of both principle and 
how this would work in practice. Many of the responses to the consultation took the 
opportunity to express how dissatisfied they were with the proposals despite the 
Government asking for suggestions on how this could be implemented and not whether
549 Available from http://www.homeoffice.gov.uk/documents/cons-2006-quashing/cons-2006-quashing- 
convictions2?view=Binary.
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it should be implemented. 5 5 0  However, the Government decided to press on and 
introduced clause 26 in the original Criminal Justice and Immigration Bill which would 
amend section 2 of the CAA 1968 and stated that 'a conviction is not unsafe if the Court 
of Appeal are satisfied that the appellant is guilty of the offence’ with the caveat that 
stated this section did not prevent the Court of Appeal from the allowing the appeal 
where they think it would be incompatible with the appellant’s convention rights to 
dismiss the appeal. As a result of criticism of this it was later changed to clause 42 which 
read ’a conviction is not unsafe if the Court of Appeal think there is no reasonable doubt 
about the appellant's guilt.’ There was also an additional section where even if the Court 
of Appeal think there is no reasonable doubt about guilt, they can still allow the appeal if 
they think that it would seriously undermine the proper administration of justice to allow 
the conviction to stand. There had been strong opposition to the clause as it had gone 
through Parliament. 5 5 1 The Government decided to drop the clause to expedite the 
legislation through Parliament.
The Government had estimated that this would apply to around twenty cases per year 
but this was a debatable point. There did not appear to be any cases in the 2002 sample 
of the Mullen type where the conviction was quashed despite the Court’s express view 
that it viewed the appellant to be guilty. But there were a number of cases where the 
Court upheld the conviction where it could be argued the Court viewed the appellant to 
be guilty such as those cases where the irregularity is minor or where the Court viewed 
there was strong prosecution evidence. If these cases were included then the provisions 
would apply to a larger number of cases but if they applied to those cases where the 
Court expresses the view that the appellant is guilty such as in Mullen, then these would 
be very rare. Whilst cases such as Mullen, Early and Grant show the Court does quash 
convictions of those it considers guilty, or who plead guilty, it only does this when the 
irregularity is extremely serious. But generally, it would appear from the Government’s 
proposals and the 2002 sample that Lord Browne-Wilkinson’s dirty dog principle is still 
being used, albeit that it may be more embedded in a language of rights and fairness.
There have been suggestions that there has been a change of attitude more recently in 
the Court in relation to technicalities as a result of the Criminal Procedure Rules which 
came into force on the 4 April 2005. The overriding objective of the Rules involves 
dealing with cases justly. This includes ’acquitting the innocent and convicting the 
guilty. ’ 5 5 2  This notion that the Court of Appeal should focus on what is ‘just’ in the sense
550 See, for example, Justice (2006); CCRC (2006); CALA (Criminal Appeal Lawyers Association) (2006); 
Criminal Bar Association (2007); Law Society (2007); Liberty (2006). In terms of the academic debate, see, for 
example, Quirk (2007); Spencer (2007); Spencer (2006).
551 See for example some of the debate ay http://www.theyworkforyou.com/pbc/2007- 
08/Criminal_Justice_and_lmmigration_Bill/10-0_2007-11-20a.8.0.
552 See R v Ashton, R  v Draz and R v O ’Reilly [2006] EWCA Crim 794; R v Boyle, R  v Ford [2006] EW CA Crim 
2010; R v Clarke and McDaid [2008] UKHL 8. For academic discussion see Spencer (2007).
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of acquitting the innocent is an attractive one and if that is now happening then it is to be 
encouraged. It is to be acknowledged that not every procedural irregularity should result 
in the conviction being quashed and not all guilty people are entitled to their convictions 
being overturned. But what is unassailable is that factually innocent people are always 
entitled to their convictions being overturned. If a more ‘just’ approach means this will be 
more of a consideration then that is to be welcomed.
As discussed in chapter three, one of the mechanisms we have for judging the Court’s 
performance is the number of times an appellant has to return to the appeal court before 
it is overturned. As discussed in chaper one, Naughton argues that criminal justice 
reform typically focuses on exceptional cases which are those cases that are referred 
back to the Court of Appeal after the initial appeal has failed. He argues that the 
consequences of focusing on the ‘exceptional’ cases are that the true scale of 
miscarriages of justice may be overlooked and an extensive range of harmful 
consequences (zemiological harms) may also be overlooked (Naughton 2007). Quirk 
has also argued that this focus on high profile atypical cases has led to the neglect of 
convictions overturned at first instance and those quashed owing to legal or procedural 
irregularities (Quirk, 2007, p. 769).
But what Naughton and Quirk fail to acknowledge is the contribution those appeals 
quashed owing to legal or procedural irregularities have made. All the research studies 
conducted so far on the judgments of the Court of Appeal, for example, have all used 
those appeals quashed at the first opportunity to gather information on how the Court 
interprets its power. And as the ‘exceptional’ cases are so rare the opportunity for them 
to bring about reform is very limited so those appeals that do consist of mainly legal or 
procedural arguments are contributing to law reform on a daily basis. That is not to say 
that it is only the first appeal that will consist of procedural irregularities because the 
exceptional appeals will also consist of procedural irregularities but the first appeals are 
more likely to only be focused on procedural irregurities due to the twenty-eight days the 
appellant has to appeal after conviction.
What Naughton and Quirk fail to address, and what this chapter has highlighted as a 
problem, is why the ‘exceptional’ appeals are so exceptional. For most of the exceptional 
appeals that are founded on factual innocence, the appellant will already have gone 
through the appeal process on a procedural irregularity argument and been 
unsuccessful. Therefore, there are many factually innocent appellants who are failing 
with procedural irregularity appeals and who are then having to negotiate the problems 
of fresh evidence appeals as discussed in chapter five, or having to locate a new 
procedural irregularity to try again. This is particularly difficult for the factually innocent 
who find both fresh evidence appeals and lurking doubt appeals so problematic that they
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have to frame their appeals in technicalities as they know this will give them a higher 
chance of success. This may also be a reason why the CCRC refers so many ‘technical’ 
appeals and so few based on new evidence. If the Court is more conducive to these 
arguments and factually innocent people have to frame their appeals in technicalities to 
achieve success then this is reinforced by the CCRC who refer cases on that basis. 
Although this does assist the factually innocent person with a procedural irregularity 
argument, it does not help those who are factually innocent and who do not have a 
procedural irregularity argument and who the CCRC is not helping with its focus on 
procedure. 5 5 3
The procedural irregularity appeals discussed in this chapter have shown that the Court 
tends to focus on the irregularity and evidence of the appellant’s guilt and whilst this is 
important, it should also be focused on the possibility that those appearing before it may 
also be factually innocent of those crimes. The requirement for repeat visits to the 
appeal court for some cases will never be eradicated because there may be changes in 
the law or procedure that mean the appellant has a much stronger argument on the 
second appeal than he had on the first appeal which justifies the overturning of the 
conviction. But the fact that history has shown that the factually innocent appellant often 
has to return to the appeal court a number of times before the conviction is overturned 
should require the Court to focus not only on the guilty but also on the innocent. If the 
Criminal Procedure Rules have resulted in a change of attitude for the Court in this 
respect then it is to be encouraged so the factually innocent can succeed at the first 
opportunity and the Court can rectify the miscarriage of justice rather than being one of 
the causes of it.
Summary
It is impossible to assess whether changing the test to ‘unsafe’ has made any difference 
to procedural irregularity appeals without a wider consideration of the impact the Human 
Rights Act 1998 may also have made. These appeals are difficult to assess generally in 
light of the problems of defining concepts such as rights and fairness and the different 
approaches the Court takes to these appeals.
There are some conclusions that can be drawn about the Court’s approach after the new 
safety test came into force. The changes in the test did not downgrade the importance of 
procedural irregularities, despite the case of Chalkley and others. There are arguably 
now more types of irregularities than before the CAA 1995. The HRA has added 
additional grounds on which to appeal under the various articles and most predominantly 
under Article 6 . There is also the distinction between when it is an unfair trial and when it
553 For a discussion on the problems for factually innocent appellants and the CCRC, see Roberts and 
Weathered (2009).
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is unfair to try the appellant. But the evidence as to the impact the safety test and the 
HRA have had on procedural irregularity appeals is once again, contradictory.
In 1990, of the total procedural irregularity grounds, there were 32% of the grounds 
allowed. But in 2002, there were 10% of the grounds allowed. This is partially explained 
by the the huge increase in grounds in 2002 (641) to 1990 (329) and potentially 
evidence that arguing more grounds does not necessarily lead to more success. This 
may also be potentially evidence that the HRA has not had a big impact on success 
rates. The most common grounds between the two samples were errors of the trial 
judge and these constituted 59% of the total grounds in the 1990 sample and 49% in the 
2 0 0 2  sample which is further evidence that a wider variety of procedural irregularities 
was being argued in 2002. When comparing the three most common grounds, 40% of 
these grounds were allowed in 1990 with 18% allowed in 2002 which accords with the 
general figures above. In terms of the statistics, it does not appear that the HRA has 
had a significant impact as none of the HRA grounds were successful. This is evidence 
to suggest that the Court is adopting a strict approach to the procedural irregularity 
despite the enactment of the HRA. There were also twenty-three abuse of process 
grounds that were unsuccessful which is further evidence of the Court’s strict approach. 
But there were judgments where it was not argued that there had been an unfair trial but 
the terminology was used when quashing the conviction so this shows that the Court is 
considering this even if the appellant is not arguing it. This could be evidence that the 
HRA has had an impact on the Court’s decision making even if that impact is not 
measured in the appellant arguing that specifically and succeeding with it.
Therefore, if we measure the value of due process in the overturning of convictions, it 
would appear that the Court is adopting a strict approach to the HRA and due process 
arguments raised that were rejected. But there may also be a value in due process that 
does not result in the conviction being quashed. This may result from the rhetoric of the 
judges in the cases which may be of use in other cases which may use that rhetoric to 
achieve the overturning of the conviction for the appellant. It may also be of use in 
sending out messages to the prosecuting authorities to not engage in unacceptable 
practices. For example, in Rodger, the Court agreed that evidence of interviews 
undertaken without a caution should have been excluded as this was a significant and 
substantial breach. This gives an indication of what breaches of PACE the Court will 
tolerate and which ones they will not. Similarly, in Mason the Court agreed that covert 
taping was a beach of Article 8 . In both judgments the appeal was upheld illustrating that 
whilst the Court was giving guidance as to what will amount to a procedural irregularity, 
it took a strict approach to that irregularity in the face of the strength of guilt of the 
appellant. There are also judgments where the Court is making a declaration as to 
whether English law is compatible with the ECHR. The Court’s decision making in those
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cases can be a valuable precedent for others to follow. There are further examples of 
this in the abuse of process arguments such as Thomas where the Court develops the 
point of legal principle that if there is tension between ‘safety’ and ‘unfairness’ then this 
would enable the Court to depart from a previous decision when there was no new 
evidence or argument. This is valuable for other cases following this, and we may see 
the benefit of this for the appellant in Mills and Poole where the conviction was 
overturned. So whilst the Court may have taken a strict approach in Thomas it may have 
led to a less strict approach on the same argument in Mills and Poole. This shows that 
the evidence as to what may be a strict or less strict approach may be contradictory 
depending on the appeal judges which adds to the Court’s inconsistent approach.
The Court’s inconsistency was further illustrated by looking at those cases that were 
overturned. Although the Court did quash convictions, mainly when it viewed the 
irregularity had occurred as well as when viewing it may have had made an impact on 
the jury, there were so few convictions overturned. The grounds where the Court did 
overturn the conviction seemed fairly fundamental such as misdirecting on the burden 
and standard of proof and the judge appearing to sway the jury with his/her views, but 
these did not seem that different to appeals that were upheld. The differences between 
them, therefore, were not overly clear. The largest number of appeals came under the 
category of the Court not agreeing that an irregularity had occurred. This seemed to be 
taking a very strict approach to deciding the appeal which is evidenced by the sheer 
number of appeals in this category. This shows that whilst it may be easier to succeed 
on a procedural irregularity appeal, this is not in itself, an easy process. This has 
implications for the factually innocent and the factually guilty. It would appear that the 
focus of the Court is on the irregularity itself and the evidence of guilt and there does not 
seem to be a wider consideration of whether this person is factually innocent. That is a 
common theme through all the Court’s decision making and will be discussed in more 
detail in chapter nine. The lack of any cases in the sample where the conviction was 
quashed where the Court viewed the appellant to be overtly guilty shows that these 
cases are rare.
Whilst the academic literature has tended to focus on the relationship between fairness 
and safety and arguments such as rights and fairness, the sample shows that this only 
forms a small part of the Court’s considerations. Whilst concepts such as moral integrity 
and moral legitimacy are important, if we just concentrate on those issues relating to 
abuses of process and human rights they provide a skewed view of the bulk of the work 
of the Court. The small number of these appeals, whilst very important, does not 
address the real problem here which is the sheer number of errors trial judges make 
which have to be overturned on a daily basis. Naughton is therefore correct in that these 
appeals do tend to get ignored as there has to be a reason why judges are making so
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many mistakes and why they continue to form the bulk of the Court’s work. Therefore, 
although notions of rights, fairness, legitimacy and integrity are extremely important, they 
are difficult to enforce without a clear definition of what they mean and in that sense, 
Ashworth and Redmayne are correct in that they may be too vague. The language of 
fairness is not new to the Court, and whilst it may be much more of a focus for the Court, 
it still has to consider the same grounds of appeal that were argued prior to the 
enactment of the HRA. The HRA has given appellants a new layer of argument in the 
sense of whether certain provisions are compatible with the HRA and whilst the HRA 
may strengthen the grounds of appeal for some appellants, it is difficult to argue that the 
Court is adopting a less strict approach to the procedural irregularity as a result of the 
HRA. In that sense it would appear that Nobles and Schiff were correct in their prediction 
that the HRA would not necessarily change the Court’s decision making process.
In chapter eight, the Court’s approach to its retrial power will be discussed.
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CHAPTER EIGHT: THE POWER TO ORDER A 
RETRIAL
The solution to many of the Court of Appeal’s problems may appear to be 
straightforward: it should order more retrials. This would potentially solve the problem of 
the Court deciding the merits of fresh evidence against the evidence at trial. It would 
also potentially solve the problem of the Court trying to second guess what the jury, or a 
reasonable jury, may have made of a particular irregularity. But the difficulty in relation to 
retrials is that the Court has to quash the conviction before it can consider the possibility 
of ordering a retrial. As the previous chapters have shown, the Court does not overturn 
many convictions. Therefore, the opportunity to order a retrial only arises in a small 
number of cases. This is not the only problem in relation to retrials however. This 
chapter will examine the appeals from the sample of judgments from 1990 and 2002 
where a retrial was considered. This is necessary in order to ascertain whether the Court 
uses a particular approach to retrials and in what circumstances a retrial may, or may 
not, be ordered. It will also be necessary to see if the approach the Court has taken has 
changed and if so, whether it can be attributable to the changes in the Criminal Appeal 
Act 1995. It will also examine the Court’s approach to retrials after the 2002 sample in 
order to ascertain what the current approach of the Court is.
The historical approach to retrials
As discussed in chapter three, the power to order a retrial had not been given in the 
CAA 1907 even though it had been a feature of many of the defeated bills before the 
Court was created. Subsequently, this caused major problems for the Court’s application 
of the proviso and there were many judgments in the early days of the Court where the 
judges expressed their regret that no provision was made in the legislation for new 
trials. 5 5 4  In 1952, the Home Secretary and Lord Chancellor appointed a Departmental 
Committee under the Chairmanship of Lord Tucker (Tucker Committee, 1954) to 
consider whether both the Court of Criminal Appeal and House of Lords should be given 
the power to order a retrial. The Committee spent two years reviewing the issue of 
retrials and finally reported in 1954. The arguments for the power were far outweighed 
by arguments against. One of the arguments against was that ‘the prolongation of 
criminal proceedings is against the public interest because it is a cardinal principle that 
the administration of justice should be swift and final’ (Tucker Committee, 1954, para. 
16) thereby emphasising the principle of finality. The Committee was unanimous in 
proposing that the Court should be given the power to order a retrial in fresh evidence
554 See for example R v Dyson [1908] 2 K.B. 454; R v Colclough (1909) 2 Cr. App. R. 84; R v Ellsom (1911) 7 
Cr. App. R. 4; R v Emilio Rufino (1911) 7 Cr. App. R. 47. For a detailed history of the Court’s retrial power, see 
O’Connor (1969).
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cases but were divided by a majority of 5 to 3 as to whether it should be granted in all 
cases. Those against again gave the reason that it would be ‘a derogation from the 
principle of finality’ (Tucker Committee, 1954. para. 35).
The Tucker Committee proposal to give the Court the power to order a retrial in fresh 
evidence cases was not implemented until ten years after it reported. This was possibly 
due to the lack of public interest as public pressure is usually the catalyst for reforming 
the appeal process. Indeed, it was the high profile case of Aloysius ‘Lucky’ Gordon 
which provided the impetus needed for implementing the Tucker Committee proposal as 
the case ‘served to crystallise a growing uneasiness about the limitations of the Court’ 
(Justice, 1964, p. 28). Gordon had been convicted of assaulting Christine Keeler and 
fresh evidence led the Court to quash the conviction but the general feeling at the time 
was that a complete acquittal was inappropriate and this controversy might have been 
avoided had the Court had the power to order a retrial.
The power to order a retrial in fresh evidence cases was initially in section 1 of the CAA 
1964, which later became section 7 of the CAA 1968. This allowed the Court to order a 
retrial once it had decided to quash the conviction.
In 1980, the Scottish High Court was given a general power to order a retrial which 
meant that England and Wales became the only common law jurisdiction in the world 
not to have one. Calls for the Court to be given a general retrial power gathered 
momentum. The Law Commission looked into the matter and produced a report in 1986 
(Law Commission, 1986). The report stated that because the matter had not been 
considered by Parliament since 1964 the then present senior judges had not had the 
opportunity to express their opinion on the matter. The report recommended that a 
general power should be given to the Court. The Government then produced a 
consultation paper and as a result a general power was conveyed in section 45 of the 
1988 Criminal Justice Act. The Court was initially slow to use this power but there has 
been a big increase in its use and this chapter will examine why.
Malleson’s sample of judgments from 1990 will be analysed first.
The 1990 sample of judgments
Malleson states (1993, p. 13) that there were two cases in the sample in which retrials 
were ordered. Both involved fresh evidence. In a third case the Court stated that they 
would have ordered a retrial but for the fact that the grounds of appeal were lodged 
before section 43 of the Criminal Justice Act 1988 came into force. In two cases, 
counsel for the Crown argued unsuccessfully that there should be a retrial.
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Malleson states that the two cases in which retrials were ordered did not appear to have 
any obviously unique features which distinguish them from the other fresh evidence 
cases. One raised fresh forensic evidence and the other concerned an identification 
witness who claimed to have wrongly identified the appellant. Malleson states (p. 14) 
from the information set out in the judgments, it was hard to discern any reason why 
these rather than other fresh evidence cases should have been considered suitable for a 
retrial.555 Malleson concluded that the power to order a retrial is clearly one which the 
Court considers to be appropriate only very rarely. With the exception of the one case 
cited above, she states that the enactment of section 43 of the Criminal Justice Act 1988 
does not appear to have broadened the Court’s application of this power. She states that 
the explanation for the Court’s limited application may lie with the wording of section 7(1) 
CAA 1968. Because the Court must allow an appeal before they can order a retrial, the 
Court has a choice between quashing the conviction outright and ordering a retrial, not a 
choice between dismissing an appeal and ordering a retrial. Malleson states that once 
the Court has determined that the conviction is unsafe and unsatisfactory the normal 
course of action seems to be to quash the conviction outright, rather than ordering a 
retrial (p. 14).
After Malleson’s sample, the Court showed a willingness to order more retrials. This is 
illustrated in the graph below:
Graph 8.1: Retrials ordered 1990 to 2006556
□  Retrials Ordered
1990 1993 1996 1999 2002 2005
As these figures show, after the very small number of retrials ordered in 1990 (three) 
there was a steady increase with fifty-three ordered in 1996 which dipped down to thirty-
555 Citing R  v White 6 /7 and R v Houghton 3/4.
556 Figures taken from Judicial and Court Statistics 2006  (HMSO: Cmnd 7273) November 2007.
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three in 1997 but which rose again to seventy-three in 1998. There was then a dip down 
to forty-five in 2003 which rose to seventy-seven in 2005 and a dip to fifty-eight in 2006. 
Whilst these figures are slightly erratic, they do show an increase before and after the 
enactment of the CAA 1995. This can be more clearly illustrated in the graph below 
which shows the number of retrials ordered against the number of appeals allowed.
Graph 8.2: Retrials ordered and appeals allowed 1990 -  2006
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As discussed in chapter four, the rise in the number of appeals allowed from the early to 
the mid-1990s is potentially evidence that the Court was going through a liberal phase 
under its new Lord Chief Justice, Lord Taylor, who was appointed in 1992. The rise in 
the number of retrials ordered in this period was also interpreted as being evidence of 
that liberal approach. But it is debatable as to whether a rise in the number of retrials 
being ordered is evidence of a more liberal approach. The Court cannot order a retrial 
unless it decides to quash a conviction. The rise in the number of appeals allowed in the 
mid-1990s would seem to correlate with the rise in the number of retrials as more 
convictions quashed gives rise to the possibility of more retrials. However, the rise in 
retrials ordered is not necessarily explained by the rise in appeals allowed as the figures 
from 1999 to 2006 show that whilst a smaller number of appeals were being allowed, the 
retrials figure remains relatively high compared to the figures from 1990 to 1997 where 
there were a higher number of appeals allowed but less retrials ordered. If the Court 
orders a retrial then this is disadvantageous for the appellant who has to go through the 
trial process again. However, the rise in the number of retrials could be evidence that the 
Court is less inclined to decide the issue for itself and uphold the appeal. This benefits 
the appellant as there is a chance of acquittal on the retrial as opposed to the Court 
deciding the appeal should be upheld. The graph shows that after the relatively low 
number of retrials ordered in 1997, the number of retrials has continued to be relatively
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high since then, especially compared to the number of appeals allowed since 1999, and 
the potential reasons for that will be explored below.
The Royal Commission on Criminal Justice was divided over the use of retrials.
The Royal Commission on Criminal Justice
The Commission acknowledged that the Court was increasingly using its power to order 
a retrial which they ‘welcome and wish to encourage’ (RCCJ, ch.10, para. 65). They 
stated that retrials ‘offer the Court of Appeal an attractive solution for its understandable 
reservations about the speculative prediction of a hypothetical jury’s decision’ (para. 65). 
But they did exercise a note of caution:
There are obvious attractions in the option of a retrial where the Court of Appeal 
thinks it possible but not certain that the jury would have acquitted the appellant 
had it known of the new considerations advanced in the course of the appeal. 
But retrials are not a panacea. Quite apart from the expense involved there are 
bound to be cases where a retrial will be impracticable and even unjust. The 
conviction may, for example, be too long ago or the witness no longer available, 
or it would be unfair to a victim to be required to give his or her evidence again, 
or the appellant may already have been released from prison or following the 
discharge of the first jury, already have been tried for a second time’ (RCCJ, 
ch. 10, para. 33).
The RCCJ’s approach to retrials and fresh evidence was discussed in chapter five but 
essentially the Commission felt that ‘wherever possible the Court should order a retrial of 
the case rather than decide the issue for themselves’ as ‘the Court of Appeal, which has 
not seen the other witnesses in the case nor heard their evidence, is not in our view the 
appropriate tribunal to assess the ultimate credibility and effect on a jury of the new 
evidence’ (ch. 10, para. 62). But the Commission also stated that where a retrial was 
impracticable or otherwise undesirable, the Court of Appeal should follow the Stafford 
test and decide the matter for itself rather than just simply allowing the appeal (ch. 1 0 , 
para. 63).
The Commission stated that ‘where the court is not in doubt, there is no difficulty in 
allowing or dismissing the appeal as appropriate. Where, on the other hand, the court is 
in doubt and would like to see the evidence or arguments more fully tested, then, other 
things being equal, retrials seem to all of us the better way to proceed, even if some of 
us would not like them to be as frequently ordered as would others’ (para. 65). They 
were divided over what should happen where fresh evidence is not available and a 
retrial was not possible. Six of them took the view that the court had no choice but to 
allow the appeal as if the court decided the conviction may be unsafe and wished to 
send the case to a new jury, it was no longer possible to say that the appellant was 
guilty beyond reasonable doubt and therefore the appellant should go free. However, the
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other five believed that the court should then consider further whether it should quash 
the conviction or uphold it as the impossibility of a retrial was not a sufficient reason for 
automatically allowing the appeal. So the Court should then decide the matter for itself 
(ch. 1 0 , para.6 6 ).
After the enactment of the CAA 1995, there was some general guidance given by Lord 
Bingham in R v Graham557 on the considerations the Court is weighing up in deciding 
whether to order a retrial. He stated that the decision to order a retrial:
'  requires an exercise of judgment, and will involve consideration
of the public interest and the legitimate interests of the defendant.
The public interest is generally served by the prosecution of those 
reasonably suspected on available evidence of serious crime, if 
such prosecution can be conducted without unfairness to or 
oppression of the defendant. The legitimate interests of the 
defendant will often call for consideration of the time which has 
passed since the alleged offence, and any penalty the defendant 
may already have paid before the quashing of the conviction.’
This will now be discussed in relation to the 2002 sample of judgments.
The 2002 sample of judgments
In the 2002 sample of judgments, a retrial was ordered in twelve cases. The possibility 
of a retrial was raised in a further fourteen cases but the decision was made not to order 
a retrial. Therefore, a retrial was ordered in 16% of the appeal grounds allowed. In the 
1990 sample, there were two retrials ordered which represented 2% of the appeal 
grounds allowed (101). This is evidence that the Court was more likely to order a retrial 
in 2002 than 1990. This is in line with the general figures above which show that in 1990 
there were 256 appeals allowed and three retrials ordered and in 2002 there were 166 
appeals allowed with fifty retrials ordered. Therefore, in 1990 a retrial was ordered in 1% 
of all appeals allowed whereas in 2002, a retrial was ordered in 30% of the appeals 
allowed. In the 2002 sample, three of the cases where a retrial was ordered involved 
fresh evidence and the other nine involved procedural irregularities. The judgments from 
2002 will now be analysed qualitatively in order to determine how the Court approaches 
its task. The cases where a retrial was ordered will be analysed first.
Retrial ordered
The Court has three options when quashing the appeal. The first is to substitute the 
verdict for another, the second is to order a retrial and, the third is to do neither of those 
and just allow the appeal. The problems of which option to take were highlighted in R v 
Bedford.558 The ground of appeal was that there had been a misdirection by the judge
557 [1997] 1 Cr. App. R. 302.
558 [2002] EW CA Crim 893.
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which had meant that the jury were not able to fully consider properly the defence of 
provocation. Counsel for the appellant wished the Court to substitute a verdict of 
manslaughter for murder because of ‘the age of these events’ and the fact that the 
principal witness in the case was a child. The Court declined to do this and Rose LJ 
stated:
Whether or not events can properly be characterised as giving rise to 
provocation reducing what would otherwise be murder to manslaughter is, 
statutorily, a matter for the jury’s determination. It is certainly no part of this 
Court’s function to assess whether, in a particular state of evidence, provocation 
does or does not arise. That is a matter for a jury, not this court. ’ 5 5 9
A retrial was ordered in this case. The difficulty for the appellant is that he runs the risk 
of being convicted again on the retrial whereas if the Court substitutes the conviction, he 
at least has a manslaughter conviction which is the most he can hope for if he runs 
provocation again on the retrial. This case can be compared to R v Roberts560 in the 
sample which raised fresh expert evidence on appeal of the appellant’s personality 
traits. It was felt that the defence of provocation had not been properly canvassed before 
the jury even though there had been evidence at the trial of the appellant’s personality 
traits. The evidence was essentially being adduced on appeal to strengthen the 
argument made at the trial. The Court accepted the evidence and substituted a 
manslaughter conviction for a murder one. The Court stated that if the evidence at the 
trial, and the new psychiatric evidence on appeal which had reinforced the psychiatric 
evidence before the jury, had been appreciated there would have been a realistic 
prospect that the trial jury would not have excluded provocation. This appears to be the 
Court usurping the role of the jury and dismissing the jury’s consideration of evidence it 
had already heard. It is not clear why the Court could do this in Roberts but refused to 
do so in Bedford, instead preferring to order a new trial.
A similar issue arose in R v McMillan561 in which fresh evidence was adduced that the 
appellant was suffering from a brain tumour which was not known the appellant was 
suffering from at the time of the trial. If it had been known it may have had an impact on 
the jury’s consideration of provocation as it would have been relevant to his 
characteristics. The Court quashed the conviction and the Crown requested a retrial. 
McMillan’s counsel suggested that the Court consider substituting a manslaughter 
conviction and argued against a retrial on the basis that the appellant had already 
served 8  years in custody, the age of the offence and the fact that there was uncertainty 
as to which witnesses were available. The Court gave the Crown the opportunity to 
agree with the decision on account of the ‘great deal of expense’ and ‘a complicated 
issue to go before a jury.’ The Crown resisted on the basis that this was not a clear cut
559 Ibid, para 17.
560 [2002] EW CA 1069. See page 88.
561 [2002] EW CA Crim 114.
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case of diminished responsibility and there were other factors for the jury to consider. 
Lord Woolf agreed with the Crown and ordered a retrial. This appears to be a somewhat 
harsh decision given that the appellant had served 8  years and was suffering from a 
brain tumour but may be illustrative of the approach which explains the rise in retrials. It 
may be that previously this would have been decided by the Court itself and the 
conviction would have been upheld or a manslaughter conviction substituted.
There are a number of judgments where the Court considers the seriousness of the 
offence and decides to order a retrial because the crimes they committed were serious. 
This occurred in R v P, 5 6 2  R v Adam,563 R v Johnson,56* and R v Demir.565 But the other 
cases show a variety of reasons why a retrial would be ordered. In R v Snooks,566 
counsel for the appellant argued that it would not be in the complainant’s best interests 
for a retrial to be ordered but Mantell LJ was clearly not impressed with that argument 
and ordered a retrial. In R v Round567 the Court quashed the conviction and ordered a 
retrial. The defence counsel raised the issue of bail and the decision was made to 
remand the appellant in custody. However, Kay LJ stated:
‘this ought to be tried as soon as possible. I think the only thing to say, Mr Wall, 
is of course that we have ordered a retrial....By ordering it, we do not say one 
has to take place. That is a matter for the prosecution so, for the avoidance of 
doubt make that clear. Enquiries will be made and the Crown can consider what 
it wants to do. As far as we are concerned, on what we know about it, we simply 
order a retrial’ 5 6 8
It would appear from this that the Court is merely suggesting that a retrial take place and 
that the Court had sympathy with the appellant’s counsel, Mr Wall. It leaves open to 
question whether a retrial does actually take place in relation to every one ordered as 
this would imply that the prosecution are then able to decide whether they want to 
pursue it.
There were a number of judgments where retrials were ordered with no discussion 
which shows that the Court does not always require the prosecution to make a request 
and the defence to argue against it. This happened in R v Ram, 5 6 9  R v Lang,570 and R v
j 571
562 [2002] EWCA Crim 1388.
563 [2002] EWCA Crim 613.
564 [2002] EWCA Crim 532.
565 [2002] EWCA Crim 774.
566 [2002] EWCA Crim 1194.
567 [2002] EWCA Crim 372.
568 Ibid, para. 60.
569 [2002] EWCA Crim 372.
570 [2002] EWCA Crim 298.
571 [2002] EWCA Crim 1218.
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With such a small sample of judgments it is difficult to draw many conclusions in terms 
of why a retrial would be ordered. The Court clearly assesses the seriousness of the 
crime and the more serious, the more likely that one will be ordered. The Court is also 
weighing up arguments from counsel in relation to the length of the sentence given to 
the appellant and how much was served; the extent to which witnesses are likely to turn 
up and the time it will take for the retrial to take place. The discussion in relation to 
retrials is not always stated in the judgment and it seems that the prosecution have a 
large role to play in requesting the retrial in the first place. Cases such as Round show 
that the prosecution also has a large role to play in deciding whether the retrial actually 
takes place as it may be that the Court orders one which is not then followed through by 
the prosecution. The cases where retrials were mentioned and not ordered will now be 
discussed.
Retrials discussed but not ordered
In some cases a retrial is not going to be practically possible as the fact that it is a retrial 
may have implications if there are other charges and it may cause problems if the jury is 
not to know there is a retrial. In R v GB572 some of the arguments had been rejected 
and this would cause problems if the appellant was retried. The Court considered that 
the appellant would not be able to have a fair trial because of this and because ‘we 
cannot be sure that he would. We are prepared, therefore, to take the risk that he would 
not. ' 5 7 3  The Court decided it would not be in the interests of justice to order a retrial. The 
Court appears to be taking a liberal approach here in relation to the appellant but this 
also highlights that a retrial is not always a practical option.
One of the problems with the delay in hearing appeals against convicton as outlined in 
chapter four, is that appellants may have served their sentence so a retrial is not 
desirable. This was a factor in cases in the sample such as in R v RF,57A where the 
Court did not order a retrial but stated ‘we emphasise that the determination of where 
the truth lies, in a matter of this kind, is not one for this Court. It is a matter, invariably, 
for a jury. ’ 5 7 5  In R v Khan and others,576 Kay LJ stated:
‘If this appeal had taken place within a short time of the conviction of the 
appellants we would have thought that this was exactly the sort of matter that 
ought to have resulted in a retrial, so that a trial could take place in which the 
jury had before them the relevant evidence and were able to consider 
themselves the competing suggestions on a proper basis. ’ 5 7 7
572 [2002] EWCA Crim 1483.
573 Ibid, para. 37.
574 [2002] EWCA Crim 633.
575 Ibid, para. 44.
576 [2002] EWCA Crim 945.
577 Ibid, para. 47.
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There was also a similar issue in a number of cases, for example in R v H,578 R v 
Hart,579 R v G, 5 8 0  R v Logiudice,581 R v Fox,5 8 2  and R v Blakeney553
It would appear that the Court may refuse to order a retrial if it does not approve of the 
behaviour of the prosecuting authorities. In R v Higgins,584 the appellant was convicted 
of robbery. The conviction was quashed on the basis of non disclosure of witness 
statements that had not been handed over to the defence under the disclosure 
provisions. The Court clearly had issues in this case with the police officer responsible 
for disclosure. With regard to the retrial, Kay LJ stated:
The further issue is that Mr Price, on behalf of the prosecution, invites us to 
order a retrial. In normal circumstances we would unhesitatingly do so. This is a 
serious matter, and if a fair trial was possible the public are entitled to have this 
matter properly investigated. Our conclusion is that, in the light of everything we 
have been told about this matter, no fair trial is now possible. No one with the 
history that we have related could ever be sure that other aspects of the 
evidence had not become tainted. In those circumstances, we think that it would 
be wrong to order a retrial. ’ 5 8 5
It would appear that the Court in this case felt that the evidence had been deliberately 
withheld from the defence. This meant that the police could no longer be trusted to 
investigate the case properly. A similar issue arose in R v Brignall, R v Barnes 588 In this 
case one of the police officers was on trial for conspiracy to pervert the course of justice 
relating to another matter. It was argued on appeal that the police officer was no longer 
a witness of truth and the conviction should be quashed. The Court decided it was 
unable to order a retrial in light of this as the police officer had been the main 
prosecution witness in the case. Both these cases appear to be an acknowledgement of 
the supposed corrupt behaviour of the police officers involved which has led to the 
impossibility of a retrial not being tainted by that behaviour.
The other cases showed a variety of reasons in refusing a retrial. In R v Jones,587 the 
prosecution applied for a retrial and the defence counsel stated that he conceded that 
this was a category of case where a retrial in the interests of justice has to be 
considered but he argued that there should not be a retrial on account that this would be 
the third trial. This case is illustrative of the problems of the Court increasing the use of 
retrials. The more that are ordered then the Court may see an increase in those
578 [2002] EWCA Crim 399.
579 [2002] EWCA Crim 591.
580 [2002] EWCA Crim 550.
581 [2002] EWCA Crim 929.
582 [2002] EWCA Crim 1242.
583 [2002] EWCA Crim 391.
584 [2002] EWCA Crim 336.
585 Ibid, paras. 19-20.
586 [2002] EWCA Crim 569.
587 [2002] EWCA Crim 287.
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returning to the Court on appeal who were convicted on a retrial. The Court then has to 
make the decision, as in this case, whether to order a further retrial. This has the 
potential to reduce the number of retrials if the Court takes the view it is unfair to try the 
appellant again but this may be the result of the Court’s attitude to ordering more retrials. 
In R v Bains,588 the appellant was convicted of rape. The appeal was allowed because 
the complainant had misled the jury about her relationship with another man. The other 
man had died. The prosecution requested a retrial in this case but this was refused by 
the Court with Tuckey LJ stating:
‘We do not think there should be a retrial in this case. The complainant’s 
credibility has been irreparably damaged by the misleading evidence which she 
gave at the trial and by the fact that she made two statements in which she lied 
to the police. The other man will not be able to give evidence at the retrial and 
so the fact that he lied will not be before the jury. In those circumstances it 
would be wrong for us to expose the appellant to a further retrial. Our view is 
supported by the fact that this appellant is now 74 and has already served the 
equivalent of a 30 month sentence; although if those two factors were all that 
stood between him and a retrial they would not be conclusive. ’ 5 8 9
This could be viewed as the appeal court not believing the complainant and refusing to 
order a retrial on that basis. This would contradict the Pendleton principle, as discussed 
in chapters 5 and 6 , where the Court should not form a view of the credibility of 
witnesses as that is the task of the jury. It would appear here that the Court is saying the 
complainant is no longer a believable witness when the contrary view to that is that the 
Court should order a retrial and allow the jury to determine that for itself. In R v Cakmak 
and others, 5 9 0  there was a detailed discussion of whether to order a retrial. The 
appellants were convicted of threatening criminal damage after they took over one of the 
pods on the London Eye to protest. The appeal was allowed after the judge misdirected 
on the particulars of the offence. The prosecution sought a retrial as there were others 
who were yet to be tried for the same offence. In the prosecution’s view they could all be 
tried together. Kennedy LJ pointed out the problem for the prosecution which was if 
there was no retrial, those yet to be tried could use this case as an illustration of them 
being acquitted but if a retrial was ordered then the matter would remain to be 
considered on another occasion which would not be so useful to the others. The Court 
declined to order a retrial with the caveat that ‘we do, however, make it clear that if 
anything is said about the proceedings in relation to the current appellants those 
proceedings must be properly explained. In other words, that they were convicted in the 
crown court and succeeded on appeal in relation to the direction given by the judge to 
the jury.’ This case shows that a retrial has implications not only for the appellants but 
also for others involved in the case.
588 [2002] EW CA Crim 83.
589 Ibid, paras. 6-7.
590 [2002] EW CA Crim 500.
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Again, from such a small sample of cases it is difficult to draw any conclusions but it 
would appear that the main reason for not ordering a retrial is that the appellant has 
already served the sentence. This is possibly down to the length of time it takes to 
appeal. These cases also show that the Court may refuse to order a retrial when it does 
not approve of the behaviour of the prosecuting authorities. This is partly due to the fact 
that the case has become so tainted that the evidence is no longer believable but there 
may also be an element here of punishment for those authorities as a mark of the 
Court’s disapproval. That may also apply to witnesses or complainants in the case if the 
Court appears not to believe them as in Bains. Whilst it is not the role of the Court to 
take a view of the believability of complainants, it may be that it does and decides not to 
order a retrial on that basis.
The position after 2002 will now be discussed.
The Court’s approach to retrials after 2002
The number of retrials ordered after 2002 continued to be high after a dip to 53 in 2003. 
In 2004, the number was 6 6 , in 2005, it was 77 and in 2006, it was 58. The figure of 77 
in 2005 was the highest number since the law changed in 1988. There were 228 
appeals allowed that year which meant that there were retrials ordered in 34% of the 
appeals allowed. In 2006, this figure was 32%. A analysis of the retrial cases after 2002 
from Casetrack provides us with further details of when a retrial will be ordered in 
addition to the ones above.
The Court gave some indication of the procedure relating to retrials in R v Jacques.59' 
This was an interesting judgment because the Court stated it had been unable to reach 
a decision and needed some more time. Potter LJ stated that ‘one is always anxious to 
avoid the necessity for counsel to attend if necessary. Let us suppose for a moment that 
we were in favour of ordering a new trial, which is what would be the effect of a decision 
favourable to the appellant, is it something that the Crown would in fact proceed with, 
bearing in mind that he has served a large part of his sentence? ’ 5 9 2  Counsel for the 
prosecution said that it would be unlikely to on account that he had served his sentence. 
Potter LJ stated ‘if that is the result, in the ordinary way one would have to invite counsel 
to make submissions on the question of a new trial. ’ 5 9 3  The above cases and this case 
appear to suggest that the Court will only consider ordering a retrial if the prosecution 
counsel ask for it to be considered. This would appear to suggest that if the prosecution 
does not request one, the Court does not consider it. Therefore, the increase in retrials
591 [2003] EWCA Crim 100.
592 Ibid, para. 4.
593 Id.
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may be the result of the prosecution asking for more though there are cases where the 
Court orders a retrial without any discussion with the prosecution as discussed above. 5 9 4
It would appear that the Court is not supposed to use its retrial power to punish the 
prosecuting authorities. In R v Prosser, R v Chandler and R v Henderson,595 the 
apellants were convicted of conspiracy to deal with proceeds of drug trafficking or 
criminal conduct. The appellants were sentenced to a term of imprisonment plus 
confiscation orders. The grounds of appeal related to non-disclosure of evidence. The 
prosecution did not oppose the appeal and the Court quashed the convictions. On the 
subject of a retrial, the Court went through the criteria as outlined by Lord Bingham in R 
v Graham 596 The appellants had served most of their sentences but if the retrial was not 
ordered they would have the money returned to them that had been confiscated. The 
Crown submitted that the public have a proper interest in seeing that those who have 
committed serious crime do not benefit from their crime and the public ought to know by 
way of a retrial whether or not these were offenders who committed serious crime and 
who ought therefore to be deprived of the proceeds of that crime. They submitted that 
the appellants would be able to have a fair trial as the documents had now been 
disclosed to the defence. Counsel for the appellants argued that as the prosecution had 
been responsible for the non-disclosure, they should not be allowed the opportunity to 
start again. The Court reviewed the case for both sides and a retrial was ordered as in 
Kay LJ’s view the appellants should not be able to profit from their crimes if they were 
guilty because if a retrial was not ordered the money would have to be returned. This 
case can be contrasted with Kay LJ’s views in Higgins above5 9 7  which also involved non­
disclosure of evidence where he refuses to order a retrial because a fair trial would not 
be possible as a result of the behaviour of the police. It seems in that case there is an 
element of punishment in refusing to order a retrial which contradicts his views in this 
case.
It would appear that there are occasions where a retrial is not ordered as the Court feels 
the appellant did not commit the crime. In R v Iqbar,596 the appellant was convicted of 
wounding with intent after the victim had been hit over the head with a vodka bottle. On 
appeal, the appellant said that at some point before the jury retired, his brother, Nasif, 
had visited him to say he was the one who had done it. The appeal court heard the 
evidence of his brother who said it had been him. The Court felt that the brother was not 
‘an impressive witness’ but ‘in other respects it has to be acknowledged that what he 
was saying on his oath would undoubtedly put him at risk of prosecution either for the 
assault or for perjury, one or the other. It would appear to this court to be inconceivable
594 See, for example, R v O ’Leary [2006] EWCA Crim 3222.
595 [2003] EWCA Crim 1067.
596 See above, n. 557.
597 See above, n. 584.
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that should the appeal be allowed the prosecuting authority would not proceed against 
Nasif for this very serious offence.’599 The conviction was quashed and prosecution 
counsel requested a retrial because the CPS did not accept the brother’s version of the 
events. The judges were clearly aghast at this and Mantell LJ stated ‘one despairs.’
It appears in this case that the retrial was refused as the Court clearly believed that the 
witness they had just heard the evidence from had committed the crime. This shows the 
problems for fresh evidence appeals where the Court takes a view on whether it 
believes witnesses or not. This usurps the role of the jury but is inevitable in fresh 
evidence cases. Instead of sending the case back to the jury for retrial where the 
brother’s evidence could have been considered by the jury, the Court decides not to 
order a retrial because it clearly disagrees with the prosecution position. It would appear 
that the conviction is quashed because the Court considers the appellant to be factually 
innocent. This does, of course, benefit the appellant and is to be welcomed if the brother 
committed the crime but it does show that the Court can usurp the jury when it wants to. 
It could be argued that it should do this more often and perhaps more factually innocent 
appellants would have their convictions quashed.
In R v Crump,600 the Court appeared to take the opposite view. The Crown requested a 
retrial which was opposed by the defence on the grounds that he had served three 
months of a three year sentence. In response, Kay LJ stated:
*We cannot accept that that is so. This is a serious matter. Any offence that 
ends in death has to be treated by the courts as a matter of real 
significance. Here the appellant was convicted on evidence that many might 
think was strong evidence of the commission of this offence. The fact that there 
was the defect in the summing-up properly leads to a conclusion that the 
conviction is not safe but it should not bring an end to the proceedings 
altogether.’601
It would appear in this case that the Court is potentially ordering a retrial because it 
thinks the appellant is guilty and does not want him ‘getting off on a technicality.’ This 
may be an illustration of why the Court is ordering more retrials as this may be an 
example of where previously the Court would have just upheld the conviction. One of the 
categories of decision making in relation to procedural irregularity appeals is the Court 
upholding the appeal where they consider there is strong prosecution evidence so this 
could be an example of a new approach to retrials. A similar case was R v Quinn602 
The appellant was convicted of actual bodily harm and argued self-defence. He was a 
police officer with a physical condition which meant he had pain in his neck and shoulder
599 Ibid, para.6.
600 [2004] EWCA Crim 894.
601 Ibid, para. 14.
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which limited his movements. One of the jurors at the trial had told someone else that 
she had seen the appellant getting into the lift and it appeared he was not as 
incapacitated they were led to believe. The other person had rung the appellant’s 
solicitors to tell them. The Court quashed the conviction and discussed a retrial which 
the prosecution requested. The defence argued there should not be one and His Honour 
Judge Stewart stated ‘there is nothing to indicate that he can no longer have a fair trial 
by virtue of the passage of time, is there? It is a simple incident. So why is it not in the 
public interest that this man be prosecuted when there is self evidentially evidence that 
he is guilty of the offence?’603 The Court ordered a retrial. The Court appears to take the 
view that the appellant is guilty and disbelieves the defence of self-defence which is 
usurping the jury’s role once again. However, the fact that the Court orders a retrial 
emphasises that it is the role of the jury to determine the issue and not the Court.
An analysis of all these cases provides a fairly clear picture of the procedure and issues 
around when a retrial will be ordered. In most cases when the appeal is allowed, the 
prosecution will be invited by the Court to make a submission as to whether it is inclined 
to ask for a retrial. There is then usually a discussion from both prosecuting and defence 
counsel as to whether a retrial should be ordered along the lines of that specified by 
Lord Bingham in R v Graham. The Court is weighing up such factors as the seriousness 
of the offence, the time the appellant has served, the time of the events, the time of the 
original trial, whether the witnesses would be available to give evidence, whether a fair 
trial is possible, the age of the appellant, the reason why the conviction was quashed, 
the credibility of witnesses, the implications on co-accused, the length of the retrial, the 
quality of the evidence and whether it is in the interests of justice taking into account the 
public. This list is not exhaustive but it does give an indication of the number of factors 
the Court considers in these cases.
It is clear from the judgments that the Crown is not obliged to continue with the retrial 
when one is ordered. There are judgments where if the Crown counsel is not sure of 
whether the CPS will pursue a retrial and needs to take further instruction, the Court will 
order the retrial anyway and leave it to the CPS as to whether they proceed. In this 
sense, whilst these cases provide us with examples of the circumstances in which they 
were ordered, it is then not clear in how many of those cases the CPS prosecutes. What 
is also clear is that by the time the conviction has been quashed, many of the appellants 
have already served their sentences. This is not a determinative factor as the Court has 
ordered the retrial of someone who has served their sentence but it does imply that if 
there was not such a delay in appealing then more retrials could be ordered.
603 Ibid, para. 30.
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There were also problems considered in the judgments of the victims and witnesses 
having to appear in court again. This seemed to be one of the major considerations for 
the Crown when deciding whether to either ask for a retrial or proceed with the retrial. 
This is also a factor for the Court when deciding whether to order one. It can be 
traumatic for a witness to have to testify again and there are also implications for the 
quality of the evidence which may have diminished over time, particular the memories of 
witnesses. The appellant may be at a distinct disadvantage second time round because 
of the time since the offence and it does seem to be a factor in deciding whether to order 
a retrial whether the appellant will get a fair trial.
What is not overly clear though is why there has been such a rise and also why in the 
vast majority of cases, a retrial is not even discussed. Although the rise in retrials at the 
beginning of the 1990s was seen to be an illustration of a supposed more liberal 
approach, the ordering of a retrial is not necessarily evidence of this. If the conviction 
would have been upheld previously, then this is evidence of liberalism as at least the 
appellant has the opportunity of an aquittal second time round. But if the conviction 
would have been quashed previously and a retrial not ordered then this is evidence of a 
stricter approach. The rise is not easily explained by an increase in convictions allowed. 
The more convictions that are quashed the more the possibility of a retrial increases. But 
in 1999, for example, a relatively low number of appeals were allowed (171) but there 
were seventy retrials ordered which is 41%, so the rise is not necessarily linked to an 
increase in appeals allowed as, as was discussed in chapter four, there has been a 
steady decrease in the number of appeals allowed since 1995.
It has been suggested that one possible argument for the greater use of retrials is the 
court rectifying unfairness on appeal. This is potentially as a result of the HRA. Nobles 
and Schiff, for example, have suggested that if the Court is increasingly remedying 
defects on appeal, this is more likely to result in a retrial being ordered when the 
conviction is quashed rather than it being quashed outright (Nobles and Schiff, 2001, p. 
915). This would appear to suggest that the Court is willing to quash the conviction as a 
result of the irregularity to uphold the integrity of the system but is preferring to send the 
case back for retrial. Whilst the quashing of the conviction may indicate a less strict 
approach to the procedural irregularity, this can be countered by the retrial ordered.
Ormerod and Taylor have suggested that ‘given the power of retrial, it is arguable that 
the optimal solution is for the Court of Appeal to favour ordering retrials so that the 
restoration of legitimacy is transparent’ (2004, p. 278). This appears to be suggesting 
that as the Court is a review court, and not a retrial court, it is more legitimate for the 
Court to send the case back to the jury for retrial than it be seen to be deciding issues 
for itself. In this way, the jury remains the primary decision maker which makes the
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process legitimate as the Court is then acting as a review court. But the problem here is 
if the irregularity has impacted on the fairness of the trial and the correctness of the 
verdict then it is legitimate to send the case back to the jury so they can decide again 
without the element that led to unfairness. But this is more complex on an abuse of 
process argument. If it is within the Court’s role to uphold the integrity of the criminal 
justice system then quashing a conviction because of an abuse is the Court’s way of 
marking its disapproval of what happened, even if it thinks the appellant is guilty. 
Therefore, in those cases the Court is acting in accordance with what its role is which is 
independent of the jury and involves assessing the irregularity, which the jury never 
knew about, and deciding whether it was so serious that it made the conviction unsafe. 
By sending the case back for retrial this is enforcing the deference to the jury in 
circumstances where deference is not required. If the behaviour that resulted in the 
conviction was so reprehensible that it is deserving of the conviction being overturned 
then this sends a message from the Court that it is unacceptable. But if the Court then 
orders a retrial, this somehow detracts from the message that the Court should be 
sending and allows the prosecution to try again when it may have been responsible for 
the conviction in the first place using underhand tactics. This is illustrated by the defence 
argument in R v Prosser, Chandler and Henderson above.604 The appeal was allowed 
on the basis that the prosecution had withheld information and the defence argued they 
should not be allowed to gain by the retrial. The Court made a point of saying that it 
should not refuse a retrial to punish the prosecution as the public deserved that serious 
crimes should be tried but if the conviction is being quashed on the basis of moral 
legitimacy or integrity, it seems central to that that the conviction remains quashed and 
the legitimacy is not diluted by sending the appellant back to be retried.
If the Court is ordering more retrials because it is now remedying more unfairness then 
this is of benefit to the appellant if these were previously convictions that would have 
been upheld. In that sense the Court would be focusing more on the grossness of the 
violation which is what Ormerod and Taylor argued would be a more principled approach 
after the enactment of the HRA. But as Ormerod and Taylor suggest, the Court’s review 
function seems at odds with this new expansion of decision making. It seems it is much 
more the role of the Court to decide on issues of rights, fairness, legitimacy and integrity 
and the Courts deference to the jury, because of its review function, may be hampering 
the Court in overturning these convictions. This potentially explains the lack of these 
convictions being overturned in the 2002 sample. If the 2002 sample is an indication of 
how the Court is deciding appeals based on these issues, it would appear that the rise in 
retrials cannot be attributed to the Court remedying the defect itself as the Court is not 
quashing the convictions so retrial issues are rarely being considered.
604 See above, n. 595.
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Summary
Both the 1990 and 2002 samples show that the Court is certainly ordering more retrials. 
The rise in the number since 1995 has been considerable and has remained relatively 
high. This is not necessarily down to an increase in appeals allowed as the graphs show 
these have been steadily decreasing. But the reason for the increase is not easily 
identifiable.
What is clear from the judgments, is the factors the Court is considering as outlined 
above. The ordering of a retrial appears to largely depend on the prosecution requesting 
one as there were very few retrial judgments where the Court ordered one without a 
request. The rise may be attributable to the prosecution requesting them much more 
than it used to. This may reflect pressure on the CPS to convict rather than be 
attributable to a more liberal approach on the part of the Court. If the CPS is requesting 
more then this is giving the judges the opportunity to order more and may provide an 
explanation.
What is not clear though is why in the majority of cases a retrial is not ordered. Those 
cases where one was ordered do not appear to be significantly different from those 
where it was not even considered. In this sense, the 2002 sample confirmed Malleson’s 
findings. Whilst there are many cases where a retrial is not possible for one reason or 
another, the lack of any retrial discussion in these cases is puzzling. This means there 
are large numbers of appeals being allowed without any possibility of a retrial which 
shows that whilst the number may be increasing it is not central to the Court's decision 
making in the majority of appeals.
It is difficult to say whether the rise in retrials is to be welcomed. If these are convictions 
that would have been previously upheld then the increase in number is beneficial to the 
appellant as the appellant may be acquitted second time round. But if these were 
appeals that would have just been quashed previously then this is not so beneficial to 
the appellant. What is clear is that there seems to be a rise in the number of appeals 
which have come from a retrial. This impacts on the Court because the more that are 
ordered, the more there is a possibility that that conviction will be appealed. This 
increases the workload of the Court. This also has implications for the ordering of a 
retrial on the second appeal as it may be unfair to try the appellant again. What is also 
clear is that there are many appellants who have served their sentence when the 
conviction is finally quashed. This impacts on the ability of the Court to order a retrial. 
The longer it takes to appeal, the more unlikely the retrial is. Therefore, by implication, if 
the appeal was a speedier process, then more retrials would be ordered.
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Whilst the retrial power may appear to be the solution to many of the problems of the 
Court, the reality is it is only considered in a small number of cases and it is only 
possible in a small number of cases. Therefore, the problems identified in this thesis are 
not necessarily solved by the use of a retrial. The problems of the Court’s decision 
making means it upholds the majority of appeals so the opportunity to order a retrial is 
fairly rare. A solution may be, which was suggested by Malleson, to give the Court the 
power to order a retrial as an alternative to quashing the conviction which may mean the 
Court is more conducive to sending cases back to the jury. If the Court is being too 
restrictive in overturning convictions, this would solve the problem of the Court having to 
quash the conviction first which may mean it is more inclined to order a retrial rather 
than upholding the conviction. But this would not necessarily solve the problem where 
retrials are not practicable and then we are left with the same problem of the Court’s 
decision making. Therefore, the solution to the Court’s decision making problems is not 
necessarily found in the use of retrials, it has to lie with changes to the decision making 
process itself.
In chapter nine, the general issues of the thesis will be discussed. The evidence to show 
a liberal or restrictive approach will be outlined in order to assess whether the CAA 1995 
has had any impact on the Court’s decision making process. Finally, proposals for 
reform will also be discussed.
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CHAPTER NINE: CONCLUSIONS
A very brief analysis of the history of miscarriages of justice was carried out by Lord 
Steyn in the House of Lords case of R v O’Conner and another and R v Mirza605 He 
stated that:
‘Nowadays we know that the risk of a miscarriage of justice, a concept requiring 
no explanation is ever present. In earlier times courts sometimes approached 
the risk of a miscarriage of justice in ways which we would not nowadays find 
acceptable.’
He referred to the fact that in 1980 the Court of Appeal denied the Birmingham Six the 
right to sue the police in civil proceedings citing Lord Denning MR’s now infamous 
comment that ‘this is such an appalling vista that every sensible person in the land 
would say: It cannot be right that these actions should go any further.’606 He also 
referred to Lord Devlin’s comment that the cases of the Birmingham Six, the Maguire 
Seven and the Guildford Four were ‘the greatest disasters that have shaken British 
justice in my time’ (Devlin, 1991).
Lord Steyn referred to the RCCJ and the setting up of the CCRC and made reference to 
‘a more general change in legal culture’ citing the case of R v Secretary of State for the 
Home Department, Ex p Simms607 where, ‘in the face of some 60 miscarriages of justice 
in the 1990s, the House of Lords set aside Home Office instructions denying prisoners 
access to journalists in their efforts to get their convictions overturned.’ In Lord Steyn’s 
view:
The philosophy became firmly established that there is a positive duty on 
judges, when things have gone seriously wrong in the criminal justice system, to 
do everything possible to put it right. In the world of today enlightened public 
opinion would accept nothing less. It would be contrary to the spirit of these 
developments to say that in one area, namely the deliberations of the jury, 
injustice can be tolerated as the price for protecting the jury system.’608
In contrast, the former chairman of the CCRC, Professor Graham Zellick, has recently 
stated that appeal judges are failing to correct miscarriages of justice where they 
suspect the jury has come to a wrong verdict.609 He has argued that the Court of Appeal 
(Criminal Division) ought to be more active in quashing convictions even though there 
has not been any irregularity in the trial process and that ‘the Court of Appeal is even 
more reluctant in 2008 than in the 1990s to quash convictions because they think they 
are unsafe’ as ‘we are more deferential to a jury now than in the 1990s when things
605 [2004] UKHL 2
606 Mcllkenny v Chief Constable of the West Midlands [1980] QB 283, at 323D
607 [2000] 2 AC 115
608 Ibid.
609 The Independent, 27 September 2008.
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were going wrong.’ He stated that ‘we know from bitter experience that juries get things 
wrong’ and that when he had raised this argument with members of the judiciary he had 
been admonished for asking judges to second-guess the jury. He stated ‘they tell me 
that in this country we have trial by jury, so who are they to go behind the verdict of the 
jury which has seen all the evidence?’ Zellick has been chairman of the CCRC for the 
last five years so is in a very good position to judge the working practices of the Court of 
Appeal.
This thesis has essentially used Kate Malleson’s study for the RCCJ and the more 
recent judgements of the Court to examine the changes to the Court of Appeal’s powers 
in the Criminal Appeal Act 1995 to show which of these diametrically opposed views is 
correct. This has required an analysis of whether the Court has moved away from an 
appeal process ‘where injustice can be tolerated as the price for protecting the jury 
system’ or whether it is more deferential to a jury now than in the early 1990s and the 
problems that caused.
This study has not sought to determine in any reliable statistical terms, whether the CAA 
1995 has changed the way in which the Court makes its decision as compared with 
Malleson’s findings in 1990. In order to make such claims, the research would have had 
to have been constructed in a way that would permit a more sophisticated analysis 
including the use of multiple regression tests. This form of analysis would have assisted 
in determining whether other intervening factors between the two studies, may have had 
a greater effect of any perceptible change in Court of Appeal decision making, than the 
introduction of the CAA 1995 and the change in the test used to determine the lack of 
safety of the conviction. However, this study does provide an indication of the ways in 
which the Court of Appeal’s decision making has changed since the introduction of the 
1995 Act and may serve as a basis for future quantitative analysis that attempts to verify 
or reject these tentative hypotheses. This chapter will evaluate the findings from 
chapters 4, 5, 6, 7 and 8 to assess whether Lord Steyn’s view is correct or whether 
Graham Zellick’s view is correct. It will also propose reforms.
The evidence that the Court has adopted a more liberal approach as a result of the 
changes in the law is contradictory.
Evidence of a more liberal approach?
In order for Lord Steyn’s view to be correct there would have to be evidence that the 
Court was now more willing to rectify injustice than it had been previously. This would 
presumably mean there was less deference for the jury and more convictions 
overturned. As discussed in this thesis, in the early 1990s the Court was supposedly 
taking a more liberal approach which is illustrated by the quashing of the convictions of
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the Guildford Four and the Birmingham Six. Therefore, as discussed in chapter one, the 
recommendations of the RCCJ and the changes in the law were supposed to restate the 
current existing practice of the Court in this liberal approach. The aim of the research 
conducted for this thesis was to evaluate whether there had been any changes to the 
Court’s approach. If this identified a more liberal approach then the aims behind the 
changes in the law would have been achieved and Lord Steyn would be correct. But if 
not then Graham Zellick would be correct. Therefore, for the purposes of this chapter we 
need to review the research to see whether there is evidence that a more liberal 
approach has been adopted.
The first indicator of a more liberal approach would be the success rate of appeals 
against conviction. As discussed in chapter four, in 1990 there were 256 appeals 
allowed which was 42% of the appeals heard by the Court. In 2002 this figured had gone 
down to 34% and in 2006 this figure had gone down further to 32% (see Graph 4.1). 
Therefore, if we are measuring the Court’s practices on the basis of how many appeals 
were allowed, it would appear that it has got more restrictive.
The second indicator of a more liberal approach is the number of leave to appeal 
applications granted. In 1990, this figure was 31% with 1705 applications but this had 
gone down to 23% in 2002 with 1914 applications but had risen to 26% in 2006 with 
1596 applications. Therefore, it could be argued that whilst a more restrictive approach 
was adopted between 1990 and 2002, this has liberalised in more recent years.
The third indicator of a more liberal approach is the Court’s approach to fresh evidence 
grounds. The 1990 sample had twenty-three fresh evidence grounds and the 2002 
sample had thirty-six which is potentially evidence that more fresh evidence appeals are 
getting through the leave filter. But ten of these appeals were CCRC referrals that do not 
need to go through the leave filter. This would leave a truer comparison of twenty-six 
appeals in 2002 but this is still more than in 1990 so possibly slight evidence of a more 
liberal approach. The 1990 sample had four appeals allowed and the 2002 sample had 
nine appeals allowed. Again, this is potentially evidence of a more liberal approach but 
could simply correspond with the rise in the number of grounds. The percentage of fresh 
evidence grounds in the 1990 sample was 7% and it was 6% in the 2002 sample. 
Therefore, whilst the number of grounds generally had almost doubled in the 2002 
sample, the number of fresh evidence grounds as a proportion had decreased. This 
shows that fresh evidence grounds were still very rare in 2002. Further evidence against 
a liberal approach is that in 1990 the evidence was admitted in 61% of cases and in 
2002 that figure was 50% of cases. This shows that despite the rise in the number of 
grounds, the Court is potentially more restrictive in the evidence it hears.
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An indication of a more liberal approach is that in five cases in the 2002 sample the 
Court heard the fresh evidence ‘de bene esse.' This is where the Court hears the 
evidence without the requirement of section 23 of the CAA 1968. The cases in the 
sample where the evidence was rejected show that the Court uses section 23 to reject 
the evidence. Therefore, if the Court hears the evidence without considering section 23 it 
is then considering whether it made the conviction unsafe so it has passed the difficult 
hurdle of at least being heard in the first place. It is not clear why the Court chose to do 
this in these cases and not in the others but if the Court adopted this approach to all 
fresh evidence appeals then there could be more chance of the conviction being 
overturned.
The fourth indicator of a more liberal approach is the Court’s approach to lurking doubt 
appeals. In the 1990 sample there were 10 lurking doubt type cases and in 2002 there 
were seven. It would appear therefore, that the hope of the RCCJ that the Court would 
liberalise its approach to these appeals has not materialised. In the 1990 sample, six out 
of the ten appeals was successful whereas in 2002, only one out of the seven was 
successful. It would appear that the Court’s supposed liberal approach was not 
encapsulated by the CAA 1995 in relation to these appeals. The numbers are so small 
that it is difficult generally to gather information about these appeals.
It is also difficult to do a qualitative analysis of these appeals due to the small number of 
them and due to the fact these grounds are often argued with others so do not 
necessarily have a decision making process that is pertinent to them. These cases are 
the most problematic for the Court because they are essentially requiring the Court to 
make its own subjective view of the evidence which it clearly does not very often. But the 
2002 sample has shown that the lurking doubt concept has survived the safety test and 
has appeared to be reinforced by RvB,  after 2002, albeit in a different language. The 
fact that there are cases that have been quashed evoking this ground shows that the 
Court is able to do it when it wants but it really does not do this very often. The Court’s 
deference to the jury verdict and its review function certainly seems to be a major factor 
causing the Court to appear be restrictive with these appeals.
The fifth indicator of a more liberal (or at least less strict) approach is the Court’s 
approach to procedural irregularity appeals. These were more problematic to do a 
comparison with because the 1990 sample does not contain much analysis of these 
appeals other than the application of the proviso to them. Also, these appeals have been 
reinforced and added to by the Human Rights Act which was enacted in 1998. So the 
majority of the data comes from the 2002 sample though it was possible to do a 
qualitative comparison between the two samples.
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In the 1990 sample, of the 271 procedural irregularity grounds 88 were allowed which 
equates to 32%. In the 2002 sample, of the 590 procedural irregularity grounds, 58 were 
allowed which equates to 10%. This is a very low figure and is certainly not evidence 
that the Court has adopted a more liberal approach, despite the enactment of the HRA. 
It also shows that increasing the number of grounds does not necessarily result in more 
success. When comparing the three most common grounds in the samples -  
misdirection on the law or evidence, defective or unbalanced summing up and evidence 
wrongly excluded or included, they all show there were more appeals allowed in the 
1990 sample than the 2002 sample. In the 1990 sample, 77 (40%) of these grounds 
were allowed or leave granted with 115 (60%) dismissed or refused. In the 2002 sample, 
57 (18%) of these grounds were allowed or leave granted with 256 (82%) dismissed. 
This shows that fewer appeals were allowed in 2002 with these grounds despite the 
huge rise in the number of grounds generally.
For those that hoped the Human Rights Act would bring about a new liberalisation to the 
Court, the evidence is contradictory as to whether this has been achieved. At first 
glance, it may appear that it has not made any difference to the Court’s approach. All the 
human rights grounds were dismissed by the Court along with all the abuse of process 
grounds. But the HRA has given appellants new avenues of argument and the Court 
used the terminology ‘fair trial’ when quashing a small number of convictions so that is 
evidence that the language of the HRA is being used which is of benefit to the appellant. 
Whilst this terminology is not new for the Court, it is at least now being used regularly.
It would seem though that despite the hopes of some after the HRA that the Court would 
adopt a new approach to deciding the appeal, which would focus on the seriousness of 
the irregularity and not the appellant’s guilt, the Court is still focusing on the guilt of the 
appellant to determine the appeal. This is illustrated by the categories of decision 
making and the sheer number of appeals dismissed or refused. When the Court is 
deciding that there was an error but it was too minor or there was strong prosecution 
evidence, it is fairly clear from these judgments that the Court is forming a view of the 
guilt of the appellant. And in the vast majority of appeals the Court disagreed that the 
error had occurred. Therefore, if we are measuring the value of due process in the 
number of appeals overturned, the Court is taking a strict approach in procedural 
irregularity appeals despite the enactment of the HRA.
But if we broaden out the discussion of the value of due process to one that is not just 
about overturning convictions, we may find some evidence of a less strict approach. To 
just focus on overturning convictions would negate the contribution the Court makes to 
the system of precedent and the value of the judgment in terms of arguments that can 
be made in later cases based on what the judges say. As discussed in chapter seven,
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there were judgments where valuable points of principle were stated such as in R v 
Rodger, where it was decided that interviews of suspects without a caution should have 
been excluded, in R v Mason where it was said that covert taping was a breach of Article 
8, and in R v Thomas where it was said if there was tension between unfairness and 
safety then this would enable the Court to depart from a previous decision even where it 
was considered there was no new evidence or argument. There were also judgments 
where the Court made declarations that specific laws were compatible with the ECHR. 
Whilst all these convictions were upheld, these were all statements that were good 
precedents for others to follow. So it could be argued that there was evidence of a less 
strict approach though that was more difficult to find. It would appear that, once again, 
the Court’s deference to the jury and its review function was very much at play in these 
judgments.
The final indication of a more liberal approach is the Court’s retrial power. This was the 
easiest of all the powers to assess any changes. In the 1990 sample there were 2 
ordered and 3 discussed but not ordered and in 2002, there were 12 retrials ordered and 
a further 14 discussed but not ordered. As graph 8.1 showed, the number of retrials has 
remained high since 2002. This rise is not just explained by more appeals being allowed 
and therefore more opportunities for retrials as the number of appeals allowed has 
continued to fall since the mid 1990s. But it is not easy to see why there should be such 
an increase in their use.
On the one hand it could be argued that the ordering of more retrials is evidence of a 
more liberal approach. If these are appeals that would have been previously upheld then 
being retried is preferable to having the conviction upheld because at least there is a 
chance of an acquittal on the retrial. But if these were convictions where previously the 
conviction would have been overturned without ordering a retrial then sending the 
appellant back to stand trial would be more restrictive.
Whilst the retrial may appear to be the solution to many of the problems of the Court, the 
reality is it is only considered in a small number of cases and it is only possible in a small 
number of cases. Therefore, the problems identified in this thesis are not generally 
solved by the use of a retrial. The problems of the Court’s decision making means it 
upholds the majority of appeals so the opportunity to order a retrial is fairly rare. A 
solution may be, which was suggested by Malleson, giving the Court the power to order 
a retrial as an alternative to quashing the conviction which may mean the Court is more 
conducive to sending cases back to the jury. But this would not necessarily solve the 
problem where retrials are not practicable and then we are left with the same problem of 
the Court’s decision making. Therefore, the solution to the Court’s decision making
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problems is not necessarily found in the use of retrials, it has to lie with changes to the 
decision making process itself.
As the above shows, the evidence to suggest the Court is adopting a more liberal 
approach now than in the early 1990s is not exactly convincing or authoritative. And any 
evidence to suggest it is easily contradicted by pointing to evidence of a more restrictive 
attitude. The differences between the two samples are minor, apart from perhaps the 
retrial power, and would suggest that any comparison in years between the two would 
have the same, or very similar, results. It would appear, therefore, that Graham Zellick’s 
argument is more likely to be supported by the evidence.
However, as discussed in chapter three, it is very difficult to assess the Court's practices 
in terms of whether it is being strict/restrictive or liberal/less strict due to the difficulty of 
defining a sensible way of measuring the Court’s practices. It is very difficult to say that 
any particular conviction should be overturned as the Court has to have some way of 
deciding the meritorious cases from those where leave should not be granted or the 
appeal should not be quashed. Therefore, whilst we can make an attempt to interpret 
the Court's powers using these descriptors, the research findings can only be intimations 
of the approaches that the Court is taking to its task. So whilst Zellick’s case is more 
likely to be supported by the evidence, it is important to point out the limitations of the 
research indicators as being able to prove that his view is correct.
We do know, however, that there were only minor differences between the two samples 
and there are potentially a number of reasons for this. As the history of the Court has 
shown, there have been a number of attempts to liberalise the Court’s approach. These 
have mainly been directed at the Court’s approach to factual error appeals as generally 
the approach the Court takes to due process appeals has not caused too much cause 
for concern other than perhaps the Court allowing too many guilty people to go free. The 
reforms of the 1990s were only the second time the Court’s powers had been 
significantly amended but it appears they have fallen foul to the problems that bedevilled 
the previous powers in the 1960s. If the previous powers were achieving a liberal 
approach prior to 1995 then it does not really make sense that they had to change as it 
does seem odd to change the law to capture what is supposed to be a more liberal 
approach. If the Court was finally adopting a more liberal approach to its powers then it 
seems the experiment of changing them to encapsulate that approach has not really 
worked. This is either because it does not matter what powers the Court has, it will 
interpret them in its own way regardless, or it means there is something more 
fundamentally wrong here that cannot be changed just by amending the powers. What is 
clear though from the research conducted for this thesis is the Court’s deference for the 
jury verdict is as strong as ever. This is illustrated by the low number of fresh evidence
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appeals, the low number of lurking doubt appeals and the low number of appeals 
overturned in relation to these grounds and the grounds generally. This backs up 
Graham Zellick’s argument that the Court is more deferential than ever. This suggests 
that the Court needs a much more fundamental change than amending its powers in 
times of crisis which will be discussed below.
The review function
As discussed in chapter three, the problems associated with the Court have largely been 
accepted to be its attitude to the jury and to finality and as chapter four showed also to 
resources. This is why its powers may change, but its attitude does not appear to. This 
thesis has sought to argue that it is the Court’s review function which is at the root of its 
problems. This would explain why the Court’s powers are continually changed and why 
its attitude appears to stay the same. The problems it causes have been highlighted 
throughout this thesis and for the purposes of this chapter it is necessary to examine 
those problems.
The Court’s creation as one of review was an experiment. This is clear from the debates 
on the 1907 Criminal Appeal Bill which do not make clear what the role of the Court is. 
The Bill was introduced into the commons by Sir John Walton, the Attorney General. Sir 
John clearly envisaged the Court taking an investigative role as he pointed out during 
the debates that the Court would be able to do all that the Home Secretary could do 
when deciding on the prerogative of mercy and ‘the Court would have ample power to 
get at the truth.’610 But he also emphasized that the appeal would not be a second trial 
as ‘there should be one trial and one trial only’ and ‘there should also be a Court of 
review with the responsibility of deciding whether that trial had been satisfactory and 
whether the conviction should be quashed or not.’611 He also stated that the anticipated 
exercise of powers to summon witnesses would be infrequent, being unnecessary in 
‘ordinary cases.’ There was clearly confusion as to the role of the Court as he himself 
stated that ‘in the course of the debate the most contradictory views had been 
expressed with regard to the functions of the Court of Criminal Appeal’612 and his 
conclusion was ‘how the experiment would work would largely depend upon the views of 
the court itself.’613
But arguably creating a court of review has not worked to remedy injustice. Sir John 
states that the Court would have ‘ample power to get at the truth’ and yet at the same 
time he states that the Court’s role is to decide whether the trial had been ‘satisfactory.’ 
That essentially means the review function limits the Court to assessing whether the
610 HC Debs, 29 July 1907, col 650.
611 Ibid.
612 HC Debs, 31 May 1907, col 235.
613 ,hlfj
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proper procedures were followed and whether there was evidence that the jury could 
convict upon. The Court does not see its role as a search for the truth because that is 
the role of the jury to determine and in the absence of a serious irregularity or 
overwhelming new evidence the Court will not interfere. The difficulties of the Court’s 
function and process of review can be seen from the research.
The first problem is the leave process. The single judge grants leave on the basis of 
reading a transcript of the judge’s summing up, counsel’s advice on appeal, copies of 
the trial documents, a list of witnesses and the indictment and record sheet. This work is 
generally done in the evenings and on the weekend. If the ground of appeal is that the 
judge was biased in the summing up then this procedure may be adequate but 
determing a lurking doubt will require more investigation. There was a case in the 2002 
sample that illustrated this problem. In R v Deacon, R v Seymour, M r  Justice Gibbs 
made reference to the written reasons of the single judge in refusing leave. These 
reasons were described as ‘unanswerable’ by Justice Gibbs but he then went on to say 
with the benefit of oral argument from appellant counsel, the Court was persuaded to 
grant leave. This shows the problems of the leave decision being made on paper and 
the benefit of oral argument. This possibly suggests that if the leave process was one of 
oral argument there may be more applicants granted leave to appeal.
The second problem is the preparation of appeals. As discussed in chapter three, the 
Court reviews the case on paper which is usually provided a week before the appeal, 
and sometimes on the day of the appeal. The judges have to read the papers in addition 
to normal sitting hours which can be up to five or six hours a day. This does not give the 
Court a great deal of time, especially in complex cases, so it is fairly easy to see why the 
bulk of the Court’s time is spent reviewing the errors of the trial judge; this is relatively 
easy for the Court to do in the time it has. It is also relatively easy to do this on paper. If 
the Court is looking for a lurking doubt or whether an injustice has occurred then this 
may take much longer than the Court can allow. This process is certainly not conducive 
to ‘getting at the truth’ as Sir John envisaged. Therefore, the Court is not even an 
effective Court of review.
The third problem is the hearing of appeals. These are generally very short and focused 
as the judges have read the papers beforehand and the burden is then on the appellant 
to show that the conviction is unsafe. This will not be easy when the judges have already 
formed their view of the outcome. If the appeal is based on an error of the trial judge 
then the Court will often be in a position to decide this itself which may give the 
impression to the appellant that the decision has already been made before the appeal 
begins. If the Court spends most of its day reviewing errors of the trial judge, which it
614 [2002] EW CA Crim 260.
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appears to do, then it is not surprising these are dealt with fairly swiftly. But persuading 
the Court there has been a miscarriage of justice in the traditional sense may need more 
time and if the Court has taken the view of the outcome before appellant counsel can 
make the argument then this adds to the difficulties in overturning convictions.
The fourth problem is the decision making process. This is linked to the Court’s function 
of essentially deciding whether the trial has been ‘satisfactory.’ The Court is constantly 
saying that it cannot delve too deeply into the facts of the case as that is the role of the 
jury and it does not ’retry’ cases. It has been criticised for this but this is correct within its 
review role. It is not allowed to come to a different decision than the jury and take a 
different view of the evidence which frequently prevents it remedying injustice. It decides 
whether convictions are unsafe, not whether appellants are guilty or not. Its role is to 
essentially review whether the trial process was properly conducted and if not whether 
the verdict of the jury can still stand. This can account for the very small number of fresh 
evidence and lurking doubt appeals and the overwhelming number of judge error 
appeals. Its role is not conducive to deciding fresh evidence and lurking doubt appeals 
which potentially explains why very few manage to get through the leave filter and very 
few are successful. This can be illustrated by the fact that fresh evidence was only 
received by the Court in 50% of cases. Whilst this is not necessarily evidence that the 
Court is being overly restrictive, this process generally involves the Court reading 
witness statements on paper when it may be more persuaded by hearing oral argument. 
The unsatisfactory nature of this process could be evidenced by those appeals and 
especially the appeal where the Court dismissed evidence it had not heard but had 
speculated on what it might be.
The Court’s basic decision making starts from the position that the jury verdict was the 
correct one and it then has to be persuaded otherwise. But the methods of persuasion 
are flawed as they are mainly decided on paper. The starting point of the guilt of the 
appellant is evidenced by its decision making processes where the irregularity occurred 
but there was strong prosecution evidence, or the irregularity did not occur in the first 
place, or the irregularity was minor and did not have an impact on the verdict, or the 
difficulties of overturning fresh evidence or lurking doubt appeals. Whilst much of the 
Court’s problems can be illustrated by its deference to the jury, this deference was an 
inevitable result of the creation as a Court of review. If there is to be one trial and one 
trial only then the Court has to proceed on the basis that the right outcome was achieved 
in the absence of new evidence or a procedural irregularity.
The relationship between the Court and the jury is a complex one. Much of what the 
Court decides upon was never before the jury so would not have been considered by it 
which makes the relationship between them difficult to evaluate. For example, in fresh
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evidence appeals, the Court is deciding upon evidence the jury never saw. The 
problems caused by these appeals were discussed in chapter five. Whether the Court is 
applying the Stafford approach or the jury impact test, it still has to evaluate that new 
evidence against the evidence that the jury heard and decide whether the conviction is 
unsafe. As chapter five demonstrated, it is not easy to understand how the Court makes 
this decision in a way that is different to what the jury are deciding at the trial. In these 
cases, unsafe has to mean whether the evidence has raised a reasonable doubt about 
guilt which is what the jury would be considering at the trial. If the Court is deciding 
according to Stafford then it is making its own evaluation of the evidence. It cannot be a 
review court in that situation but it uses its review function to be restrictive by saying it 
does not have the power to retry the case and come to a different decision than the jury. 
But it is difficult to see what unsafe means when the Court does quash the conviction if 
that is different from the jury finding the defendant not guilty.
It is a similar situation with lurking doubt appeals. The Court is looking for a lurking doubt 
that the jury never saw. It is reviewing essentially the same evidence and is really being 
asked that if it was the jury would it have found the appellant not guilty. If so, the 
conviction should be quashed. But again, it uses its review function to say it is not its 
role to come to a different decision than the jury who were supposedly in a superior 
position to view the evidence at trial. And this is true, it is not within its legally defined 
role to do this. But again, if the Court quashes the conviction in this situation then its 
view must be that it thinks the appellant is not guilty.
The Court’s review function also causes problems for procedural irregularity appeals. 
These are slightly different than fresh evidence or lurking doubt as they are generally 
more successful. An appellant, or his lawyers, will know that there is much more chance 
of success with a procedural irregularity so he/she is often forced to frame the appeal in 
a technicality. The reasons why they are more successful is fairly obvious. They are 
easier to locate than fresh evidence, and the Court’s decision making process is more 
conducive to reviewing them than lurking doubts. But whilst they may give rise to more 
chance of success, the 2002 sample showed that only a small fraction of them are 
overturned. As discussed in chapter eight, one of the implications of the Court being 
prepared to remedy unfairness on appeal is more retrials being ordered, or should be 
ordered. The reason for this is that the more the Court takes on the role of remedying 
unfairness on appeal the more it moves towards rehearing a case rather than reviewing 
it. Those who say the Court should not stray into the realms of rehearing suggest that 
the answer to this conundrum is for the rise in retrials thereby enforcing the role of the 
jury as the primary decision maker. But again just as with fresh evidence and lurking 
doubt appeals, appeals based on procedural irregularities do not have anything to do 
with jury decision making. The Court is being asked to review an irregularity the jury
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never saw and it is also being asked to exercise its discretion in a role that is 
independent to it which is to uphold the integrity of the criminal justice system. It is 
difficult for the Court to do this when it is constantly deferring to the jury.
If the HRA has had any impact on the Court, and the evidence in chapter seven on this 
was patchy, then this will potentially be shown in the Court being more willing to make 
decisions which move away from deciding whether the person is guilty towards looking 
at the severity of the irregularity and whether it is substantial enough or morally 
reprehensible enough to warrant the quashing of the conviction despite what it thinks 
about guilt or innocence. It is difficult to understand deference to the jury in this situation. 
Whilst the Court’s review process may work well for these appeals, because often these 
irregularities can be viewed on paper, its review function is preventing it from taking a 
more interventionist approach of remedying unfairness on appeal that the HRA requires. 
It is still focusing on whether the verdict was one the jury could come to without taking 
on a role for itself that is independent of the jury that the HRA requires.
It would seem that the review process and function seriously hinders the Court in being 
able to remedy injustice or unfairness. To some extent it is to blame for this because it 
uses it as an excuse to be restrictive. But on the other hand it is correct in those 
judgments that it is not there to retry cases or come to a different decision than the jury 
as this was the role created it for it. It might now be the time for a much more 
fundamental change to the Court which moves it away from whether the jury could have 
convicted to whether the jury should have convicted.
Review to rehearing?
A solution to the problems of the Court could be to change its function to one of 
rehearing. If the Court of Appeal was given the power to re-hear the case, as in appeals 
from magistrates’ courts, the first main reason for the Court’s deference would be 
eliminated because the Court would no longer be able to argue that the jury was in a 
better position to draw inferences than the Court because the jury had seen the 
witnesses and the Court had not. Although the second main reason for the Court of 
Appeal’s deference is that constitutionally the task of deciding whether a defendant is 
factually guilty or not is given to the jury and not the Court, the Court does appear to 
decide on issues of guilt and innocence. There are various judgments where the Court 
has expressed a view that it felt that there had been a miscarriage of justice in that an 
innocent person had been wrongly convicted, or at the very least that an injustice had 
occurred, and judgments such as Hanratty show that the Court can and does decide on 
the basis of guilt. This is to some extent inevitable in fresh evidence and lurking doubt 
appeals, as discussed above, as both require the Court to form a subjective opinion 
about the evidence in the case.
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If the Court is making decisions based on guilt and innocence, although not allowed 
within its legally defined role, the wider theoretical question is whether the Court of 
Appeal should be deciding on guilt and innocence more overtly by rehearing the case. 
This would clearly remove the constitutional reason for the Court’s deference to the jury 
verdict but in Lord Devlin’s view, would undermine the right to trial by jury. But as 
Pattenden has argued, Lord Devlin’s criticism is based on the assumption that the right 
to trial by jury persists after a trial has already taken place, as the counter view is that a 
defendant’s right to trial by jury is fully satisfied by the original trial. It appears that most 
of Lord Devlin’s criticism, and the RCCJ’s support of it, was based on the fact that the 
effect of the Stafford approach was that the case was part heard by the jury and part 
heard by the Court of Appeal and involved the Court forming its own views on the 
credibility and reliability of witnesses and also making assumptions about the original 
jury’s decision-making. This led to Lord Devlin’s ‘imperfect retrial by judges.’
Whilst Lord Devlin, and others, may argue that jury decision making is preferable to 
judicial decision making, and that cases which involve fresh evidence or procedural 
irregularities should be sent back to the jury for retrial, this does not solve the problem of 
the decision making process that the criminal division has to adopt when deciding 
whether to quash the conviction. If the Court of Appeal is currently using ‘an imperfect 
retrial by judges’ to uphold the conviction then arguably it would be preferable for the 
appellant if the Court were to hear the entire case on appeal, unfettered by the restraints 
that the Court’s review function currently places on it. This would mean that the Court 
would no longer have to choose between the jury impact test and the Stafford approach 
and the problems they cause in assessing new evidence on appeal against the evidence 
given at trial, and the Court would no longer have to speculate about jury decision 
making and make decisions which are not transparent and can never be tested on what 
the jury did or did not decide with regard to the evidence. It would also mean that the 
Court felt more able to remedy unfairness on appeal. This could result in more 
convictions being quashed and the Court would then still have the option of ordering a 
retrial before a jury.
A rehearing power may also bring more finality to the appeal process which would be 
welcomed as the current process shows that large numbers of appeals are failing on the 
first appeal and keep returning to the Court for perhaps a second, third or even fourth 
go. Whilst the judges may feel that their restrictive approach promotes finality, the large 
numbers applying to the Criminal Cases Review Commission would contradict this as 
the vast majority of these appellants have already been through the appeal process. 
Whilst a rehearing function may not eliminate the Court’s attachment to the principle of 
finality, it would not give the Court as much discretion as the Court’s review function 
currently does to be so restrictive.
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However, a rehearing de novo is not going to be possible in every case just as a retrial 
by jury is not possible in every case. If a case is particularly old, as many in the Court of 
Appeal are because of the length of time it takes to appeal, and the fact that most of the 
references from the Criminal Cases Review Commission have already been through the 
appeal process, it may not be practically possible to retry the case on appeal. This 
potentially means that the number of appeals where a rehearing de novo would be 
possible would be relatively small and therefore the current unsatisfactory process would 
have to be used for those appeals where a rehearing de novo is not possible. Therefore, 
instead of giving the criminal division the power to rehear the appeal de novo, an 
alternative solution would be to give the criminal division of the Court of Appeal the 
powers that the civil division currently has. This form of rehearing would allow the 
criminal division to read all the evidence in the case, including the transcripts of the 
witnesses, and it would allow the judges to draw their own inferences from the facts and 
reach their own conclusions on the evidence. Whilst the powers of the civil division are 
currently more restrictive than before, they are still much wider and extensive than the 
powers of the criminal division as discussed above. This is particularly anomalous when 
considering an appellant’s liberty may be at stake and there are innocent people serving 
long prison sentences because the criminal division is not providing an effective 
mechanism for rectifying miscarriages of justice.
Allowing the criminal division to have all the powers of the civil division may not provide 
a defendant with rights as extensive as he would have if the appeal to the criminal 
division was heard de novo, but it would give the criminal division much more scope for 
rectifying miscarriages of justice than the current process and function of review allows. 
A more thorough investigation of the case on appeal would have an impact on the Court 
of Appeal in terms of workload and resources but if this proves to be a more effective 
mechanism for determining appeals then it could prove to be cost effective in the long 
run as if the appeals were dealt with satisfactorily first time round, it would prevent 
appeals continuously returning to the Court because the first appeal is often 
unsuccessful. A lack of resources should never be a reason for not providing an 
effective mechanism for rectifying miscarriages of justice and if more money is required 
then it should be found.
If the fundamental problems of the criminal division of the Court of Appeal are not 
addressed, history will continue to repeat itself with the Court’s powers continually being 
amended in the hope that the Court will liberalise its approach. It seems that unless a 
fundamental change is made to the Court’s structure, miscarriages of justices will 
continue to go unidentified and uncorrected. It may now be time to acknowledge that 
creating the Court of Criminal Appeal as a review court did not work as it created a
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system where, in Lord Steyn’s words, injustice can be tolerated as the price for 
protecting the jury system.
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APPENDIX ONE: DATA COLLECTION
Court of Appeal (Criminal Division) Appeals Against Conviction
2002
Date: Name: Counsel/Non-Counsel:
Offence: Sentence:
Application for leave refused/granted:
Appeal allowed/dismissed:
Statutory ground(s) of appeal:
Detail of grounds:
Court’s approach re ‘Unsafe’:
Application of ‘Lurking Doubt’
Court’s approach to retrial (where raised):
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Fresh Evidence Cases
Date: Name: Counsel/Non-counsel:
Offence: Sentence:
Argument for fresh evidence heard orally/paper:
Decision:
Nature of fresh evidence:
Court’s reason for admitting/excluding it: 
Court’s reason for allowing/dismissing appeal:
Court’s approach when quashing conviction:
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APPENDIX TWO: CODING FRAME
Ct think person is 
innocent - unsafe
Ct think fresh 
evidence may 
have made verdict 
unsafe
Ct think fresh 
evidence may 
have had impact 
on the jury
If evidence not 
admitted would 
the verdict have 
been guilty
Fresh evidence 
not admitted/or if 
admitted not 
unsafe
Ct think
irregularity did not 
occur
Irregularity did 
occur but strong 
prosecution 
evidence
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Minor irregularity 
did not impact on 
safety of verdict
Irregularity may 
have had an 
impact on the jury
Would the jury 
have inevitably 
convicted if no 
irregularity
Ct think
irregularity made 
conviction unsafe
Ct think person is 
guilty but 
conviction 
quashed
No irregularity nor 
fresh evidence but 
conviction unsafe
No irregularity nor 
fresh evidence 
and conviction not 
unsafe
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